


ANALYTICS OF LITERATURE

A MANUAL



FOR THE OBJECTIVE STUDY OF ENGLISH
PROSE AND POETRY

BY

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TO

William Dwight Whitney

AND

Thomas Baynesford Lounsbury

IN MEMORY OF GUIDANCE AND INSPIRATION
THROUGH MANY STUDENT YEARS

P R E F A C E.

THE manner in which I was led to develop and use in teaching English Literature the method outlined in the following pages is too long a story to tell here. For a long time I had been convinced that an objective plan was best, but failed in attempts to devise one until some six years ago. Finding then a substantial principle on which a system of analysis might be based, I ventured several experiments with it upon classes in the advanced study of prose authors. The results were extraordinary. Students not only learned much more of the subject proper than I had ever expected or required in former years, but in a few weeks radically altered their own styles. Those accustomed to write in a lumbering awkward fashion began to express themselves in strong, clear phrases, and with a large preponderance of simple sentences. After the analysis contained essentially in the prose chapters of this volume had been worked out, the poetic side of literature was taken up. Would the objective method answer as well here? With considerable confidence of its success I began experimenting as before. The results were even more surprising. Students apparently without taste for reading, or capacity to discern common literary excellencies, were enabled to appreciate and enjoy poetry as well as the best. Bright scholars were also in their way benefited not less than the undiscerning. Things vague were made definite. Grounds of judgment before indeterminate or hidden were made plain. Criticism was rendered confident; and no little enthusiasm was aroused. On account of unqualified suc-

cess with the mode, and not only in my own teaching but of others who have tried it in ways different from mine, the resolution was formed to prepare this manual, — primarily for personal use, and also for others who may wish to try the plan.¹

With a little theorizing, the results just described were seen to be in no way either singular or remarkable. They were simply what they should be, and just such as had been and were being achieved abundantly elsewhere. Twenty years ago the college study of Physics and Chemistry consisted of recitations in assigned pages from a text-book, just as in Greek Grammar and Metaphysics. At times the students were called together to witness experiments carried on by the professor, while the class remained on the other side of the laboratory table. Of course this instruction, if of some value to the best scholars, who could by imagination supplement and deepen the impressions derived, was of no use to slower minds, — we can all see why. It assumed that it was possible to make the laboratory experiences of the instructor answer for the laboratory experiences of the student. Little by little this assumption has been given up. Not only Physics and Chemistry and Botany, but also Zoölogy and Geology, and, following their lead, History and Economics and Psychology, have gone over from theoretical and dogmatic to experimental modes of teaching. The results have more than justified the change. Plodding, ungifted students, by taking pains, and by being led through all the consecutive processes, have been enabled to acquire the scientific consciousness like their betters, and, indeed, to become practically just as good analysts and electricians and assayers as their instructors themselves. It is no longer a question of gifts or genius, except in theoretical lines and in dealing with unsolved problems. Science has, in its method of substituting experiments and experiences for second-hand knowledge, found a means of bridging the chasm between exceptionally endowed and mediocre minds.

¹ Those interested to know more concerning the genesis of the method will find the main facts told in the *University Studies* of the University of Nebraska, issue for July, 1892.

For reasons identical with the above, various other subjects as History, Mathematics, and Economics have come to be taught in the same way as the sciences. The scientific method has in each case been found to be the best, simply because it is nature's way, and the parent's way, and the way men learn their trades and crafts and callings in practical life. The professors of Chemistry and Physics and Geology, considering the closeness of their contact with the industrial world, have been slow in recognizing and appropriating its advantages. The earliest scientists were as scholastic and professional as college fellows. Hence it has happened that subjects farthest removed from the common touch have lingered longest in purely academic methods. There can be little question that literature remains at the end of the list, though there have been material advances. In a general way it has long been recognized, even by those not specialists in the subject, that there is little profit in requiring students to memorize observations from text-books about literature, or biographies of authors, or circumstances under which masterpieces have been composed. Clearly they must go to literature itself; they must get their acquaintance with books and authors and circumstances as nearly as possible at first hand. They are therefore sent into the library to find out things for themselves,—as they should be. But, among students set thus to study literature in its pure forms, only those quick to perceive principles and merits intuitively have thus far consciously or unconsciously gotten much from the subject. The slower of perception are not helped to find the implied processes. Especially has this been true of poetry. There has been little success in teaching this except to such as have already felt its power, and, so far as my observation goes, little attempt to teach it otherwise than intellectually. In average college classes, hardly more than fifty per cent of the students have any taste for poetry beyond a burlesque *Æneid* or the Hans Breitmann Ballads. All their training has been essentially intellectual. The theory of higher education assumes that there is no direct means of reaching the sensibilities, but that through addressing the understanding directly they may be aroused

to some exercise indirectly. Hence, of all young men in the world of equal privileges and knowledge the academic undergraduate, except for causes outside of the curriculum, is most elementary in his emotional culture. Every day of his residence at the university contributes to the disproportion between the intellectual and the emotional powers of his mind. But polite literature is in the last analysis emotional; and all its charms and message must be spiritually discerned.

The first requisite, therefore, in teaching literature, would seem to be some certain means of reaching and engaging the sensibilities more directly. So far as their exercise is called for in teaching science the method in general use assures it. By it each student acquires not only systematic knowledge concerning the aspects and nature of the phenomena considered, — which is of the understanding, but also experimental knowledge of each quality and process, — which is of the feelings and becomes a part of himself. All this is of course trite enough to teachers well-versed in the theories of their work. I take it the most of us, who have been trying to interest young men and women in the masterpieces of our literature, know well enough wherein our methods fail. It is no wonder that the most eminent teachers in this department throughout the country are by no means agreed as to how better results may be secured. New suggestions and expedients are put forth constantly by enthusiastic and progressive instructors, all no doubt of value, but wanting that major principle which they might supplement or assist. The method generally in use in our best colleges is a combination of the philologic and the scientific, the one adapted from the study of the classics, the other borrowed from the laboratories. Both are excellent as far as they go, but neither reaches further than the intellect. It is well and necessary to study into the forms and language an author uses, but only as the means to an end, and not an end it is to be taken for granted the student must or will compass of himself. I have never found pupils capable of doing anything of the sort, and do not believe that such exist. As to the influence and worth of a given author, students

are set to find what has been thought and written concerning him, just as concerning questions of fact in a German seminar of History. There is not the slightest question that such work and much of it has its use in the study of literature, but not as the means of finding out the quality and power of a Browning or an Emerson. That is not a question of fact to be made out through other men's observations and judgments, as of historical happenings ages ago. It is a matter of personal discernment, and all the data are present in the pages of the author himself. What the critics say about proportions and kinds of excellence is like what the professor of Chemistry used to say when he talked to his classes from over the experimenting table. The students must be called in to get their own experiences of each degree and quality in some way for themselves. No other man's impressions may take the place of ours. We may weigh, compare, and accept or reject, but must first have impressions or judgments of our own, or we shall be dealing with unknown quantities. The paramount business in the teaching of literature is to enable the student to have first impressions, to develop in him the power of independent observation and judgment; to show him how to discern and interpret every manner of excellence and beauty for himself.

With the scientific method, as most of us have used it, there is apparently another defect. In our literary laboratory there is no talk about *elements*. Organic compounds are taken for granted and treated as ultimate phenomena, without much recognition that there may be 'inorganic' or less complicated forms of the same kind, as well as constant ultimate elements whose presence in new proportions and new combinations make up all differences observed. It is as if there had once been, or should be, an effort to teach Chemistry without recognition of the unlike molecular constitution, we will say, of spring water and coal tar. In other words, Chaucer and Shakespeare are considered simply as Chaucer and Shakespeare, with no reference to the fact that there must be in both common constituents and factors which, in different frequency and degrees of potency, make up the very diverse

effects of their respective poetry. The same must be true also of our prosaists. The differences between the style of Newman and De Quincey can be analyzed out through inventorying all points of sentence structure, as also each element or item in the character of their respective terms, phrases, and figures.

The aim of the present manual is simply to remedy, so far as may be, the seeming defects in the teaching of literature just considered. It is in no sense a substitute for the various text-books on the subject now in use. Its purpose, more particularly, is not only to render somewhat of the higher interpretation of literature possible to such as have little normal bent towards letters, but likewise to enable the better gifted to understand more definitely and confidently their own processes. It essays to make criticism begin on less vague and more exact foundations. There is no desire or expectation to render the art of criticism a popular accomplishment, but to recognize and distinguish its objective from its subjective aspects. The first judgments of an expert critic depend on observation, often unconscious, of certain outer and material characteristics. The commonest student can be taught to do thus much through proper comprehension of first principles. He may never tread the higher walks of subjective criticism,—though he may do even that,—but he will at least appreciate the work of those who render this rare service, and his culture will be vastly enriched and broadened withal. This is not a volume, moreover, to be merely read. Each topic and point must be diligently and thoroughly worked out to a personal solution. The discussion in each chapter is in the nature of a condensed lecture preparatory to experiment and verification in the given-analysis, and should be carefully expanded and if need be further elucidated by the teacher. It seemed unnecessary to swell the contents of the volume by treating the various topics more diffusely. The text-pages of the volume proper are adapted alike to students of higher or lower grade, and the discussion so far as left incomplete is continued in Notes provided in an appendix. To aid teachers not acquainted with laboratory methods,

hints and suggestions how to set the student at work for himself are appended to many chapters. The usual manual study of literature alone is presupposed; and classes that have not yet undertaken so much as this, if of the ninth or any higher grade, may very profitably be given, in a more or less simplified form, the earlier prose as well as poetic chapters. Indeed, there is no lack of evidence that the first school work in literature should be solely of this objective kind.

In the study of literature perhaps more than in most subjects besides the teacher must first get the sympathies, the feelings of his class aroused. The students will then do anything he may require, and much more that is not asked for. If a minute study of references is to be exacted, or the English of some author to be looked into, the pupils can be held to enthusiastic work after they have felt his power, but not before. There must in no case be omission or abbreviation of steps. Though some scholars may learn the knack of analysis by merely observing others, it will be best, as is insisted on in all experimental subjects, that they do each process formally. The work laid out in the last of the book may seem too tedious to beginners with the mode, and the 'Suggestions to the Teacher' have been prepared rather to meet the wants of those that will wish to compass the book in a general way than for such as may prefer to go through a few topics exhaustively. Chapters VI., VIII., X., and XIII. might alone furnish a year's work. The book is intended, if used in a connected survey of the subject with classes of college rank, to furnish three exercises per week through two semesters. That in itself seems much, but is no more than is given to laboratory practice in elementary Chemistry or Physics, and that but introductory to two or four semesters of undergraduate study in these subjects. The use of curves in the exhibition of results is strongly recommended. With average classes the teacher will find them of great advantage not only in making a passing difficulty easier, but also in developing in the student a quick sense of forms and qualities, or what one might call the literary consciousness. It

will be found convenient to have a blackboard painted into squares, after the fashion of profile paper, that the several curves for a given passage may be exhibited together.

It is a common notion that the average boy or girl of the earlier high-school grades can have little understanding or appreciation of the phrases and turns of poetry. This so far as figures are concerned is doubtless true, but it is by no means true of poetic expressions proper. Pupils of those years have not yet learned to carry the sense quickly of the common prose they read aloud in school exercises. The fault is not with the imaging faculty as such, which is never more active in later life than now, but with the power to use it at another's instance. In other words, phantasy is at first chiefly spontaneous, and they have not yet learned well how to use it determinatively. In the first exercises of this volume the teacher will find that young pupils will begin distinguishing poetic from prose words by mere intellectual inference. In their use of books they are accustomed to deal chiefly with logical terms, and readily detect such as are not of that sort. A few days' practice will enable them to test directly by the emotional intension of words; and through exercising this species of discernment they will grow rapidly in taste and power to respond to poetic quality. The secret of the process, so far as there is any secret, is in thus using the element of consciousness. Any impression communicated to the sensibilities will be very vague and ineffective until brought definitely to the notice of the mind. In general, the method, if tried intelligently and fairly, will discover to those who suppose they have no taste for the best literature that they have such taste; and it will make those who have never found anything in poetry both feel and know something of its power.

At various times in the development and first use of the present method it seemed to me beset with manifold objections, some of which will no doubt offer serious trouble to many to whom the idea is new. Will not the mind, through such analyses, become too conscious of 'associational words,' or 'tropes,' or 'effects,' or other elements, for best enjoyment of poetry as a whole? Here

would seem to be an objection indeed, and I must confess I expected some such results with matter-of-fact minds. But quite to the contrary I have seen no instance in which literal logical intellects have not been spiritually quickened like the rest. I did not remember I had known eminent chemists who, one might naturally suppose, were as conscious of the chemical constitution of things as Bunsen himself, yet never appeared to be interfered with in appropriating toothsome morsels by any thought of the intricate carbon compounds they were swallowing. There are always theoretic objections, like the New England farmers' opposition to the introduction of locomotives, that are practically of not the slightest moment. There is a very natural antipathy to treating æsthetics by scientific methods. Yet there is in the nature of things no reason why we may not as well analyze the tissues of human speech and thought as the tissues of the human body. Within a generation science has been broadened by the use of imagination, and there is no good reason why æsthetics in turn should not have the material aid of facts and statistics. Both are equally modes of search for truth, but truth is always first found in applied and concrete forms. Not that one man's figures can be weighed against another's, for one word in the one may be equal to a volume of the other; not that one man's force can be expressed in terms of another man's force. It makes little difference what proportion of elements is found in any author, so far as other authors are concerned. It is the experience of the finding that makes the student expert in judgment. No poem can in any sense be equal to another poem, for everything of worth in art is wholly unique. But that is no reason why we may not study out stroke by stroke, in somewhat of a scientific spirit, the purpose and meaning of great paintings, as has been done for ages. Even the sources of power in music are beginning to be inquired into through like analytic means. I have noticed with pleasure essentially the same course of interpretation in a series of papers on 'Impressions of Beethoven's Sonatas,' by Frederick Horace Clark, in Vol. I. of *Music*.

Perhaps some excuse will be expected for introducing the chapters on Shakespeare and Browning. Of course there are those who do not believe that any minds worth considering ever meet with difficulty in comprehending or interpreting the art of Shakespeare. On the contrary, I must beg to believe that there are nowhere either teachers or students not alike in need, from every quarter, of all the helps they can command. The subject is so complex and vast that there is small hope of knowing Shakespeare even a little save by the co-operation of all who can contribute even single hints. As to the other point, I have known hundreds of students who could never have understood anything of Shakespeare's art without prolonged and systematic help, who yet, interpreting him with help, have taken into their minds new influence and inspiration. Some of these through the occasion of Shakespeare's types have derived new ideals, and in accordance with them changed their lives and character. I do not believe the business of teaching Shakespeare's art unworthy of any teacher, or the time it may require, in college classes or out of them, ill-spent. The paramount evils of the day in cultured circles are intellectualism and sentimentality. I do not see how they are to be reached and corrected save by the study of literature; and in literature I do not think there is other such speedy or effective means of cure as a complete and thorough study of the great plays of Shakespeare. The chapter on Browning was added, not to take the place of handbooks introductory to his poetry, but to supplement these, as I believed, in needful ways.

The lack of a consistent and quotable system of æsthetics has forced me from time to time to lay down principles of my own. These I find I have been led little by little and unconsciously to expand or enlarge, until at the end of the volume I find myself committed much further to my own theories than I should have been willing at first to contemplate. For this there seems now no remedy. If the doctrine advanced prove unacceptable, its positions can be rejected without integral disuse of any chapter or paragraph. In keeping with the new movement in philosophy I

have treated imagination as a mode of mental action, not as a gift or faculty. It has, of course, been necessary to devise or appropriate various terms, some of which may require a word of explanation. As is well known, the new psychology has discarded the use of 'mind' and 'soul' as designations of the conscious principle. Needing a name for this that should be free from the suggestions of faculties or attainments that attach to the former of those terms, and wishing to avoid the experiential associations belonging to the latter, also finding it impracticable to use the 'consciousness' of the new psychologists in their sense of the word, I was forced to take up with the neutral, colorless 'ego.' 'Experimental,' as in 'experimental religion,' *pace* the scientists, is resuscitated. 'Spiritual' also has been taken, in the absence of a more available designation, to indicate the general exercise of refined feeling. I have in particular avoided giving definitions, except provisionally until they shall have been lodged potentially in the student's consciousness. Considerable summarizing and other repetition has been permitted, chiefly to ensure consideration of principal conclusions from several points of view. So far as able I have not hesitated to introduce from art and other outside subjects any illustrations that seemed likely to be helpful to junior learners, and particularly such as may study the book without a teacher. Literature is not the thing immature thinkers are apt to regard it; and I have felt bound to lay special stress everywhere upon its practical aspects, and treat the question of its influence and moral uses with some fulness. As to the inconstant character of the Notes, the purpose is generally either to extend a discussion, or to give references, or to stimulate the student to further thought and reading.

The work is based throughout upon abundant statistics and other data, soon to be published, concerning the development of form in prose and poetry, both in English and out of it. Several monographs upon investigations in this line are finished or in progress. Two of these, by former pupils, — *The Decrease of Predication and of Sentence Weight*, by Mr. G. W. Gerwig, and *The Progress in Figures from Piers Plowman to Spenser*, by Mr. H. C.

Peterson, — have been depended upon in the preparation of several chapters. The latter gentleman has further assisted by compiling, from exercises used in his own teaching, the questions on the art of Macbeth, which succeed the Notes. That the book will prove a complete treatment of the topics considered, I do not in the least expect. Any attempt of the kind even in a field like this, only partly new, must be supplemented and amended by many scores of hands. If it serve merely as the basis or beginning of a system of objective study for English Literature, the author will feel amply repaid for the labor and perplexities undergone in putting it together.

I am under obligation to many friends for assistance and encouragement in various ways. Among these I am peculiarly indebted for suggestions in the proofs or otherwise, to Professor Cook of Yale University, and Professor Corson of Cornell, and to Professor Wolfe and Professor McMillan of my own college.

L. A. S.

LINCOLN, NEB., *December 29, 1892.*

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ANALYTICS OF LITERATURE.

CHAPTER I.

LITERATURE AND ITS DEPARTMENTS.

IN a certain sense the chief object of the whole study here undertaken is to find out what literature is. There is enough of mystery attaching to the subject, even with those who should know it best, to warrant an attempt at analyzing its elements, so far as possible, from the very bottom. But before the task is undertaken there should be some general notion of the scope and the limitations of literature, and of the ends it serves. We should in the main be clear, both as to what it is in nature, and what it accomplishes for society.

Stopford Brooke's observations at the opening of his *Primer of English Literature* have helped so much first thinking upon the subject that it may be well to begin with them here. "By literature," he says in substance, "we mean the written thoughts and feelings of intelligent men and women arranged in a way which will give pleasure to the reader. As to its form, it has two large divisions, one of which is called prose literature, and the other poetical literature. But we must not think that everything that is called prose is literature. We cannot say, for instance, that a ship's log, or a catalogue, or the daily journal of a traveller is to be called literature simply because it is written in prose. Writing is not literature unless it gives to the reader a pleasure which arises, not only from the things said, but from the way in which

they are said, and that pleasure is only given when the words are carefully, or curiously, or beautifully put together in sentences. To do this in a special way is to have what we call *style*. As much art must be used in building sentences up out of words as in building houses, if we wish the prose we write to be worthy of the name of literature. Again, in looking at a large building, we see not only the way in which it is built, but also the character and mind of the builder. So also in a prose book which is fit to belong to literature we ought to feel that there is a distinct mind and character who is speaking to us through the style, that is, through the way in which the words are put together. Prose, then, is not literature unless it have *style* and *character*, and be written with *curious care*. Of poetical literature we may say the same thing. Poetry must be tried by rules more severe than those by which we judge prose, and unless it satisfies these rules it does not take rank as literature. There must be more care taken, more beauty, more musical movement in the arrangement of the words than in prose; and the way in which the thoughts and feelings of the poet are put together into words will always be, in true poetry, wholly different from the way in which they would be put together by a prose writer."

Now all these things are true, but fall far short of being the whole truth. Of course Mr. Brooke is not to be understood as implying in these general observations that nothing more than curious care in composition, or the quality of giving pleasure to the reader, is necessary to make a given page, or chapter, or volume literature. Rather is literature the sum of the thoughts and the feelings or experiences of the race that have been recognized as valuable beyond the moment of their first utterance, and hence been treasured up for further use. Anything deemed worth thinking again, or experiencing again, and preserved, no matter how, with such intention or expectation, is literature. It is not essential at all that it be written in books or stored on the shelves of libraries; for the hymns of the Rig Veda, the histories of Moses, and the poems of Homer were preserved

for many generations in nothing more enduring than the human memory. The very essence of literature is thus seen to be common service to mankind. No man can perpetuate the thoughts of his mind, or the select and rare experiences of his soul simply because they are good or beautiful. The fact that his thought or sentiment lives after him proves not that it is true, or that he believed it immortal, but simply that it has been of service to other minds, and has been preserved that the service may continue. We must then take care not to suppose that literature is only a something that gives pleasure to the reader, and that skill or nicety of expression is alone sufficient to produce it. The ship's log, or a catalogue, or the daily journal of a traveler does not become literature merely by being written out with "curious care," or by being made to reveal the distinct mind and character of the author, for his may be no personality that one cares to come in contact with. On the other hand, even a ship's log or a catalogue may become literature, if it prove capable of *being something* to those who read it.

If this be what literature is in its objective, essential nature, what then is it potentially? What can it accomplish? What does it do?

It will be necessary first to consider the nature of institutions in general. An institution may be defined not inexactly as an organized method of obeying a common impulse, or of supplying a common need. The common impulse to amass property and maintain it against purloiners would of itself, without other concurrent tendencies, in due time produce the administration of justice. The possession of a principle of conscience in common makes even the members of a tribe of savages combine and cooperate in instituting some rude form of sacrifice and worship. The impulse which in general prompts every civilized parent to the resolution that, at whatever cost, each child shall begin in life where its father and mother left off, has given rise to savings banks and universities. So throughout the whole list of common impulses and recognized needs, and institutional devices cor-

responding. But there is in special a common impulse to hold fast that which is good and helpful; and this, before the invention of letters, prompted men to commit to memory the ennobling and inspiring strains of early poetry, and later to write out slowly and painfully the facts and happenings of early history. Such was the beginning of literature in both poetry and prose.

But there are other impulses that, newly evolved from time to time, have joined forces to the same effect. Among such none is more remarkable than that which prompts to the transmission and spread of new ideas and sentiments. Strange is it there is no discovery of new truth, no choice and ennobling experience of the soul but prompts the possessor to impart and transmit it to others. It is noteworthy that there is no corresponding genuine, persistent impulse to transmit or perpetuate the bad. It is indeed seldom that men are willing to be estimated or remembered at their worst. Nature, moreover, tends to suppress and eliminate whatever is deleterious after the third or fourth generation at the longest.

There is, again, the social impulse which sends men forth to seek communion not only with their superiors, but upon occasion their inferiors as well. Even the Aristotles and Bacons who read the open secrets in the outer world for themselves, and by their prescience need no aid from books, must yet turn aside and commune with the authors they have antiquated and displaced. This necessity not only that the small shall sit at the feet of the great, but that even the great shall hold intellectual communion with the small, has almost as in obedience to an automatic law made literature indispensable in a higher or a lower form to every mind.

What, then, is literature in its potentiality? It is the most powerful instrument known or devised by society for transmitting, as its best inheritance to each new generation, the treasured, choicest thought and feeling of the ages before. Without its aid civilization would go about in a circle with no advance; with its assistance no time is wasted in learning over again old knowl-

edge, in rediscovering old truths, or in relearning by experience. It supplies ready-made and well-tried criteria of taste and conduct. It exhibits the ideals after which the last generation has striven. If it is borne in mind that the ideal of one age tends to pass into the actual of that next following, it will be clear that largely by the aid of literature each new generation is enabled to begin as a foundation with that with which, as its best complete structure, the preceding generation finished.

As to the divisions of literature, it should now be clear that the general classification into prose and poetry according to form is a delusion and a snare. For, if anything prosaic was ever written, much of the so-called poetry of the English classical period is such, even to the last word; while, on the other hand, if anything poetical was ever written, much, one may say, of Jeremy Taylor, of Hawthorne, of Butcher and Lang's or Professor Palmer's translation of Homer, or Professor Norton's of Dante, unquestionably is such. It is only necessary or possible here to recognize two great divisions: all literature of fact or judgment should be entered as thought-compositions or prose, and all literature proceeding from or addressed to the emotions as sentiment-compositions or poetry. In other words, that which *informs*, coming from the intellect and going to the intellect, is prose; that which *moves*, coming from the heart and going to the heart, is poetry. De Quincey has well named the two departments respectively, the Literature of Knowledge and the Literature of Power. Of these departments, poetry is the first to be evolved in every civilization, and will be first treated here.

CHAPTER II.

THE PROSE AND THE POETIC STYLE DISTINGUISHED.

THE style best adapted to prose is that which *conveys* most directly and effectively.

Any person prompted to communicate a fact or thought naturally seeks the most definite and exact expression. The mind also of the hearer or reader, on the slightest hint that the speaker or writer has a prose-purpose, takes the statement literally and seriously, and proceeds to *realize* it.¹ The most important element in this conveying form of expression is *predication*.²

But the style best adapted to poetry is that which *suggests* most vividly and abundantly.

The poet perhaps oftener shuns than seeks literal and precise expression. He is not so much concerned to set forth the definite time and space relations of things as to test and treat them experientially. Moreover, at the first hint that the purpose is poetic, the reader draws upon his own choicest experiences touching that which is presented to his mind, and proceeds to *idealize* it.³ The simplest elements in the suggestive mode of expression are *epithet* and *exclamation*.

Note the contrast between the declarative and the suggestive

¹ That is, if a *fact*, by reconstruction of the situation through phantasy, using the language as a strict letter of directions; if a *thought*, by trying to derive the same judgment or conclusion independently, from such data as the reader may chance to have in his own mind.

² There is, of course, no predication in the speaker's thought. It serves on utterance chiefly to signalize and attest his conviction that he has discerned the truth.

³ That is, by the aid, not now of phantasy, but imagination. In other words, the reader, understanding that he is released from the obligation of literalness, gives himself up to all the satisfaction or delight that his fancy can make the passage yield.

quality in the following sentences. Try also whether those of the one form may be converted into really equivalent sentences of the other:—

Studies serve for delight, for ornament, and for ability. — The duke struggled, rose from the block, and looked reproachfully at the executioner. — Comfort is strength. — Everywhere around you are evidences of the existence and movement of a mysterious power which you can neither see, nor touch, nor define. — The people now dragged us above forty yards on the sand: it was the first and last time I was ever on a cayman's back. — The impression produced upon my mind, when I first visited this beautiful glen, will never be obliterated.

“How beautiful this night!”

“But the people, — but the cries,
The crowding round, and proffering the prize!”

“But I might see young Cupid's fiery shaft
Quenched in the chaste beams of the watery moon,
And the imperial votaress passed on
In maiden meditation, fancy-free.”

“But quick
To the main wonder, now. A vault, see; thick
Black shade about the ceiling, though fine slits
Across the buttress suffer light by fits
Upon a marvel in the midst. Nay, stoop —
A dullish gray-streaked cumbrous font, a group
Round it, — each side of it, where'er one sees, —
Upholds it; shrinking Caryatides
Of just-tinged marble like Eve's lilled flesh
Beneath her maker's finger when the fresh
First pulse of life shot brightening the snow.”

Moreover, the difference between the declarative and the exclamatory sentence is here illustrated. In the former, the reader is asked to comprehend and contemplate a fact or principle as simply actual; in the latter, assuming the fact, he is asked to test or evaluate its significance in his emotions. If the exclamatory sentences just quoted were to take the declarative form, they would become inadequate, since they would express experiential

propositions intellectually. "This night is very beautiful" is valueless as a fact, and fails to reach the feelings *because it does not provoke estimation of degree*. In like manner the prose quotations—except the last, which is in part emotional—would become void if made exclamatory, since, dealing with facts and judgments, they cannot be experientially realized.

It is now recognized as essential to a good prose style that the writer make his sentences pointed and strong, and that he prune away all superfluous adjectives. In poetry, the tendency to the contrary is no less positive and clear. We shall find that the best poets not only multiply adjuncts, and subordinate the verb to these,¹ but frequently, even in the strongest passages, suppress predication altogether. In addition to the examples of such omission as occur above, we may cite the following:—

"Here Homer, with the broad suspense
Of thunderous brows, and lips intense
Of garrulous god-innocence.

"There Shakespeare, on whose forehead climb
The crowns o' the world. Oh eyes sublime,
With tears and laughter for all time!"

MRS. BROWNING: *A Vision of Poets*.

"And one, a foreground black with stones and slags,
Beyond, a line of heights, and higher
All barr'd with long white cloud the scornful crags,
And highest, snow and fire.

"And one, an English home, — gray twilight pour'd
On dewy pastures, dewy trees,
Softer than sleep, — all things in order stor'd,
A haunt of ancient Peace.

"Nor these alone, but every landscape fair,
As fit for every mood of mind,
Or gay, or grave, or sweet, or stern, was there,
Not less than truth design'd."

TENNYSON: *The Palace of Art*.

¹ Except when the verb contains a metaphor, or is otherwise vital to the sentence.

But the suppression of predication is not confined to single lines or stanzas of poetry. Sometimes it plays an important part in the effect of a whole poem, as these remarkable examples show:—

“Pure moonlight in thy garden, sweet, to-night —
 Pure moonlight in thy garden, and the breath
 Of fragrant roses! O my heart's delight,
 Wed thou with Love, but I will wed with Death.

* * * *

“Dawn in thy garden, with the faintest sound —
 Uncertain, tremulous, awaking birds!
 Dawn in thy garden, and from meadows round,
 The sudden lowing of expectant herds.

* * * *

“Wind in thy garden to-night, my love,
 Wind in thy garden and rain;
 A sound of storm in the shaken grove,
 And cries as of spirits in pain!

* * * *

“Snow in thy garden, falling thick and fast,
 Snow in thy garden, where the grass shall be!
 What dreams to-night? Thy dreaming nights are past.
 Thou hast no glad or grievous memory.

* * * *

“Night in thy garden, white with snow and sleet—
 Night rushing on with wind and storm toward day!
 Alas, thy garden holdeth nothing sweet,
 Nor sweet can come again, and thou away.”

PHILIP BOURKE MARSTON: *Thy Garden.*

“Then I reach, I must believe,
 Not her soul in vain,
 For to me again
 It reaches, and past retrieve
 Is wound in the toils I weave;

“And must follow as I require,
 As befits a thrall,
 Bringing flesh and all,
 Essence and earth-attire,
 To the source of the tractile fire:

"Till the house called hers, not mine,
 With a growing weight
 Seems to suffocate
 If she break not its leaden line
 And escape from its close confine.

"Out of doors into the night!
 On to the maze
 Of the wild wood-ways,
 Not turning to left nor right
 From the pathway, blind with sight —

"Making through rain and wind
 O'er the broken shrubs,
 'Twixt the stems and stubs,
 With a still, composed, strong mind,
 Nor a care for the world behind —

"Swifter and still more swift,
 As the crowding peace
 Doth to joy increase
 In the wide blind eyes uplift
 Through the darkness and the drift!"

ROBERT BROWNING: *Mesmerism.*

What would be the effect of introducing predication into these stanzas is evident: they would be turned into prose, or would become at best prose-poetry merely. Prose-poetry is produced not only by putting intellectual propositions into emotional terms and forms, but also by putting things which must be emotionally or spiritually discerned into terms and forms which appeal to the intellect alone. These famous lines of Denham furnish a good illustration of the latter fault: —

"O could I flow like thee, and make thy stream
 My great example, as it is my theme!
 Though deep, yet clear, though gentle, yet not dull,
 Strong without rage, without o'erflowing, full."

Here the sentence form is exclamatory, as it should be; but the author, instead of setting the imagination at work by saying

simply *Thames-like*, addresses the phantasy, and gives prose details. In other words, Denham attempts to *convey* his sentiment, and thus pretty effectually hinders it from going further than the intellect of his reader.¹ This is the principal source of weakness among the classical poets of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

¹ Of course, the meagreness of the sentiment itself has something to do with the effect. How jejune and poor it is will be revealed if what was really in the mind be expressed pointedly, as a Tennyson or a Browning would have phrased it—it either of these poets could have said so little—somewhat perhaps as thus:—

Would that my thought Thames-like might flow
Out to the world, its sea!

CHAPTER III.

SUGGESTIVE WORDS.

IN the preceding chapter were provisionally noted certain points of difference between prose and poetry. Let us now, beginning with the poetical side of our literature, attempt a more serious analysis and examination.

Poetic delight comes by way of the idealizing faculty, which we call imagination proper. But the imagination in itself does not enjoy beauty, or crave beauty to enjoy, or demand that the partially beautiful be amended so as to become such wholly. That which longs for beauty and ideals of beauty is the conscious principle, the ego, or soul of man. This indeterminate ego, this spirit or soul of man, when at its best of development and when not preoccupied or hindered, seeks beauty everywhere for beauty's sake, detects noble analogies allying the lower with the higher, and interprets a spiritual meaning out of material things. That which we call imagination is really a collective designation of the activities or the operations by or in which such efforts of the 'ego' are accomplished.

The exercise of imagination is dependent upon many and various causes, — or rather conditions; for the cause in every instance is wholly in the subjectivity of the soul itself. Thus a dazzling color or a delicate combination of shades, the noise of a brook or the harmony of a chorus, each afford the soul an occasion or warrant for entering into its idealizing activity. So likewise with the words of our common English vocabulary. A large number of those used most constantly have become so trite and familiar as apparently to give no hint or challenge to the emotional consciousness. If we open the dictionary at random and chance upon the word *glad*, for instance, we shall prob-

ably find that we have only a prosaic, annalistic appreciation of its meaning. Very different is it with *gladden*, and *glade*, next in the column. Certain select experiences at some time had with these words come back to us and shape a definition far more significant than the dictionary-maker could possibly have put together. So of *sad* and *sadden*, *tall* and *lofty*, *low* and *lowly*, and the rest. Throughout the vocabulary of the language, scientific, technical terms and all, those words which we know experimentally will by association always force upon us some emotional element of meaning, while those new or old that stand for no experience and are incapable of awakening the imagination are intellectually or etymologically discerned, and that is all.

Different minds are of course differently constituted in respect to sympathies and susceptibilities, and besides from unlike associations and circumstances incur unlike experiences. Yet there is a species of precision in the use of experimental words by poets, and a community of interpretation and understanding on the part of those that read them such as, perhaps, to warrant the assertion that poetry is less difficult to comprehend than prose. Each mind is always the court of last resort as to what is poetry to it, yet disagreement as to the potency of a suggestive word will not be met with more frequently than difference of opinion as to the proper intension of a prosaic term. But in many cases the student will at the outset need some assistance in determining what his experience of suggestive terms really is.

As to the range of suggestion, not only adjectives denoting rare and lofty qualities will have poetic potency, but of course the adverbs derived from such. Moreover, nouns and verbs often contribute strong effect when used in some transferred or metaphorical significance. Even words of neutral content and quality may by neat and dexterous composition acquire poetic strength and value. So to a certain extent of archaic words and forms, as sometimes third persons singular in *-eth* of the 'solemn style.'

Designate the suggestive words—for the present without inquiry into the kind or manner of suggestion—in the following

passages, and compute their number. Only the effect of *words* should be considered, including compounds, not of phrases, or clauses taken as a whole. Time should be given to consideration of all questions that may arise, through any uncertainty. This exercise fully mastered at the present point will leave few perplexities to be encountered in the studies later on.

"So much describes the stuffy little room —
 Vulgar, flat, smooth respectability.
 Not so the burst of landscape surging in,
 Sunrise and all, as he who of the pair
 Is, plain enough, the younger personage,
 Draws sharp the shrieking curtain, sends aloft
 The sash, spreads wide and fastens back to wall
 Shutter and shutter, shows you England's best.
 He leans out into a living glory-bath
 Of air and light, where seems to float and move
 The wooded, watered country, hill and dale
 And steel-bright thread of stream, a-smoke with mist,
 A-sparkle with May morning, diamond drift
 O' the sun-touched dew."

ROBERT BROWNING: *The Inn Album*, 42-55.

"But the majestic river floated on,
 Out of the mist and hum of that low land,
 Into the frosty starlight, and there moved,
 Rejoicing, through the hush'd Chorasmian waste,
 Under the solitary moon; — he flow'd
 Right for the polar star, past Orgunjè,
 Brimming, and bright, and large; then sands begin
 To hem his watery march, and dam his streams,
 And split his currents; that for many a league
 The shorn and parcell'd Oxus strains along
 Through beds of sand and matted rushy isles —
 Oxus, forgetting the bright speed he had
 In his high mountain-cradle in Pamere,
 A foiled circuitous wanderer — till at last
 The long'd-for dash of waves is heard, and wide
 His luminous home of waters opens, bright
 And tranquil, from whose flow the new-bathed stars
 Emerge, and shine upon the Aral Sea."

MATTHEW ARNOLD: *Sohrab and Rustum*, 875-892.

CHAPTER IV.

FORCE.

SOMEWHAT of the effect produced on the imagination through suggestion should now be clear. Let us pass next to Force.

Force is not energy expended merely in the oral *utterance* of sentiment. It is an integral part, whenever and wherever present, of the emotion itself, and is at once apprehended through its effect on the thought or language by the discerning reader. So organic is its essence that no poet can affect it without quick detection. Moreover, it cannot be supplied, if not found inherent in the author's message, through any contribution of energy from without. Let us compare the following passages:—

“Nor rural sights alone, but rural sounds
 Exhilarate the spirit and restore
 The tone of languid Nature. Mighty winds,
 That sweep the skirt of some far-spreading wood
 Of ancient growth, make music not unlike
 The dash of ocean on his winding shore,
 And lull the spirit while they fill the mind;
 Unnumbered branches waving in the blast,
 And all their leaves fast fluttering all at once.
 Nor less composure waits upon the roar
 Of distant floods, or on the softer voice
 Of neighbouring fountain, or of rills that slip
 Through the cleft rock, and, chimbing as they fall
 Upon loose pebbles, lose themselves at length
 In matted grass, that with a livelier green
 Betrays the secret of their silent course.”

—COWPER: *The Task*, Bk. I. 181-196.

“I? What I answered? As I live,
 I never fancied such a thing
 As answer possible to give.

What says the body when they spring
 Some monstrous torture-engine's whole
 Strength on it? No more says the soul.

"Till out strode Gismond; then I knew
 That I was saved. I never met
 His face before, but, at first view,
 I felt quite sure that God had set
 Himself to Satan; who would spend
 A minute's mistrust on the end?"

"He strode to Gauthier, in his throat
 Gave him the lie, then struck his mouth
 With one back-handed blow that wrote
 In blood men's verdict there. North, South,
 East, West I looked. The lie was dead,
 And damned, and truth stood up instead."

ROBERT BROWNING: *Count Gismond*.

In the first of these passages it would be manifestly absurd to try to introduce force by strong reading; the effect would be sheer burlesque. In the second it is as obviously impossible to avoid reading strongly, if one reads at all. The reason is not far to seek. In the former extract the sense as well as the spirit requires that only a few of the words receive emphasis in reading; in the latter, many. The words thus made eminent to the ear are the only certain signs of the author's fervor, and the only measure of its intensity. If we examine a dozen examples of ordinary unimpassioned prose, we shall find a pretty constant per cent of emphasis, which here for the most part serves merely to give the subject and predicate and perhaps one or two adjuncts of each due prominence in the sentence. This is nothing but *Grammatical Emphasis*, and will be found essentially stereotyped and constant in different sentences of like construction. In 'Five of the men were held for trial' there is grammatical stress on the first, fourth, sixth, and eighth of the eight words, as also correspondingly in 'None of the goods were sent on approval,' 'Some of the votes were cast by proxy,' and all like sentences. The same will of course be true of all sentences,

whether less weighty or more involved, that are made up respectively of the same parts of speech, and take no extra emphasis for any reason. Also when some single idea is to be brought into especial prominence, as in Hamlet's

"the *play's* the thing
Wherein I'll catch the conscience of the King,"

or two ideas are contrasted, as in the first line from Cowper above, the distinction is made by stress upon prominent or contrasted words. This is *Emphasis of the Thought*. But force is something different from either of these. It is the *Emphasis of Sympathy*, and amounts, or may amount, to nothing less than unction. It generally allies itself with and corroborates both the grammatical stress and the thought emphasis, and often pervades besides not only minor modifiers, but even particles, — sometimes, as in the last stanza from Browning, seeming to exalt and energize every word. Hence the force of a given passage or author may be approximately represented by the ratio of emphatic words to the whole number of words employed.

The former of the two examples will be found to contain little emphasis except of the first two kinds, and is therefore essentially devoid of force. The stress-words average a little less than three to the line, making the ratio of emphasized words to the sum of all perhaps exactly 40:120, or in any interpretation practically not above 1:3. But the stanzas from *Count Gismond* show very different results. The poem abounds in force throughout, and these stanzas contain the climax, the first registering the ratio of about 23:38, the second, 24:41, but the third rising at least to 30:44.¹

¹For an example of still greater intensity — quoted hereafter in the prose treatment of this topic — compare the following from Carlyle. The words by which the force is manifested are in italics: —

In this God's world, with its wild whirling eddies and mad foam oceans, where men and nations perish as if without law, and judgment for an unjust thing is sternly delayed, dost thou think that there is therefore no justice? It is what the fool hath said in his heart. It is what the wise, in all times, were wise because they denied, and knew for ever not to be. I tell thee again, there is nothing else but justice. One strong thing I find here below: the just thing, the true thing.

It therefore seems evident that force will not be indicated if the general ratio of emphasis in a given passage or composition does not rise higher than 1 : 3. In the *Count Gismond* the sum of emphasized words to the whole number is as 449 : 865, or not far from 1 : 2. In the prose passage from Carlyle there is more than seventy per cent of emphasis, but the force-ratio of the present paragraph and the next is 25 : 45, or only fifty-five per cent. To offset the seventy per cent from the lines quoted, the greater part of the paragraphs must therefore fall below the ratio of 1 : 2. After such outbursts, reaction will naturally be marked and speedy.

But the student must not suppose, when he has learned something concerning the modes of force, that he has explained or comprehended force itself. The cause is not the manner, the how must not be mistaken for the why. Force in poetry is the enthusiasm of the 'ego' called forth by some near approximation to one of its ideals, as on perception or contemplation of some moral or spiritual excellence. It is the most intimate and unequivocal manifestation of the personality, and transcends all exhibitions of it beside in its effect on other minds. When a writer manifests emotion because some act or quality closely approaches his utmost conception of excellence in that direction, the enthusiasm of the reader will be aroused from sympathy, even before the occasion is fully interpreted to him. He will at the same time try to account for the author's exaltation of feeling by idealizing what has been and what is yet to be told as fully as he may. The effect of force will therefore vary according to our sympathy with the author, as well as our attitude towards that which inspires him. When the occasion of his utterance is not extraordinary, when his words argue no profound emotion and in suggestiveness reach scarcely higher than our phantasy, we experience a minimum of force. But we are sensible of it at its maximum when the occasion is the agony of an Ugolino, the trials and triumphs of a Sordello, or the passing of a Lear. Now the soul not merely experiences through imagination the inspira-


tion of the poet's theme, but to the full interpreting and appropriating his enthusiasm is lifted out and above its usual world into relations with the infinite, and becomes therewith transfigured. Such exaltation in the author, as also the accompanying experience in the reader, is a form of the emotion called Sublimity.¹

But some poets, sensible only of beauty in a merely receptive and passive way, and not adequately realizing what great themes mean, are devoid of force, or affect it merely. Others there are who experience it genuinely, yet cannot by any means impart it, while the few truly great spiritual seers and guides, without taking thought or seeming aware of what they do, flash it forth in thunderbolts. Yet even in such manifestations force has its own laws, and is in no sense subject to those who wield it. No more force may be employed than is interpreted from nature. The writer cannot provide or supply it where he does not derive it from his theme, more than can the reader who does not find it in what is written. As in music, too much force, even were it at command, would defeat itself. Hence the composers of symphonies as well as the makers of great poems are led, though unconsciously, in accordance with art as well as truth or nature, to combine light and heavy passages, and to use force in relief and contrast. The spiritual has always its ebbs and flows, its periods of assurance and of doubt, and there is no piece of interpretation that has not its gaps and blanks, its glares and shades of illumination.

For first illustration of the interchange and harmony of light and heavy passages there is nothing simpler than the *Count Gismond* already quoted from. The range of force, as well as the

¹ But *sublimity* and *the sublime* are terms applied also and more frequently to that which is the occasion of the feeling. Thus the romantic heroism of Count Gismond and the self-vindication of justice which respectively in Browning and Carlyle raise the force-ratio to a climax above, may be said to 'border upon, or to reach, the sublime'—meaning they fairly evoke that emotion in the reader. For other forms and occasions of sublimity, see Chapter XL.

ratio of force-terms to the whole number of words in each stanza, may be indicated in one view by the aid of curves, as thus:—



Note how the two opening lines give a foretaste of the strength, and how the author's energy, and correspondingly the ratio of emphasis, rises and sustains itself after the seventh stanza. As an example of force quite different Tennyson's *Godiva* or *Ode on the Death of the Duke of Wellington* may be taken. Moreover, it will be nowise difficult to distinguish honest, organic energy from rant and bombast, any discovery of which should at once stop the analysis. There is no estimating a fraud or falsehood as genuine, when once found out. The reader, consciously or unconsciously, must identify his author's emphasis, or will miss the meaning, and will often, in ordinary prose, to solve a doubt, reflectively and experimentally re-read. If a sentence is rightly put together, there will in no case be danger of over-interpretation. In each and every analysis here the sense and spirit should be as patiently studied as the musician studies a composition—stanza by stanza, line by line. There will then, unless the writer is himself at fault,¹ be little doubt at least as to what words were intended to sustain his force, whatever other questions proper for the elocutionist, as tone, inflection, modulation, may remain.

¹ See Chapter VII., p. 48.

CHAPTER V.

TONE QUALITY.

It has been shown already how the mind finds an experimental meaning in certain words over and above that which is recognized in the definitions of the dictionary. In like manner, the mind often gets an experience out of the phonetic elements of which words are made, independently of what the words as such may signify. The phonetic qualities from which such further experience is derived are called Tone Colors.

The cause, as in the former case, is in the subjectivity of the soul itself, which, ever alert and eager for delight, strives to interpret and turn to account the utmost possible of what is apprehended by the senses. Indeed, the activity of the 'ego' in taking cognizance of the tone quality of syllables is nowise different in kind from its ordinary activity in interpreting the significance of spoken words. When we say *man, house, tree*, nothing proceeds from the lips except waves of sound, but the mind of the listener rises from the vocal suggestions of each to an idea, and does this even unconsciously. But the effect of tone colors is less positive and speedy, being experimental only. Out of all possible sounds made by the organs of speech, some are instinctively and invariably used in giving utterance to painful while others to agreeable emotions. There is one particular set of sounds employed in groans, another in murmurs of pleasure or applause. It is clear that by the use of syllables or sounds from the one set or from the other, the mind of the reader may be affected through suggestion of the respective emotion, and the author's meaning as contained in his words greatly strengthened and intensified. In other words, the mind through association,

in addition to the meaning carried by the sentence, takes cognizance of the experiences it has elsewhere had with the same sounds, accepting and allowing them as a part of the author's message. Of course these revived experiences must be akin to the sentiment the author is trying to arouse, and in great poems always are. The highest art makes no mistakes; and nothing is more remarkable than the skill with which the great masters assist their purpose by use of the various qualities and effects of tone. Many of such effects belong to elocution and cannot be made apparent save by the most careful rendering. Only those tone qualities which are obvious in unprofessional and even unoral reading are to be considered here.

We may begin with this observation. ✓ When the spirit of a poem or a passage is buoyant or lively, the language will not abound in heavy vowels or hard combinations of consonants; also when the sentiment is full of energy or momentum, the light vowels and the liquid consonants will be few or wanting. Compare these examples in illustration:—

“We would call aloud in the dreamy dells,
 Call to each other, and whoop and cry
 All night, merrily, merrily;
 They would pelt me with starry spangles and shells,
 Laughing and clapping their hands between,
 All night, merrily, merrily:
 But I would throw to them back in mine
 Turkis and agate and almondine:
 Then leaping out upon them unseen
 I would kiss them often under the sea,
 And kiss them again till they kissed me
 Laughingly, laughingly.
 Oh! what a happy life were mine
 Under the hollow-hung ocean green!”

TENNYSON: *The Merman.*

“The pair of goodly palaces are burned,
 The gardens ravaged, and our Guefs laugh, drunk
 A week with joy. The next, their laughter sunk

In sobs of blood, for they found, some strange way,
 Old Salinguerra back again — I say,
 Old Salinguerra in the town once more
 Uprooting, overturning, flame before,
 Blood fetlock-high beneath him. Azzo fled;
 Who 'scaped the carnage followed; then the dead
 Were pushed aside from Salinguerra's throne,
 He ruled once more Ferrara, all alone,
 Till Azzo, stunned awhile, revived, would pounce
 Coupled with Boniface, like lynx and ounce,
 On the gorged bird."

BROWNING: *Sordello*, Bk. I.

It is clear that, if the first passage were written and rhymed with the vowels which prevail in the second, and were stripped of its liquids, a good share of the poetry would disappear. In like manner, the second example would be unequal to its burdens of force and meaning, if the light sounds of the former were substituted for those we find. The principles underlying these important differences belong, as will be seen, both to physics and psychology.

Friction, slow and griding motion imply obstacles or resistance, but oily and noiseless movements, the contrary. The dash and roar of a mountain stream and the murmur of a brook slipping through a meadow make very different impressions upon the mind of the observer. Clenched hands, set or grating teeth, involuntary rigor of the muscles, tell their own story even to the slowest imagination, as also the agile and graceful leap or lively gesture. The like is true also of vocal sounds. The natural opposite of groans and cries, which are both the symptoms and, as it were, the vents or escapes of pain, is laughter. Phonetically speaking, groans are nothing but the effect of forcing breath through the vocal chords when in a condition of extreme constriction, and laughter is the effect of passing it through abundantly while the throat is completely relaxed and widened. The sound most naturally produced while the throat is constricted is *ā*, but when released entirely from tension is *ä*. Hence groans and laughter,

so far as vocal, are produced by the repetition or prolongation of these respective sounds. But the mind on recognizing, no matter where or how, those syllables which suggest and echo continually the symptoms and utterances of pain, is affected subjectively by the experience of pain itself, or so tends strongly. Similarly when it hears the rippling syllables and tones of merriment ring out in the *tra la las* of barcarolles and ballads, or notes the same elements of sound under other circumstances, the mind tends subjectively to share the experience of joy, just as bystanders are inclined to join in a laugh before knowing wholly its occasion.

But there are many effects between the extremes of groans and laughter that may be echoed into speech. The same principles are discernible everywhere, and in fact prevail throughout the whole range of animate notes and cries. All vocal rubs and stops imply muscular contraction and those conditions of the nerves or mind which produce it involuntarily or otherwise. Bated whispers indicate fright, or dread of arousing an adversary; hisses, fear with purpose to repel. When there is less fear and more anger, the voice becomes audible in growls, which are composed mainly of constricted \bar{o} , \bar{u} , *au*, *ou*, with the rasping sounds of hard *g* and *r*. If anger gives place to consternation or horror, the instincts of expression change the voice to a peculiarly hollow and unemittent quality which has been called pectoral. In all these qualities the most marked characteristic is *obstruction*; and obstruction always indicates the presence of some burden upon the feelings. What this is, and whence, the mind of the reader makes haste to interpret from the particular symptoms of sound, inferring from the lesser obstruction of course the lesser burden. But the absence of all stiffness and constriction in the vocal passages argues complete release from heaviness or pain. Hence joy, delight, and exaltation of spirits reside potentially in the wholly unobstructed vowel \bar{a} , or (as this is almost extinct in English) the vowels next it in the scale of openness, \bar{a} , \bar{e} , and \bar{i} , especially if reinforced by *l*. This last serves not only as an excellent copula to the opener vowels, but as a lubricant in any situation,

and thus contrasts strongly with the fricatives and especially with the guttural or hard *g*. By suggestion of rise in pitch these clear vowels will indicate, beyond exhilaration and elasticity of spirits, varying degrees of excitement;¹ while by proper combination with the heavier sounds they may be made to shade into the tones of sadness and pain. In like manner the harsh tones may be expanded into more generous colorings, as by relaxing the tension and adding intonation hisses may be changed to sighs.

In contrast of tense and relaxed effects compare first the following examples. It will assist if the number of sounds suggestive of distress or pain in the one, but of exultation and merriment in the other, be definitely computed, and the ratio respectively to the whole number of sounds in each case indicated. It will be noted that grating *r* may be used to re-enforce guttural effects, but that this letter lightly enunciated allies itself with the opposite tones. Similarly *d*, *t*, *th*, *f*, and *s* in the first example, under the evident tension, assist the gutturals.

“Oh how dark your villa was,
Windows fast and obdurate!
How the garden grudged me grass
Where I stood — the iron gate
Ground its teeth to let me pass!”

BROWNING: *A Serenade at the Villa*.

“Hear the sledges with the bells, —
Silver bells!
What a world of merriment their melody foretells!
How they tinkle, tinkle, tinkle,
In the icy air of night,
While the stars that oversprinkle
All the heavens seem to twinkle
With a crystalline delight!”

POE: *The Bells*.

¹ On the principle that a mind energized will energize its utterance. This it must do by increasing the tension of the vocal chords, thus multiplying the sound-waves. But to do this is to raise the pitch.

The strained and hard guttural quality is produced by a succession of fricative resonances in the throat. There is no free emission of breath, but all sounds are as it were compressed within before heard without. Hence all other consonants or consonant combinations that can be uttered explosively may be used with conspicuous effect even if the strict gutturals are wanting. On the other hand, the pure quality is due for the most part to a round, free utterance; and all sounds that can be made to ring out melodiously like notes in singing will be effective in their degree. Compare further the following passages:—

“But see, his eyeballs . . .

Staring full ghastly like a strangled man:

His hair upreared, his nostrils stretched with struggling;

His hands abroad displayed, as one that grasped

And tugged for life, and was by strength subdued.

His well-proportioned beard made rough and rugged,

Like to the summer's corn by tempest lodged.”

SHAKESPEARE: *II. King Henry VI.*, III. ii.

“His every sense had grown

Ethereal for pleasure; 'bove his head

Flew a delight half-graspable; his tread

Was Hesperean; to his capable ears

Silence was music from the holy spheres;

A dewy luxury was in his eyes;

The little flowers felt his pleasant sighs

And stirred them faintly.”

KEATS: *Endymion*, Bk. II.

“Nor is it in me to unhate my hates,—

I use up my last strength to strike once more

Old Pietro in the wine-house-gossip-face,

To trample under foot the whine and wile

Of that Violante,—and I grow one gorge

To loathingly reject Pompilia's pale

Poison my hasty hunger took for food.”

BROWNING: *The Ring and the Book*, Guido.

"I listened to the music broad and deep —
 I heard the tenor in an ecstasy
 Touch the sweet, distant goal, I heard the cry
 Of prayer and passion, and I heard the sweep
 Of mighty wings, that in their waving keep
 The music that the spheres make endlessly;
 Then my cheeks shivered, tears made blind each eye
 As flame to flame I felt the quick blood leap,
 And, through the tides and moonlit winds of sound,
 To me love's passionate voice grew audible.
 Again I felt your heart to my heart bound,
 Then silence on the viols and voices fell;
 But, like the still, small voice within a shell,
 I heard Love thrilling through the void profound."

PHILIP BOURKE MARSTON: *Love and Music.*

The best illustration of the universality as well as potency of tone colors may be found outside and below the human scale. No wonder the owl and raven are birds of evil bodement. Scarcely higher belong the hawk and bittern; but much better tones are reached in the magpie and the jay. Finally, at the summit of the scale we come to the clear and pure notes of the lark and the canary. These clear and pure joy-tones appear variously shaded and sombered, chiefly through pectoral colorings, in a series of effects which range from the notes of the nightingale to the moans of the mourning dove. Nature abounds in plaintive tones and cries, matching them, as it would seem, to prevailing human moods; and the principal element in all such effects, from the chirp of the cricket and peep of the treefrog, is pectoral. But sounds contributed from the lower genera of animal life, it might be said, are in some sense supererogatory, since hardly any feeling natural to the 'ego' but may be induced by appropriate suggestions afforded in the notes of birds alone.

The pectoral quality, therefore, very naturally abounds in literature. It takes its name from the fact that such tones, owing to the suspension of diaphragmatic breathing, seem to be suppressed and muffled within the chest rather than articulated from it.

When most natural, they are very like the tones of a consumptive in the last stages of his disease, and indicate pre-eminently the prostration which comes from the emotions of horror or despair. But when, without real change of quality, through the exercise of some abnormal energy these tones are actually forced forth, the effect is, as it were, to project the horror felt by the speaker upon the hearer. The two effects are easily distinguished, and surpass in potency all other tone colorings whatsoever. The following passages furnish good illustrations of each. All tones that readily lend themselves to a hollow, muffled utterance, — especially *g*, *ǒ*, *ō*, *oi*, *ū*, *ū*, *u*, also the fricative and the stop consonants, with *m* and *w*, — may be employed.

“Oh, I have passed a miserable night,
So full of ugly sights, of ghastly dreams,
That, as I am a Christian faithful man,
I would not spend another such a night,
Though 'twere to buy a world of happy days,
So full of dismal terror was the time.”

SHAKESPEARE: *Richard III.*, I. iv.

“Sirs, my first true word, all truth and no lie,
Is — save me notwithstanding! Life is all!
I was just stark mad, — let the madman live
Pressed by as many chains as you please pile!
Don't open! Hold me from them! I am yours,
I am the Granduke's — no, I am the Pope's!
Abate, — Cardinal, — Christ, — Maria, — God, . . .
Pompilia, will you let them murder me?”

BROWNING: *The Ring and the Book*, Guido.

But perhaps the best illustration of both effects is found in the words of the ghost to Hamlet (I. v. 2-91). When the ghost begins to speak, from horror of quick return to torment his voice is almost inaudible; but when later (13-22) with an energy born of the pit he attempts to convey to Hamlet some sense of the agony of his lot, even his hollow tones become pervaded with a

force nowhere else surpassed in Shakespeare.¹ Of all masters of pectoral effects in both kinds Shakespeare stands easily at the head. Nothing could be more artistic or more tremendous than the suggestions of felt and projected horror in *Macbeth*, as in II. ii. 31-43, iii. 61-78; III. iv. 69-73, or at 93, 100, 122, and indeed, after the first act, throughout the play. Excellent tone colors of every sort have been produced by conscious and deliberate imitation, but such effects as these must come always by inspiration.

In the examples thus far it is the associations of the sound elements and not usually of the words themselves that affect imagination. Often, indeed, it is nothing more than the general quality, as guttural, orotund, or plaintive, and not specific syllables or tones, that carries potency. No one that has ever heard a person attempt to speak while struggling for breath is likely to so forget that experience as not to be affected, consciously or unconsciously, by genuine pectoral tones of whatsoever kind. But specific elements of sound are and may be used imitatively to produce specific effects, as in this well-known passage from Milton:—

“He would have spoke
But hiss for hiss return'd with forkèd tongue
To forkèd tongue; for now were all transform'd
Alike, to serpents all, as accessories
To his bold riot. Dreadful was the din
Of hissing through the hall, thick swarming now
With complicated monsters, head and tail —
Scorpion, and Asp, and Amphisbæna dire,
Cerastes horn'd, Hydrus, and Ellops drear,
And Dipsas.”

Paradise Lost, X. 517-526.

Here are as many species of hisses as of snakes to cause them. Compare Shakespeare's imitation of the bubbling in the witches' caldron:—

¹ Let the ratio of force, at least in II. 15-20, be definitely computed.

“For a charm of powerful trouble
Like a hell-broth boil and bubble.
Double, double toil and trouble,
Fire burn and cauldron bubble.”

Macbeth, IV. i. 18-21.

and Spenser's of flowing water:—

“And more to lulle him in his slumber soft,
A trickling streame from high rock tumbling downe,
And ever-drizzling raine upon the loft,
Mixt with a murmuring winde, much like the sowne
Of swarming Bees, did cast him in a swowne.”

Faerie Queene, Bk. I. xli.

But such attempts as the last often cross the line between association and combination. Tone colors should make the reader's mind remember, not construct, for the latter he must do to the full with the major meaning. So far as onomatopoetic imitation essays to produce new experiences it is to be deprecated, since here the limit is quickly reached between organic and inorganic colorings. The sense should never serve the sound; poetry must not be cultivated or regarded as merely the algebra of tone.

CHAPTER VI.

THE ASSOCIATIONS OF WORDS.

IN the last chapter was shown how the vocal elements of words may by association reach and engage the imagination. It will be in order next to find out what effects may be produced, through association, by the words or the meanings of the words themselves.

Much has been written about the un-Saxon portion of our English vocabulary, and not a little also against it. No doubt it is to some extent a misfortune that our book-words are derived so largely from other than Anglo-Saxon sources, since the uneducated can never confidently manage the *ap-s* and *hypo-s*, the *-ures*, *-ments*, *-ics*, *-isms*, with our forty other prefixes and eighty suffixes not in the mother tongue, without learning them from books.¹ The uneducated Italian is far less at fault with his Dante than the uneducated Englishman with his Milton, since Dante's book-words are yet Latin like the rest, and seem native and natural enough when their meanings are known. But to the Englishman not yet waywise with books and ignorant of Latin, reading *Paradise Lost* is much like translating it from another language. Though he may have no especial difficulty in finding out what the words mean, they still in themselves from prefix to termination will seem intractable and strange. So far from immediately appropriating them to use when once he has noted their intension, he is very likely to find them slip from his memory

¹ The native Anglo-Saxon prefixes and suffixes amount to something less than half these respective numbers. For lists — not quite complete — of both Saxon and foreign, see Earle. *Philology of the English Tongue*, p. 290 ff.

altogether. So, also, though to a less degree in the lay reading of Shakespeare.

But though the unlettered Italian finds the book-words of Dante not strange or unnative to his ear, they yet may prove as hard to memorize and put to use as Milton's to the Englishman. What makes words easy to remember is not the simpleness of their meaning, nor their similarity to other words well known, but a certain something about them which has struck the fancy, or some experience of or with that for which they stand. Nor is the crabbedness and alien aspect of our Miltonic book-words due wholly to their many syllables, or to their Romance or Latin origin, for our unread Englishman is surely acquainted with three or four hundred words from the same sources, many of them trisyllabic, which he learned in his mother tongue. The trouble is, he did not learn those from Milton in the same way, — by *meeting with the thing before the name*. What makes words seem familiar and tractable is not their logical intension, but their associations. By these we mean the experiences had with or derived from that for which they stand, which experiences the presence of the words, consciously or unconsciously, revives in us.

It is with the experimental as distinguished from the logical intension of words that poetry has to do. The one is distinct from the other and is acquired much earlier. The process begins at the point in the child's life when attributes and qualities are first discerned, but only attributes and qualities of an active kind. "Will this or that thing *hurt*, will it *give delight*?" — these are the tests by which the child-mind divides and identifies its chaotic and mysterious surroundings. All objects are to it alive and potent to charm or harm. Inert or passive qualities are undistinguished or undiscerned until the logical powers develop. Demons peer out from every darkling corner. A new face, if not absolutely attractive, is not forbidding merely, it strikes terror. We are all too apt and willing to disregard what we call the foolish awe with which the child creeps away with

bated breath from something which its fancy has clothed in monstrous character. Yet in later years the child grown man will perhaps never view that same object without a pricking in the pulses. What wonder we are moved when the poet hits upon some random word which sets in vibration all our past? ✓

Little by little the inanimate world is set off from or grows upon the animate, and life becomes less momentous. Yet even at the mother's knee the process of learning the emotional intension of things goes on; for it is still the time of impressions, not of thoughts. Hence all child-minds are full of poetry, of course varying with the degree of sensitiveness and susceptibility. Not until the reflective stage is reached does the child begin to learn names before things, and things before their qualities are experienced, chiefly by books. Yet poetic minds do not disuse the faculty of sounding the experiential depths of words, even at maturity. A Shakespeare or a Keats will ever be quick to discern the experimental along with the logical, and grow in susceptibility as in knowledge. Moreover, minds so endowed will even read the experiential out of the logical. But in others the development and exercise of reason will dwarf and perhaps supplant the faculty of experimental recognition.

It is impossible to get back to the beginnings of poetical intension; they lie beyond the pale of memory. But most of us can recall illustrations of the restless and aggressive activity of the 'ego' at the age of three or four and under, when there was already a goodly fund of associations. Some abstract term let drop by the preacher, or heard from books, sets the fancy all agog. The mind seems bound not to receive it conceptually, but must know it experimentally. Hence some vivid or sensational image is assigned to the word as its proper meaning, even if an impossible and crazy analogy has to be manufactured out of whole cloth to justify it.¹ Meanings thus constructed often perversely ✓

¹ I vividly recall an example in connection with the theological term *grace*. The object assigned to this at first hearing was a shovelful of gray wood-ashes such as I had seen my mother remove from the grate. The word did not cease to call up this image insistently until long past boyhood.

cling to certain words long after the mind has learned to separate the operations of phantasy and imagination, sometimes last through life. Moreover, permitting fancy to play about words experientially is a diversion which, unless the imagination is habitually denied its proper exercise, is never given up. A word which we do not like—that is, which calls up unpleasant associations—will never succeed as the sign of a pleasant thing. Names proposed for towns or streets on account of some recognized objective attribute are often rejected by the experimental sense of the people at large. We detect ourselves continually inferring and constructing character out of names. We are sometimes prejudiced in advance against or in favor of persons we do not yet know, according as they bear favorite names or the contrary. Such names we find are favorite not because they etymologically signify excellent qualities, but because they stand for something that in a manner gives us or has given us pleasure. So, also, of the common experiential words, as *glade* and *gladden* before cited. The difference between *glade* and *woods* lies chiefly in the fact that the one changes our mood, or on mention stirs in us somewhat of the experience at some time had in being or imagining one's being in such a place, while the other represents a concept merely. So in *sad* and *sadden*, *glad* and *gladden*, the dissyllabic words make us partake through a sort of sympathy in the implied emotions, while the others do not.¹ We therefore call such words experimental because they excite, or enable us to identify, a peculiar experience of the soul. But the names we apply to different emotions are conceptual designations, and except for cause are not responded to by the emotions themselves, but call up the ideas only.

The doctrine of Association of Ideas as ordinarily set forth does not, therefore, tell the whole truth concerning the daily life of

¹ Yet the power never goes out even from these words. Our first experiences of what they mean are never lost, but often come back and possess us strongly upon occasion, though we may not know what it is that affects us. Much of the power of poetry comes from such occult associations.

the 'ego.' Not only is there incessant cognitive activity through presentative or representative forms, but emotional as well. Just as incessantly and inevitably must the 'ego' respond to every sort of stimulation pleasurable or the contrary, derived from the active qualities in objects contemplated by it in perception, — or rather both activities are united. In listening to the recital of even inconsequential happenings, as the mind interprets the words logically, it at the same time responds to the emotional influences with which they are charged, and in like manner when the media are the eye and a printed page. When the body is in repose and the march of ideas becomes wholly subjective, the states of the ego are still as chameleon-like as when the body is awake. Whether it wakes or sleeps the avenues of influence are ever open. Not only the inarticulate sounds in nature but every object discerned, whether a face or patch of sky or stretch of landscape, enter potentially the soul. Poetry is an institutional device through which the outside sources of influence may be reproduced and continued at will in the closet or by the fireside.

As to sources of our English vocabulary, it evidently matters little whence words are derived if fully naturalized. A word from Sanskrit or Chinese is just as potent as any other, and will not seem strange to the ear if it stands for something in the common experiences of men. Revived and restored Anglo-Saxon terms will be yet foreign if they do not bring back their associations with them, while importations like *creator*, *saviour*, *virtue*, *honor*, *gentle*, for like reason are as good or better than if Saxon. It is said often that the Romance and Latin portion of our vocabulary consists of the thought-terms, and the Anglo-Saxon of the emotional. This is apparently not so largely true as has been supposed. Out of the 800 Romance words found in Chaucer that are still in use not much less than half are known and heard in every native household in the land. It would hence seem that from one-fourth to one-sixth of the words in the folk-speech are un-Saxon. In respect to number of syllables, above 600 of the 800 words just mentioned are dissyllabic, or over. But the

great majority of best associational words in the language are monosyllabic; and Shakespeare, as Professor Corson has pointed out, resorts to these by instinct in pathetic passages.¹

To illustrate the effects of association in poetry there is nothing better than the two passages in *Macbeth* to the meaning of which Mr. Lowell has given us the clue:²—

“The raven himself is hoarse
That croaks the fatal entrance of Duncan
Under my battlements. Come, you spirits
That tend on mortal thoughts, unsex me here,
And fill me from the crown to the toe top-full
Of direst cruelty! Make thick my blood;
Stop up the access and passage to remorse,
That no compunctious visitings of nature
Shake my fell purpose, nor keep peace between
The effect and it! Come to my woman's breasts,
And take my milk for gall, you murdering ministers,
Wherever in your sightless substances
You wait on nature's mischief! Come, thick night,
And pall thee in the dunnest smoke of hell,
That my keen knife see not the wound it makes,
Nor heaven peep through the blanket of the dark,
To cry ‘Hold, hold!’ ”

I. v. 35-51.

Shakespeare has here in hand the difficult task of making Lady Macbeth—who is not unwomanly or ungentle—equal in our sight to forcing on her husband the murder of King Duncan. To do this he shows us how intolerable to her seems the burden she is trying to assume. He makes her cry out for strength, pray that she may be emptied of her woman's tenderness and filled with ferocity instead, that her blood may thicken, and that all approach to pity be stopped effectually. Withal she is made to shroud her-

¹ See Professor Corson's paper, "Latin and Anglo-Saxon Elements," in *Introduction to Shakespeare*, pp. 99-111.

² Prose Works, vol. 3, pp. 44, 45.

self with appalling associations of cruelty from without, that we may the less think it characteristic within. Moreover, these associations are arranged in the order of a climax. *Raven, hoarse, croaks, fatal, battlements*, are given us at the outset. Even the first of these is potential enough — as the crow of corpses — in any mention without being declared to be on this occasion hoarse even for *him*. Hers is not a house of entertainment, a *home*; she recognizes it as the place for violence and carnage. Even “woman’s breasts,” from the wish their milk may be as gall, are made to join the list of words that tell. *Night* with its own *thick* darkness is in her wish to be *palled* in the *densest smoke* of *hell*, that she may not look upon the *wound* her *keen knife* will make, nor a just *Heaven peep* spyingly through the *blanket of the dark*, to cry “*Hold, hold!*” in consternation.

This is not the place to debate the character of Lady Macbeth, whether she was by nature, as some have held, a monster, or a true gentlewoman beside herself from ambition for her husband. At any rate, here are something more than thirty terms and phrases of darkest and direst association, and some of the merely epithetic, as *murdering ministers* — not the ministering spirits of salvation, but those that lie in wait against the soul, prompting to murder and all like mischief — hardly less effective than those more directly used. Let us now compare the other passage:—

“*Duncan*. This castle hath a pleasant seat; the air
Nimble and sweetly recommends itself
Unto our gentle senses.

“*Banquo*. This guest of summer,
The temple-haunting martlet, does approve,
By his loved mansionry, that the heaven’s breath
Smells wooingly here: no jutting, frieze,
Buttress, nor coign of vantage, but this bird
Hath made his pendent bed and procreant cradle:
Where they most breed and haunt, I have observed,
The air is delicate.”

In this scene Duncan in measureless content and confiding wholly in his kinsman enters beneath those same battlements. But he is not moved to call them by that name. To him the very air is redolent of peace and *safety*. That we may breathe the same outward atmosphere and realize the terrible contradiction between the seeming security and the actual danger, as also feel more deeply Duncan's helplessness and innocence, Shakespeare again makes use of association. It is not now the raven that is mentioned, but the martlet that only summer may entertain, and that only builds in spots where there are no noises affrighting, and where it divines can be no danger. Thus we find, in the nine lines, above twenty terms and expressions

The extent to which associations are employed in poetry is greater than the reader is generally aware. Sometimes they produce the major part of the effect, as in the witches' lines which declare the contents of the caldron, at the opening of Act IV. in the same play. Here, unquestionably, it is Shakespeare's purpose to dampen the enthusiasm of the audience for its hero, and the bare meaning of the words or of the sentences, as such, is of small importance. No such array of disgusting and revolting associations was perhaps ever elsewhere heaped together. In Juliet's soliloquy, just before she swallows the sleeping potion, the associations, though now but secondary, serve both to deepen the general effect, and assist the plausibility. But to show how general is Shakespeare's use of this instrument of power, it is not necessary to select the superior passages, for examples abound in every play. Hamlet scarcely opens his mouth without swaying our sympathies according to the experiential tenor of his terms. To go outside of Shakespeare, in the quotation from the *Inn Album* used in Chapter III., the effect of the words is to contrast the clean, sweet, free outer world with the thick, carbonated atmosphere of the gamblers' room. A more excellent example is

the passage on the same page from *Sohrab and Rustum*, or the following paragraph, which next precedes it in that poem : —

“And night came down over the solemn waste,
And the two gazing hosts, and that sole pair,
And darken'd all; and a cold fog, with night,
Crept from the Oxus. Soon a hum arose,
As of a great assembly loosed, and fires
Began to twinkle through the fog; for now
Both armies moved to camp, and took their meal;
The Persians took it on the open sands
Southward, the Tartars by the river marge;
And Rustum and his son were left alone.”

Here the contrast later to be realized emotionally is first intellectually summarized in the two opening lines. In the presence of the solemn desert and the mighty Oxus, whence creep fog and night that envelop all, we share again in the routine concerns of men, while we forget not Rustum sitting with his dead. It is by the associations in *hum*, *great assembly loosed*, *twinkling fires*, that life is brought in to contrast with death so strongly. There is contribution to the general effect even in *meal* over and above what had been made, say, from the use of *food*. And then, to anchor the whole, comes the final paragraph earlier cited. It is a poem of error and weakness and calamity, which irk and ruffle the reader's spirit. But these are thrown into their true perspective by the associations of untransientness and strength and rest, of the Infinite and Complete elicited through new mention of the Oxus, and by reference to the ‘new-bathed stars,’ and the Aral Sea.

But poetry, unfortunately, is not always made up so abundantly of associational words. As the student will have been advised, it is rare that these amount to as many as one-third, or even one-quarter, of the whole number in the sentence. However, it is not the number of associations, but the potency, that tells. The effect of one may float a whole passage, or even a whole poem. In Ossian's “I have seen the walls of Balclutha, but they

were desolate. The fox looked out of the windows," the last sentence — by making the fox, with his almost inspired shyness and avoidance of man, look out of windows where once human faces peered — offers more to the imagination than volumes of detailed description, and amounts, indeed, to a poem in itself. Yet all the effect comes from bringing together the associations in *fox*, and *windows*. Moreover, we must not assume there is no power except in terms that carry their emotional value upon their face. Just what potency some of the seemingly trite and commonplace words of the mother tongue conceal we cannot know until some cunning hand lays hold upon them, as in "Deep calleth unto deep at the noise of thy waterspouts." On the other hand, nothing can be more fatal to poetry than the prominent use of a word that has never acquired an experiential meaning.¹ 'Profundity calleth unto profundity' is logically correct, but would be poetically suicidal.

¹ This is the inevitable source of defect in poetical translations. It seldom happens that words of equivalent logical intension can be found that will have the same experiential value in the two languages. It is perhaps quite as impossible for one mind to know two languages experimentally, — at least, I have not succeeded in finding such.

CHAPTER VII.

METERS, THE ORDER OF THE SENTENCE,
AND RHYME.

No one pretends of course that, objectively speaking, there can be any power in Form. The difference between the most polished and harmonious verse and the most elementary artistic delight is little less than infinite, since the one is only inanimate and material, while the other is interpretative, and involves the postulation of ideals. But the soul of man is conditioned by its environment, and if acquainted with nothing nobler, may get pleasure and inspiration, as with the Indian, from even a feather or a shell.

So we find that poetic form is merely stimulative, and that its effects come only by the subjective selection of the 'ego,' wherein something pleasing in the material sphere is taken as the earnest of another thing vastly different and nobler in the intellectual or the spiritual. One of the most elemental of the stimulants of form is rhythm. It is not in itself poetic, yet it stirs the emotional activity of even the crudest mind. Smoothness and harmony do not enter the mind of the reader as mere smoothness and harmony, but are taken up in the form or with the effect of spiritual exaltation, or made stepping-stones to a loftier mood. In like manner rhyme, if rightly used, starts the feelings at once, in the direction of idealizing whatever is couched in it.

. But each race from different endowments and varying environment develops peculiar susceptibilities, and hence requires a special set of excitants as the proper form of its national verse. The ancient Greeks were especially sensitive to exactness of proportion and definiteness of form, and so rigid and monotonous

a thing as quantity was made the basis of poetic structure.¹ In the north of Europe at the beginning of history we find the Teutonic nations in the process of evolving a system of poetic form in which rhythm, dependent on force-emphasis, and the repetition and then the echo of some particular consonant or vowel, in emphasized words, were the instruments of effect. Thus in the following lines from Cædmon's description of the flight of the Israelites from Egypt, the italicized syllables are emphatic, and the repeated *n* or *s* in the first half of the line is echoed in the second hemistich:—

“*Nearwe geneðdon on norð-wegas,*
Wiston him be suðan Sigelwara land.”²

There are four emphatic words in each double line, and all unessential words are suppressed when possible, as shown in the translation below. The number of syllables in the line is inconstant, varying in Anglo-Saxon from seven to fourteen, each hemistich, as it would seem, being sung originally in recitative to a new chord upon the harp.

But the Romans followed the Greeks and made a quantitative rhythm the basis of their system. The opening line of the *Æneid*, for example, was thus read:—

Ārmā vī|rūmqvē cā|nō Trō|jāē quī | p̄mūs āb | ōris
 ♪ ♪ ♪ | ♪ ♪ ♪ | ♪ ♪ | ♪ ♪ | ♪ ♪ | ♪ ♪

Each line of the poem consequently occupied in theory exactly the same time in rendering as any other. Hence there was little variety except what might be produced by exchanging spondees for dactyls, or *vice versa*, in the first five feet of the line. Each

¹ It is probable that Greek poetry derives its quantitative rhythm from an early custom of singing while marching or dancing to music. The wholly stereotyped and artificial *ictus* seems best explicable on such a supposition. But the theory is not altogether acceptable, and awaits further proof.

² Narrowly [they] nōw on nōrthways hāsted,
Sāw to their sōuthward Sūnfolk's lānds.

of the divisions, or 'bars,' in any sort of verse was called a *metron*, 'measurer,' and like a foot-rule served to indicate how many times the whole line used this fundamental unit. Hence *trimeter*, *tetrameter*, *hexameter*, etc., are equivalent to 'three-foot,' 'four-foot,' 'six-foot' verse or line. But more important than all, at least in effect upon modern poetry, was the special stroke or stress of the voice upon some certain syllable of every metron, called *ictus*. No matter what the form of the sentence, or the place where the emphasis of the thought or of force should fall, the designated syllable must have its stress, — even if a mere suffix or ending of declension. Clearly the foot was to be helped to beat the time, however the ear and the mind might be hindered with respect to the author's meaning. The Teutons, on the contrary, seem not to have been addicted to dancing, but took their delight more seriously. Life to them was something more than a dream of beauty. Hence the meaning, the message in their poetry, even if told in curt and ungraceful forms, was enough for them. They could never have devised or adopted an artificial system of metronomic rhythm, and would surely have avoided all attempts at verse based on word-accents as such. So they made emphasis the foundation of their poetry. All unimportant words, as articles and particles, were dispensed with, and the adjunct was made one with its noun by composition seemingly where possible. The sentence thus condensed might be made up almost entirely of emphatic parts of speech, and not seldom lines occur in which there are but the four force-words required by the measure. It was not found difficult to distribute the natural emphasis of the sentiment so as to produce more than mere prose harmony to the ear. Needing some guide to the identification of corresponding hemistichs, as also some stimulus to fancy, the old Teutons devised, or adopted, alliteration.¹

¹ It is then no marvel that force has always been a special characteristic of Teutonic poetry. Many portions, at least of the *Beowulf*, outrival the strongest passages of Carlyle. The third canto of that poem — selected at random and apparently not stronger than the average — shows seventy-five per cent of emphasis.

But in the fulness of time the Northern and the Southern literatures touched each other. The Greek and Latin masterpieces represented principles of universal beauty in respect to form, and spoke with an authority that had never yet been questioned; the literature of the North was full of sincerity and momentum. The best and fittest in each united and survived. The Teuton was content to give up alliteration for foot-meter if he might retain emphasis as the real basis of his poetry. The new Greeks and Italians gave up the false and enfeebling ictus of quantity and made the accent of the words and of the sense supply its place. Thus to poetry was restored the naturalness and force of prose. In Italy the fusion was most complete and perfect. Dante wrote the first great poem of the new age in classic meter, yet with the old Northern force-stress upon the fourth, the eighth and the tenth, or the sixth and the tenth syllable of every line.¹ Thus

¹There is generally emphasis also on other words than those in which these syllables occur. Sometimes the stress occurs on the seventh instead of the sixth syllable, sometimes on the ninth instead of the eighth, as in the sixth and fourth respectively of the following lines from Canto XIII. of the *Inferno*. The figures indicate the place of emphasis, and the marks of long quantity the metric accents.

Nōn ē|rǎ ancōr | dī lǎ | Nēssō ār|rīvā|to,
 Quāndō noi | cī mēttēm|mō per | un bōs|co
 Chē da | nēssūn | sēntiē|rō era | sēgnā|to.
 Nōn frōn|dī vēr|dī, ma | dī cō|lōr fōs|co;
 Nōn rā|mī schiēt|tī, ma | nōdō|sī e invōl|tī;
 Nōn pō|mī v' ē|rān, mā stēc|chī cōn tō|sco.
 Nōn hān | sī ās|prī stēr|pī, nē | sī fōl|tī
 Quellē fiē|re sēlvāg|gē, chē in | odio hān|no,
 Trā Cēcī|nā e Cōrnē|tō, i luō|ghī cōl|tī.
 Quivī | lē brūt|te Arpiē lor nī|do fān|no,

the *Divina Commedia* rivaled the classic epics in harmony and statuesque perfection of form, and fell no whit behind the poetry of the North in fierce and gloomy energy.

England was not to be so fortunate. First the conditions out of which the national literature was to grow were very different. No Virgil had lived to fill the land with traditions of elegant culture; there was not even as yet a language capable of bearing the thoughts of a great soul; nor was there a Dante who could make his lines say what he would despite the exactions of rhyme and meter. The *Poema Morale* and the *Ormulum* show hardly even promise of a genuine, forceful poetry. The first Middle-English poem of merit is the *Owl and the Nightingale*. This, though wanting serious purpose, is vigorous and natural, and owes its success throughout to the use of emphasis as the basis of rhythm. Coming to Chaucer, we find at first little change for the better. His early poetry scans far better than it reads. Proof abounds upon every page that he is bent rather upon making out his scheme of feet than delivering himself of his thought in a normal way. In the *Parlament of Foules* it is not easy to determine at sight where the emphasis belongs. There is dull, monotonic dispersion of stress, which comes from the meter and not the sense, and there are forced accents,—not less than three in the first stanza, and two of these upon rhyme words.¹ In the *Deth of Blanche* and the other early poems the same effect of perfunctory metric stress is noted. But in the *Prologue*² we

Chē cacciār | dellē Strō|fāde i | Trōiā¹⁰/ni,
Cōn trī'sto ānnūn'ziō di | fūtu⁸/ro dān¹⁰/no.

¹ "The lyf so short, the craft so long to lerne,
Thassay so sharp, so hard the conquerynge,
The dredful joye alwēy that flit so yerne,
Al this mene I be love, that my felýnge
Astonyeth with his wondyrful werkýnge
So sore iwis that whan I on him thynke,
Nat wot I wel wher that I flete or synke."

² The first paragraph of this is quoted on p. 60.

come upon another sort of poetry. The author is now evidently speaking to a purpose far outside and beyond his measures: the reader feels at once the supporting points as he reads the lines. There are three or at most four emphatic words to the line that the voice easily finds. The other words seem to drop of themselves into a natural subordination, and the metrical stress they carry seems to support but not to rival the main emphasis. Clearly Chaucer has learned Dante's secret — perhaps from him. All the poetry of his latest period is of this quality.

This, then, is the lesson that English literature was to learn — all correct poetry must, like Dante's, read itself; that is, must be so put together that the emphasis will designate and assert itself just as in prose or in oral utterance. Thus the reader will be released from the necessity of inferring it from the sense at large, and may give himself almost wholly to modulation, tone colorings, and other finer points and effects of interpretation. To be sure, none but great poets make poetry of such sort, but this is what distinguishes great poets from poetasters. Contrast the following passages, one from a much decried poet of Addison's and Pope's generation, the other from Shakespeare: —

“You say the hills, which high in air arise,
Harbour in clouds, and mingle with the skies,
That earth's dishonour and encumbering load,
Of many spacious regions man defraud;
For beasts and birds of prey a desolate abode.
But can the objector no convenience find
In mountains, hills, and rocks, which gird and bind
The mighty frame, that else would be disjointed?
Do not those heaps the raging tide restrain,
And for the dome afford the marble vein?
Do not the rivers from the mountains flow,
And bring down riches to the vale below?
See how the torrent rolls the golden sand
From the high ridges to the flatter land!
The lofty lines abound with endless store
Of mineral treasure and metallic ore.”

SIR RICHARD BLACKMORE: *The Creation.*

"The quality of mercy is not strain'd;
 It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven
 Upon the place beneath. It is twice blest;
 It blesseth him that gives, and him that takes:
 'Tis mightiest in the mightiest: it becomes
 The throned monarch better than his crown;
 His sceptre shews the force of temporal power,
 The attribute to awe and majesty,
 Wherein doth sit the dread and fear of kings.
 But mercy is above the sceptred sway;
 It is enthroned in the hearts of kings;
 It is an attribute to God himself;
 And earthly power doth then shew likest God's,
 When mercy seasons justice. Therefore, Jew,
 Though justice be thy plea, consider this —
 That, in the course of justice, none of us
 Should see salvation; we do pray for mercy;
 And that same prayer doth teach us all to render
 The deeds of mercy."

Merchant of Venice, IV. i. 184-202.

Both extracts are abstract and argumentative, yet note the difference. The style of the one seems to assist the meaning, to be even a part of it, but of the other, to resist and obstruct it. So much is clear; and the explanation is no mystery. There is no such thing as a poetic sentence-structure as apart or distinct from the prosaic. Sentiment must be uttered, just as facts and judgments, in normal, living idioms of speech. The subject must come before the verb, and the object follow it. To put the object before the verb, as in the first quotation, is a Latinism, and wholly at variance with spoken English. To transpose any important member of the sentence without prose warrant not only transcends the rights but defeats the ends of poetry. There are associations of *structure*, as well as of words, in the mother tongue; and the poet must do no violence to the one, if he cares for the best effect of the other. The beauty and hence the power of the second passage are dependent upon the fact that idiomatically, structurally, and accentually it is as natural

and normal as prose itself. Not that it is in form prose merely; it is that and very much besides. Prose, indeed, as well as poetry, may be stilted and unnatural. The standard is the unstudied, spontaneous manner of the mother speech. There are idiomatic places for emphasis in each oral sentence where the listener's mind awaits it in advance, and even his ear misses or supplies it if the speaker blunder with his stress. Shakespeare at his best makes his sentences as perfect in this respect as the simplest colloquial utterances, though he is poetically inditing high thoughts with all the grace and majesty of a god. But the author of the former passage has much ado to hold up the mere weight of his metric and rhyming panoply.

The basis of poetical form is organic, oral emphasis, such as abounds in *Beowulf* and the Ballads. With this as secondary and dependent everywhere the subordinate verse-accent must consist and be allied. To write poetry is not, then, to put words correctly into meter, but to put worthy sentiment metrically, and with the proper aid from lofty as well as familiar associations, into a natural and effective rhythm of emphasis. It is the vice of our literature that so many poets have been content to do all these things except the last, without which even Shakespeare would cease to be supreme. It is not too much to say that the eminent emphasis of a certain number of words in each line is as much a law of English poetry as the formal rule of Italian heroic verse already cited. It is not enough that all important words in the line have metric stress alike, so as to admit any emphasis that the reader may infer or opine the theme demands. The pivotal words must with their own organic self-assertion stand out to anticipate and take on their proper emphasis before they are reached in course. This eminent emphasis of the sentiment or of the sense will, unless the force is extreme, coincide with and generally not fall outside the accents of the feet, and in heroic verse will use from two to five of these per line. More-

naturally that the reader will be in no unwelcome wise reminded he is reading poetry.

The last observation gives the clue to a comprehensive principle. *The 'ego' in the activity of appropriating poetic delight must be kept as far as possible from every occasion of employing itself in conscious intellectual perception or judgment.* But little direct stimulus is required, as has been shown, to exalt the fancy when it is understood that conditions have been prepared to this end, that the author's purpose is poetic. On the other hand, but little friction or *gaucherie* is enough to bring the consciousness of the 'ego' willingly or unwillingly back to the sphere of phantasy. It is very willing to subscribe spiritually to the poet's fictions and devices, and will often take the will for the deed most charitably; but the odd and strange must be kept from sight. There must be no omission or displacement of words to cause a jolt or suspension, or in any other way challenge notice, or the spell will be rudely broken. The lines must not labor, or take on extra feet.¹ The metrical accents must not be forced, but should always arise from, or be allied with, the natural accents of the words and phrases, and more than all should consist with grammatical precedence; that is, the modifier must not take the accent from the word modified, except for cause. Next, as has been shown at length, the essential rhythm of the sentence must proceed as in prose from emphasis, which must be organic and coincide with the accents of the words and meter. Finally, there must be no rhythm of sentences, or of lines, as by the end-stopped mannerism, or other form of anticipation or expectancy, to allure attention.

The process of evolving poetic discernment in these various details of form has of course been slow. There are grades and degrees of excellence not only in different poets, but in the same poet at different points of his development. This has already been illustrated in the case of Chaucer. Closer exami-

¹ As in the fifth line of the passage from Blackmore,

nation will reveal that even in the poetry of his maturity he sometimes transposes — as in the first couplet of the *Prologue* — or forces an accent. Spenser will be found to have done little more on the whole than restore Chaucer's standard. Shakespeare is the first great master, yet even he went on in an amazing round of development until he anticipated essentially the blank-verse technique of the present day. The passage used above from the Merchant of Venice is by no means in his best vein, being end-stopped and somewhat declamatory. Milton added sublimity to facility and force. Wordsworth made Shakespeare's rhythmic manner universal.

The origin of rhyme is involved in as much obscurity as of foot-meter. As in effect implied early in this chapter, it is outwardly or objectively altogether impotent and foolish. It pleases the ear, and the pleasure is appropriated spiritually by the 'ego.' But to secure the highest effect rhymes must be so chosen and employed as to escape intellectual apprehension. Here also anything that arrests or draws away the 'ego' from its idealizing processes is reactive and perhaps will prove calamitous. In order to escape its purely perceptive or critical cognizance all rhymes must be unstrained and perfect, and should be made with experiential words. There is no shorter road to burlesque than the use of rhyming terms having only a logical intension. Much of the effect in *Hudibras* is produced by this simple means, and much unconscious travesty has been since turned out by better-intentioned poetasters in the same way. Similarly, the making of double rhymes by use of two words is likely to challenge attention, and introduces an element of friction.¹

With respect to the choice and use of words as such the same principle of evading the critical cognizance of the 'ego' holds in force. Everything that is at variance with its best prose habits, as contractions and elisions, should be scrupulously

¹ But it should be noted that sometimes this effect appears to be intentional, as in certain of Browning's poems written in a vexed mood, notably *Old Pictures in Florence*.

avoided. Respecting ellipses, the reader should never be delayed that he may see a word on the printed page that is already yet more vividly before his mind, — as at times the verb. On the other hand, he should not be perplexed by the omission from the page of ideas or terms not yet apprehended. Obviousness and obscurity are equally mischievous in poetry. The 'ego' here acts with its best intuition; and the successful poet will be found to aim neither above nor below the general range of that activity.

The sources of power in poetry, therefore, as contained in form, are both negative and positive. As positive they stimulate and enable idealization, as negative they prevent the interruption of that activity. Among the former should not be omitted the natural selection of the scheme of rhymes and meter as echoing or re-enforcing the sentiment or spirit of the poem as a whole.

CHAPTER VIII.

POETIC PHRASES.

WHAT experimental quality may through association reside in single, isolated words, has to some extent been shown. An attempt will next be made to analyze the poetical effects of phrases.

It is evident that suggestive words, when compounded or combined in phrases, should retain the potency they had as singles, and sometimes, but perhaps not often, enhance it by the union. But what shall be said of words, in themselves prosaic and common enough, which rise to poetic potency when phrased, as in this from Keats?

“There is a sleepy dusk, an odorous shade
From some approaching wonder, and behold
Those winged steeds, with snorting nostrils bold
Snuff at its faint extreme, and seem to tire,
Dying to embers from their native fire.”

Endymion, Bk. IV.

‘Steed,’ and ‘winged,’ are of course not prose words, but all the others are even commonplace; yet the passage is not inferior to many built up of choicest associational terms. Are, then, the words in themselves as impotent poetically as they seem?

Not all the poetic delights of the mind are enabled or occasioned by the influence of words alone. Many are complex and not derivable from single ideas or things. A common attribute joined to a common object in a new relation does not necessarily yield a product as tame as either, but may amount to a revelation of beauty. ‘A sleepy — *i.e.* sleep-causing — dusk,’ ‘some approaching

wonder,' are fair examples. One at first suspects it is the use of the abstract for the concrete that furnishes the pretext on which imagination acts. That this is not all or much of the truth is seen if the description is recast in the prose way. Nor is it in the spirit, or art-purpose of the passage merely. Another example—this also not from the most exalted sort of poetry—will be clearer on this point:—

“That very time I saw, but thou couldst not,
 Flying between the cold moon and the earth,
 Cupid all armed: a certain aim he took
 At a fair vestal throned by the west,
 And loosed his love-shaft smartly from his bow,
 As it should pierce a hundred thousand hearts.
 But I might see young Cupid's fiery shaft
 Quenched in the chaste beams of the watery moon,
 And the imperial votaress passed on
 In maiden meditation, fancy free.”

Oberon to Puck, M.S.D., II. i. 152-161.

Here the last four lines furnish the illustrative phrases. *Chaste*, *beams*, *watery*, *moon*, *imperial*, *votaress*, *maiden*, and *meditation* are, as before, words which, prosaic as singles, form combinations stimulative of the mental activity called imagination. *Fiery* is not included since, signifying not 'resembling' but 'causing' fire, it is in this case poetic. It is evident at once that the poetry here is not merely in the phrases, that the beauty revealed comes from beyond the language. Moreover, it is not in the spirit of the passage as a whole, nor in the author's purpose, which was merely to indite a passing compliment to Elizabeth. It lies in the bodying forth of an ideal,—not true literally, as prose would have made only too apparent, but true spiritually. The mind of the reader is as intellectually aware as was Shakespeare's that Elizabeth was not insensible to the attractions of handsome courtiers, and was not above encouraging native as well as foreign aspirants to her hand; it nevertheless believes in the existence of the vestal ideal, and that this ideal is right and true.

perforce would fain have all ideals realized. Hence Shakespeare's compliment consists in representing the ideal as in this case actual; and thus it is that we are charmed by the contemplation, so long as we can make the illusion last.

Shakespeare's use of phrases here is therefore analogous to his employment of suggestive words in the passages quoted from *Macbeth* in Chapter VI. In those he uses familiar and ready-made associations each by itself; here he blends associations less potent for the sake of their combined effects. 'Chaste,' 'beams,' 'watery,' 'moon,' 'imperial,' 'votaress,' 'maiden,' 'meditation,' open each to an independent vista of recollections, and are made by pairing to refine and idealize each other. 'Maiden meditation' is meditation proper for or characteristic of the maiden mind; an 'imperial votaress' is one who, though an absolute ruler, is yet under a vow as fully as if withdrawn from the world; and so on. The effect of all is to assist removal from the actual world to an ethereal, super-sensuous plane. There is nothing of the human, of the earth earthy, left in sight. We are somehow above in space, with Oberon and the moon.

It is further characteristic of suggestive phrases that they involve a new activity. In the suggestive passages from *Macbeth* the mental operation was reminiscent merely; here it is constructive. Only thus creatively was it possible for Shakespeare to produce the effect last noted, for aerial experiences in the actual could not be drawn upon. Similarly in the lines from Keats first cited and throughout the description of which they form a part, the fancy is kept upon the stretch creating from old materials fresh combinations that give pleasure, not because of the associations wrapped up in the parts as singles, but because the experiences from the wholes as such are new. So in these later lines from the same book of the *Endymion* —

" Ah Zephyrus! art here, and Flora too?
 Ye tender bibbers of the rain and dew,
 Young playmates of the rose and daffodil " —

the 'ego' is peculiarly grateful for the notion that Zephyrus and

Flora are in a sense, indeed, rain and dew-bibbers, and playmates of the daffodil and rose. But this sort of suggestion leads the mind to *think* as well as to remember, challenges it to test experimentally the objects named in their new relation. Thus is it that the phrase serves preavilingly as an instrument for the revelation of fresh analogies and new poetic truth.

It may be well to distinguish here the different kinds of phrases that may occur in poetry. First are, of course, the ordinary prose phrases made up of noun and limiting or qualifying adjective, like 'pleasant dreams,' 'secret purpose,' 'first disobedience'; likewise prepositional adjuncts used in logical strictness, as 'loss of Eden,' 'pride of kings,' etc. Next come epithetical phrases, or such as add to the noun an adjective more or less superogatory or implied already, like 'fickle freaks,' 'shady grove,' 'shapeless ruin,' and the like. After these are properly ranked combinations in which the noun or its adjunct is used in some transferred or figurative sense, as 'rivals of my watch,' 'dews of blood,' 'skirts of Norway,' 'solid roar,' 'patient stars,' and all such. Next belong phrases of which one or both principal elements, considered independently, are poetic words, like 'winged steeds,' 'dusk demesnes.' Finally, we reach the poetic phrase pre-eminently, in which, as in Shakespeare's 'russet mantle,' 'little month,' 'maiden meditation,' neither noun nor adjective is used in an unliteral significance. Of these classes only the last three are of prime importance, — save that epithetic phrases sometimes greatly avail when the adjunct commands potent associations.¹

The history of phrase development is a very important chapter in the evolution of poetic power. Phrases are almost unknown in Chaucer and his successors, who use the adjective essentially in prosaic ways. In Wyatt and Sackville, in addition to such epi-

¹ There is an old instinct of English speech which permits the placing of an adjective after its noun in poetic diction, as in expressions like 'ashes cold,' 'prelude soft,' 'stride colossal.' The effect is generally, through associations of form, to give dignity to the line or sentence, sometimes to exalt the phrase so composed to poetic potency. Whenever this occurs, the instances should be entered under a sub-group *b* of the respective class.

thetic cases as 'thoughtful care,' 'tender ruth,' 'dumb dead corse,' we find some genuine examples like 'night's misty mantle,' 'withered fist,' 'vapoured eyes,' etc. In Spenser the phrase instinct is more pronounced, but still somewhat blind and vague. He seems to approve such expressions as 'infernal feend,' 'blustering storms,' 'watrie wette,' 'shady grove,' 'swete harmony,' equally with 'afflicted stile,' 'wasteful spite,' 'gentle jollities,' 'cruel sky.' Shakespeare is the first poet in our literature to eschew mere epithets and use the phrase discriminatingly to the uttermost of strong effect,—as indeed no poet since has wielded it with superior energy and skill. Yet he often falls short of the simple beauty just noted in the lines from the part of Oberon. He will also be found to employ comparatively few phrases of the last or most poetic kind above described. In the first act of *Hamlet*, 'bird of dawning,' 'russet mantle,' 'little month,' and 'wicked speed,' are the only good examples of such phrases, and there are perhaps twenty admissible instances in all; while of phrases of the third kind—involving some indirect or transferred meaning—there are two hundred and over. Shakespeare has clearly not yet evolved the skill to lay hold of the materials just under his hand, but reaches out after indirect etymologic or other effects from beyond the mother tongue. 'Rivals of my watch,' 'sensible avouch,' 'strange eruption,' 'impress of shipwrights,' 'extravagant and erring spirit,' 'dejected havior of the visage,' may stand for the long list of examples. Milton belongs to Shakespeare's school, and in his best lyric style almost outrivals his master in unlabored and simple phrasing. But the promise of the *L'Allegro* and the *Lycidas* was not yet to be fulfilled. In the Metaphysical and Classical periods which follow, and even past the *Lyrical Ballads*, the skill if not the will seems wholly wanting. The new age had begun in spirit, we are wont to say, with Coleridge, but had not yet possessed the form. Hitherto this had been treated, so to speak, only in light and shade. Keats and Shelley, by using the increment of color—and this through the effect of phrases—now make poetry an art indeed. In these masters phrases outnumber all other

poetic elements, and are also no longer perfunctory or tautological, but prevaillingly of the last or most potent kind. In the *Alastor* the ratio of phrases to the sum of all poetic elements is as 8 : 15, nearly, while of fifth-class and fourth-class to third-class phrases, as 35 : 9. In the first act of *Hamlet*, as will be remembered, the latter ratio was as 1 : 10.

Shakespeare, as was shown in the last chapter, found the secret of perfect form so far as that consisted in emphasis and meter. Were the young twin poets his equals in this respect, they had been great names indeed in English and universal literature. Though they did much towards rediscovering his lost secret, they yet stand on their one attainment and contribution. While men read Shakespeare in these days of accepted canons for the sake of the matter, in spite of unevenness and frequent nods or lapses in the manner, they read Shelley and Keats chiefly for the manner without greatly caring for the matter. Indeed, if form and purpose are to be regarded, both the *Endymion* and the *Alastor* come far short of being great poems. There are, moreover, relatively as many slips and offences against taste, at least in the former, as in any work of Shakespeare's. Yet is there such beauty everywhere in spite of all as makes Shakespeare in comparison, except here and there for a few lines, seem statuesque and distant, marble-grained and cold, — or should we say that his severity finds its analogue rather in the technique of steel-engravers? But English poetry at its best since the *Alastor* has had all the richness and glow of painting.

It is of course admitted that some poets of reputation do not much use either suggestive words or poetic phrases, and perhaps the taste of some readers would fain reject them altogether. But associational terms and poetic phrases are not only extant in the minor poets of the day, but also abound almost equally in greater masters as unlike in theory and form as Robert Browning and Matthew Arnold. Moreover, there is as little denying their potency in the economy of literature as their presence, though tastes may well differ as to how frequently they should be used. They have

had thus far their history, and will complete their destiny in spite of the avowed approval or hostility of the critics. Any given poetic composition may for a time or sometimes run in bald, straightforward prose terms and phrases, but the day is past when a great poem can be cast throughout in these alone. To establish this it will be sufficient merely to compare Mrs. Hemans, "L. E. L.," and Mary Howitt with Mrs. Browning, and Montgomery, or even Byron, with Tennyson.

To enable clear comprehension of the differences between prose, epithetic, indirect, fourth-class and fifth-class phrases, compare the following passages, and note the instances in each class. Any phrase that stops the prose progress of the reader for a poetic reason, should be admitted and its place determined.

"Lo! where the heath, with withering brake grown o'er,
Lends the light turf that warms the neighbouring poor;
From thence a length of burning sand appears,
Where the thin harvest waves its wither'd ears;
Rank weeds, that every art and care defy,
Reign o'er the land, and rob the blighted rye :
There thistles stretch their prickly arms afar,
And to the ragged infant threaten war;
There poppies nodding, mock the hope of toil;
There the blue bugloss paints the sterile soil;
Hardy and high, above the slender sheaf,
The slimy mallow waves her silky leaf;
O'er the young shoot the charlock throws a shade,
And clasping tares cling round the sickly blade ;
With mingled tints the rocky coasts abound,
And a sad splendour vainly shines around."

CRABBE: *The Village*, Bk. I.

"For that our kingdom's earth should not be soil'd
With that dear blood which it hath fostered;
And for our eyes do hate the dire aspect
Of civil wounds plough'd up with neighbors' swords;
And for we think the eagle-winged pride
Of sky-aspiring and ambitious thoughts,
With rival-hating envy, set on you

To wake our peace, which in our country's cradle
 Draws the sweet infant breath of gentle sleep;
 Which so rous'd up with boisterous untun'd drums,
 With harsh-resounding trumpets' dreadful bray,
 And grating shock of wrathful iron arms,
 Might from our quiet confines fright fair peace,
 And make us wade even in our kindred's blood; —
 Therefore, we banish you our territories."

SHAKESPEARE: *Richard II.*, I. iii.

"Shepherd, stay!

There is a land behind the western cloud,
 A low deep meadow land of ceaseless spring
 And everlasting twilight: olives there
 Shed a perpetual shade of softened lustre
 Like woven light on the green grass below;
 Where foam-white asphodels, tall milky blossoms,
 Shimmer with interchange of hyacinth,
 Blood-red anemone, and faint narcissus,
 And the blue violet strays in sweet tangles,
 Seen and unseen, by pool and running brook,
 Lulling the sense with fragrance; while a song
 Rocks in the odorous height of spreading pine
 And spiry cypress and aerial palm.
 There Hymenæus dwells with me, what time
 We rest from roaming the star-spangled sky.
 There all good lovers, after toilsome life,
 Lie raimented with everlasting youth."

JOHN ADDINGTON SYMONDS: *Hesperus and Hymenæus*, 117-134.

CHAPTER IX.

FIGURES.

CHAUCER, it has been said, does not make poetry by means of suggestive words and phrases. But Chaucer is a great poet nevertheless. He must therefore have reached his effects in some way by means of the sentence as a whole. Let us next try to find out how.

Chaucer is admittedly nowhere more poetic or admirable every way than in the opening paragraph of the *Prologue to the Canterbury Tales* :—

“Whan that Aprille with his shoures sote
 The droghte of Marche hath perced to the rote,
 And bathed every veyne in swich licour
 Of which vertu engendred is the flour;
 Whan Zephirus eek with his swete breeth
 Inspired hath in every holt and heeth
 The tendre croppes, and ~~the yonge sonne~~ ‘
 Hath in the Ram his halfe cours yronne,
 And smale fowles maken melodye
 That slepen al the night with open eye—
 So priketh hem Nature in hir gorages—
 Thanne longen folk to gon on pilgrimages—
 And palmers for to seken straunge strondes—
 To ferne halwes, couthe in sondry londes;
 And specially, from every shires ende
 Of Engelond, to Caunturbury they wende,
 The holy blisful martir for to seke,
 That hem hath holpen whan that they were seke.”

In these lines there is some ground for supposing that *devout*, *courage*, and *martir* were experiential to the writer's mind. Of

poetic phrasing no good instance occurs, unless we admit *shoures soe*, as doubtless we should not, since it is attached to the triple metaphor of 'piercing the drought of March to the root,' and designates the means. But in the first line we find *Aprille* personified, as *Marche*, *Zephrus*, *sonne*, *Ram*, and *Nature* later. The other figurative expressions are far more numerous — '*April piercing the drought*' (vaguely conceived as a tree or plant) '*of March to the root with the sweetness of his showers*'; '*bathing every vein in that moisture from the virtue of which the blossom is begotten*'; '*Zephrus inspiring the tender shoots in every wood and heath*'; '*the young sun running his half-course in the Ram*'; and '*nature pricking the birds in their hearts to make melody*.' Hence, in addition to the implication that the 'longing of folk to go on pilgrimages' is only another effect of the same kind with the rest, also apart from all felicities of form and not a little of that "high seriousness" and dignity that must underlie all poetic power, we have the effect of no less than twenty figurative terms and expressions in the eighteen lines of the paragraph. To the figures mainly, therefore, the passage no doubt owes its perennial charm.

But what are figures? How does personification, how do metaphors make poetry? What charm can there be in the indication of saying, '*April pierces a drought to the root*'?

Let us begin with metaphors and similes. What is the difference between them? Which is the more effective? These and like questions, with which we are all more or less familiar, may be satisfactorily answered after an analysis similar to that which has been employed before. Somewhat of the characteristic subjectivity of the ego, particularly in the activity called imagination, has been shown in previous chapters. This subjectivity greatly varies with different minds and even with the same mind in different states of energy, and when different subjects are under consideration. This subjectivity does not consist merely in presenting objects pictorially before the mind; it goes much further, and especially in the direction of revealing, and maintaining, subtle and unsuspected analogies. By this

discovery of characteristics possessed in common the mind proceeds, often in an arbitrary or fantastic fashion, to construct new species, — even new genera, for the moment, or until the flash of fancy has passed from sight. For example, in "Thou hast brought a vine out of Egypt; thou hast cast out the heathen and planted it," the transcendent energy of the mind's cognition recognizes the analogy between the work of Jehovah in bringing the Israelites out of Egypt and settling them in Palestine and the husbandman's transplanting of vines, so makes Jehovah for the moment stand in the genus or class of vine-dressers. But this does not describe the whole process. In the case of those whose imagination is slow and mal-adroit, the metaphor will be incompletely realized; there will at least be no apprehension of God as a vineyard-tender. But the more vigorous and nimble intellect will realize the figure in a flash of fancy by thinking or seeing the personal Jehovah, symbolically, for the moment in the form of a real gardener, or, in other words, will identify the image formed in the mind with that declared or called for by the metaphor, and thus get the whole effect intended by the speaker or writer. For it is evident here that the writer saw mentally this same identity, and said or wrote the metaphor *because* he experienced it thus vividly in his mind. This exaltation of resemblance, through the creative energy of imagination, to identity, is especially agreeable to the ego. No other disconnected operation of imagination gives so much delight.

Herein also may be discerned the difference between the metaphor and the simile. When the resemblance is not so marked as to warrant the assignment of the two objects to a new class by using it as the basis of classification, no such attempt will be made by the well-balanced mind; the resemblance will be predicated merely. "He shall be *like* a tree planted by the rivers of water" gives notice specifically that the righteous man and the tree are not at all to be thought of as included in the same class, but merely as having a certain incidental characteristic in common. With the quiet spirit of the first psalm the figure chosen by the writer is in perfect keeping. A more erratic or excited mind might by subjec-

tive enthusiasm have so magnified the common quality as to conceive the prosperous man during a flash of fancy as really a perennially green tree. But the imagination of most readers could not have gone with him in this, so that the figure would have amounted to little or nothing more than the simile we find.¹

We may deduce easily from the foregoing certain important observations. The highly imaginative mind will in general deal too much in metaphors. The poet will write too florid prose; a Tegnér will become almost fantastic.² On the other hand, the prosaic, matter-of-fact mind will often fail to call things by some metaphorical class-name that will speak volumes of detailed description. "O ye generation of vipers" condenses an encyclopedia of characteristics into a single word, and *all because in the image which that word calls up in the mind we see Pharisees and vipers identified in a common class*. Likewise "wolf in sheep's clothing" bestowed upon one who has abused confidence is vastly different from the same preceded by 'like.' In the former case the excited mind of the speaker sees that which is named in the metaphor, and by a transcendently subjective act unites with it the personality and character of the traitor addressed. In the latter

¹ Note how the writer, no doubt unconsciously, intensifies the effect by using a complementary metaphor in the next clause: "his leaf also shall not wither." Contrariwise, a metaphor is often assisted through the mind of the reader by a succeeding simile.

² Esaias Tegnér, the most celebrated of Swedish poets, and scarcely rivalled in any literature for vividness of fancy. His principal poem, *Frithiof's Saga*, begins with this metaphor:—

"There grew in Hilding's manor fair
Two plants beneath his fostering care.
The North before saw never blended
Such beauty sweet and promise splendid.

"The one burst oaklike forth a tree,
And like a lance its stock to see;
Its crown that in the breezes trembled,
In arch a warrior's helm resembled.

"The other flourished as a rose," etc.

But the two plants are Frithiof and Ingeborg, hero and heroine of the story!

case his mind contemplates two ideas, as separate, in an act of comparison. Moreover, a reader of vivid imagination will catch the spirit of a figure which a halting writer has improperly introduced as a simile, and will realize it as a metaphor in spite of the printed words.

It is evident there can be and should be no principle of choice between similes and metaphors but this: *Write as you think*. If the writer sees the two objects compared as really identified through some common characteristic, let him so pronounce them, — even if Christ shall call Peter ‘Satan,’ or Paul, the high priest, ‘a whited wall.’ Let him write what is *in the mind*, or write not at all. Obedience to this law of truth will prevent the abuse of figures except in case of minds too agile and vivid in perception of analogies. Very little of what is called fine writing is due to honest transcription of what is seen in fancy, but the embellishments are filled in afterwards without organic relation to the theme. Such use of figures betrays generally its occasion. So also when the complex is taken to illustrate the simple. Men do not call vipers ‘a generation of Pharisees’ in response to any genuine thinking whatsoever.

Similar to metaphor, but simpler and cruder, are the Allegory and the Parable. The allegory is a consistent history, capable equally of a literal or a spiritual interpretation. The parable is a less extended instance, taken from or squaring with the material side of life, and designed to carry the mind to some spiritual conclusion. In both of these figures resemblance is made the pretext, as in metaphor, of establishing a passing identity. Allegory and the parable, as well as the fable, belong to an elementary stage of spiritual history. What might be cast in the form of either, well-appointed minds may, at least in the present literary stage, be expected to take for granted.

Personification appears at first to be a figure entirely unlike those first described. The principle at bottom seems to be merely egoistic. The child manifests it by insisting on treating its pet dog or canary as endowed with human faculties, or by giving its rocking

horse or doll at least the attributes of life. It will often invest inanimate things with moral responsibility, and whips the stool over which it has stumbled as culpable for its fall. In maturer years, when the fancy has been chastened and sobered, the habit is by no means abandoned, but rather confirmed. Whenever the enthusiasm of the mind is called forth towards some inanimate object, the natural impulse is to raise it to a higher genus, to endow it with personality, and thus make it the proper object of a higher sympathy. The railroad engineer speaks usually of his engine as 'she,' simply because he finds it natural to consider its almost human efficiency and trustworthiness as wholly conscious. To his fancy it behaves 'well,' or 'ill,' is 'contrary,' or 'obliging'; though he knows as well as the profoundest philosopher that the machine can do or be nothing of the kind. This subjectivity is exercised also towards men and women. Persons to whom we are partial are the 'best people in the world': we ignore their faults, we exalt their virtues. Our chosen friends are to us of supreme worth, of even more than human excellence. Our children are always to us good, and interesting, and full of promise. Our home, our street, our city are to us the best. In general through this subjectivity, we see less in better things that are not ours than in our own. Moreover, if we become alienated from friends, if we change abode, or street, or city, we transfer our partiality to other objects, and in time put an estimate on what we have abandoned that more nearly squares with outside or general opinion. On the other hand, towards persons or things disliked or hostile the enthusiasm of the ego is manifested, not in raising to a higher plane by subjectively emphasizing best characteristics, but the contrary. People of worth and culture with whom we do not chance to be associated in some close way, are likely to be regarded with indifference: so that in all the world there is perhaps no person or thing that does not stand nearer our sympathy or further away from it, than to the general mind is wholly reasonable and just.

But the essence of this egoism is not mere selfishness as we commonly understand that word. What causes the ego to become

attached to the objects which make up its environment is not the consciousness that they are its own, but the fact that *it is having or has had experimental knowledge of them*. What the soul has had experience of becomes a part of its life, or of itself. Herein lies the secret of perfect memory; herein lies the difference between the old education and the new. Not *iteration*, but *experience of things* is the key to memory and true knowledge. An "enlightened selfishness" is therefore incident to the isolation of the ego, which is, as it were, an independent pivot or focus of the universe. Hence the ego craves its own that it may multiply the occasions of delight. It seeks joy everywhere, is under a constant spell of expectancy as of one that has lost his way, and imagines each phenomenon an earnest of that of which it is in search. So when it finds an object in which it is sure of delight, it is fain to enhance its satisfaction by adding to it an increment from its subjective self. For the sake of joy in the relationship, it chooses friends by recognizing some certain quality or qualities and ignoring others. In personification there is the same process; things from a lower genus are exalted into the same relation with the ego as another ego might sustain. But this personal relation is not physical. It is only by the supremest subjectivity that a personified quality can be brought before the physical eye in painted or sculptured forms. To most of us, Faith, Hope, and Charity are probably not a trio of new graces, but three names capitalized by the printer. This may be due to slowness of fancy, but oftener perhaps to a livelier spiritual apprehension. For it should now be clear that personification is after all only a process of the same kind as allegory, parable, or metaphor, inasmuch as in each and all of these an outer resemblance is accepted as evidence of inner identity, or that, though the objects associated differ outwardly, they mean the same spiritually. In other words, the ego finds in the lower a type of the higher, from charity or some other human characteristic limns out the complete superior being which would be appropriate or proportioned to the single quality.¹ Or it sees

¹ So in the Dawn, Justice, Liberty, Chastity, Piety, etc., the ego constructs the entire goddess or angel personality of which it has recognized the type. By the

also in the higher a type of the lower ; as in Jehovah, of the vine-dresser, or in Christ, of the good shepherd.

We may therefore pronounce each of the figures now considered a species of idealization. We commonly think at least of metaphor as a help to intellectual understanding merely, but this is clearly a mistake. The basis of all the figures mentioned is analogy. But analogy is not always an intellectual relation, is never properly such at all. When we speak of youth as the morning of life, we thereby in no wise elucidate youth as an intellectual or logical concept, but simply go beyond the literal and physical sphere, and note that life may, *in a spiritual sense*, be said to have its morning. Analogy is properly a spiritual proportion, or rather an identity of spiritual ratios.¹

But the ego does not love merely what it has experienced, it loves its experiences themselves ; not only its environment, but its work as well. The author enjoys his own poem perhaps more highly than another by a better hand. The reader enjoys a composition in which he is allowed to assist the author, rather than one which does not take for granted his powers of penetration. Hence his mind delights in condensed expressions, since it can more quickly reach the meaning. A 'brave assault' is more pleasing than an 'assault by brave men,' for the mind apprehends at once the real nature of the thought, and wins an experience besides. An author who affords no such opportunity is 'dry,' which is the ego's favorite name for compositions that do not recognize its highest activity. Moreover, one of the most familiar of mental phenomena is abbreviation of symbols. In spoken language there is a constant tendency to shorten words and lighten the utterance of heavy syllables. In writing and printing, symbols and abbreviations are universal. These of course save energy and time, but

same process were produced the superior and inferior deities of the Greeks, and in general the other gods and goddesses of the heathen world.

¹ The fault called mixed metaphor is due to a confusion of types, and proceeds from an imperfect, or merely intellectual, discernment of like qualities or relations. When resemblance is spiritually apprehended, there is small place in thought for a rival experience at the same time.

they do yet more. The ego will not be bored. After an idea becomes familiar, the mind tries to avoid contemplating it in full, and if possible cuts short the representation. If the object to be pictured is a house, the process of imaging is stopped when the most salient or characteristic part has been constructed, as the roof. So also of a ship, the mental picture is reduced to the representation of the sail. But this is not all. The ego is at the same time alert in the activity which produces metaphor, and constantly recognizes the spiritual identity of the whole and the part, the cause and the effect, the container and the thing contained. It sees in gray hairs the type of 'old age.' Summer being the soul of the year, 'ten summers' will mean the same to it as 'ten years.' Hence when there is an identity of values, the notion that is less complex and burdensome will be the favorite. Hence 'bar' and 'pulpit' and 'press' have become established even in common thinking, and in the language of common life.¹

Other mental habits and tendencies kindred with the foregoing might be here considered. Nicknames suggest the abrogation of formality, the closest and most familiar approach of mind to mind. Diminutives argue a caressing fondness, and a subjective effort to invest with qualities that will justify or invite it. On the other hand, a change from familiar to formal appellatives indicates rising differences. The only remaining figure connected with these states of the ego is the much-abused apostrophe. When the mind resorts to this in moments of rare spiritual clearness, it is very effective; but unless the mind spiritually sees the object addressed as present before it, common sense generally dissuades from calling on what cannot hear and cannot answer. Common sense indeed is the code of the ego, and is a function of the feelings rather than the reason.

The student should now be prepared to distinguish clearly the

¹ This is the course of nature in the history of words. Metaphors of rarest excellence often lose their first significance, and cease in time to be more than intellectual. As Carlyle has so excellently pointed out, our common vocabulary abounds in terms once highly figurative.

different kinds of suggestive words considered together in Chapter III., — a thing obviously impracticable before. A suggestive word is properly an experimental word, or one that through association has direct, intrinsic power with the emotions. But a word that gives pleasure because used for what it is not, is a “trope,” and should be considered by itself. It may involve a metaphor, or a personification; it may stand — like *brave* in the example above — as an abbreviation for a whole phrase, or in some other way as a part for the whole; contrariwise, as a whole it may be mentioned merely to designate some part. Each example should be restored to its direct and literal form, and patiently studied until the specific source of the effect upon the imagination is determined. So in phrases of the third class, the particular kind of figure should be made out in the same way by changing to the literal or prose manner of expression, and even further expansion if necessary. Both word and phrase figures should be carefully distinguished from clause figures, or those in which the transaction or quality is fully predicated. To insure quick discernment of these and other differences, it will be well if the student *parse* the poetical elements in a few paragraphs. The suggestive words, phrases of each class, and figures of whatever sort, should, each in its place, be determined and declared. To facilitate such an exercise the following examples, mainly of the three forms respectively, may be used.

“Ye holy towers that shade the wave-worn steep,
Long may ye rear your aged brows sublime,
Though hurrying silent by, relentless time
Assail you, and the wintry whirlwind sweep.
For, far from blazing grandeur’s crowded halls,
Here Charity has fixed her chosen seat;
Oft listening tearful when the wild winds beat
With hollow bodings round your ancient walls;
And Pity, at the dark and stormy hour
Of midnight, when the moon is hid on high,
Keeps her lone watch upon the topmost tower,
And turns her ear to each expiring cry.

Blest if her aid some fainting wretch might save,
And snatch him cold and speechless from the grave."

WILLIAM LISLE BOWLES: *Bamborough Castle*.

"Once a fair city, courted then by kings,
Mistress of nations, thronged by palaces,
Raising her head o'er destiny, her face
Glowing with pleasure and with palms refreshed,
Now pointed at by Wisdom or by Wealth,
Bereft of beauty, bare of ornaments,
Stood in the wilderness of woe, Masar."

WALTER SAVAGE LANDOR: *Gebir*, Bk. v.

"I felt the wind soft from the land of souls;
The old miraculous mountains heaved in sight,
One straining past another along the shore,
The way of grand dull Odyssean ghosts
Athirst to drink the cool blue wine of seas
And stare on voyagers. Peak pushing peak
They stood: I watched beyond that Tyrian belt
Of intense sea betwixt them and the ship,
Down all their sides the misty olive-woods
Dissolving in the weak congenial moon,
And still disclosing some brown convent-tower
That seems as if it grew from some brown rock,
Or many a little lighted village, dropt
Like a fallen star, upon so high a point,
You wonder what can keep it in its place
From sliding headlong with the waterfalls
Which powder all the myrtle and orange groves
With sprays of silver. Thus my Italy
Was stealing on us."

ELIZABETH BARRETT BROWNING: *Aurora Leigh*, Bk. vii.

CHAPTER X.

FIGURES — CONTINUED.

It has been shown that Allegory, Metaphor, and Simile are figures really alike in kind, and differing merely in the degree of spiritual identity established or recognized. Hence they sometimes run into each other, as in this verse before quoted from the Psalms: "Thou hast brought a vine out of Egypt: *thou hast cast out the heathen*, and planted it." Here the author plainly starts out with allegory, but by using *heathen* in the second clause, turns the whole to metaphor. He seems to have shrunk from developing the idea of a vine independently, to be interpreted by the reader later on, but purposely introduces *heathen* — instead of *wild*, or *native*, *vine* — for the sake of appropriating at once the benefit of the analogy. He finds himself able to develop the two ideas together in his own mind, and assumes — though all unconsciously — the ability of his hearers to do the same. Similarly, the opening of Psalm xxiii. is cast in running metaphor.

The reason of the change here from allegory to metaphor is the same as that which explains 'brave attack' above: the mind abbreviates, condenses, thus attaining superior vividness and energy. Also with reference to the hearer, it is enabled, by reducing the bulk and weight of the figure, and wielding it with firmer grasp, to produce a more immediate and intense effect. For the instrument of speech grows, or should grow, more prehensible and efficient as the mind expands. Hence the reason why young readers are so slow to take in the higher effects of poetry: they are not accustomed to the terse and intense manner of our best poets. To appreciate Keats and Tennyson, or even Byron, requires an awakening of the spiritual sense, or a taste for analo-

gies, and expert readiness in developing and appropriating them that, in the main, can only come by culture. Therefore to young minds just beginning to use analogy, allegory is very welcome; but as these grow more and more accustomed to the spiritual view the parallels grow shorter and shorter, until, in practical thinking, they are reduced to points, and made, as we say mathematically, to coincide. A single phrase, or perhaps a word, is made to do duty, with telling effect, for a whole metaphoric clause, or original allegoric paragraph.

This process is nowise exclusively poetical, but is illustrated in all departments of intellectual expansion. The tendency everywhere is to reduce reflective processes to instinctive. The boy that begins with adding digits whose sum is less than ten, may end as a bank clerk who casts four columns of figures at once. The unit of comprehension to him is now in the thousands' column. So in poetry at first the unit is each significant circumstance included in the analogy, as — to take once more the same example — 'bringing the vine out of Egypt,' 'casting out the heathen,' and 'planting it.' But when the mind has learned how to go along the beaten paths of analogy without a guide, it is enough to say 'vine from Egypt,' or 'Jewish vine.' So, in the lines quoted from Denham in Chapter II., the unit is each point of resemblance indicated, or 'called off' — we almost might say — to phantasy. But to the trained imagination, as was shown, 'Thames-like' is potential of all high effect. The unit is here *the whole analogy*.

On examining into the nature of the other figures, we find like concentration and intensification everywhere. In Synecdoche, we are told, 'a part is put for the whole, a species for the genus, a definite number for an indefinite, and *vice versa*.' It has been made clear already that 'British sails' is abbreviated and energized in thought from 'British ships,' because the mind sees pictorially as at a distance merely the sails, and will not permit phantasy to construct more of the image. To show the whole would not add definiteness, but would divert energy, in the same

manner as, in mathematical thinking, to attach to an algebraic symbol its known value would clog the mind. In "Ten thousand were on his right hand," the definite number is used for the sake of making the indefinite number apprehensible. It would be manifestly impossible to use in such case an indefinite number for a definite; it is on account of the very impossibility of representing the large indefinite number satisfactorily in thought that the large definite number is taken as its substitute. Hence the *vice versa* part of the definition, in so far as it may imply option or equivalence, is misleading. The larger will not be taken as the proxy of the smaller unless the smaller cannot furnish a good one of its own,—that is, unless it lacks a salient and sufficient characteristic to serve as its symbol. Whenever good examples of the 'vice versa' kind occur, as of the whole for a part in "He was gray, but not from age," a sufficient reason for the mind's so choosing will not be hard to find. Here it is the fact that it is easier—from the familiarity of the image—to think the whole man gray-haired, than abstractly the gray hair alone. Even if 'his hair' had been used instead of "he," it would not have kept us from imaging more or less vividly the face and form. Gray hair is here of no significance save as the effect of experiences undergone by the subject of the story. Hence the personality, the *whole man*, is brought into the figure, because it cannot be excluded from the thought.

In the various forms of the figure called Metonymy the same effort to save both time and energy may be traced. The mind always, unless for reason, goes along the course of least resistance. The constant use of the cause for the effect is in general due to the fact that the former is concentrated and single, while the latter may be multiform and various. 'Shakespeare' is the prevailing designation for the collective writings of our greatest poet, not merely for the reason it is easier to pass through the mind a symbolic or other image of the man than of the volumes in which his works appear, but chiefly because the *soul*, the *pervading genius* of the poet, is a favorite and vital element in the thought. 'Moses

and the Prophets,' from the effect of their character and mission in ourselves, is more speedily and completely intelligible as a designation of the Hebrew canon than any objective symbol derived from the writings themselves could be. Only when thus spiritually applied can a cause be used for a material effect. When the container is used for the thing contained, as a 'glass — for glassful — of water,' the explanation is simpler; since the mind can easily think the glass, which retains its shape, but not the water, except as taking shape from its receptacle. Thus much on the 'vice versa' side of this figure. On the other hand, when an effect is put for the cause, the abstract for the concrete, the material for the product, or sign for thing signified, the gain to thought in speed and vividness is evident. Yet we seldom realize what tremendous concentration and energy are possible through the mind's thus postulating the spiritual equivalence or identity of parts and wholes. Perhaps it is only when, aided by the physical eye, we discern an empire that girds the globe in the paltry ounces of the British crown, or, on alien seas or soil, all that home and country mean in the national flag, that we in some measure comprehend this miracle of the mind.

The general tendency is, therefore, clearly in the direction of condensation and vividness in the simpler figures. Further specific evidence of a systematic advance in command of figures and effect in using them as the mind develops, is abundant everywhere. It has been shown how allegory may be cut down to running metaphor. How it may be abbreviated still further by union of two or more of the simple figures, as apostrophe and single metaphor, is illustrated in these lines from Keble:—

"Sun of my soul, thou Saviour dear,
It is not night if thou be near."

There can be no question that this is an allegoric thought. The analogy is set forth in the first line, and the application of that which is true of the one object to the other, in the second. But it would have been more natural, or more in accordance with the

expectation of experienced readers, if the analogue could have been designated and the application made in a single sentence, in some such way as this :—

Thou art, O Christ, the banisher of my night.

That is the proper form of the metaphoric thought, such as abounds in Chaucer and would doubtless have been used in the present case except for the rhyme. The unit here is the whole analogy, but in a *clause presentation*.

But, in reality, "Sun of my soul," if the reader is prepared to take hold of the analogy, contains all that the second line declares, and will suggest it to the mind. Thus is it that phrases, at the proper point in the evolution, begin to appear in poetry by condensation of clauses. Bernardo, in the thirteenth line of *Hamlet*, might have been made to say 'If you do meet Horatio and Marcellus, *who are to be my rivals in the watch to-night*, bid them make haste.' This would, of course, have enabled the reader, though with a sterner liberty, to recognize the guardsmen in their excited watch for the reappearance of the ghost as rivals indeed, but the phrase-form 'rivals of my watch' is more effective. "The predicate conditions the imagination." To the accustomed mind it is sufficient to *name*, but not necessary to *prescribe*, the parallel. The same is true throughout all phrases proper of the third class. The unit is a whole analogy, but in *phrase presentation*.

It will now be clear how phrases of the fifth kind, or poetic phrases proper, acquire their power. They owe it to the fact they each disclose some new spiritual type, that is, one not resident by figure in either of the terms as singles, and not communicable except through mention of a binary characteristic. 'An empress,' yet 'vestal votaress,' designate a type involving two idealistic, but literal, notions, and unrevealable by any single term. The thought, indeed, to the spiritually inexperienced is complex enough to have been set forth in a complete allegory, while to the prepared imagination 'imperial votaress' carries all the effect of one. In

like manner, 'maiden meditation,' as presenting potentially to the imagination the type of a maiden so at one with her estate as to meditate in the law thereof, with monastic fast and vigil, both day and night, reduces a yet larger allegoric thought to the same proportions. Of course, it would seem that only a few allegories could be so treated. But the art of the greatest poets is full of surprises. There is no calculating beforehand what shall be or shall not be possible to mind. The hieroglyphics of ancient Egypt were doubtless no easier of interpretation in that day than our stenographic symbols now.

At the distance of half-a-step between phrases and single terms stand poetic compounds. These show upon their face the fact they have been reduced from full phrase forms. "Glory-bath" stands evidently for 'bath of glory'; "steel-bright" for 'bright as steel'; "a-sparkle" for 'in a sparkling,' etc. 'Diamond-drift'—though not so written by Mr. Browning in the passage on page 14—since it means 'drift of diamonds,' should be added to the list, making the sixth instance in thirteen lines. If we examine again the passage it will be evident why the author used these compounds instead of the full phrases, for the most careless rendering shows that *words*, and not phrases or clauses, are the basis of effect. The impulse is strong upon him to spend only a single word upon a single analogy or type; and it even seems he would have reduced also the compounds to singles were he not stopped by the natural limitations of language encountered in the process. Tennyson was more fortunate, or more masterful, in the following from *The Princess*:—

"So saying, from the court we paced, and gain'd
The terrace ranged along the Northern front,
And leaning there on those balusters, high
Above the empurpled champaign, drank the gale
That blown about the foliage underneath,
And sated with the innumerable rose,
Beat balm upon our eyelids. Hither came
Cyril, and yawning, 'O hard task,' he cried:

'No fighting shadows here! I forced a way
 Thro' solid opposition crabb'd and gnarl'd.
 Better to clear prime forests, heave and thump
 A league of street in summer solstice down,
 Than hammer at this reverend gentlewoman.
 I knock'd and, bidden, entered; found her there
 At point to move, and settled in her eyes
 The green malignant light of coming storm.
 Sir, I was courteous, every phrase well-oil'd,
 As man's could be; yet maiden-meek I pray'd
 Concealment: she demanded who we were,
 And why we came. I fabled nothing fair,
 But, your example pilot, told her all.
 Up went the hush'd amaze of hand and eye.
 But when I dwelt upon your old affiance,
 She answered sharply that I talked astray.
 I urged the fierce inscription on the gate,
 And our three lives. True — we had limed ourselves,
 With open eyes, and we must take the chance.
 But such extremes, I told her, well might harm
 The woman's cause. "Not more than now," she said,
 "So puddled as it is with favoritism." " "

The condensation in many of these lines is marvelous. Through-
 out, analogy is the unit, but in *word presentation*. We do not
 here have sentences like 'April pierces a drought to the root with
 the sweetness of his showers,' in which not only the subject and
 the predicate, but also the object and the adverbial modifier, are
 unliteral, and all in the line of a single thought. On the contrary,
 either the subject, or the predicate, or a modifier of the one or of
 the other, often sustains an independent analogy, while the rest
 of the sentence may either remain unliteral, or similarly show else-
 where some further center or centers of thought radii. Even the
 adverb *astray*, in line seventh from the end, carries a whole alle-
 gory in itself.

It was pointed out in Chapter VIII. that Shakespeare was the
 first to use the phrase as a special instrument of power. He uses
 preferably and prevaillingly the clause, but seems at times quite
 ready to shift his unit and make phrases the basis of his style.

It was, however, Keats and Shelley that introduced the phrase manner as a norm. These poets also use a large number of word-analogies, yet keep well to phrases—just as Shakespeare before them stood by the clause. But in the succeeding generation we find Mrs. Browning, and her husband, and Tennyson, taking the next step forward together. Shakespeare had also given foretaste of the days when words should speak with the power of clauses, but the impulse with him was fitful, and seldom yields more than a brace of word analogies in a single paragraph or page. Yet there is nothing in literature more dynamic than some of his condensations like ‘cream and mantle,’ ‘vice,’ ‘trifled,’ ‘jaded,’ ‘goddied.’ Tennyson and Browning can count scores of such to his singles, but few so wonderful. However, as in his phrases, we detect the presence of something inorganic and compelled, that is like the lightning from the clouds, not the glare of a constant sun. It is not the interrupted shock, but the sustained momentum, that carries most effect. The condensed figures, the analogies focused into single terms, and these massed like so many commonest words in sentence structure, produce an array of force that is the marvel of modern literature. Twenty years after Shelley in phrase-forms wrote

“There was a Poet whose untimely tomb
No human hands with pious reverence reared,
But the charmed eddies of autumnal winds
Built o’er his mouldering bones a pyramid
Of mouldering leaves in the waste wilderness,”

and seventeen after Keats in the same vein had said

“A thing of beauty is a joy forever,”

Robert Browning, while making those poets his ideal and striving to compose lines like theirs, was actually crowding word-analogies together after this fashion :—

“The centre-fire heaves underneath the earth,
And the earth changes like a human face;

The molten ore bursts up among the rocks,
 Winds into the stone's heart, outbranches bright
 In hidden mines, spots barren river-beds,
 Crumbles into fine sand where sunbeams bask —
 God joys therein. The wroth sea's waves are edged
 With foam, white as the bitten lip of hate,
 When, in the solitary waste, strange groups
 Of young volcanoes come up, cyclops-like,
 Staring together with their eyes on flame —
 God tastes a pleasure in their uncouth pride.
 Then all is still; earth is a wintry clod:
 But spring-wind, like a dancing psaltress, passes
 Over its breast to waken it; rare verdure
 Buds tenderly upon rough banks, between
 The withered tree-roots and the cracks of frost,
 Like a smile striving with a wrinkled face;
 The grass grows bright, the boughs are swollen with blooms
 Like chrysalids impatient for the air,
 The shining dorrs are busy, beetles run
 Along the furrows, ants make their ado;
 Above, birds fly in merry flocks, the lark
 Soars up and up, shivering for very joy;
 Afar the ocean sleeps; white fishing-gulls
 Flit where the strand is purple with its tribe
 Of nested limpets; savage creatures seek
 Their loves in wood and plain — and God renews
 His ancient rapture. Thus he dwells in all."

Browning hoped he might follow in the footsteps of that master whom he worshipfully called Sun-treader, at least afar off. The years have shown that it is not Shelley, but himself, that treads the sun. The message of the *Alastor* and the *Endymion* was Beauty, but of the *Paracelsus*, Power.

The course of concentration in figures is, therefore, without leap or break. Allegory or parable was first, and succeeded by running metaphor; next, clause metaphors, which were reduced to phrases, and phrases finally to compound or single terms. But poetry at large will not follow these changes systematically or chronologically. Since individuals are constantly passing through

the same stages of development as the general mind, it is evident that literature must be adapted neither to the highest nor the lowest grades of culture, but the average. The conversation of mature thinkers, unless technical, is generally intelligible to the child of ten or twelve. Or, to resume our figure, the elementary digits are not abrogated through familiarity with such higher units as thousands and millions. The bank clerk upon occasion adds again in single columns, as in school-boy days. In a manner somewhat similar the allegory yet lives by a sort of sufferance, though the mode is recognized as pedantic and overwrought, except for edification of the nursery or burlesque grade. Sometimes, also, readers consent, in default of better entertainment, that things be said which go without saying, and may, for the moment, derive a degree of satisfaction from Dante's or Spenser's threefold parallels. Those even who most delight in the condensed and fervid manner, will at times be better served by poems that less tax the energy of the mind. Men in these days of limited express trains and electric cars yet ride in carriages or go on foot, and some indeed there are who maintain these last should be the maximum methods of locomotion. So there are readers who, though they have reached the requisite point in culture, are not in sympathy with such poets as Tennyson and Browning, and dislike the titanic and lightning energy of their haste. They prefer under all circumstances to move more slowly, and study, so to speak, the topography of the region in details. For such moods and temperaments there is bulk-literature in plenty, while not a page even of the tersest and strongest poetry but will yield, like the passage above quoted from Tennyson, a good proportion of lines keyed down to their proper pitch of energy.

Analogy, therefore, serves more than a single purpose in poetry. It is used pre-eminently to set forth a material fact or truth spiritually, making the reader *feel* before he *thinks*, as in

"Up went the hushed amaze of hand and eye,"

in the passage from *The Princess*. It is used to accompany and interpret a material fact or truth in a spiritual repetition, as "How often would I have gathered thy children together, *as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings*." Finally, it may be employed to furnish a poetic parallel or embellishment, as in examples cited later. So for the final difference between figures we are brought back to our first observation of varying degrees of energy in the mind.¹ When the perception is so intense as to recognize a new spiritual genus and postulate true spiritual identity, the resulting figure will be of the condensed sort that we have been considering. The characteristic to be noted is, *the material and the spiritual are combined, and the spiritual is used to express both*. If the imagination recognizes, not identity, but resemblance merely, the material is set forth and expatiated upon so as to include the spiritual, sometimes in the same sentence, sometimes in an almost allegorical succession of appended clauses. The characteristic is, *the material and the spiritual are separated, and the one is interpreted through direct comparison with the other*. We thus find, in the last analysis, grounds for distinguishing two kinds of figures, those that are conceived with sufficient energy to set forth a main circumstance and its innermost meaning at the same time, and those that accompany or follow the statement of a main circumstance, in order to set forth, re-enforce, or amplify some meaning spiritually involved therein. The figures of the one class we may call *concentrative*, of the other, *expansive*.

We naturally turn to Homer or Milton for first illustration of expansive figures. The following, from the *Iliad*, is an excellent example :—

"Nor waited Paris in his lofty halls,
But when he had put on his glorious arms,
Glittering with brass, he traversed with quick steps
The city; and as when some courser, fed
With barley in the cell, and wont to bathe
In some smooth-flowing river, having snapped

¹ See p. 62, last paragraph.

His halter, gaily scampers o'er the plain,
 And in the pride of beauty bears aloft
 His head, and gives his tossing mane to stream
 Upon his shoulders, while his flying feet
 Bear him to where the mares are wont to graze, —
 So came the son of Priam, Paris, down,
 From lofty Pergamos in glittering arms."

Bk. vi. 641-653 (Bryant's translation).

Instances like this are frequent in which the poet, having affirmed his incident or thought, goes back and approaches it again by the spiritual pathway. Sometimes the parallels are too far separated to be kept in mind together, as in this paragraph from *Sohrab and Rustum* : —

"As when some hunter in the spring hath found
 A breeding eagle sitting on her nest,
 Upon the craggy isle of a hill-lake,
 And pierced her with an arrow as she rose,
 And follow'd her to find her where she fell
 Far off; — anon her mate comes winging back
 From hunting, and a great way off descries
 His huddling young left sole; at that he checks
 His pinion, and with short uneasy sweeps
 Circles above his eyry, with loud screams
 Chiding his mate back to her nest; but she
 Lies dying, with the arrow in her side,
 In some far stony gorge out of his ken,
 A heap of fluttering feathers — never more
 Shall the lake glass her, flying over it;
 Never the black and dripping precipices
 Echo her stormy scream as she sails by —
 As that poor bird flies home, nor knows his loss,
 So Rustum knew not his own loss, but stood
 Over his dying son, and knew him not."

Here the illustration is in the nature of an episode. But instances like this are exceptions rather than the rule. An impulse, even in early poetry, can be traced that prompts interpretation, so far as possible, from within or about the fact or thought itself, thus

making the illustration shorter and simpler than the thing illustrated. One of the first steps in this direction is to omit from the simile its predicate and let mere mention of the analogue indicate to imagination the act or attribute required.¹ Examples of this occur in Homer and Virgil, though generally with some after-predication, as —

“The assembly wavered to and fro
Like the long billows of the Icarian Sea,
Roused by the East wind and the South, that rush
Forth from the cloudy seat of Father Jove.”²

In due course the predicate is made to affirm the attribute tropically of the main subject: —

“Go, bind thou up yond dangling apricocks,
Which, like unruly children, make their sire
Stoop with oppression of their prodigal weight;
Give some suppurtance to the bending twigs.
Go thou, and, like an executioner
Cut off the heads of too-fast-growing sprays,
That look too lofty in our commonwealth:
All must be even in our government.”

SHAKESPEARE, *Richard II.*, III. iv.

Finally, as in

“The barge she sat in, like a burnished throne,
Burn'd on the water,”

we see the phrase simile used merely to enable and introduce a condensed analogy, which expresses the actual and the spiritual, fused as it were together, by use of the spiritual term. Thus it is that poetry has risen from the expansive to the concentrative pitch of energy. Homer, to be sure, also presents the material

¹ See Chapter II., and Notes.

² *Iliad*, Bk. ii. 179-182 (Bryant). The predication stands with ‘roused’ in the original: —

κινήθη δ' ἀγορὴ φη κύματα μακρὰ θαλάσσης,
πόντου Ἰκαρίοιο, τὰ μὲν τ' Ἑδρός τε Νότος τε
ὥρορ' ἐπαίξας πατρὸς Διὸς ἐκ νεφελῶων.

Ll. 144-146.

by way of the spiritual through word-analogies, yet, we must admit, so seldom that his instances are to be regarded but as prefigurative of the coming type. Dante and Milton stand far hitherward from the poetry of mere parallels, though such they know. Shakespeare, as we saw in phrases, is far on the way to the modern manner. He nowhere, it may be said, employs a simile in Homer's way. He uses his figure to reach his effect, and, that attained, never stops to double-track or parallel the route by which he came. Indeed, in energy of imagination he is not surpassed, almost certainly is not rivalled, by Tennyson, or Browning, or any of their fellows in English or out of it. It is merely the *mode*, not yet intelligibly evolved in Shakespeare's time and unavailable to free use, that in these days has given them their advantage.

The impulse to make things so far as possible interpret themselves, — to yield up some circumstance, or give off some attribute that shall serve as clue to their spiritual significance, is traced in the various forms of epithet. This is the explanation of Sackville's 'dumb dead corse,' Spenser's 'watric wette,' and Homer's still more pleonastic and bald expressions. The mind, assuming a spiritual meaning in some notion, essays reflectively or meditatively to elicit it by sample, and, at times, when imaginative energy was low, seems, at least subjectively, to have succeeded. But attempts at finding the spiritual meaning by expanding the logical often lead to tautology and even worse consequences.

When the imagination of the poet is fully aroused, he runs small risk of tautology or expatiation; he will for the average reader, perhaps, oftener say too little than too much. Nature is full of analogues and spiritual duplicates, which may or may not be discerned by the given poet without exaltation, but cannot by him be flashed upon another mind without great energy. If he have not the power to reveal the analogy by a single stroke, he must continue the effort and repeat the stroke until the revelation is accomplished. The requisite force must be exerted in some form, if the effect is to be reached. But the imagination of the

reading world grows generation by generation more intense and eager, and no poet will be called, in these days, *great*, whose strokes are very numerous or light. Greatness consists in making the many strokes in one. The day has passed when canvassing or inventorying types, with hardly more than that degree of mental energy which we call phantasy, can produce on well-appointed minds the effect of poetry. These lines from Thomson's *Autumn* were accounted every way poetical a century ago:—

“Thoughtless of beauty, she was Beauty's self,
Recluse among the woods; if city dames
Will deign their faith: and thus she went, compelled
By strong Necessity, with as serene
And pleased a look as Patience e'en put on,
To glean Palemon's fields.”

The first clause here would still be admitted as poetic, since it appeals to fancy, *i.e.* sets the imagination at once in search of types with which to idealize what is told. But ‘compelled’ is tautologized to ‘compelled by necessity’—‘*strong* necessity,’ indeed; while ‘Patience’ is gratuitously ‘expanded’ with ‘serene’ and ‘pleased.’ Yet it might have been worse. Pope, as is well known, amended the passage thus:—

“Thoughtless of beauty, she was Beauty's self,
Recluse amid the close-embowering woods.
As in the hollow breast of Apennine,
Beneath the shelter of encircling hills,
A Myrtle rises, far from human eye,
And breathes its balmy fragrance o'er the wild;
So flourish'd blooming, and unseen by all,
The sweet Lavinia; till, at length, compelled
By strong Necessity's supreme command,
With smiling Patience in her looks, she went
To glean Palemon's fields.”

That is, ‘recluse among the woods’ is expanded to ‘recluse among the *close-embowering* woods, *as* in the *hollow breast*, *far from human eyes*, breathing fragrance *o'er the wild*, so flourished

blooming [*sic*] and *unseen by all*.' Thomson's 'compelled by strong Necessity' is stretched to the unaccountable length of 'compelled by strong Necessity's *supreme command*,' — which, to say the least, is beneath tautology.

Epithet is, therefore, the result of the mind's realizing to itself implied elements or qualities by specific mention; tautology, of expatiation or expansion until some part of the meaning is unwittingly repeated. When the reader is unaware of the repetition, epithet and even tautology may have for him all the effect of poetry, since he recognizes the author's purpose as poetic, and will subjectively maintain a corresponding frame in his own mind. Perhaps, indeed, these will furnish occasion for all the imaginative activity he is yet capable of enjoying. Many of ourselves can doubtless testify that we experienced our first poetic delight over paragraphs involving scarcely more imaginative energy than those just cited from Pope and Thomson. A century hence some of the fine passages we now with maturer taste admire, may seem to our successors equally insipid and uninspired, — though it is hard to see how the standard can further alter relatively so much. The two tendencies of expansion and concentration — old as Homer and the *Beowulf* — and the races to which they respectively belong, run counter to each other: the one tends to raise the unit of conception, the other to lower it; one to force its own passages to expression, the other to follow along the beaten pathways. A Tennyson, except when his analogy is unfamiliar or intractable, writes in the concentrative manner; an Arnold, from the contrary impulse to simplify and leave all clear, writes in the expansive vein, yet flashes out thus sometimes like Shakespeare —

“as, at dawn,

The shepherd from his mountain-lodge descries
A far, bright city, *smitten by the sun*,
Through many rolling clouds — so Rustum saw
His youth.”

Upon the one manner and on the other respectively rest, as their ultimate foundations, two great schools of poetry.

CHAPTER XI.

THE THEME.

ON further examination of Chaucer's *Prologue* we do not find the poetic promise of the first paragraph fulfilled in the composition as a whole. In the 840 remaining lines there are not as many figures as in the first eighteen, and poetic words and phrases are as generally wanting. Yet the *Prologue* as a whole is exceedingly pleasing, and has always been considered a masterpiece. That it is poetry has not been questioned. But if wanting in words, phrases, and figures, wherein does the poetry consist?

It must not be supposed that the business of a poet is chiefly the invention or condensation of analogies to grace his verse. Literature is not a craft merely, it is a mission. It is never his facility in figures that makes a poet. There can be nothing beyond an incidental potency in poetry made up only of figurative, or of associational terms and phrases. These are but the 'limbs and outward flourishes,' not in the last analysis beautiful except as endowed and enabled by something from beyond. Beauty is not objective, but remains unrecognized until spiritually interpreted or discerned, and there is an ultimate, inherent beauty which transcends and controls the incidental beauty of mere form. We must then go further than clauses, or phrases, or suggestive words, if we wish to account for the higher effects of poetry: they come from the larger, enabling spiritual truth which lies back of the poet himself. That which we call spiritual truth is the final and supreme truth, or that which concerns itself not with what things are, but with what they mean. It is not enough

to know and say that John Howard was an Englishman, who died in Russia a hundred years ago. We must be aware of his character, and of what his life signifies to the world, or we might as well be ignorant even of the name. A flag of truce, as a fact, may be a very simple thing, yet may mean weal or woe to half the globe. Similarly in art and literature, spiritual truth is the ultimate meaning to which the mind, sooner or later, attains, forgetting the course or means of ascent thither. Take, for illustration, the *Count Gismond* used in Chapter IV. Here the author conceals himself behind the personality of the speaker, and makes no manifestation of himself save through her words and feelings. It reads at first like the stock juvenile romance whose end can be guessed from the beginning, and we hardly consent to be detained by it at all. But we soon catch the spirit, and are drawn to read again and yet again. Then the meaning, the ideals of truth which inspired Browning to write the poem, begin consciously to possess our minds. The power of innocence to proclaim itself from the astonished face of an orphan whom envy plots to crush, is the first thing that kindles our enthusiasm. Count Gismond, who reads the innocence, divines the wickedness of Gauthier and the cousins, and comes forward as our proxy to defend the helpless, engages our sympathies yet more deeply. Then we note the like power in the heroine to read in turn a noble heart in Gismond's face, and her simple, but sublime faith, —

“ I never met
His face before, but at first view
I felt quite sure that God had set
Himself to Satan; who would spend
A minute's mistrust on the end ! ”

No wonder that this unconscious confidence which could look North, South, East, West, for her accusers, and watch her deliverer with unperturbed and even joyous gaze in his impatient preparation for the trial, changed his feeling from chivalrous pity to reverence and love. And last of all we are made to feel the

power of truth in vanquishing conscious calumny and malice. Gauthier had been Gismond's peer, if he had had his quarrel just ; but now his conscience and even the foolish women whom he serves despair of his success. The victory, indeed, was won already in the magnificent defiance with which the poem comes to its climax. Had Gismond doubted, had she who gave him inspiration wavered, even the combat might have been uncertain. Thus the poem presents to us lofty types of goodness, faith, and daring, for comparison with the ideals of these qualities postulated by our own minds. The transfiguring power of a holy, conscious — or rather unthinking, unconscious integrity, is the motive of the whole. This might have been treated sculpturally by representing the heroine at the moment of her unrealizing dismay, as Gismond with the 'clear great brow' and 'black full eye of scorn' strode forth to rescue. It might also have been embodied in a painting that should show the group the instant after Gismond's blow, while Gauthier stands appalled as at the voice of judgment, and the heroine looks abroad to know whether the lie dares yet to breathe. The object lesson, as we have it in the poem, is only made more objective by being cast in circumstances which call up romantic and vivid associations. Figures are but few ; and the whole is couched in the simplest language which even a child may read.

It is then the spiritual truth in his subject-matter that has made Chaucer an immortal name. This is not difficult to understand. As is well known, Chaucer was the first portrayer of character in modern literature. Before him it had not seemed possible to register so much as the grosser differences between man and man. Chaucer found it no hardship to set down even minor characteristics which his eye detected. To his contemporaries the observation and interpretation of character from books was a novelty, a sensation. The ability to read men thus well face to face was doubtless no common accomplishment. Hence Chaucer, who in a measure interprets for his reader, helped his generation into a larger place. But all that he did,

barring his manner of doing it, is done outside of verse to-day in novels. The more complex and refined sentiment of our Tennysons and Longfellow, if the language could have contained it, would have been meaningless in Chaucer's time.

Next to itself and its own experiences the ego prizes sympathy with other minds. It wishes to see the universe through other eyes. It wishes to sound the philosophies of other men, to watch the evolution of their motives, and compare experiences with them. This really means that the ego covets to know other minds experientially, as it knows itself. It is the same process as has been studied already in the figures; we are constantly reading types in things and grafting complete things upon types, only we are doing it as Chaucer's readers and contemporaries could not. To find types of character in faces, forms, and speech, is to us little better than prosaic to-day, but in Chaucer's age amounted to poetry, — as indeed by the charms of his style and spirit it yet continues. But we require that this be done upon a higher plane, and in rarer, less-frequented walks of spiritual observation. It indeed is seldom that a poet of reputation nowadays delineates a character for its own sake. He will use it as a means to some end, will in general show what it *enables* to its possessor or to others. Thus in the poem just considered, no direct characterization of Count Gismond or the speaker is attempted, but all hints of such kind let drop by the author go at once to account for that which comes to or is done by the one or other.

The age into which Chaucer was born in England was most unfavorable to the career of a great poet. There was as yet no accepted idiom, and the springs of lofty feeling had been befouled. Men still believed, through the inner insistence of the ego, in moral and spiritual ideals of an abstract kind, but were chary in accepting concrete examples. In these days we take virtue and worth for granted, and only on evidence and with reluctance withdraw our faith. In Chaucer's time it seemed necessary to do the opposite. No other English genius was ever so handicapped on every side. Chaucer saw as clearly as the historian of to-day that there

was no hope for English society as it then existed ; it needed the cleansing of pestilence and sword. But he refused to voice the common looking-for of fiery indignation ; he left that to Langland. The long-bowman and common sense had exploded chivalry, but England was not deep enough in culture to appreciate a Cervantes. There were heroes to celebrate ; but what to the people was the Black Prince more than John of Gaunt, what the pious pretensions of "Loller" Wicklif more than any monk's? If he was to be neither a Juvenal nor a Jeremiah, there was but a single course still open. Hence Chaucer will be of the people for weal or woe, will make the most of life such as he finds it, will reflect its sunshine but refuse to brood upon its darkness. He essays first to interpret old lives, to popularize old learning, so far as he deems these will edify, to the public of his days. Then after he had learned the joy of it, he fell to interpreting the common men and women to themselves, showing types of character in deeds, and types of action potentially in character. This correlation of the eternal verities was new and striking, and the revealment gave as much delight as the age craved or could appropriate in literature. Thus Chaucer became the first great poet of modern English.

But by Spenser's times the Reformation had brought back to England a clear and bracing moral atmosphere, and the Renaissance had brought models and standards of beauty. Chaucer's age had been essentially devoid of ideals ; Spenser's was wild with them. Chaucer tends to reconcile us to their absence. Spenser introduces us to a world whence the actual has been excluded. He recognizes nowhere the limitations of the actual. The world had suddenly awaked as from a heavy sleep, and was not yet certain what was dream and what was real. A new hemisphere, a veritable Eldorado, was alluring to exploration and conquest. A new era in science and industry was beginning. Man was free to go where he would in thought and theory. The printing-press was making books for every man who could use them. In morals and religion old things had passed away : there were new heavens and a new earth to every pious soul. Life was

beautiful and full of hope, and men fitfully, madly, — like children overwhelmed with gifts, clutched at its promises. The very air was full of heroism and romance. Abroad the battle was yet on between the Dragon and the Red-cross Knight of Truth, and England, though beyond the reach of Armadas, often felt her pulses quicken with anxiety. The age craved a voice to lead its pæan of deliverance and hope. Spenser was too shamefaced and sensitive for such a service; but he could lend himself to the clamor for pure types of holiness and majesty, strength and beauty, so makes his *Faerie Queene* shine with every religious, moral, national, domestic, and personal ideal.

But Spenser was but the voice crying to prepare the way for a greater than himself. His ideals, though genuine and noble, were really adapted from a former age and could not satisfy the times. Men were looking at life too seriously to be much edified concerning it by a poet of allegories, and elves, and chivalry. They demanded a new prophet, a fresh dispensation of spiritual truth. They wished to study character, not by the lay figures of knights and dragons, but in living men. They had awakened to the fact that the men who had gone to the stake to save conscience were not victims, but heroes; that not the form without, but the transcendent experiences within, make the archangel or the fiend. They would sound the lowest depths of their own being, they would experimentally know the sublime secrets of the soul. The mysteries of life, of duty, and of destiny, had been oracularly pronounced upon in the middle age and earlier, by great doctors and masters of theology. But the day of individual authority was passed; the great ecumenical councils had been dissolved forever. Human intelligence had attained its majority; the thousand new questions of pure and applied ethics, of influence of mind on mind, of redemption or degradation of character, were now and henceforth to be settled — at first grossly and mistakenly, yet in a few generations with essential soundness — by the world at large. Thus England needs not precept and theory, but object lessons in morals, public instances, authoritative experiments in destiny-

making. So when the lay playwright made his studies in free-will and necessity and the self-punishment of crime, in the vindication of justice even through the misconception, blunders, and resistance of its chosen instrument, in the irremediableness of race-differences, and in woman as the heart and hope and inspiration of mankind, the people were edified better and more profoundly than they knew, and testified to the service by enriching their instructor while other playwrights starved. The age had been brought to its senses by Calvin's doctrine of the decrees. Men trembled for their souls, but from sinner to saint chafed in their heart of hearts, each to his own degree, at what seemed the arbitrary and tyrannical restraints of right and duty. Yet while the decalogue might appear almost a piece of divine impertinence, there was, nevertheless, a rudimentary moral sense of an every-day, practical sort that was trying to be alert, to discern and know the truth. Through this sense Shakespeare caused men to awake little by little to the consciousness that the moral law was not at all a code of perverse denials, but a system of danger signals to keep mankind from dashing to pieces upon the rocks. More than all, his generation craved to find the human in supreme ideals, to realize them as not above the aspiration and reach of common souls, and this service also the great diviner rendered. But it was not Shakespeare that thus made English literature immortal; it was the spiritual truth revealed everywhere — it was the types in Othello and Hamlet, Cordelia, and Hermione, and Imogen, that will keep it memorable forever. Set forth even by lame and faltering fingers, these yet would have moved the world. Thus with Shakespeare was the Theme evolved into its full significance and potency in English literature.

The ego cares properly only for the soul, — the final value and significance, of things. As boys, we delight in feats of strength and daring, because our notion of supreme excellence is to be strong and to do exploits. Achilles and Hector are heroes to us, not because they are Achilles and Hector, but because each stands as the embodiment of a type we find potentially in our

minds, which type we cannot help making the norm and standard in all comparisons of worth. Anything that makes concrete and tangible, that realizes or actualizes this idea, gives us supreme pleasure. Any and every hero, every manifestation of heroic quality, will stir our enthusiasm according to the degree in which it materializes or translates to actuality the inherent potential type. But as we grow older, we begin to be conscious that there are heroes outside the sphere of violent exploits. We find our notion of greatness has shifted from the physical to the intellectual plane. It is no longer Cœur de Lion, but rather Napoleon, that embodies our conception of true greatness. Our enthusiasm is aroused far more by brilliant strategy, feats of ingenuity and skill, than by the old triumphs of brute force. Finally, our enthusiasm shifts to the moral sphere. We experience our chief delight in Dante and Shakespeare, because we here find the realization of our maturest notions, our ultimate ideas of excellence. The varying, progressive types to which the mind thus refers all apprehended excellencies, are called Ideals.

It is an inherent necessity in the ego, when it recognizes any single element from one of its ideals, that it make haste to fill out and apprehend in thought, or rather in the emotions, the whole which the recognition of the part postulates or presupposes. When we see an action involving self-denial, our emotions are aroused to delight, not from the act itself, or the degree of self-denial actually implied, but because the mind, taking occasion of the act, rises to an experience of that quality as an ideal, — generally, indeed, takes the further step of exalting the whole character and personality of the agent to a level with the ideal quality. This process is called Idealization.

As was early pointed out, the various processes of idealization have been collectively designated, like the respective manifestations of the outer, cosmic forces in 'sound,' 'heat,' 'light,' etc., by an abstract name, imagination. As the palpable difference between the activities summed up by this word and the merely

intellectual or contemplative states of the ego consists in the conscious co-operation of the emotions in the former, we naturally measure the degree of imaginative energy or intensity by the amount of excitation in the feelings. Whenever the mind, on representing an idea to itself in thought, is aware that the emotions are enlisted by the presence of the idea, the 'representative' mode is imagination. A suggestive word, or the revelation of a new analogy, is sufficient to produce a momentary exaltation of this kind. But such effects are merely incidental and contributive to the main current of emotion flowing from the theme. When the types realized or embodied in treating this touch rather the passive sentiments, or those which seek their fullest relief in tears, we call such theme, as well as its effect, 'tender' or 'pathetic.' When the involved ideals arouse the active sentiments, or those that produce the manifestations of Force and of the Will, we call both the experience and its occasion 'strong,' or 'powerful,' or 'overpowering.' Any object like the pyramids which, as planned and achieved by man, involves the recognition of a type too vast for adequate spiritual comprehension, is said to be 'grand,' and produces the emotion of Grandeur. There is yet an experience beyond. In presence, for instance, of the ocean, the mind cannot help recognizing in it a type not of the Vast but of the Infinite. It is a familiar notion, as a geographical phenomenon has been well understood from childhood. There is no logical reason whatever that the sight of it should have such effect upon the imagination. But the ego *must* go beyond the outer manifestation and take cognizance of the type. Though it knows well enough that the ocean is only some hundreds of miles in breadth, and has seen, perhaps, the further shore, it insists on subjectively realizing what an ocean or something like an ocean would be that had no bounds indeed. It thus, through taking what it sees as an earnest of that which transcends sight, attains an experience of the Infinite. Since the mind can be carried to nothing loftier than an experience of this kind, both the occasion and the emotion are

called Sublime.¹ Thus according to the experiences of the ego as produced and enabled by the given types are the various effects of poetry classified and named.

The theme or the truth revealed by it is therefore the paramount source of poetic power. All other elements are at best mere helps or supports, like the escort of honor in a king's progress, but never principals in any degree or sense. Not a little of the first effect upon us of a Dante or a Shakespeare is due to a natural awe of genius or of the spiritual truth which it reveals. Though the mind may not comprehend what excellence there is in a passage like either of the above from Arnold (pp. 14 and 39), it yet feels the presence of something lofty and majestic.² This is not literary sanctimony, or anything else in the author merely, but in so far as it is personal is the effect of an inference concerning the degree in which he feels the conviction or persuasion of his message. The ego is as it were sexed to the higher, final truth, and cannot but choose it and cleave to it, leaving all excellencies besides. It believes in this higher truth instinctively, and is quick to assume the proper attitude in its presence. The author is only its apostle or its agent, the seer and interpreter of that which lies beyond him, and which he may himself but dimly apprehend. Hence while we are interpreting and realizing after him the types belonging to the theme we are also interpreting, chiefly by watching whether and how far he feels towards his theme as he should feel, the types manifested in himself. If we find him exalted to true enthusiasm over his ideals, we construe this immediately as indicative of a great and noble nature, and so idealize the *man* along with, or even in advance of, that which he is developing from his theme. But if we detect signs that his words are cant

¹ The name is also somewhat loosely used of other exalted experiences, as of Force, when the emotion begins to be a burden, and the ego to be conscious that the limit of endurance is not far off. The imagination cannot long be held to the pitch of sublimity. Like 'heat,' it is not a normal mode, and will end in reaction and perhaps depression.

² This is what Mr. Arnold has called 'High Seriousness,' as a prime requisite of poetry. See his first paper in *Essays on Criticism*, Second Series.

and his enthusiasm feigned, on the strength of the types implied we degrade the author as much as from their opposite we might have exalted him. Even genuine enthusiasm in a poet, if paraded in his protestations, will go for nothing under our brand of 'bombast' or 'turgidity.' But if an author who is inspired by poetic truth can do no more than utter it in baldest prose, the product will yet be poetry, and will move men. Conviction of spiritual truth is the warrant and the seal of the poet's mission. Let it be realized once for all that the poet is only a means, never the cause, and at his best and uttermost can but give the truth a worthy setting.

As we have seen, the ideals of the individual change for the better from youth to maturity by an inherent principle of moral growth; and the same is true of the world at large from generation to generation. But when new ideals are apprehended and accepted under abnormal excitement and fail to become a part of the every-day consciousness of the ego, they will soon lose their power. Any undue exaltation of the spirits must be paid for out of the elasticity of the future, and at the cost of apathy and perhaps depression. The great Elizabethan era ended in such reaction. Shakespeare had scarcely passed away when men were discovering his types had lost their luster, and were even beginning to doubt the genuineness of the experiences late had with them. Also the two strains in British blood, the one ascetic and Northern, prompting as in the earlier age, to a lofty, relentless strife and a Valhall won by victory, the other epicurean and Southern, the true genius of merry England, which prompts to appropriate all life offers or can mean, soon broke out in war against each other. The one held the mastery under Long Parliament and the Protectorate, the other prevailed from the Restoration till the flight of James. Pure literature in the main was left in the hands of a Waller, a Herrick, a Lovelace, and their brother worldlings, while the ideals of Elizabethan days sank out of sight. Of those whom Shakespeare should still have caused to find the type of an Hermione within, and held entranced as were shown

the inner experiences and consciousness of a woman whose faith in right and truth defied circumstance and time ; of those who should still have cared to know how a Cordelia could be true even at the cost of seeming false, or how even a Cleopatra could conquer her lifelong selfishness and die heroically, the one party had ceased to countenance such things as sinful, the other to feel or greatly care.

Now follows the generation of the Conventionalizers and Conventionalists. From Dryden to Pope and past, the work of unifying, unifying the national literature — so necessary to the establishment of standards and authority — goes on. But the types of power are wanting still. Efforts are put forth to respiritualize poetry, to effect a reformation from within, though vainly. There is no hope except in revolution. The people are so famished they ravenously devour the crude ballads of Percy, the flimsy imitations of Chatterton, and even the husks of Ossian. There is again a religious purification of the springs of feeling, — this must come first as before. Then signs of an awakening tenderness and sympathy may be noted. Men remark that philanthropy is abroad. High and low alike begin to call the rights and grounds of privilege in question, and recanvass the first principles of society. Man, with or without the livery of his rank, is vindicated *as man*. Also abroad the prescriptions of privilege are called in question, and a lieutenant of artillery mounts to the sacred throne of the Bourbons. It is the triumph of genius over rank, of will over the accidents of birth and station. It is a new era of hope for every soul, and England is on fire again. The old ideals of achievement and worth are once more supreme.

The inherent types of the mind belong either to Man or Nature. In the days of Chaucer there was but little power in nature that could be re-exerted by way of literature. Chaucer feels the flame, but is awkward as a bashful lover when he tries to tell his passion ; he can only murmur of the daisy and the May morning. He felt all the charms of his beloved, but could tell her but a tithe of the joy she kindled. Spenser is more successful, though he interprets

nature much at second hand, through the classic masters. Shakespeare first is genuine and perfect, — yet only incidentally, or while something waits upon the stage ; for he is pre-eminently the poet of the human. Milton in *L'Allegro* and *Lycidas* was nature's catechumen, yet even he unconfidently, and for the nonce, until he should take orders in — as he thought — a higher priesthood. Next comes the century of periwigs and powder, of nature unmade and amended. Then in Coleridge and Keats and Burns begins a new age of sympathy, not alone of man with man, but with everything that God has made. Indeed at first in Shelley and Wordsworth the inspiration amounts well-nigh to a pantheistic craze, almost a degradation of man and an exaltation of his environment, to be but parts of a common whole. Thus while man with his sublime possibilities and worth stands once more before the spiritual eye of England, he appears this time upon the background of a glorified, transfigured nature. Millions of types and analogies unguessed before, which had been waiting as open secrets since the creation of the world, seemed now to force themselves upon the poet's sight. The power to find the mood in nature, to commune with her in a universal, all-embracing sympathy, and *to teach men so*, had been at last fully aroused in him.

But on attempting to trace the character and effects of the new ideals in man, we encounter greatly changed conditions. When Gray and Goldsmith wrote, England was a reading public of some thousands, but in the days of Scott and Byron had increased a hundred fold. All this increment came up from below, hence tended not to raise the standard of taste, but lower it. The elevation of the masses, as has been shown, had come in obedience to an inspiration that seemed to permeate and fill the very air. The sentiment that a man was at least a man, and that all men were brothers, had suddenly taken possession of human consciousness as an axiomatic and final truth. It was not from man nor through man that the revelation came : it was the voice of God directly to the age. The advancement of the people, moreover, had been enabled and prepared for beforehand by the invention of steam

and the rise of manufactures. It was only through the wholesale multiplication of services that the third estate could maintain the social advance conceded it by its betters. Thus money began to find its way into hands little accustomed to its feel, and books soon followed. Even the sons of miners, and sailors, and artisans, though in turn but miners, and sailors, and operatives themselves, turned readers, and the cost of literature was cheapened correspondingly. Hence arose throughout the realm an almost fabulous demand for books, which even as far north as Edinburgh kept the presses of Ballantyne and Co. toiling night and day.

Thus was it that the national imagination demanded types and ideals adapted to the newly adjusted social average. Thus was it that the new public of millions instead of thousands was waiting for the advent of its *Waverley* and *Childe Harold*. There were, moreover, other reasons why Edinburgh should become a second literary capital of the nation. There had been a genuine revival of sentiment, and the public pulse was beating wildly. There was again all the Elizabethan buoyancy, all the expectation of fresh profit from existence which had fired the British breast two centuries before. But in England proper the new Shakespeare was not yet come, there were no poets capable of satisfying the demand for a new literature of feeling. But Scotland had always been full of sentiment, and thither the Southrons now turned for emotional inspiration. The Ballads of the Border had, indeed, a generation before drawn all eyes that way. Thus it was that Burns and Scott, who were but minstrels of a later day, could win storms of applause such as England had never known. In a revival of emotion like that which now prevailed, men and women grow young again, and are for a time content with very elementary sentiment. Hence we find giants like Scott and Wilson devoting their best and maturest strength to the production of a literature that would to-day be thought beneath their years. Even conservative, cultured readers of the old sort were drawn out after *Ivanhoe*, *Marmion*, and *The Lights and Shadows*, perhaps further than they knew. Campbell, who spoke Scottish feeling in classic rhymes,

was an accepted poet of this class, as was Lockhart afterwards its novelist and censor. The critics, meanwhile, chafing and fuming at the unaccountable perversion of taste, were aghast that Wordsworth must still soberly obtrude his Peter Bell and Goody Blake sentiment upon grown-up folk, and Byron persist in outraging all the poetic proprieties. By general consent, after the storm had cleared, the old Johnsonian criticism was left aground. The Scottish 'school,' not only in Edinburgh, but also in London, was now supreme.

Thus was Scotland supplying the long-lacking element of emotion, thus were being laid deep down, and as we may hope permanently, the foundations of a literature of power. Moreover, thus it chanced that the poets of the new types and ideals in man escaped immediate attention. New emotions had been evolved which the popular heart could not yet feel. Many of those ready for the new experiences were scandalized and blinded by the faults and failings of those who offered them. To such Wordsworth appeared only a poet of the commonplace; Shelley shocked by his iconoclastic impatience of all wrong; Keats seemed but a wild, untutored bacchanal. Before the sense of the times had awakened to their mission, Browning had gone yet other steps ahead, which hardly the succeeding generation might overtake. Here at last was the second Shakespeare, but with no audience yet prepared. The Teutonic nature is heavy, and hard to rouse, but once stirred moves with great momentum. The energization of Anglo-Saxon inertia with Celtic fire was essentially complete. The spiritual sympathies of the English-speaking world had been awakened, but its spiritual lore was still hardly beyond the range of the first Shakespeare. Since Byron the tide had set toward fiction, and English poetry was left with only the simple, elementary lessons of life to teach. But what at first seemed a misfortune now began to bear fruit a hundred fold. Even the novel by inherent development had been little by little drawing the popular mind into the contemplation of great spiritual truths, so that after *Henry Esmond* and *Middlemarch*, men craved to look into pro-

founder depths. Thus forty years after Browning seemed to himself and the world to have been forgotten, he is rediscovered as one of the world's great seers, hailed as the prophet of a new era, and vindicated as the chief poet of the century. No man longer calls in question his greatness or his mission. As fast as men and women attain the capacity to interpret his concentrative figures and appreciate his types, they are drawn to him. Until eye and ear have been prepared, Raphael and Mozart mean less than their inferiors. Each mind must overtake in its own development the progress of the race at large, or it will declare the best thought and sentiment of its times meaningless — though it thereby but publish its own inchoate and arrested culture. Not so very long ago it was popular to decry the symphonies of Beethoven, but little by little the presumption has become general, even among those unversed in music, that the fault is not with Beethoven, but with the undiscerning hearer. Similarly, within the last five years the once frequent girds at Browning have disappeared from public print. What with clubs, societies, and college study, what with the ever-increasing output of primers, handbooks, and commentaries, the persuasion is abroad that this poet evinces the loftiest ideals yet revealed in our literature, as well as fulfills its long delayed and often repeated prophecy of power.

Thus long and tortuous is the course by which the English-speaking public was prepared for the latest change in its spiritual standards. We have taken time here for this hasty sketch that it might at least be clear there is nothing arbitrary or fortuitous in the process, but all is organic and controlled by law. The general mind finds itself generation by generation possessed of potential ideas of excellence more and more exalted, which the poet of the day translates into concrete, realizable forms. To mark how great the advance from Shakespeare, let us compare his *Othello* with Browning's *Luria*. In the Elizabethan age the maximum notion was *Doing* and ability to *Do*, and especially power over men by presence and word and will. There are no grander situations in all Shakespeare than that in which Othello cows the

Italian mob come to arrest him and thirsting for the traditional street-duel, by a gesture and a word ; or that later where the same heroic figure, unconscious of his powers and without eloquence or art, makes the august senate forget its excitement over the threatened attack on Cyprus, and even its blue-blood prejudices. It is not clear that Browning was dissatisfied with this type of greatness in action, yet he was drawn to make a study, in many respects similar to Shakespeare's, that should amend it. His Luria overawes no nobleman's posse, fascinates no senate, cashiers no subaltern ; he does nothing whatever in our sight. Betrayed, baited, outraged, and sorely tempted to punish Florence by the strong arm, he withholds his hand, and by the silent force of character brings at last all his suspecting, contriving enemies to his feet. From contemplation of this new type of greatness we rise to the consciousness that Being is greater than Doing, that the character of God transcends his force, and, indeed, must potentially include it. That which overmastered the Italian mob was but Othello's compelling presence and superb unconcern ; what captivated the senators was his unsparing, unshrinking, transparent honesty. Yet these are no insignificant manifestations, for they postulate a will of iron. They do not involve much force directly, but they tell unequivocally of the whirlwind, the earthquake, and the fire. But the influence of a Luria is as the still small voice before which Elijah veils his face.

Shakespeare seems not unadvised concerning the effect of character in pure forms, especially with his women, yet he makes us feel the power even of Virgilia and Imogen pre-eminently through what they do. His public was not ready for finer studies, and indeed can scarcely have comprehended the best of his meaning in those types of greatness in action. Even in the religious world men understood little of the character of God, though they trembled at his power. To-day fear as an ethical motive is of small effect ; appreciation of the divine nature persuades men in its stead. The maximum idea is *Being*, and power to *Be*, or to *Become*. Hence character, the stages in its development, and

the influences emanating from it, are now the paramount themes of poetry. So eager is the interest in personality that living names are unequal to the demand for subjects. Men dead long ago, and insignificant in their lives except by deeds, play once more a part in human affairs through effect of the character some poet has reconstructed. The mystery of a *Paracelsus* is revealed, the failure of a *del Sarto* is explained, *King Arthur* realizes the notion of modern gentry; and so on to yet higher themes. *Sordello* shows how a soul may grow from selfishness to altruism, in spite of environment, through the effect of types inherent within. *The Return of the Druses* illustrates the necessity, at some time in the history of a race, that the divine be realized to the physical eye. *Caliban on Setebos* is the study of a consciousness below the human; *A Death in the Desert* discovers to us the range and mode of the soul's upward growth. Thus it is that character, whether high or low, complex or simple, furnishes the themes in the great poems of the day. To dissect the types, to recognize the ideals which go to make up a personality, has a never-ending fascination. It was the identification of certain such types in the heroine, supreme also in ourselves, that edified us in the poem considered near the beginning of this chapter, though we may not have been aware how it gave us inspiration. But even Count Gismond seemed not to know it was the substantiation of his own ideals that drew him to her feet.

We have called Browning a second Shakespeare because he has devoted himself prevaillingly, like his master, to new types of men and women. We have another great poet who perhaps equally with him fulfills the long-delayed promise of power in English poetry. But Tennyson is not, like Browning, drawn to deep studies of human nature in the concrete and actual. He has composed much poetry for the masses, on which too largely his reputation rests. He has, besides, upon abstract and recondite truths, composed poems which are more unread than Browning's, and are yet even more profound. It is upon these, and pre-eminently the *In Memoriam*, that his future fame will rest. Even the

Idylls, often accounted popular, are far beyond the appreciation of most readers. It may be said of his themes in general that they require of the imagination in a large way the same kind of preparation as in a small is called for by the condensed analogies he uses. To one well versed in spiritual lore, and able to dispense with concrete instances, Tennyson is an open book. Other minds must wait until they have grown up to his level.

The student's first, and perhaps principal, task is, therefore, to determine the significance and importance of the theme. He must identify the inherent ideals to which the poem appeals and analyze the method and expedients of the author's plan. In every instance it will be seen that the power of poetry is in direct proportion to the degree of rareness or refinement in the types involved. He will note that the paramount types must be contained, not incidentally in the illustrations, but in the theme itself. Moreover, as in sculpture or painting, he will observe the meaning must not be extracted in the form of an application or a moral, but left an open secret as in nature. The business of a poet as of an artist, is to *put the meaning in the reader's way*, not declare it to him. The *Count Gismond*, though a popular poem merely, has a lesson which must be made out precisely as one interprets and estimates character and conduct among men every day. To have set this forth by an "argument," or a foot-note, or in the concluding stanza would — according to all right principles of art — but have spoiled the whole.

CHAPTER XII.

THE CLASSIFICATION OF POETRY.

POETRY is, then, the activity of the soul in large that we have seen employed in small in metaphor and personification. It consists in the superior delight of the ego derived from contemplating its environment as typical, not actual, from taking cognizance of the spiritual rather than the material aspects of the universe. As we have seen, the ego is not content with the literal, exterior meanings of things, but is always trying to abstract from them a certain something they cannot objectively supply. It does not long to read rare books, see noble landscapes or famous pictures, merely for the sake of the reading or the seeing, but postulates and expects a substantial satisfaction lying beyond these acts, which serve but as the means. It is in tireless search for that which will gratify its essential, final self, and in nature can never be content until the ultimate experiences it craves are reached. Though we may be long in making the discovery, or perhaps never make it consciously at all, it is yet true that these ultimate experiences come only through the higher spiritual activity of the soul. Denied or deprived of these, it suffers apathy or *ennui*. Until fully advised how to read things spiritually it goes aimless and maimed about the world. We do not learn to read our environment spiritually with ease or quickly; it is the hardest and last of all accomplishments. But the instinct that spurs us on to acquire it is insistent and unremitting, sometimes even blindly drives us into mistakes and failure. When first the ego becomes aware that the exterior world cannot supply the good it craves, it grows discon-

tented, and would declare a general revolt against the actual, were it not for the exactions of the physical life. This discontent at the limitations of its material surroundings often lasts beyond the bounds of childhood. It is evinced in the impractical, castle-building tendencies of many minds, particularly among those that have been relieved from the burdens of bread-winning. But such lives are at once seen to be abnormal. The ego would not be benefited by the abolishment of phantasy; the spiritual life is not promoted by the use of imagination alone. It is by the sweat of his brow that man must eat also his spiritual bread. In other words, the soul best knows higher excellencies by contrast. The moral nature must be braced and energized through obstacles and exertion, if spiritual delight is to be intense and healthy. The environment must not be succumbed to, or ignored, but conquered, and that, too, not only in the physical and the intellectual sphere, but also in the one yet higher.

The stages in the discipline and inurement of the soul are the same as those recognized in the last chapter, with reference to the progression of inherent types. The babe, little by little, acquires strength to lift its head, then its body, and finally to walk abroad, in spite of the outer, cosmic forces that would pluck it prostrate. This is the physical stage, and lasts until the bodily powers have reached their maximum. The child, grown almost to manhood, feels himself, by virtue of his hardened sinews and bounding pulses, the autocrat of his little world. In the meantime he has entered also the second stage—for there are no hard and fast lines in nature, but all ages and eras overlap. Very early he found out how to save himself from bumps and trips and pitfalls, and now is rapidly acquiring the knack of guarding life and limb under more unusual circumstances or in exigency, and will soon learn care of health and person, proper forms of approach to men and things, and the other modes of civilized society. Moreover, while thus becoming master of his environment intellectually and even strategically, he finds his eyes beginning to open, also, to the inner meanings of things. He finds his notions as to the true

grounds of worth and greatness have shifted. He appreciates the difference between a Napoleon and a Lincoln, takes in hand seriously and consciously the rounding out and amending of his own character, and begins to aspire after and receive the respect of men. His chief delights are now of the highest plane. In childhood his soul was virtually in the senses; he was maddened by pain, his delights were of the palate, and his types were physical. In his youth the ego had shifted its centre of activity to the intellect, his ideals became essentially intellectual. He saw no limitations of knowledge, no bar to the achievements of mind. Now he realizes that learning has its limitations indeed, can never be in itself an end, but must always serve as the means to something higher. He begins to appreciate the power of art and poetry, and see somewhat of difference between the poetic and the prosaic side of literature. He should now begin to understand why poetry, through contributing to and shaping the sentiments of men, is called the literature of power, will perhaps need not to be told that sentiment controls society, and that it is elevation of sentiment that advances civilization. His first poetry was sensational and crude—perhaps, outside of Homer and parts of the *Æneid*, only humorous and burlesque. In his intellectual period he may have enjoyed poetry of a high order, but it may be questioned whether his enjoyment was not of an essentially subjective sort. Minds in this stage are apt to believe much in poetry,—chiefly on authority, and expect much of it, but it is largely what they bring to the lines and pages by anticipation that they seem to find in them. Spiritual values will perforce be but intellectually discerned; and poems that, like Goldsmith's *Traveller* and *Deserted Village*, furnish their own running interpretation, will seem most substantial and satisfactory. But in the third period of the soul's development, it will be found to have parted with much of its blind, presumptuous subjectivity, and in matters of interpretation to have become receptive, almost passive. It does not now manufacture the sentiment it expects to feel, according to the example of some mind it has known or read about, but waits until

the experience is borne in upon it from the theme. The inherent types have been growing towards character, and are perhaps refined already to the degree of *Luria* or *In Memoriam*, or soon will be. At any rate, when final meanings of things have come to abound and be paramount in consciousness, the ego has reached the goal of its felicity. For the spiritual life consists in the preponderance and facility of spiritual experiences, in each of which the soul attains a normal and ultimate gratification or delight.¹ By learning thus to rise above the lower planes, and appropriate or turn the material universe to his spiritual account, man at last conquers his environment in the final way, and achieves that for which the long and trying years of discipline have been preparing.

The course of discipline in the individual is a repetition of the development, in epitome, of the race or nation. The race at large must have conquered its environment in the several stages, or the individual will not be likely to attain his best of culture. First is the physical period, in which forests are felled and dikes builded, and the soil tamed to the service of man. While this lasts, the occupations of society are principally manual; there will be but few men and women in the commonwealth who are not muscle-workers. In due time come capital, and commerce, and manufactures, and the majority are now brain-workers. But brain-work multiplies ideas and knowledge; ideas and knowledge enable sentiment; sentiment inaugurates reforms, sends out colonies and missions, emancipates slaves and serfs, institutes arbitration, builds hospitals, asylums, colleges, libraries, and galleries of art. Literature carries the best thought and sentiment of the day to the farthest corner of the land, so that the son of the eastern forests or western prairies, who sees year out and in only the few stereotyped, unshifting faces of his native village,—if he have the types within, may know the world like a cosmopolitan. There is indeed much to allure him to a higher point of culture; the very

¹ It will be noted here, of course, that the soul's delectation is not quantitatively but only qualitatively complete; otherwise there could be no further aspiration, and no advance.

air about him is full of inspiration. For under such conditions, provided there are no inorganic, foreign elements to disturb the process, the national average will soon have risen from the intellectual to the next higher grade, and each individual mind, according to its quality, will feel the impulse to realize within itself the general advance.

Literature in the largest sense is the body of ideas and sentiments that the spiritual sense of the times has selectively ordained shall be preserved. Thus we have a vast congeries of compositions of many races and ages—some produced in the first stage of spiritual history, some in the second, and the third—that we call Universal Literature. There are still produced in this final day of ours poetry and fiction that should in strictness belong to the very earliest period of race-development, because there are yet sections of society that demand literature of this grade. Likewise, the most eminent poets of a nation have also their intellectual, as well indeed as physical, stages, the products of which in maturer years they are often unable to disown, or exclude from collections of their works. Hence by a sort of unconcerted, almost unconscious assent, it has become customary to speak of poetry, according to inherent quality, as of three grades, perhaps oftenest under the respective designations of *sensational*, *intellectual*, and *true*.

The history of poetry, therefore, on the subjective side, is nothing more than the history of the development in man of the ability to identify and interpret types. The universe and its spiritual truths have not changed, but the ego and its relation to them. The evidence seems at first to point to a period in the beginnings of human history when the nature or existence of spiritual truth was not apprehended at all. But fetich and idol worship even in its crudest forms indicates rather the contrary,—an exaggerated and perverted activity of the idealizing faculty. To be sure, inorganic objects of the lowest grades are taken as types of gods and demons, but the fault is clearly not in the instincts but the culture, the enlightenment, of the ego. When the mind of the Australian

savage is better advised concerning what art can do in creating beautiful forms, he will begin to carve his feticch. So onward in the development of his mind, until he will no longer see deity in a single figure or image, but in the universe at large in a truly spiritual way, or with Herbert Spencer will apprehend the presence of the First Cause in even the experience of lifting a book from the table.¹ The poems which compose the Rig Veda show a stage nearly midway between the lowest and the highest degrees of development. There is a vivid and intense realization of the forces which pervade the universe, and a lively apprehension of the higher type revealed in each. But every separate effect is ascribed to a separate personified cause. There is as yet no capacity to read the open fact of a co-ordination of forces, to apprehend the existence of "Nature" as a logical summary of external causation. So likewise it is only within a generation or two that we ourselves, children of the latest day, and heir of the spiritual lore of the ages, have evolved power to conceive and postulate, not theologically but cosmically, the solidarity of both material and spiritual forces.²

We may not, therefore, assume a stage in the spiritual development of man when he was without instinct or capacity to find the higher in the lower. Yet was this instinct at first so blind and grovelling as in reality to fall short of any and all recognition of true types, amounting, in fact, to little more than sheer automatism. So we may premise a stage in which to the ego the spiritual universe was in effect a blank. Accordingly, the several stages of mental evolution by which, in the manner we have seen, the various elements of power come into operation, might approximately be thus distinguished : —

¹ *First Principles*, p. 189. The reader will need no further hint in making the observation that superstition is merely the effect of interpreting types on wrong assumptions of spiritual identity. Also that Science, properly so called, since it concerns itself with types, their history, and their interrelations, is in reality a search for spiritual truth.

² See p. 103.

1. Spiritual Truth in the Universe as inherent in and apprehensible by Types, but beyond the capacity of man to recognize and identify.

2. Such Spiritual Truth discerned by Seers, but darkly, and uncommunicated to other minds.

3. The same Spiritual Truth discerned more clearly, by a greater number of poetic minds, and to some degree communicated, though without figures or adornment, in common prose.

4. Spiritual Truth, discerned by yet greater numbers of Seers and Poets, and to such extent correspondingly by lay minds as to enable spiritual communication with them through Allegory, Parable, and like figures. As yet no meters, but all cast in a species of lofty, impassioned prose.

5. Spiritual Truth further familiarized to Seer and people, so that he may intelligibly communicate to them his thoughts in running metaphor. Rude metric and rhythmic forms appear.

6. Spiritual Truth apprehended yet more independently by the lay mind, and in such degree as to enable single metaphors to carry each the effect of a complete Allegory or Running Metaphor. Complete metrical systems now evolved.

7. Spiritual Truth yet more generally discerned, and taken for granted in the reader, hence communicated to him prevailing in the abbreviated form of phrases, with the accessories of Association, Tone Coloring, and Force.

8. Such common familiarity with spiritual experiences and notions as to enable stenographic communication between Poet and reader, on the basis of words for sentences or clauses. Whole trains of association, as well as complete analogies, condensed to single terms.

Poetry, objectively considered, is, therefore, a very incongruous collection of literary remains and products from all the above periods except the first and second. It includes the poetry of our times as well as the productions and fragments of productions dating from long before the use of letters. Each preserved poem or fragment of a poem is a survival out of many that have perished, because they all, having served their immediate purpose, had in them also somewhat that the generation next succeeding was not willing to part with. In each era the common mind reaches the level of the seer intelligence of some preceding age, often of that immediately before. Even when a composition is essentially antiquated and devoid of influence, it may have antiquarian or ethnic

interest to certain leading minds, and at their instance be retained in the body of universal literature. This is true eminently of the Northern Sagas, the Kalevala, the Vedas, and many of "The Sacred Books of the East." It would, therefore, be most natural to classify poetic compositions according to the stage or period to which they severally belong. But the fact of a progressive development—no doubt one day to be used as the basis of a scientific classification—is hardly an available principle in the present state of literary knowledge. The student, however, should not omit to consider the chief objective features of important poetic compositions, and note the range of development represented.

From generation to generation, as human capacity to read the universe by types expands, the ability to communicate the truths perceived to other minds increases. The average man or woman learns ultimate truth in two ways,—through the experience or example of others, and by direct experience in himself. The more generously endowed read it at first hand from nature. Minds of the latter sort find themselves affected in consciousness by an impression or conviction of truth to them before unknown. It may be truth already familiar to other men, but if recognized independently, stamps the mind discerning it as original. There are, moreover, degrees in originality. To belong to the type of original minds in such signal degree as to perceive and reveal, not what will edify one's self, but be useful or necessary to society at large, is to be a Copernicus, a Bacon, a Shakespeare, or a Beethoven,—in short, to be a genius.

To be original, therefore, is to be open to the unwritten meanings of the world without, to see the possible in the actual, to see the reasons and consequences of facts along with the facts themselves. These are in reality the same activities of the ego that we have traced in poetry, save that in the former the mental mode is phantasy, and the end not spiritual delight. The processes of an Edison and a Shakespeare are, therefore, not dissimilar. Each is persuaded of a certain ulterior law through detection of it in type.

The one by ingenuity demonstrates his truth to the senses in the form of a phonograph or motor, the other by art to the spiritual perceptions in the guise of a Hamlet or Macbeth. Both indeed in strictness employ art, the one in a material way for a material end, the other in a manner largely transcending time and space relations for inner edification and delight.

Genius and art, like poetry itself, are relative. The *Gorboduc* and the *Ralph Royster Doyster*, Lyly's *Campaspe* and Marlowe's *Tamburlaine* evince in respective degree both genius and art. A poet gifted beyond the appreciation of his age cannot be a genius beyond the recognition of that age, but may rank beneath the poetaster until some succeeding generation restore him to his place. Hence there were genius and art sufficient to their day in each of the stages above indicated. But art properly begins in the third of the stages, when the mind of the seer grappled with the task of expressing, in a language grossly material, a spiritual conception. All intellectual and higher notions have received names properly signifying nothing but physical attributes or things. There is no ultimate root denoting a purely spiritual entity or action. It is not necessary to count the spiritual terms of the dictionary to estimate even the incidental work of seer minds in a given literature. Here, indeed, is need that we recognize the concurrence of the rest of society who have adopted all these tropes and metaphors, and put them in their dictionaries. The successful battle is not won solely by the strategy and foresight of the leaders, but is due not less to the momentum of the rank and file who accept and put to the test the prevision of their chiefs. The original idea of a single mind may become the instinct of a race. Co-operation between lay and leading intelligence is the secret of all progress. As to the larger, ultra-incidental achievements of original intellects, in the industrial world ideas and types are secured to and associated with the mind achieving them by patent, and all advance of one innovator over another is thus plainly registered. Somewhat similarly it should be practicable to make divisions of poetry according to the rise and advance of

types. But this again, until as in architecture we shall note the genesis and growth of theme-ideas, will scarcely furnish an adequate basis of classification.

There seems, therefore, no principle of classification more available, at least provisionally, than the one we have seen to have been practically, almost consciously, selected by the spiritual sense of the reading world. It was pointed out that the acceptable poetry of the first stage in the development of the individual as of the race is sensational, having its sphere almost in the very nerves, and reaching its fullest effect in the physical act of laughter. There is much poetry of this kind, from the minstrel ballad and broad travesty to the better class of humorous or burlesque poems that find their way permanently into books. There is little need to instance general examples, as this sort—at its best entirely agreeable, and even edifying in its way—is easily distinguished. But there is a certain species of this class of poetry that deserves attention. We have seen how an era of emotional and literary ardor is followed by one of barrenness and depression. There comes a time after the Shakespeares and Tassos when minds of a baser sort attempt to make art take the place of genius, when mannerisms will be put forward in the place of message. Marini did this in seventeenth century Italian literature with such success as to fasten his name upon poetry of such sort presumably for all time. Marinistic poetry is not written for the sake of seriously considering or truly interpreting the meaning in the subject. It consists of surprising and sensational things said *incidentally*, or *along of*, instead of *in development of*, the theme, and owes its success to the reader's mistaking the extraneous emotion for the expected effect from the subject itself. Examples are only too frequent in our literature from Donne and the other "Metaphysical" poets down even to our own day. Perhaps the most flagrant instance of Marinistic extravagance to be found in our standard literature occurs in The Given Heart of Cowley's *Mistress*. Here instead of attempting to give expression to somewhat of the refined sentiment intimated by the title—after the manner of a poem to

be mentioned later — the author at once dismisses his theme, and in stanzas third and fourth proceeds to astound his reader with these conceits : —

“Wo to her stubborn heart, if once mine come
Into the self-same room.
'Twill tear and blow up all within,
Like a grenado shot into a magazine.

“Then shall Love keep the ashes, and torn parts,
Of both our broken hearts :
Shall out of both one new one make,
From hers, th' alloy, from mine the metal take.”

Anything in verse that is not spiritually true, or that is not said because spiritual truth is discerned and inspires utterance, is, of course, not true poetry. If an author, failing to read his theme aright, or going aside from it altogether, fall to heaping together far-fetched and anomalous figures or allusions, the composition is Marinistic. If he go yet beyond, and, instead of commending his professed subject, proceed to disinvest it of the dignity and importance it in common acceptance had before, it is satire or burlesque — in general a still lower form of sensational poetry. If, on the other hand, he apply himself genuinely to his theme, but succeed only in discerning and uttering things emotional in an intellectual way, the product belongs to the next higher plane of poetry. When the intellectual element predominates, when objects are contemplated logically or literally to a greater degree than typically, the effect cannot, as a matter of course, get far enough beyond the intellect to affect the feelings strongly. A poem of this kind is the *Cooper's Hill*, of which an extract has been characterized already. A similar example and one almost equally praised by old-time critics occurs, as the student will remember, in Addison's *Campaign* : —

“But O, my muse, what numbers wilt thou find
To sing the furious troops in battle joined !

Methinks I hear the drum's tumultuous sound,
The victor's shouts and dying groans confound,
The dreadful burst of cannon rend the skies,
And all the thunder of the battle rise.
'Twas then great Marlbro's mighty soul was proved,
That, in the shock of charging hosts unmoved,
Amidst confusion, horror, and despair,
Examined all the dreadful scenes of war;
In peaceful thought the field of death surveyed,
To fainting squadrons sent the timely aid,
Inspired repulsed battalions to engage,
And taught the doubtful battle where to rage.
So when an angel, by divine command,
With rising tempests shakes a guilty land,
Such as of late o'er pale Britannia passed,
Calm and serene he drives the furious blast;
And, pleased th' Almighty's orders to perform,
Rides in the whirlwind, and directs the storm."

There is evidently tremendous meaning here, but the reader finds himself in some way baffled in the attempt to derive a satisfying experience from the passage. The imagination asks only for the spiritual identity, will do its work without assistance if this be given, but cannot accept in lieu of it a literal description of that in which it is to realize a loftier type. Moreover, it will never do to let the imagination of the reader run ahead of the author. If the reader have an inkling of the analogy at the outset, he will long have ceased to feel the effect of the comparison before the application is reached. As we have seen, both the literal and the spiritual should be brought before the mind together, if possible by the use of the latter only.

Genuine poetry, or the poetry of Pure Sentiment, remains to be characterized. Here the theme finds its way through the intellect to the emotions in such wise that the reader scarcely notes the words, or lines, or 'form,' or the notions employed as such at all. The author's enthusiasm, as evinced by the force, helps the effect. As the most convenient example we may name the *Count Gismond* already studied. Far superior to this in tone and form

is the *Evelyn Hope*, or *Childe Roland* of the same author. But perhaps no better example of pure sentiment can be chosen for first study than Browning's *One Word More*. Though a love-poem and nothing else, there is preserved throughout the most perfect dignity, — there is no sign of willingness to parade what is sacredly personal for effect's sake, and there is no syllable of sentimentality. Sentiment is the true of our emotions, as sentimentality — that pestilent vice of third-rate poems and novels — is the false. Sentiment is a collective name for all those forms of emotion that are native to normal minds, and corresponds to truth and fact in the sphere of prose. Sentimentality is the emotionally fictitious, and stands collectively for those experiences which are represented by unprincipled or unskilled authors as organic and actual, but are on the contrary at best abnormal, and perhaps impossible. Conscientious and truly inspired poets and novelists, like Browning and George Eliot, are no more to be suspected of introducing experiences not demonstrably belonging to human nature, than historians of admitting facts not yet established beyond question. The utter absence of stock Marinistic breathings and voicings of 'homage' and 'devotion' is the first of many surprises in *One Word More*. It is the loftiest and truest love-poem in the language.

It has been pointed out that each complete poet will betray a sensational, or Marinistic, as well as an intellectual stage in his own development. Milton furnishes a good example. As a college youth he wrote a mock epitaph, consisting mainly of "cranks" and Marinistic jests, on the death of poor Hobson — not knowing what he did. In the hymn *On the Morning of Christ's Nativity* he had passed to the next stage, but not beyond; for even a secular, or historical, realization of what the event he celebrated had meant to the world should have warmed the lines. But in the *L'Allegro* he has awakened to the joy of nature and is trying to voice it forth. Not to multiply illustrations, Shakespeare's *Venus* and *Lucrece* betray their stage, as also the puns and conceits of certain early plays; Cowper's *Verses on Finding the Heel of a Shoe*

is a surprising example of intellectualism ; Browning's *Pavline* is riotously full of sensuous emotion, while the *Sordello* is packed with metaphysic disquisition. Moreover, portions of truly inspired poems will often, when considered apart from their connection, seem to fall to the intellectual grade or lower. It is only by keeping our attention centered upon the theme that we shall avoid judging wholes by parts, and subordinating the paramount to the incidental.

Concerning further classification of poetic compositions, it will be sufficient here to note and characterize two or three inferior divisions. Didactic poetry is plainly a variety of the class that has been characterized as Intellectual. The Pastoral is a species of artificial poetry, in which profounder aspects of nature or society are described or contemplated under the simpler conditions of shepherd life, and often through the medium of shepherd minds. As before explained, the charm consists in the use of the spiritual to express the literal. The real subject and circumstances are kept out of view : the shepherds are lay figures, and the surroundings merely furnish naïve and refreshing associations. When men have advanced far enough beyond the stage of Arcadian simplicity to appreciate its amenities, forgetting its serious side, there is a pleasure in figuring their present life and surroundings as rustic and primitive. As already intimated, pastoral poetry is in effect a form of allegory ;¹ and success in it is seen to be doubly difficult, both from the risk of inconsistencies, as well as from the counter danger of keeping too close to nature. It will not do to make one's shepherd talk either like an Aristotle, or indeed like the peasant he really is.

Burlesque and humorous poetry remain to be considered. Here the range is limited, and, as we have seen, the effect aimed at, sensational. The purpose is not to elevate and refine the mood, but, on proper occasion and for sufficient reason, to reveal the ludicrous types that may be detected even in the most serious

¹ See the quotation from Lord Kames, in note to the first paragraph of Chapter X., below.

things. The effect is mainly produced, not by showing that the lower has ennobling relations with the higher, but contrariwise, by revealing some degrading affinity which connects the higher with something lower. Grotesque and surprising analogies, bathos, and anticlimax are brought in to assist. Satire is another species of inverted poetry, but its purpose is, or should be, to correct and reform through revelation of lower spiritual affiliations. But Anglo-Saxon satire, as Pope's, has too often amounted to nothing better than vulgar abuse, sometimes to little less than literary assault and battery.¹

¹ The student should compare if possible, for the sake of the standard and for a clear notion of what satire may effect, the spirit and style of Parini's *Day*. Any good encyclopedia will sufficiently describe the work.

CHAPTER XIII.

ART, AND PRINCIPLES OF ART.

It has been shown that to be a genius is to find one's self capable of perceiving ulterior truths of far-reaching consequence, without passing through all the intermediate stages of approach and preparation. Some children are able to read on learning the alphabet, without going through the steps of syllabication. Zerah Colburn comprehended abstruse processes of higher mathematics without learning the simpler. Mozart understood the complex and involved counterpoint of a musical score without mastering technical harmony. The mental activity in all such cases is of the same kind as that which comprehends a 'brave attack' as an 'attack by brave men'; the subjective energy is great enough to reach the end from the beginning without division into stages, to comprehend the whole without taking cognizance of separate parts. But what enables the ego to recognize the end thus reached as an end, to know the ulterior truth *as* an ulterior truth? The precocious child is precocious not merely from thinking the thoughts and saying the phrases of his elders, but from realizing that these, *for them*, are normal modes. The child that reads on learning its letters, appears to appreciate beforehand what reading means, and this seems in some way to reveal a short-cut approach to the advantages of the art. So a Zerah Colburn solves trigonometric problems, not like an automaton, but with the seriousness and enthusiasm of a professional mathematician.

The only adequate explanation of the mystery involves the assumption of especial prenatal endowments in the ego. Con-

sciousness must begin with certain powers and aptitudes that other intellects have to acquire, already developed and provided; the mind finds itself in some especial point or points already master of its environment. Hence, we may distinguish genius as the ego in such condition of preadaptation to certain particulars of environment as enables it to take these for granted, and thus unhandicapped, advance to extraordinary discoveries of ultimate, useful truths. When the endowments of genius so recognize time and space relations as to discern, in the form of activity called phantasy, types of the materially possible in the materially actual, and nothing more, we call it inventive. But when the endowments of genius do not admit or recognize such limitations, but apprehend, in the activity called imagination, types of the spiritual in the material, we call it creative. But in this sense 'genius' is more frequently employed without any qualifying word.

The processes by which genius translates its inner perceptions into outer revelations, or makes over its discoveries and experiences to other minds, have been called Arts or Art. The latter is the term appropriated to products of the imagination. As we have seen, art is wholly relative, and its degree determined by the genius which employs it, and by the attainments of the age or audience addressed. Art is dependent upon two conditions: delight in the artist over some discovery of inner truth, and an impulse to share that delight with other minds.

The ego, on perception of inspiring truth, has been moved in literature to communicate that truth in two principal ways. In the first of these there is an impulse to set forth the whole as a whole, literally, often effusively, part by part, and, so far as may be, with accompanying circumstances. In the second, there is the contrary impulse to set forth only such parts as contain types spiritually potential of the whole, and to suppress mere circumstantial and accessories altogether. The former is Homer's way, and in the main is characteristic, with one exception, of all the Aryan literatures. The Gothic mind, which furnishes this exception, seems pervaded by some absolute principle of repression and

self-restraint. Homer and the other non-Gothic poets abound in free, if not garrulous, expatiation. They aim simply to restore a given incident or situation, even to its time and space relations. When there is emotion, the impulse is frankly to utter it, or avow it, or at least manifest it directly. The Gothic genius, on the contrary, strives everywhere to select and suppress, to concentrate and intensify, and gives evidence of feeling only indirectly, by signs of a struggle to overcome it. It is characteristic of the race at large to maintain self-possession in spite of overmastering emotion; it is held unseemly to give way to it, or to be overcome, at least outwardly, thereby. Under the burden of supreme sorrow, the Kelt will yield himself to various naive demonstrations, while the Anglo-Saxon bears his agony in silence. The grief in each mind is doubtless equal, and the effect upon the sympathizing bystander not less in case of the one than of the other. Hence, we may admit that either principle of art, in its respective race, is equally effective with the other. The effusive Keltic temperament demands a more immediate and positive response to an exciting occasion, while the Saxon mind more slowly, and perhaps in the end not less deeply moved, will resist and keep to its dignity until its inertia is overcome. It is therefore clearly impossible to try a composition adapted to the Keltic mind and one answering to the feelings of the Saxon by the same standard. Each race must have its own canons of taste. The Anglo-Saxon demands that his poet maintain a fixed reserve, continue impassive under all circumstances of emotion, and keep his personality out of sight. Since the theme is greater than its servant, no poet must presume to speak for it, or in its stead, or make himself an example of its power. But these have been from the first fundamental principles of Gothic literature.

This second of the two modes of art, clearly to be called Gothic, is seen first in *Cædmon* and the *Beowulf*. It would, indeed, be hard to find a more genuine illustration than 'The Passing of Scyld,' in the opening fit of the latter poem:—

Then fared Scyld forth at the fated hour,
 Courageous to come to comfort of God.
 They bore that brave to the beach of the sea,
 Sorrowing soldiers as himself had bid,
 While wielded with words that warder of Scyldings,
 While long the land-prince beloved held sway.
 Ready at harbor rose the ringed-stem,
 Shining and shapely ætheling ship.
 Then alone they laid their dear lord,
 Bracelet-giver on the boat's bosom,
 Much-famed by the mast. There were many of jewels,
 Fairest treasures fetched from afar :
 I never knew another keel fitted
 With such woven war-weeds and weapons of slaughter,
 With bills and byrnies ; there lay on his bosom
 Riches unreckoned, bound to roam with him,
 Drift on domains remote of the deep.
 Truly they trapped him with treasures not less,
 Prince of the people with precious stores,
 Than those who at first had sent him asunder,
 Yet but a babe on the billows alone.
 They bound above him a golden banner,
 High overhead, let the waves hold him,
 Consigned to the surges : sad were their spirits,
 Mourning their minds. Men are not able
 To say for sooth fate's requisition,
 Heroes under heavens, who had that lading.

The attempt here is not to communicate a fact, or information about a fact, — which the minstrel or poet seems almost to take for granted, but to assist and assure appreciation of that fact. There is matter enough in this first division of the poem, if descanted upon and gossiped over and told throughout for its own sake merely, to fill up the 3200 lines of the whole : the impulse is unmistakably to excise and exclude everything that the hearer or reader cannot be made to *feel*. The first nineteen lines of the fit summarize the significant happenings of Scyld's kingship, — how he cast out his treacherous thanes and began his

career anew—how he lived to see compensation, and increased until each of the surrounding tribes was forced to own him lord and pay tribute—how God gave him a son to comfort the people, who had been long in distress for lack of a capable leader. Even this much is told in the main only to introduce the manner of his ‘passing,’ or rather of his burial after death. When a babe he had been laid wailing and helpless on the deck of a ship, with jewels and treasure in heaps beside him, and sent adrift alone on the ocean; and the ship had wandered to the shores of the tribe which in his young manhood had made him king. Scyld never despised or forgot his feeble beginnings, but long before the end, while he was yet in vigor, ordained that he should go out as he came in,—that he should be laid alone on his resplendent vessel, his costly coats of mail and swords, his ornaments and treasures beside him, and his choicest jewels upon his breast. This was his funeral. A golden banner was raised high over his head and the ship pushed out, to drift on and on to his last resting-place—which his dear tribes-men should never know. What race besides ever so buried a king, or after told the story so sublimely?

But the chief example is the *Divine Comedy*. Though the first finished product of Gothic poetry, it remains the best, a monument and marvel of greatest effect produced by fewest and smallest means. Written when it was written, without models or traditions of trimness and symmetry, it is the standing wonder of literature in respect to form. It is the only modern poem until Shakespeare that is not too long. The vastness of the theme considered, perhaps no poet had ever such temptation or warrant to expatiate; for many single episodes might have been enlarged to volumes. But the iron restraint nowhere relaxes; it holds within set limits, no matter how awful or transporting the scenes, not only the great divisions, but likewise each specific canto to the last line of the whole. The same instinctive dread of expatiation, when not overmastered and controlled by the literary traditions of the South, is as conspicuous in the later Scandinavian and

Teutonic poetry as in the sagas. In England, after the Conquest, the native stream of poesy was diverted through the monasteries and universities, and the original channel lost and forgotten. Yet the old springs of popular inspiration still ran. While the poetry of books was waxing conventional and worse, *Chevy Chase*, *Sir Patrick Spens*, *The Nut Brown Maid*, and many another ringing ballad kept the spirit and manner of the old saga minstrelsy alive, and refreshed the people. In the fulness of time the poetic stream diverted by learning found its way back to the old banks; Chatterton and Percy, Coleridge and Wordsworth effectually balladized the standard poetry of books. Thus had the Northern genius triumphed over the Southern restrictions of form. Mr. Freeman has taught us to go back to tribal times, if we would know the history of our institutions; and poetry is no exception. From Tennyson's *Locksley Hall* down to such compositions as the *Tramp*, *Tramp*, and *John Brown's Body* of our Civil War, we identify but varying forms of Gothic minstrelsy. Though rhyme has displaced alliteration, though the number of syllables per line has become for the most part constant and a stereotyped metric stress is submitted to, yet, as we have seen, oral emphasis is still the real basis of rhythm, while—unequivocal and paramount characteristics—little is said where might be much, but that little with all the wondrous effect, upon the feelings, of a whole.¹

How the race-instinct manifested itself in the ballad period while England was appropriating the benefits of the Renaissance

¹ The above titles have been chosen as especially, but not exceptionally, illustrative of the features named. Cf. these lines from the *Locksley Hall*:—

“O my cousin, shallow-hearted! O my Amy, mine no more!
O the dreary, dreary moorland! O the barren, barren shore!

“Falsar than all fancy fathoms, falsar than all songs have sung,
Puppet to a father's threat, and servile to a shrewish tongue!”

That these verses are so planned and put together as not only to tell their story but likewise ensure appreciation of what they mean, goes without saying. We have only to note that the meaning is interpreted to us and imparted *all in one*.

and fixing its standards of form, it may be well in brief to notice. That the common people should have kept on composing minstrel poetry after minstrelsy had ceased, must have been due to natural, innate emotion that demanded vent. Clearly, nothing else could have given them inspiration; there is no making poetry, at least among the unlettered, merely because poetry has been made. To take one of the crudest compositions of this class, that the art and spirit may be more evident, we select *Babylon, or the Bonnie Banks o' Fordie* :—

“There were three ladies lived in a bower,
Hey how bonnie!
And they went out to pu' a flower,
On the bonnie banks o' Fordie.

“They hadna pu'ed a rose but ane,
Hey how bonnie!
When up started to them a banisht man,
On the bonnie banks o' Fordie.

“He's ta'en the first sister by the hand,
Hey how bonnie!
He's turned her round and made her stand,
On the bonnie banks o' Fordie.

“‘It's whether will ye be a rank robber's wife,’
Hey how bonnie!
‘Or will ye dee by my wee penknife?’
On the bonnie banks o' Fordie.

“‘Before I'll be called a rank robber's wife,’
Hey how bonnie!
‘I'll rather dee by your wee penknife,’
On the bonnie banks o' Fordie.

“Then out he's ta'en his wee penknife,
Hey how bonnie!
And he's parted her and her sweet life,
On the bonnie banks o' Fordie.

"He's ta'en the second ane by the hand,

Hey how bonnie!

He's turned her round and made her stand,

On the bonnie banks o' Fordie.

'It's whether will ye be a rank robber's wife,'

Hey how bonnie!

'Or will ye dee by my wee penknife?'

On the bonnie banks o' Fordie.

"'Before I'll be called a rank robber's wife,'

Hey how bonnie!

'I'll rather dee by your wee penknife,'

On the bonnie banks o' Fordie.

"Then out he's ta'en his wee penknife,

Hey how bonnie!

And he's parted her and her sweet life,

On the bonnie banks o' Fordie.

"He's ta'en the youngest ane by the hand,

Hey how bonnie!

And he's turned her round and made her stand,

On the bonnie banks o' Fordie.

"'It's whether will ye be a rank robber's wife,'

Hey how bonnie!

'Or will ye dee by my wee penknife?'

On the bonnie banks o' Fordie.

"'It's I'll not be called a rank robber's wife,'

Hey how bonnie!

'Nor will I dee by your wee penknife,'

On the bonnie banks o' Fordie.

"'For I hae a brother in green wood tree,'

Hey how bonnie!

'An' gin ye kill me it's he'll kill thee,'

On the bonnie banks o' Fordie.

"'Come tell to me what's thy brother's name,'

Hey how bonnie!

'My brother's name it is Baby Lon!'
On the bonnie banks o' Fordie.

"O sisters, sisters, what hae I done ?'
Hey how bonnie!
'O hae I done this ill to thee?'
On the bonnie banks o' Fordie.

"O since I've done this evil deed,
Hey how bonnie!
'Good sall never be seen o' me,'
On the bonnie banks o' Fordie.

"And he's ta'en out his wee penknife,
Hey how bonnie!
And twined himsel o' his ain sweet life,
On the bonnie banks o' Fordie."

Here are all the features of a modern prose romance. The identity of the 'rank robber' is concealed until the mind of the reader has had time to invest the characters with experiential interest; and the device introduced for delay is not padded description of personal looks, antecedent circumstances, or even of the 'bonnie banks,' or other immediate surroundings, as in the effusive manner, but an unmeaning refrain that does not occupy even the intelligence of the reader.¹ The style is lacking somewhat in

¹ There seems little reason to doubt that the refrain in ballads of this kind is Keltic, and appropriated as in the present case by Gothic bards, not to spin out the narrative, but to avoid introduction of details. For an example of the effusive manner, compare *The Ryme of Sir Thopas*, which Chaucer introduces as a take-off and gets himself silenced for repeating. It is unfortunate that the minstrel literature of England and Scotland should have received the name "ballads," as if similar to or identical with the lyric poetry of the romance literatures, from which they are admitted to be distinct. While it is perhaps impossible to separate definitely Gothic from Keltic elements, it seems clear in the main that it was the Scandinavian minstrel that set the fashion and gave them their distinctive tone and spirit. It is, at any rate, not difficult to distinguish the style and manner of Burns and Scott from the same in *Helen of Kirconnel*, *Glasgerion*, or even Campbell's *Hohenlunden*, which is in all respects a Gothic ballad. Shakespeare was at one with the ballad-makers in spirit, and seems (*Cf. Winter's Tale*, V. ii. par. 5), by no means vainly, to have coveted their power.

dignity and force—in so far echoing the lighter and more voluble metrical romances of the South; but there can be no mistaking the serious spirit beneath the form, or the selective, suppressive manner of presentation. It is not too much to say that to these characteristics not less than to the theme itself, the poem owes its power. Cast in the spirit and manner of *The Confessio Amantis*, it could but have proved insufferable to every well-appointed reader.

The first element in the Gothic mode of art is, therefore, ‘to know what to leave in the inkstand’; it is *the ability to produce most effects by fewest means*. We have already seen exemplification of it in a more elementary form,—namely, in the ‘concentrative figures’ of Chapter X. The other important element of the Gothic mode is *the power to make the little include potentially the much*. This is its supreme source of strength; it is this which has given to both Dante and Shakespeare the best part of their fame. It does not consist in producing impressions or experiences by direct comparison or deduction, but contrariwise, inductively, or through inference. To state the principle formally, — *An effect is set forth in such wise as to challenge the fancy to account for it, then out of the sufficient cause, duly conceived and estimated, to interpret such particular effect as the reader, in the given circumstances, is most vitally concerned to know*. There is no better example than the passage from Dante, which Ruskin has made familiar to all readers of his *Modern Painters*:¹—


On my right shoulder did the sun now smite me,
Which, raying forth, already changed the aspect
Of all the west from azure into white,
So that I with my shadow made the flame
Appear more red. — *Purgatorio*, xxvi. 4–8.

¹ Vol. II., p. 163, American edition. The original lines, which Ruskin quotes, are these:—

“Feriami l’ Sole in su l’ omero destro,
Che già, raggiando, tutto l’ occidente
Mutava in bianco aspetto di cilestro:
Ed io facea con l’ ombra più rovente
Parer la fiamma.”

Here is no expatiation, no attempt at direct description, either of which would have caused the author to fail utterly of his purpose. No mind less endowed than Dante's with artistic sensibility could have hit upon such an expedient, which even the reader, unless quick to draw inferences from effects of color, will at first but ill appreciate. Ruskin thus remarks upon its efficacy. "This is a slight touch; he has not gone to *Ætna* or *Pelorus* for fuel; but we shall not soon recover from it, — he has taken our breath away and leaves us gasping. No smoke or cinders there. Pure, white, hurtling, formless flame; very fire-crystal, we cannot make spires nor waves of it, nor divide it, nor walk on it; there is no question about singeing soles of feet. It is lambent annihilation."

Now as to the art of the passage. The mind of the reader is at once engaged by the phenomenon of a flame seemingly *reddened* by a shadow cast upon it from the sun, and proceeds to imagine the degree of heat necessary to account for it; then from this as a cause, makes haste to interpret and realize to itself the especial effect intended by the author, — namely, *how must Dante have felt* in this temperature of some thousands of degrees Fahrenheit? From the incidental, inferior effect given by the author the reader is led to infer, through supplying the cause of both, the essential, superior effect demanded by the treatment of the-theme. The mental process here evidently involves a forward as well as a backward step, which, together with the relative effect of the three notions upon the feelings, might be represented graphically in some such way as this: —



Really, however, these steps are rather implied than actual; for

the effect set forth by the author is, through imagination, potential of its cause, which again through imagination is potential of the effect designed. The mind does not seem to recognize the relation of cause and effect consciously or completely. The process is logical, but not ratiocinative. It is not the ego as reason, but as emotion, that is now in exercise. The inferences are not categorical but empiric, and can be stated only in interrogative or exclamatory propositions. Formally expressed, the course of thought is this: 'Shadows cast upon a light background should be dark; but Dante speaks of one that was *red*: how intense, therefore, must have been the heat which caused it? When we make *dark, cool* shadows, the experience of heat may be inordinately hard to bear: what, then, must have been Dante's sensations in casting a *red* one,—or, under the same circumstances, *would have been my own?*' For a second illustration, which shall be of a higher sort and involve symptoms of character, we turn to the opening scenes of Shakespeare's *Macbeth*. The author here makes to us such an exhibition of King Duncan's incapacity and of Macbeth's fitness as to make us desire to see the crown transferred from the one to the other, and without much concern as to the means or manner of the transfer. When the witches declared their prophecy we saw Macbeth 'start and seem to fear,' and we at once apprehended he might have scruples about abetting or even consenting to his promotion. But his starting and seeming to fear were really due to a very different feeling, as we are to find out later. The author wishes us here and now to *expect* as well as desire Macbeth's advancement; hence in the little he lets his hero say in the third scene Shakespeare several times makes him prevaricate on small or no occasion, and finally, on his coming to himself from his fit of abstraction, causes him, without the least symptom of conscience, to cry out to his waiting companions:—

"Give me your favor! *My dull brain was wrought
With things forgotten.*"

That is enough. The last falsehood, so immediate and unconsidered, has done its work. We are fully persuaded that Macbeth will not be kept back from making himself Duncan's successor by principle. In other words, from the 'effect given,' or Macbeth's indirections of speech, we have divined the character from which they emanate, and read quickly in this character the potential truth that he can and must do the deed which we await.¹

We may test the diagram by a still finer and more intricate example from Browning's *Luria* :—

"*Secretary.* Here I sit, your scribe,
And in and out goes Luria, days and nights;
This Puccio comes; the Moor his other friend,
Husain; they talk — all *that's* feigned easily;
He speaks (I would not listen if I could),
Reads, orders, counsels : — but he *rests* sometimes, —
I see him stand and eat, sleep stretched an hour
On the lynx-skins, yonder; hold his bared black arms
Into the sun from the tent-opening; laugh
When his horse drops the forage from his teeth
And neighs to hear him hum his Moorish songs.
That man believes in Florence as the saint
Tied to the wheel believes in God."²

The question over which Braccio and the Secretary are in debate is, Will Luria abuse his victory and seize Florence? They have watched him in season and out of season from their respective points of view, assuming on general principles that he must be as unscrupulous and self-seeking as themselves. But the Secretary has had peculiar opportunities for espionage : he has seen Luria not only when on duty as chief officer and under observation, but likewise at times when the latter could have had no suspicion he was being studied. The naïve and ingenuous doings enumerated and described by the Secretary are really intended

¹ But perhaps the simplest as well as most familiar illustration is "Giotto's O," in which he intended the Pope to read his fitness for the work proposed.

² Act I., ll. 97-109. The italics in the lines quoted are not in the original.

for ourselves, and are the effects put forth by the author through him for our imagination to seize on and interpret. He is next used also as a kind of proxy or mentor, for Browning helps us in the inferences we are to draw by having the Secretary tell us how he has shaped his own. Along with or after him we see there is no accounting for such child-like, unconscious action in a chieftain who might make himself master of all Italy, except as typical of a grand and noble nature, a transparent, Othello-like integrity. From this as his spiritual whole of character we pass immediately, not to the conclusion, but the conviction, that Luria can no more raise his hand against Florence which he reveres, than the saint against his God. It is necessary for the author's purpose that we be put at once in possession of the truth concerning Luria's worth to which Puccio, Domizia, and Braccio so slowly but so sublimely come; and thus by a single stroke Browning gives him to our conception. It is principally by strokes wholly similar that Dante, Shakespeare, Goethe, Schiller, Oehlenschläger, Tegnér, Victor Hugo, Tennyson, Browning, and all other Gothic poets have put forth their power.

In complete contrast with the Gothic mode, in both its elements, stands the school of literature or art called Classical. We have seen how in the fundamental form of figures, Arnold and Pope and Thomson are inclined to repeat or expand the literal until it shall include the spiritual, but poets of the other manner to condense the spiritual and the literal into one. The principles of each school are the same in higher lines. As of Gothic stock we prefer Dante's or Shakespeare's or Goethe's way, except when in certain frames of fancy we wish not to be transported through new scenes at lightning speed, but to stroll and roam on foot through old. Homer, it is true, sometimes uses an effect as the means of setting forth its cause, as in the famous talk of the Trojan nobles concerning Helen's beauty, but even here he uses the known as means of illustrating and better realizing the known, not of reaching the unknown. His themes are current and well understood beforehand, but he outdoes expectation in rehandling.

He is no prophet of new truth,—the classicist seldom is. He enables us to realize how it would feel to have and hold the bow of Pandarus, the shield of Achilles, by giving us each of the inferior antecedent experiences which make up or enable that final one.¹ He makes the less reach to and produce in sum the greater. But Dante makes the greater potentially include and supply the less.

There is further and more complete contrariety between the classic and the Gothic spirit. The classic impulse is to do all in the name and for the sake of the literary body politic. The whole community of culture is its spiritual unit. Hence its idiom is a public language, like that of statutes and proclamations. Thus it has made the language of books more select and lofty than the language of the camp and fireside. But the Teutonic mind has never taken kindly to this idea, and when not befogged or baffled, has tended towards making the language of books and the language of men alike. No Gothic genius from Dante or Langland, to Browning and Carlyle, has ever used other than the people's language, and his own personal dialect of that language.² Not embodiment of all men's excellencies, but assertion of its individual ideals is the object of Gothic aspiration. Personality is its sacred thing, the unit of its spiritual society.

It is important to trace the steps by which the earlier aspects of the classic and the Gothic movement have evolved their present forms and standards. The first influence of Classicism tended to draw men within the library and away from nature. Chaucer's earlier poems evince this first effect of books. Gower is the whole of which Chaucer saved himself from becoming more than a part. To minds of this sort a book is a book without much reference to its message or difference from other books. Later comes a stage in which the spiritual truth and beauty of the old-

¹ This is of course the 'natural method' *par excellence*. But some things even the most plodding of mature minds may learn in a more abbreviated way.

² So far as possible the student should here compare the Gothic authors of other literatures, as Victor Hugo, Goethe, Oehlenschläger and Tegnér.

world poetry are reached. Spenser, Ben Jonson, and Milton belong here. The fault of these and their fellows lies mainly in the fact that they but dimly see the beauty in the outer world, whence the Greek and Roman masters at first hand derived it for their works. They draw their figures and illustrations preferably from classic sources, — much as the child will pore over crude, ill cut or colored pictures in some dark corner, rather than go out to their originals in green woods or sunlit fields. Then we come to the colder and more technical severity of the Dryden and Pope school, which suppressed Marinism — as well as other modes of emotion — for the time being. Finally, we reach the Romantic outburst near the beginning of our century. This was in reality a Gothic restoration, and for a time the hostility against Classicism was unreasoning and extreme. The cry everywhere was ‘Down with the studied and polished. Give us meaning and sentiment, no matter what if strong, in spontaneous and natural forms.’ For fifty years the struggle to find an equilibrium went on between the warring forces, and no less names than Carlyle and Browning came to be regarded, in prose and poetry respectively, as the exponents of literature made on impulse, without the censorship of taste. But early in the present generation it began to be clear to well-appointed minds that Classicism is an inherent principle in art as well as nature. Ever since the Revival of Learning it had sought themes that, in the main, only men of books cared for. It was now felt that literature should treat such subjects as high and low alike might read. Moreover, minds of classical tastes and training began to see that some poets of their school had actually essayed to make poetry out of a maximum of form and a minimum of sense with no sentiment at all. Thus was it recognized on every hand that, in poetry, sentiment must be paramount. Meanwhile, the poets and novelists of the Romantic school had come to feel that truth and probability must be as much respected in art as outside of it; also, that in the matter of presentation, they should at least achieve such form as, if their work were to be done over, would be good enough to use again.

Thus was each of the warring factions compelled to admit the essential principles of the other. Though the designation 'classical' is popularly supposed to apply to compositions in which form occupies the author's attention to the essential neglect of the matter and its message, and 'romantic' in like manner to stand for matter and message put forth substantially without reference to the proprieties of presentation, there is in fact little or no literature reputedly turned out in these days that either term will approximately characterize alone. Good prose and poetry include and must include both principles in some certain proportion or degree. With respect to style, the romantic mind, as will be shown in a later chapter, seeks preferably its own terms and turns of speech, and by instinct avoids—like Shakespeare, the highroads and beaten paths of diction; the classicist, on the contrary, declines to hazard an expression not definitely sanctioned by authority. As to matter, the classicist in spite of his universalized and general form is exclusive and narrow in range of subjects, while romantic writers, individual in manner, are democratic and universal in choice of themes. Finally, all great Gothic poems of whatsoever age or kind, as the *Divina Commedia*, Shakespeare's *Lear*, or Browning's *Luria*, are both romantic in spirit, and also carry their own authority—or make their own classicism, in respect to form.¹

The earliest manifestation of Gothicism as a governing principle in modern English was the idealism of the Elizabethan drama. This consisted not in the exaltation of human achievements—like the Greek, but of *experiences*. The same spirit manifested itself again, as was shown in Chapter XI., near the close of the last century. But the new idealism or romanticism had evolved new features. What had been little more than individual in the age of Elizabeth now became personal. The Teutonic mind must perforce recognize, not the State or the Church, but the individual, the soul of man, as the unit of society; and what has so slowly but so surely vindicated the rights of the individual in the political and social sphere must as inevitably respect them and

¹ Cf. Chapter XVIII., p. 248.

give them prominence in the representations of art.¹ The essence of individuality is character,—not the sum of passive, but of active qualities and habits, the aggregate of influence. Cœur de Lion, the Black Prince, Napoleon are not to us demigods like Achilles and Æneas, they are intensely human; they do not evoke vulgar wonder merely, they inspire. Thus individuality potentially includes personality; and the recognition of personality involves potentially the recognition of environment. Hence, when the evolution is complete, it becomes possible to read personality out of environment, as well as to apply environment corroboratingly to personality. Thus within the last few years a new phase or school of art has brought itself to notice and established itself under the name of Realism. Herein is no undue exaltation, as at first supposed, of the small at the expense of the great, rather more complete exaltation of the great through the medium of the small. On the prose side the same process of development, during almost the same period, has been going on. Science—which is prose Realism—by enhancing the significance of each item of man's environment has but enlarged his cosmic and spiritual supremacy, since it finds nothing but him and his in the types varied or repeated everywhere.² So Realism in art is potent because it makes even circumstances reflect the personality that has shed itself about them. The old Romanticism of the *Christabel* and *Frankenstein* sort in a few years gave place to a literature of relevancy and probability of incident, which was succeeded by the poem or novel of characterization according to the life. To these Realism has added those integral and congruous details which must be seen whenever a master hand holds the mirror up to nature. Upon occasion we

¹ Cf. Browning's *Old Pictures in Florence*, in which the contrast between Greek art,—which sought to realize a synthetic type of beauty, and the first Christian-Gothic art,—which was analytic, and strove but to reach and express the soul, is brought out with great force and clearness.

² It is more than probable it will one day be shown that the *Novum Organon* and the Inductive Method were the natural outcome of Teutonic separative or analytic tendencies of thought, as the Deductive, of Greek synthetical.

still are willing to make an excursion into the world of romance, as of allegory, but always in the manner of an episode, and must be brief. We have learned to take our chief and sustained delights in the world in which we daily live.

In the earliest activity of the Christian-Gothic mind, — namely, the cathedral-building of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, — the mode called Realism appears, as later in art and letters. Of these there were no duplicates, as essentially of Greek temples; each minster was individual, and seemed in some way at one with, almost an outgrowth from, its particular surroundings; and upon its portals or elsewhere was often carved somewhat of the flora of the immediate vicinity. The realistic impulse can thus be traced continuously, by way of the Early Italian, the Early German, and the Dutch school, as well as various other phases of art and sculpture, to Runeberg and Browning, and the novelists that more popularly represent the movement in our day. But Realism does not signify merely truth in externals and details; it is a name by which we have restored true bounds to heroism. True heroism, we have come to feel, consists in sturdy conquest of self and of circumstances in the dull, hard routine of every-day existence hardly less than in having supreme experiences, in ruling one's spirit as much as in taking a city. 'No man is a hero to his valet' runs the adage. This in reality sums up many generations of observation to the effect that men, world-famed for powers of some extraordinary sort, often prove unequal to petty trials and annoyances that smaller minds can conquer. To exhibit the inferior exigencies in which common men and women attain to heroism, in such wise as to enable other men and women to do the same, is art of no unworthy kind. The King Richard or Napoleon, who appears enshrouded with a halo in books of romance nevertheless eats, sleeps, shaves, yawns — in short, is human at every pore. To describe the functional life of such a man or of any other is not Realism, but Naturalism, Physiologism rather. Yet to show the man in so far as the soul and the moral nature shine through the humbler things of life may be Realism at its best

and noblest. The taste of many critics would seem to crave stronger themes and more sturdy treatment. But if a reader get inspiration from a poem like *The Cotter's Saturday Night*, who will attempt to argue him out of his profit?

It is, therefore, of the essence of Realism to admit to art-treatment all themes which may yield delight and inspiration. The sole restriction is that all things great or small out of or by way of which such experiences are derived, be presented in the veritable forms and relations in which those experiences are met with in the actual. A Napoleon is not to be exhibited so far off as to be out of true perspective, but as virtually in presence where the tones of voice, the expressions of the face and gesture, may serve as 'effects' to fancy. Romanticism uses only transcendent or exceptional 'effects' which supreme moments yield; but these, being stereotyped and few, soon become familiar to the imagination, and lose their force. The power of Realism lies in the fact that it brings into use the unwonted and simpler 'effects' or types wherein may reside potentially not less than in greater, the grand and heroic whole of character. It selects and expresses what we are to feel, and makes it do duty also for what we are to know. Moreover, men do not, so far as we can at present see, always act in the same circumstances in the same way. Realism forbids that the novelist or poet venture *a priori* to ordain how in a given set of circumstances destiny will shape itself, — he must give veritable instances only. Realism, therefore, in the larger sense, stands for the inviolability and integrity of spiritual truth in all its relations and details.

The rise of Realism does not mean that the native Gothic mind has lost its aspiration; rather that it has begun to turn all its environment to spiritual account. Great themes no longer monopolize art treatment; men are seeing types and ideals in even smallest things. Scott's *Lay* or *Marmion* or Byron's *Childe Harold* move and have moved the world not more than Burns' *Mountain Daisy*, *Mouse's Nest*, and *Auld Mare Maggie*. There is a strange tendency in nature to recur to an old type or mode

endowed as to see beyond the material aspects of his environment, and not only intuitively apprehend the final meanings of things, but likewise appreciate or experience them at their worth. The facts of the universe as facts are but truths half told, which the poet finds himself commissioned to tell in full. He sees, for example, in the mediæval legend of a Count Gismond, not vulgar belief in ordeal by combat, but a sublime principle ; and by it is kindled to enthusiasm which, in spite of the limitations of written speech, he makes ring out as with the impassioned tones of his natural voice.

The poet is, then, gifted in two ways : he discerns the essential meanings of things, and he has the technical ability to make others see with his eyes and feel with his feelings. But his source of power lies wholly in the truth which inspires him. Without that he would lack the momentum even to overcome the obstacles of meter and rhyme ; with it, like Dante and Shakespeare, he may move all minds through all generations. Somewhat loosely the word poet is often used as a generic term and applied to all minds that discern essential meanings in whatsoever way. More strictly, the man who, as Carlyle or Emerson, reads the open secrets of nature or society only with reference to what is true, is called a seer. That is to say, the seer discerns spiritual truth simply as truth, without especial reference to its æsthetic aspects. But the ultimate truths of the universe are not only true, but beautiful, and produce delight. The genius that discerns spiritual truth in such wise as to be filled with the sense of its beauty, whether in forms, proportion, and colors in nature, or in heroic and sublime qualities of soul, is a poetic mind. If he bring any of these before the physical eye by brush or chisel, he is an artist or sculptor ; but if he translate them into language, he is specifically a poet. The seer mind, however, is not unaware of beauty in the last significance of things. There is an exaltation in the contemplation and experience of spiritual truth as truth that is superior to all other delights of the soul in kind, and second to none in degree save the poet's, who discerns the beautiful more completely than the

true. It is rare, such are the limitations of our common humanity, that the same mind is endowed to take equal cognizance of both ultimate truth and beauty. * Modern literature knows but three geniuses of such transcendent kind, — Dante, Shakespeare, and Goethe.

It has been already pointed out in Chapter XII. that there are three stages in human development, whether of the individual or the race. Those that have full privileges of culture are quite likely to mount to the highest plane, though many fail of actual attainment to that preponderance of spiritual experiences which constitutes the Spiritual Life. The masses of mankind very evidently are not yet endowed or enabled to reach this stage. Many remain in the physical, — that is, cannot rise above a preponderance of sensual experiences, and gird at delights above. But in this land and generation, where industrial employments are so largely expert and special, and where woman is so generally emancipated from outdoor and other manual drudgery, a majority of the population, at least of native stock, should belong to the middle plane. When the acts and experiences of men partake more of the intellectual than the physical, therewith begins the operation of taste. The awakening of taste is really the awakening of the sense of ultimate, spiritual beauty; and the activity of this sense marks in so far a passage of the boundary dividing the middle from the final stage. There is, as we shall remember, no hard and fast line between; crossing it at one point should ensure crossing it at many. It is the theory of all education that by teaching a few things in the schools, pupils will be able to learn many things for themselves outside. The State does not provide instruction without charge to school-children merely that they may know Arithmetic, and Geography, and Grammar, and other branches which they will want to use in after life. It believes that empowering them to see a few things with aid will cause them to see afterwards without it other things which will bring spiritual experiences and make character. Good citizenship is the justification and the end of public education. But good cit-

izenship depends, not on common or special knowledge, but controlling sentiments that are right and noble.

In the same manner that the schoolmaster puts public-school children in the way of discerning and appreciating final truths which will make them good citizens, poets put men and women in the way of spiritual experiences which arouse and strengthen the loftiest sentiments of their nature. The public educator broadens the horizon of knowledge, and now and then identifies to his pupils a spiritual object. The seer or poet deals with things spiritual more directly. Both pedagogue and seer are parts of a great institutional system by which occasions are brought to causes, and the soul of man is helped and prompted to develop in its last capacity. Few minds can look abroad and discriminate the select from the common, the inspiring from the base, but seers and poets impart to the world this secret. When their service is complete, the sufficient mind is seer and poet unto itself, discerning the beautiful and the true wherever met independently, with small further need of monitor or guide.

The work of the poet, therefore, presupposes some degree of taste already developed. Taste is a name for the inherent capacity of the soul to perceive and experience ultimate beauty, and is in consequence allied closely with the ability to discern and appreciate final truth. The varying progressive types, called Ideals, to which every mind refers all apprehended excellencies, are made up in the last analysis of these two elements alone. Hence there can be no work of art dependent on beauty only, nor any revelation of final truth wholly devoid of beauty. It is an antecedent, primal necessity that all minds assume both ultimate truth and ultimate beauty to be real qualities, which must be somewhere, and should be everywhere, supreme. Moreover, each given mind is conscious of the obligation to actualize and exemplify both. This fact not only invests the seer or poet with ethical responsibility, but likewise with ethical authority; for he is looked upon as one who has realized high possibilities, and as essentially a prince among his fellows. The paramount need of

society is not only that the rising generation be kept from becoming bad citizens, but that all men be elevated and come to their best everywhere. The first duty of the State, though but a negative and defensive obligation, is self-preservation: hence its reformatory and free-school systems. Its next business is self-improvement, or industrial, intellectual, and moral progress. But this positive and edificatory concern the State perforce leaves largely to public sentiment and individual aspiration. Manifestly, no one who discerns ultimate truth and beauty is without responsibility for his fellows. Private munificence which founds libraries, art-galleries, and schools of art or of music sustains well its part of the universal burden. So, great preachers and teachers like Spurgeon and Arnold, along with Emerson and Browning and other specific, professional representatives of the seer and poet class, carry upon their shoulders much of the general obligation. But all men cannot be furnished with occasions that will set in exercise controlling sentiments by the effort of such few, for these do not perceive all the spiritual truth and beauty yet apprehensible to man. The uttermost that all men collectively discern must be called into requisition if society is to have its sum of spiritual, upbuilding influence. There is no limit to the truth that mankind shall know. The universe of fact is fast merging into the universe of ultimate truth and beauty; and the universe of fact is broadening every day. The difficulty is not to find men that see truth and experience beauty, but minds that seeing and experiencing at first hand can make other minds see and experience at second hand. A man may be the Bacon or Emerson of his times, yet if he feel no inspiration, or lack the art to make his perceptions known, he will be profitless beyond his personal circle. Probably thousands see and experience spiritually for themselves to one who makes his spiritual sights and experiences over to other minds. There is surely no enlightened spirit but has some one glimpse of truth, some single sentiment of beauty that is its alone. The time should come and perhaps will come when each shall be enabled through culture to become the servant of all, and

contribute, whether much or little, his own spiritual illumination and delight to the universal sum of truth and inspiration.

Art, therefore, rather than genius is the need of literature in these times. There are great stores of spiritual strength and knowledge which, if made available, would do much towards elevating mankind to the spiritual life in a single century. While the impulse to communicate comes yearly to hundreds and thousands who have really nothing new to say, there may well be more than a single Bacon or Shakespeare in each generation who, knowing fresh secrets, lack the skill and inspiration to make them known to the world. Nothing is so invaluable to man, so essential to human progress, as new truth. The failure to discover a new mine is relatively an unimportant loss, since it could but have yielded the same gold or iron or quicksilver as are known already. But the permanent burial of an ultimate sentiment or principle in a brain that never spoke its thought or feeling may be an irreparable calamity. Even what we consider a small discovery of new truth may transform society and change the living of every one of us. The end of culture is not only to bring all men to the spiritual life, but to enable and embolden each to impart his unique contribution of spiritual inspiration to the rest. But though the ability to impart one's own spiritual illumination is essential to literary service, let us be clear that it does not make literature a profession. Because a Matthew or a Mark writes 'a successful' gospel, neither will presume to continue making gospels for the rest of his natural life. Each having said his say is content thereafter to be silent. Two hundred years ago it seemed settled for all time that a man even with a message should be silent, unless he had the knack of delivering it in a certain fashion. Bunyan in Bedford jail refused to think so, and out of his dismal leisure wrote a book that now outweighs in literary art and worth all the volumes of his generation. Literature is simply the medium through which we communicate what we feel and know, and is not valuable beyond what it causes to be felt or known. It is a form of speech which can be echoed and perpetuated at will, and if taken down

on wax by the phonograph would be literature not less than if made by the pen. Art is the means by which all men and women should be enabled to communicate accurately and effectually whatever of their thought or feeling may be valuable to other minds.

The uttermost that can be done for man in civilized society is to make him discern and experience ultimate truth and beauty. Some final truths are so salient and palpable as to be clear essentially of themselves without the aid of art. Sometimes the literal statement of a fact carries sufficiently its lesson ; there is no need of condensing or multiplying details, or of adjusting the background. Other truths are so recondite or complex that they can scarcely be set forth at all except in circumstances or relations greatly altered from the actual. Art sometimes, moreover, in addition to setting forth subtle or far-reaching truths, must undertake to make them acceptable, that is, must interpret and bring to light the spiritual beauty always indissolubly connected with spiritual truth. The province of art is to condense nature and epitomize human experiences, thus enabling the unskilled to discern the spiritual as far apart as possible from the material. The significant facts and circumstances must be grouped, and their meaning as far as possible set out to view, but all unessentials kept from sight. The sculptor, for example, eliminates the tints and warmth of flesh, the light and energy of the eye, so that only the associations of what lies beyond the physical are called up to our thought. The artist will paint a fruit piece successfully by producing upon us vivid impressions of form and color such as we have experienced in the actual, relying merely on our associations of gustatory enjoyment to make his work effective. In like manner the work of the poet is in the main but to set forth some fact or group of facts lying near the sympathies which will produce a lively emotion, and by the inspiration of the emotion through association amplify and complete the facts. The manner of this process has been sufficiently illustrated already in Chapter XIII. from *Beowulf* and *Locksley Hall*.

As an example of poetry of the first sort, containing only palpable truths, hence expressed with only a minimum of art, we may instance Crabbe. It is indeed a question whether Crabbe's selective and presentative processes, according to present standards, involve art at all; that is, whether his incidents, seen and known in actual, would not be as clear to ordinary readers of this generation as interpreted in his own narration. Compare the following lines on *Arabella*, near the opening of *Tale IX.*:

“This reasoning Maid, above her sex's dread,
Had dared to read, and dared to say she read;
Not the last novel, not the new-born play;
Not the mere trash and scandal of the day;
But (though her young companions felt the shock)
She studied Berkeley, Bacon, Hobbes, and Locke:
Her mind within the maze of history dwelt,
And of the moral Muse the beauty felt;
The merits of the Roman page she knew,
And could converse with More and Montague:
Thus she became the wonder of the town,
From that she reaped, to that she gave renown,
And strangers coming, all were taught t' admire
The learned lady, and the lofty spire.”

Art does not consist in mannerisms, which often defeat the most skillfully planned procedures. What kind of a temper and disposition Crabbe here wishes to make known is indicated to us rather in spite than in consequence of the means employed. Instead of selecting some single element or effect of character which will enable us to discern experientially the whole, and from thus knowing the soul lead us on to learn the mind so far as requisite, Crabbe gives certain facts about the intelligence of his heroine, while leaving the personality indeterminate. He tells us her attainments were the talk of the town. That of course might be true if 'Arabella' were but a ridiculous blue-stockings; and in spite of all his efforts to engage our imagination we should incline to that conclusion, but for the charitable assumption that the *Tale*

could not have been written of such a person. Crabbe's nearest approach to art here is doubtless in coupling Arabella and the town steeple as objects that strangers were persuaded equally to admire. Though this is not unlike Homer's making the gray-haired Trojans discourse of Helen's beauty, it will scarcely be accounted a success. Even a figure of speech must at least be spiritually true, while this is but grossly and awkwardly Marinistic. The whole paragraph by its very clumsiness and failure reminds us of Shakespeare's method with Lady Macbeth and Desdemona, — or indeed any of his women : he makes us first feel, then know. He does not depend upon our charity to get his characters duly launched. There is somewhat of spiritual repugnance — often of sarcastic antipathy, in our Adamic nature, to advertised and prospectused idealization, and this the poet must subjugate in advance. By arousing sympathy Shakespeare forestalls all prejudice and levity. Only thus can the ludicrous types that lurk behind the shadow of an ideal be laid. There is no other way to sketch character with power.

For an example of the next higher sort of poetry, which shall contain art indeed to the extent of epitomizing nature and indentifying instances to the spiritually inexpert, we turn to our own Bryant. Here is a poet who, born in an age and people that as yet scarce dared to think of Providence as concerned for aught save the elect, found the world full of evidence to the contrary. How shall he set forth the new universal law? He may state this as a Bacon or an Emerson would declare it, to be apprehended as a truth, leaving the feelings to concern themselves in their own way with the consequences of the truth ; or he can exhibit what is to be felt and let that do duty for the rest. The latter is the poet's way, which Bryant of course, without debate or resolution, will have found himself employing. The first step is to select from the myriad of facts in nature some representative illustration of his truth that may serve as an 'effect given' to the feelings of the reader. It must evidently be simple, and universal, and familiar to the experiences of all. Hence, possibly on realistic

grounds and from actual observation, Bryant chooses the flight of a bird in its spring migration as the basis and occasion of the poem. The scientific mind would perhaps discern little else in the incident than might thus be told — ‘*Anser ferus*, or *Bernicla Canadensis*: gray, with black head, neck, tail and feet; white cheek-patches and tail coverts; *gregarius*; *migrans*;’ and may in such literal items overlook for the moment the ultimate truth and beauty beyond. Bryant, whose mind is intent upon these only, to avoid associations antagonistic to his purpose, devises the euphemistic title *To a Waterfowl*. Next, what shall be the time and space relations? For the first step in the execution of the poet’s plan is to fix these so far as requisite. Bryant makes them easily apparent by a dramatic opening: —

“Whither midst falling dew,
While glow the heavens with the last steps of day,
Far, through their rosy depths, dost thou pursue
Thy solitary way?”

But the author while clearly indicating the time when and the place where to phantasy, may also engage imagination. It is well to idealize the subject of a poem if possible at the outset, and this Bryant has accomplished almost perhaps before he is aware, through the reflection of his own exalted mood — by use of question, and by idealizing the surroundings named. The principal expedient is association, which begins its work with even the first word. The sympathy which is at once stirred by such a presentation, and greatly assisted by ‘solitary,’ the author makes haste to deepen by this negative stroke: —

“Vainly the fowler’s eye
Might mark thy distant flight to do thee wrong,
As, darkly limned upon the crimson sky,
Thy figure floats along.”

The author now feels it is time to approach the significant part of the whole, — namely the ‘instinct’ or inspiration which is guiding

the straggler, left behind by his sturdier companions, to the final rendezvous. Expressed in the style already adopted, the facts he will need to touch upon are these : 'Thou art going, thou knowest not why, to join thy companions, thou knowest not whither. They have reached, perhaps already, their specific summer haunts, which thou, in obedience to impulses not of thyself though thine, wilt quickly find. All day, swerving neither to left nor right, though many expanses of water and signs of food have from time to time allured, thou hast held to thy summons, and now, though the natural resting-time approaches, art still pressing towards the goal.' There are many ways in which these items and many more, through the use of associational and figurative terms, may be detailed poetically. Bryant more or less unconsciously feels it is better to express all potentially in little, keeping the subject, Burns-like, close to the sympathies of the reader, than literally in full after Denham's fashion. He begins, accordingly, with the destination. He indicates, by a deft question, that this is to be

"the plashy brink
Of weedy lake, or marge of river wide,
Or where the rocking billows rise and sink
On the chafed ocean-side" —

that is, in either the fresh or the salt marshlands of the far north ; thus identifying, so far as consists with his poetic purpose, the genus and species left undetermined by the title. Coming then to the point proper, the poet sees no better course than to affirm, as to himself, the secret or the 'final truth' of the inspiration that keeps the lone wanderer securely upon the track over which his fellows have preceded : —

"There is a Power whose care
Teaches thy way along that pathless coast —
The desert and illimitable air —
Lone wandering, but not lost."

This is not a logical proposition to be argumentatively proved, and the thought — or, rather, sentiment, — had best been cast in a

form not so directly addressed to the understanding. Yet such is the lofty dignity of the language and the inspiration of the figures that the mind of the reader is perforce quickened instantly to spiritual discernment. The passage as a whole, in consequence, is not unworthy of a greater poet. Two stanzas of experiential illustration, bringing to consciousness all that is essential from the facts implied, now follow, and the author is ready for the conclusion. This he makes consist of a skillful dramatic transition —

“Thou’rt gone; the abyss of heaven
Hath swallowed up thy form;”

and, after the manner of stanza four, an application : —

“yet, on my heart
Deeply hath sunk the lesson thou hast given,
And shall not soon depart.

“He who, from zone to zone,
Guides through the boundless sky thy certain flight,
In the long way that I must tread alone,
Will lead my steps aright.”

That is, instead of making the whole poem an ‘effect’ to imagination and leaving the conclusion potential and unconditioned in consciousness, the author ends by asserting openly and categorically the lesson he intends it to convey.

The paramount rule in all art is, *Attract and engage the feelings by the first phase or stroke* — that the mind, thus held to the theme and playing about it intellectually, may realize implied details and appropriate all further occasions of experiential interest.¹ Bryant has made the present poem almost a masterpiece in this respect. The second grand principle of art forbids the artist to reveal, or attempt to reveal, spiritual truth except in its own speech and terms.

¹ The reader will hardly need reminding that this is nothing more than Milton’s rule of “simple, sensuous, passionate,” applied at the very opening of a poem. The first phase or stroke must be simple, must appeal strongly by association to the senses, and must engage the feelings.

Canvas must declare what has been put upon canvas, marble what has been cut in marble. To tell the meaning of a sonata, or of a poem, except in aid of those who are not yet quick in spiritual discernment, is an offense against nature. Browning has exemplified this truth superbly in *One Word More*.¹ As was implied at the beginning, *To a Waterfowl* is a somewhat elementary object-lesson in spiritual interpretation; and the author has made it a poem with a moral. He, however, escapes an unartistic close by giving the meaning under cover of his own reflections,—not as formulating it for others. Why is a 'moral' inartistic? Because it assumes the inability of one's fellows to discern even prepared truth without a guide, or to appropriate it without a mentor. But the fault of exhortation, which Bryant does not escape at the close of his *Thanatopsis*, is wholly wanting here.

Moreover, the poem just considered affords a good illustration of the attitudes of mind which produce the mode in poetry called dramatic. The term properly signifies doing over again in the presence of the reader, so far as possible, what has happened in the experiences of the author. The device in the present case is in effect a union of apostrophe and monologue. The subject is addressed as if actually before the eye of the poet in the act of flight. After the speaker makes it to have disappeared he continues in the attitude and mood of one who has just watched it pass from sight. Similar are the opening of the *Faerie Queene* and all like situations in which the details of an action are represented as actually taking place or the words of a speaker given as in veritable utterance. Chaucer, for example, in the *Prologue to the Canterbury Tales*, is narrative, but becomes dramatic when he makes his Knight begin to speak.

One of the most difficult things to manage in authorship is the approach of a poet to his audience. In the drama proper this

¹ Browning in this poem attempts what Dante and Raphael attempted, and justifies the effort, but with consummate art at the close—in the true way—confesses to failure. The song he would have sung he can sing but in his brain. Neither his emotion, nor the object which calls it forth, can be expressed *except by itself*.

difficulty is reduced to a convenient minimum ; the audience is in effect ignored. The things enacted are set forth as happening without eyes challenged to see or ears prepared to hear. When we pass from the drama to more direct forms of poetry as the epic, we not seldom find authors putting themselves to the disadvantage of accounting or apologizing for their presence as uncommissioned secular priests or self-constituted spiritual advisers. The classic way was to put the responsibility at once upon the Muses ; and this mannerism had not disappeared even in the days of Crabbe. The ballad-makers and their imitators, on the contrary, broke out without preface into the boldest strains without thought of critic or audience. Confident of their message and mastery, they disdained ceremony ; and the methods of poetry from Coleridge to Tennyson have generally in consequence avoided introductions. Moreover, the plan of beginning with detailed narration, or description, as in Scott's *Lay of the Last Minstrel*, and Eliza Cook's *Melaia* is vaguely though not uncertainly felt to be too heavy, — really because it conditions the imagination and prevents quick access to the sympathies. Hence, by a sort of unconscious selection, the most usual manner of poetic beginnings involves immediate use of some time or space-circumstance, either in full dramatic style, as in the poem of Bryant's just considered, or less definitely, like the opening of *Evangeline*, *Godiva*, or *Sohrab and Rustum*. Doubtless it is the more effective expedient to bring the reader to the very ground like Tennyson in *Godiva* and *Locksley Hall*. Longfellow in *Evangeline* makes as if he had his audience with him in the primitive forests of Acadia, with very good effect. Thus in general the dramatic method puts the reader most nearly in the place of those whose experiences are the theme, and hence, consciously or unconsciously, is most frequently selected by poets who would produce most effects by fewest means.

The next higher, or highest form of art involves, in addition to the presentation and interpretation of final truth and beauty, the full persuasion and control of the sympathies in accordance with such truth and beauty. We will illustrate by certain points from Browning's *Colombe's Birthday*.

The characters and happenings in this drama are imaginary. The plot was devised by the author as means of illustrating the truth that it is sometimes necessary to revolt against conventionalities and environment and go back to first principles. The play may be regarded as a companion study to Shakespeare's *Othello*,—in which the revolt against environment was a mistake.¹ Here Colombe, who is a second Desdemona, is loved and worshiped by Valence, not because she first loved him but because of the ideal worth which he spiritually discerns in her. To no other eyes save his will she ever stand revealed so fully, in no other soul inspire such noble emotion, from none other will be such homage proffered. Here is a chivalrous and lordly nature, though wanting the world's stamp, and here, on the other hand, in Berthold are the patent of Philip and the Pope and prospect of an empire, but no knowledge that life must be greatest and noblest in itself. Colombe can accept nobility without a title, or a title without nobility. There is but one choice, and the business of the play is to secure our approbation. In some respects it is an old and well-worn theme. But Browning has no intention of making a blooming, Apollo-like hero outrival a repulsive villain. Valence is half-old with cares and sorrow, Berthold is correct and honest, Colombe is a girl-woman who has not yet learned the world. It will be evidently no easy task to make an edifying play from types like these.

Every work of art must be self-introductory as well as self-explanatory. As there may be, at least here, no prologue or chorus to tell the antecedent circumstances, such actors must be brought on as will in natural interchange of speech reveal what we need to know. This might be variously managed. Colombe might introduce the whole, and in conversation with her maid be caused to speak of the events of a year ago, and the maid then used to give her mis-

¹ Othello and Desdemona were too far separated in race-traditions and sympathies ever to be intelligible to each other,—as the awful chamber-dialogue before the strangling makes clear. Had no Iago crossed their path, Othello would never have read or divined the real nature of Desdemona. If he had comprehended one tittle of her real worth, no Iago could have disturbed his peace.

tress and ourselves the hint of what is coming. But there are many better ways. The imagination needs to be prepared for the Duchess, and the Duchess to enlist our sympathies. Browning having gone far enough to determine that the scenes enacted shall take place upon Colombe's birthday, and this give name to the play, begins by showing certain courtiers awaiting admission to pay their duty to the Duchess. One of these is reading the last lines of a missive from the claimant, soon to be here in person. The first words uttered make the past and much of the present clear : —

Guibert. That this should be her birthday; and the day
We all invested her, twelve months ago,
As the late Duke's true heirress and our liege;
And that this also must become the day . . . [*i.e.* of her abdication]
Oh, miserable lady!

1st Courtier. Ay, indeed?

2d Courtier. Well, Guibert?

3d Courtier. But your news, my friend, your news!
The sooner, friend, one learns Prince Berthold's pleasure,
The better for us all: how writes the Prince?
Give me! I'll read it for the common good.

Guibert. In time, sir,—but till time comes, pardon me!
Our old Duke just disclosed his child's retreat,
Declared her true succession to his rule,
And died: this birthday was the day, last year,
We convoyed her from Castle Ravestein —
That sleeps out trustfully its extreme age
On the Meuse' quiet bank, where she lived queen
Over the water-buds, — to Juliers' court
With joy and bustle. Here again we stand;
Sir Gaucelme's buckle 's constant to his cap:
To-day's much such another sunny day!"

First impressions or 'effects' are generally used by the mind to their uttermost conclusions; and Browning wishes us to dislike at once these courtiers — who stand for 'environment,' or the world and its conventionalities — most cordially. So he turns their first utterances and doings in this scene against them. He will not make them odious collectively — that might react against

their mistress — but singly, and will thus individualize each so far as necessary. Guibert then well begins by piquing and refusing to satisfy the curiosity of his fellows, insults Gaucelme by allusion to his last year's cap, and ends with flinging the Prince's letter upon the floor. The author sees next he may recommend the Duchess to our fancy through them ; for though having only the most snappish and spiteful feelings towards each other they would yet spare *her*. Maufroy, the youngest, who may be assumed most under the influence of his mistress, declares he could not, for all there was to win,

“ tell her on this happy day of days,
That, save the nosegay in her hand, perhaps,
There 's nothing left to call her own.”

Also Sir Clugnet, the old man, world-wise and prudent, though he first inquires ‘ what kind of a corner may be Ravestein,’ answers Guibert rebukingly to the same effect : —

“ What man do you suppose me? Keep your paper!¹
And, let me say, it shows no handsome spirit
To dally with misfortune: keep your place!”

All this supplies the needed ‘ effect ’ which has been already appropriated by imagination. The process is the same as hitherto : ‘ If these, being evil, evince only kindness and consideration towards their mistress, evidently none other than herself can have inspired in them sentiments so foreign to their nature ; *she* must be signally good and noble.’²

¹Note the excellent sub-‘ effect ’ in Guibert's refusing to hold the paper, while he offers it with his ‘ indifferent honorable place,’ until there is some expression from the rest; thus forcing any who under the conditions would succeed him to pick it up.

²That she is also signally beautiful is adequately hinted in what Guibert says later: —

“ Call the Prince our Duke!
Then she 's no Duchess, she 's no anything
More than a young maid with the bluest eyes:
And now, sirs, we 'll not break this young maid's heart
Cooly as Gaucelme could and would!”

The reader will note or will have noted that this Gaucelme — quite evidently the clearest head and coldest heart of the company — is used as a sort of moral counter-

The next step will naturally be to introduce Valence to the audience. Can the courtiers be used to his advantage? Evidently; and Browning, reversing Shakespeare's order — who never relies first on the physical — makes him appear in their despite by knocking over the halberdiers that guard the entrance. The author does not intend, at present, to do more than exalt this personage; hence, in preparation, has made Adolf but hint of the man's earnestness and persistence. Will it answer to have him come thus before these courtiers unknown? No: hence he is made to recognize Guibert, to whom he breaks out in an impassioned plea for Cleves. Will this Guibert endure such an harangue meekly to the end? Evidently he could not in nature: it would be ludicrous to pretend it. So Browning makes Guibert to have been helped in saving his estate by this same Valence, — and to vent his spleen vicariously at being accosted upon Clugnet. Here the scene in effect is finished. The author skillfully and speedily prepares for the next by effecting through Gaucelme and Guibert, — who think their lady can hardly notice this messenger, much less reward him, that Valence present Prince Berthold's manifesto and thus gain audience with the Duchess as one of them.

The author, then, in the first division of his poem has succeeded in arousing our feelings against the courtiers, as they deserve; and, by showing him in comparison a man above thoughts of self and ready to lend himself to an ideal, has exalted Valence. How next shall he idealize the Duchess? For he must now bring her face to face with these courtiers and ourselves who wait.

One of the most significant and telling traits in women who have charms and can exact homage is unconsciousness of such charms. Browning can see no better characteristic with which to begin his task here, especially if he may couple with it the desire to compass joy for others. Yet were it not well to indicate first that Colombe

poise to the character who here speaks. Gaucelme proposes, and Guibert, with some transfer of responsibility to his tempter, executes. Moreover, the reader should observe how deftly, in the last two lines, the impressions Browning has given us of Colombe are sympathetically utilized.

is gifted with women's subtlest, most unerring intuition? So he makes her divine the cause of her maid's delay, and some little of the shadow about to fall upon her fortunes.

The Duchess. Announce that I am ready for the court!

Sabyne. 'T is scarcely audience-hour, I think; your Grace May best consult your own relief, no doubt, And shun the crowd: but few can have arrived.¹

The Duchess. Let those not yet arrived, then, keep away! 'T was me, this day last year at Ravestein, You hurried. It has been full time, beside, This half-hour. Do you hesitate?

Sabyne. Forgive me!

The Duchess. Stay, Sabyne; let me hasten to make sure Of one true thanker: here with you begins My audience, claim you first its privilege! It is my birth's event they celebrate: You need not wish me more such happy days, But—ask some favor! Have you none to ask? Has Adolf none, then? This was far from least Of much I waited for impatiently, Assure yourself! It seemed so natural Your gift, beside this bunch of river-bells, Should be the power and leave of doing good To you, and greater pleasure to myself. You ask my leave to-day to marry Adolf? The rest is my concern.

Sabyne. Your Grace is ever Our lady of dear Ravestein,—but, for Adolf . . .

The Duchess. 'But'? You have not, sure, changed in your regard And purpose towards him?

Sabyne. We change?

The Duchess. Well then? Well? .

Sabyne. How could we two be happy, and, most like, Leave Juliers, when—when . . . but 't is audience-time!

The Duchess. 'When, if you left me, I were left indeed!' Would you subjoin that?—Bid the court approach! —Why should we play thus with each other, Sabyne?

¹ Note the contradiction in this last line. It is evidently the instant apprehension of this 'effect' that calls forth the following emphatic rejoinder. Thus does indirection often unwittingly betray itself.

Do I not know, if courtiers prove remiss,
 If friends detain me, and get blame for it,
 There is a cause? Of last year's servid throng
 Scarce one half comes now."

The courtiers are admitted — twelve, as counted for our benefit by Maufroy earlier, besides Valence in his torn, bespattered cloak — and the Duchess is reassured. As, waiving formality, she passes about conversing with each group, the author makes Valence in soliloquy reveal that his enthusiasm for Cleves owes its inspiration to the graciousness and beauty of this same Duchess : —

"T is she — the vision this day last year brought,
 When, for a golden moment at our Cleves,
 She tarried in her progress hither. Cleves
 Chose me to speak its welcome, and I spoke
 — Not that she could have noted the recluse
 — Ungainly, old before his time — who gazed.
 Well, Heaven's gifts are not wasted, and that gaze
 Kept, and shall keep me to the end, her own !
 She was above it — but so would not sink
 My gaze to earth ! The People caught it, hers —
 Thenceforward, mine ; but thus entirely mine,
 Who shall affirm, had she not raised my soul
 Ere she retired and left me — them ? She turns —
 There 's all her wondrous face at once ! The ground
 Reels and . . . [*suddenly occupying himself with his paper,*]
 These wrongs of theirs I have to plead !"

How shall Valence begin his plea? It will not do that Guibert present him formally, nor that he present himself. Now it becomes clear that Browning has made the Duchess leave her position and mingle among the groups that she may approach Valence in course. As she does so, the author has but to make Guibert call her attention to the stranger and, naming his city, bid him advance : —

"*The Duchess.* And you, sir, are from Cleves? How fresh in mind,
 The hour or two I passed at queenly Cleves !

She entertained me bravely, but the best
 Of her good pageant seemed its standers-by
 With unsuppressive joy on every face!
 What says my ancient, famous, happy Cleves?"

Guibert thought to use Valence but as a hand which should extend, without speech, Prince Berthold's missive, and cut off all audience for Cleves with the Duchess after. But the plan, through her gracious question, woefully miscarries. Here is an opportunity for telling, decisive dramatic strokes, which Browning is not slow to seize. He has but to let the allegation of 'wrongs' stir the Duchess to a demand for the document recounting them; to make Valence, about presenting the paper, bethink himself of his 'debt,' and give her the Prince's demand instead, and Guibert, seeing Valence already in favor, cry "Stay! for the present." The Duchess, understanding nothing, takes the paper and reads — not the wrongs of Cleves, but the claims of Berthold.

There are many ways in which the situation might have been used to idealize Colombe; Browning follows naturally along the course prepared. Here are no hysterics, no tears, no perturbation — 'effects' whose conclusions would have severally belied the truth; here is nothing but the sublime triumph over adversity of a soul that has long since triumphed over itself: —

"Prince Berthold, who art Juliers' Duke it seems —
 The King's choice, and the Emperor's, and the Pope's —
 Be mine, too! Take this People! Tell not me
 Of rescripts, precedents, authorities,
 — But take them, from a heart that yearns to give!
 Find out their love, — I could not; find their fear, —
 I would not; find their like, — I never shall,
 Among the flowers! [*Taking off her coronet*
 Colombe of Ravestein
 Thanks God she is no longer Duchess here! "

This is superb, though it suggests only types potentially revealed before. May there not be further idealization? Browning divines

'effects' that may yet be used, resources of character of which the Duchess herself is unaware. How shall these be reached and roused?

Valence stands by quivering with wrath, as the real Valence must certainly have done, at having been thus used against the Duchess. May he not strike to earth the man who has through him insulted her?¹ As the courtiers hold back Guibert, springing to the challenge, that he may not disgrace himself by recognizing 'the clothier's spokesman' and a 'churl,' the Duchess is kindled to surprising irony. Reading in her gibes his mistress's complete sympathy with Valence, Guibert is drawn to his knees with the customary cant of readiness to die for her, and on making clear certain points until now unappreciated receives a sort of parenthetic pardon. For the Duchess is really preoccupied with the remark—let drop, perhaps, not without intention—that this is only 'a nameless, mere provincial advocate.' Yet 'this nameless advocate whom she has never seen, much less obliged,' at the risk of his life defends her dignity, and proposes yet to punish, for a constructive insult to herself already pardoned, one of her people. Here is loyalty; here is devotion—something indeed worth being Duchess for, worth at any cost staying Duchess to keep. There is evidently a climax within easy reach. Browning has but to make her cry out,—meaning she knows not what, bringing she realizes not what consequences, in an access of enthusiasm—

"How many are at Cleves of such a mind?
Or stay, sir—lest I seem too covetous—
Are *you* my subject? Such as you describe,
Am I to you, though to no other man?"

¹ By the device of making Valence *ask* if he may strike, the author avoids a vulgar castigation-scene, yet derives for his hero all the credit of such rudimentary justice. (Cf. p. 103.) In other words, he carries out sympathy to the extent of the blow—very much in keeping with a play of first principles—at the same time spares it as a fact. Moreover, we should not overlook the human nature as well as art by which the chastisement of Guibert is selected as the means or 'occasion' of arousing the Duchess's enthusiasm. No homage is so irresistible to a Colombe as, through man's best of physical strength and daring, this of protection.

Then I remain Cleves' Duchess! Take you note,
 While Cleves but yields *one subject* of this stamp,
 I stand her lady till she waves me off!
 For her sake all the Prince claims I withhold;
 Laugh at each menace; and his power defying,
 Return his missive with due contempt!" [Casting it away.

Is there a higher point to reach? Browning bethinks him that this is the daughter of a line of fiery dukes who, begirt with foes, have sustained themselves for centuries upon this soil. He has but to let the martial blood flash up for an instant while the courtiers, proposing in behalf of the Prince to resist her presumption, find themselves disgraced, discarded. They cannot but exclaim in admiration, as she retires —

"Our Duchess yet!
 A glorious lady! Worthy love and dread!
 I'll stand by her, — and I, whate'er betide!"

We are ready for the Prince, who now arrives. The Duchess has been idealized, Valence ennobled. Will Berthold disturb the balance of sympathies established for us between these? No doubt, unless deftly introduced and managed. It would have been easy to show him despicable, but that would not be art. He is no villain — but simply an unpractical man of visions, much as Valence — only not subject to the power of ideas and ideals as he. How can he be kept beyond the reach of imagination? A single chance-hint merely of his prospects might spoil all. Browning will begin therefore with a precaution: he makes the Prince declare just what he hopes to compass. The tone of patronizing towards Juliers with which he begins to speak, though not yet in possession of a single foot of soil, the senseless, half-audible enumeration to himself of the stages in his assumed advance, and Melchior's gloomy, impatient retort, "The Grave," turn our feelings sufficiently against him at the start. The author needs further but make him to have been a priest, and once to have wooed in vain. No man who has failed of a Priscilla, under the gray con-

vent-wall, will ever by our consent speed with Colombe at this court of Juliers.

In this way, then, or in ways analogous, may art engage our sympathies towards characters and subjects not known before. The author simply presents traits or elements that please, keeping the rest from sight until (according to p. 94) the mind has inferred a whole character spiritually proportional to or consonant with the features shown. Then, within certain limits, the worser side, if need be, may be shown with safety.¹ But if the subject yields no phase or stroke which will at once engage the feelings,² and external aspects are forbidding, the artist reversing the process just illustrated will let these last have their weight with us in advance. He will afterwards undo their effect, as explained in the observations, near the close of Chapter XV., upon the art of *Othello*. But art of this final kind may reach yet higher achievements. Not only has it overcome momentary prejudices against men and things we are yet to know, but life-long and well-founded notions which no amount of argument could have shaken. Strong predilections have been changed to antipathies, and antipathies back again to predilections, by a few magic strokes. This highest form of art will be illustrated briefly from Shakespeare, its sole great master.

A signal example of how lightly Shakespeare regarded prepossessions or consistency in his audience is afforded in the play of *Coriolanus*. For obvious reasons we stand first with Rome, afterwards side with the Volscians to the extent of wishing Rome punished, on account of its tribunes, even to the last man; then in

¹ After our affections have gone out towards an object, faults do not destroy, but on the principle that what costs most tends to become dearest, often strengthen its hold upon us. In the drama just considered, our imagination becomes so engaged with Colombe that we easily endure to see the weaker side of her nature, as of Valence's, exhibited. Moreover, we are persuaded so fully concerning Prince Berthold's worth that it does no harm to learn of his better qualities, but, on the contrary, makes us fear he will get more than his deserts. Colombe's romantic notions make us anxious lest she see in the prospect of sharing an empire the realization of some girlish ideal, and prove untrue to herself. Thus the trial becomes invested with deeper interest, as the author planned.

² See p. 221.

Volumnia's leading go over again to the Roman cause. But the illustrations we need are found at their best in the *Julius Cæsar*. The purpose of Shakespeare in writing this was, of course, to produce a successful play. But what constitutes, or in his day constituted, a successful play? Shakespeare's genius was great enough to perceive that men do not account being amused so great a service as instruction in the deeper things of life and destiny — provided the purpose to elevate and edify be kept from sight. How, then, will Shakespeare treat such a theme as the Decay of Rome? He will need both to reveal and interpret unsuspected causes as well as secure acquiescence in unacceptable conclusions. To begin, he will, therefore, show the condition of national sentiment and patriotism in the Roman state. When a people ceases to have convictions and generous impulses, is no longer willing to spend and be spent for principle; when it has no aims or ideals that reach beyond the hour, it is no longer capable of liberty or self-government. The power behind the throne is dead, and some arm of iron will soon bear sway alone. What 'effect' will best show that all this was true of the Roman republic in Cæsar's times? Shakespeare determines it shall be the mood, the humor in which Rome regards a change of masters. Hence his 'first stroke' shows the general levity in connection with an effort of the tribunes, Flavius and Marcellus, to turn a crowd of citizens, making holiday over Cæsar's return, back to their homes. It is long before these once revered defenders of the people get other than impudent, bantering answers. The second and the third 'effect' are signified to us directly by the author in the long paragraph of Marcellus: this people have no conscience; they have no feeling. When it is charged that they, who, many a time and oft, have climbed to walls and battlements, yea, to chimney tops, to see great Pompey pass, are now actually assembled, as if no principle were involved, to greet him who comes in triumph over Pompey's blood, they slink away, tongue-tied in their guiltiness. The tremendous 'effect' in this self-confessed chagrin and shame is strengthened by another which precedes it, — the intimation, to

which we unconsciously subscribe, that such fickleness and disloyalty must provoke the gods to vengeance. Finally, even these tribunes have lost their respect for law and duty. To spite Cæsar and testify to their factious spirit they will even disrobe the images, decked for his triumph during the sacred festival of the Lupercalia.

Here then is an overture not unlike the 'Representation of Chaos' with which Haydn opens his oratorio of *The Creation*. The vital business of the play now begins with the second scene. The matter to be used as tragic material demands first that the reader justify the conspiracy, but later acquiesce in the evident course of destiny. To justify the conspiracy, which proposes 'nothing less than a dastardly assassination of 'the foremost man of all this world,' it is necessary to exhibit Cæsar as one who, in comparison with his rivals, ought not to live. To dispossess the reader's mind of notions held since school-boy days, to put him on the side of the conspirators, and make him dramatically or in imagination as one of them, is a task more presumptuous and daring than Shakespeare anywhere attempts in maturer years. It would not do to say that Cæsar had his weak side — that he was superstitious, ambitious, vain ; that he had passed his prime. Such declarations of fact would have no effect, save, perhaps, to arouse feelings adverse to the author's purpose. The only course is manifestly to exhibit signs, and let the reader draw his own inferences ; and to exhibit them in such wise as to compel revision of all prescriptive ideas and theories hostile to the end in view.

The trained imagination is fond of pressing to the farthest bounds of thought. The speediest access thereto, as we have seen, is by the way of negating positive qualities or inferences. Hence the negative method unconditions the imagination, seems often, indeed, to challenge it to fullest exercise. But imagination is the ego eminently as emotion, and in a high degree controls and inspires the determinative manifestations called Will. Hence the tremendous power yielded by Shakespeare and like artists over the destinies of men. The ego as imagination prefers unconditioned

excellences, but is not averse to contemplating what it is pleased to consider unconditioned evils if free to act as will in some form of determination. A man supposed good, if convicted of some one fault, may be popularly set down as guilty of every wrong. Another, admittedly a worthless citizen, by giving his life heroically in his country's need, is canonized as a patriot. A Garfield's stout-hearted battling with death makes him at once a martyr to many who had cherished towards him only dislike or hate before. All these are but illustrations of the conduct of imagination when the spiritual bearings change.¹ If such revulsions of feeling occur in the practical side of life, where there is least glamour and illusion, what may be expected in the sphere of art where spiritual truth is revealed in its purest forms?

It should now be easy to trace the steps by which Shakespeare makes Cæsar seem to us the man the conspirators deemed him. The first stroke which introduces him to our sight is exceptionally dramatic and powerful. The master of the world is desirous of an heir. How unwillingly we read in this 'effect' the proof of Cæsar's purpose to found an imperial line! Quickly again the procession is stopped by the dictator's order. While all ears beside are deaf he has detected the utterance of his name and will not stir until assured that the soothsayer's warning is gratuitous. This timorousness and superstition argue a bad conscience and strange unconfidence of the future. That the man has the magnificent Roman firmness and daring of all his Gallic campaigns we know, but new symptoms take spiritual precedence with the old. These two 'effects' shown,—all we can at present bear *from him*, Cæsar passes from sight. Cassius, however, is made to drop out from the throng, that we may know further how unfit Cæsar really is to be the master of his fellows. We are on the lookout with Brutus, who is our proxy, for anything unfair, but are obliged to admit no self-respecting Roman could ever bow down to one

¹ The real secret of such changes is, not that imagination is inconstant, but that *the new types are the true*. See pp. 233 and 348.

whom he, Æneas-like, had borne upon his shoulders, or heard cry 'Give me some drink, Titinius!' like a sick girl.¹ This paragraph from Cassius essentially makes an end of all our romantic notions concerning Cæsar. He is now caused to reappear — this time as a broken-down man who sees lions in his path. 'The new hints 'Let me have men about me that are fat,' 'yond Cassius has a lean and hungry look,' — the latter all the more potent because we know this Cassius and are in sympathy with him, — are yet more radical and surprising than the first. Then, after a few braggart phrases, betraying both insincerity and pride, the last personal 'effect' is introduced, — physical as so frequently in Shakespeare, and here of the negative kind: 'Come on my right hand, for this ear is deaf.'

Casca now in his thick, blunt talk is used to explain why the angry spot glows on Cæsar's brow, and pour contempt upon his refusal of the crown, and the scene is done.²

The character of Cæsar is handled with no little boldness and freedom, such as Shakespeare in maturer plays avoids. But it may well be questioned whether the portraiture, if in certain literal features exaggerated, be not in the main true spiritually.³ The business of showing how Brutus, failing to read the signs of the times aright, is inveigled into the conspiracy for the sake of his name, is handled much more gently and naturally. Through Brutus' slow decision and the influence of Portia we are led to yet more unequivocal consent to Cæsar's death. Perhaps few of us

¹ Herein is of course an 'effect' of a different sort, in which we may read the envy of great Cæsar common to all the conspirators save Brutus. Compare the words of Antony in V. v. 69-70, of this play.

² Except in so far as yet concerned with showing how Brutus is won over to the conspiracy.

³ The reader will long since have remarked that in portraying character as in depicting a face all depends on minor 'effects,' so grouped as to produce the same relative impression as the real character or physiognomy. A single element of expression gives a hint of character, and is therefore a sub-'effect'; but a whole face giving all that can be shown of character through expression, is a full 'effect.' Art groups sub-'effects' in such a manner as to make those that are significant take the eye unerringly and quickly, yet do essential justice to all.

have ever been conscious what makes us so eager at the close of Act II. that the conspiracy should press on and do its work. It is the spectacle of Portia sending that message "Say I am *merry*" to her husband in his need, and swooning at the prospect of Rome once more delivered under the leadership of a Brutus. But the deed once done, the sight of Cæsar's blood puts the conspiracy in the wrong: and though we give it yet our sympathy we feel that it is a mistake; that destiny is with Octavius, and will prevail.

It is quite certain we are not always conscious of what an artist like Shakespeare is doing with our sympathies. Was he himself aware of what he accomplished? Did he intend all the effects we have found out that he produces? One often hears grave doubts whether literary genius knows anything of its processes. But it seems never to have been questioned that a Rubens or a Corot or any other reputable artist knows and intends all that he does with color. Whether he knows *why* the impulse comes to do this or that is quite another thing; but is he really unaware that he *does* this or that? It would certainly be preposterous to pretend that Mozart, or ~~Handel~~, or even deaf Beethoven wrote scores which he never consciously appreciated or understood. There is never the slightest question when a significant chord or dissonance is struck that the tone-artist meant just that and nothing else, and felt its effect as he wrote it in the score. But the poet uses means vastly more untechnical and universal, hence more objectively and immediately intelligible both to himself and his public than the artist or musician. No one doubts, of course, that there are many minds of uncertain poetic commission that indite both worse and better than they intend or know, just as there are innumerable daubers in art, and horn-pipe composers in music. Where the line is to be drawn would doubtless be hard to say. Crabbe, perhaps, thought he wrote like an Apollo. But Bryant surely must have known what his *To a Waterfowl*, line by line, would bring to his reader's feelings. Much less can it be maintained for a moment that an Arnold, a Browning, a Shakespeare, or a Tenny-

son can be ignorant of the figures, the associations, and the 'effects' they combine to exalt the fancy. We know of no penetration more lightning-like than Browning's, no intelligence more all-embracing than Shakespeare's. To assume that we who read know more of the work of such masters than they who wrote is not only pitiable but should be wholly ludicrous.

Poetry, so far as it is a thing of art, is yet clearly in its infancy. Perhaps there are fewer men and women to-day conversant with its highest forms and alive to its better inspiration than are open to the influence of the representative arts and music. It should now be evident how poetry touches the practical side of life, and affects the motives and ideals of men. As in art and music the highest culture consists not in the ability to produce but to study and appreciate from the artist's point of view, so here the chief edification must come from thinking the author's thoughts after him and partaking in his exaltation. There can be little question that the future of poetry, for all cultivated readers, has this in store.



CHAPTER XVIII.

THE MORAL USES OF ART AND POETRY.


It is then not to be doubted that as the individual mind passes from the physical to the highest stage the occasions and excitements of its spiritual activity multiply in an almost geometric ratio. At a certain point in the child-life of the ego the universe seems but a congeries of facts apprehensible to sight and taste and touch, but significant no further than these avenues may reach. During the period of youth, moreover, the sensibilities are in abeyance; the ego is often, for a time, inordinately selfish and cruel. To the immature mind 'a waterfowl' is but a waterfowl, all the mysteries of its haunts and habits are merely so many things to take for granted, and the destruction of it and its kind but irresponsible sport. But little by little the mind learns the lessons of interpretation and sympathy, until—if endowed or privileged to know the secrets of the seers—it at last reads in even the fall of a sparrow or the blossoming of a lily meanings too deep for tears. Thus the stimulants and occasions of the soul's highest activity grow from zero to infinity,—from the simplest object first spiritually discerned to the whole universe of intelligible things. The increase, moreover, is not only thus quantitative, but also qualitative. The earliest spiritual lesson appropriate to the child-mind is fable or allegory. A whole page or even chapter must be devoted to a single parallelism, or the elucidation of a single truth. But the mind is eventually so enlarged and quickened that a single word of a single sentence may be equal, or indeed superior, to a whole allegory, a score of parallels may be condensed potentially within the compass of a single period, and a single scene, through

leaving the imagination free, may be more effective than an expanded drama. At first none but very elementary truths can be discerned, and these only if revised, remade, and cast in certain polished and conventional forms. But finally all the phenomena of the outside world reach their utmost significance, without idealization or amendment, taken as they are.

Thus we are brought face to face with the truth, no doubt long since apparent, that the end of culture is the Spiritual Life. This truth once discerned furnishes the explanation of many mysteries, and especially of the seemingly disproportionate remuneration of the service rendered by the makers of art and literature. The demand for the highest products in these is generally very small, but the remuneration large. Only seldom is a work of art, as not long since the *Angelus*, subject strictly to the operation of market laws. What conduces most eminently and universally to the spiritual life of society is sooner or later recognized as the greatest of services and receives the highest compensation. Even the commonest economic transactions contain the germ of the principle evinced thus in its highest forms. The services of muscular labor are paid for at a fixed price per diem; so to a certain extent are intellectual services also. For services higher than these society has no fixed schedule, but will be found content in each given instance with the best terms it can get. Of course we can perform no service whatever without some kind or degree of muscular exertion.¹ If we begin with digging trenches for water mains,

¹ Not even can a Newton's *Principia* or a Bacon's *Novum Organon* be rendered available to the world until the discoverer at least move his lips or pen to make the new truths known. Moreover, the physical and the intellectual elements are complementary, as the adjoined diagram will illustrate.

Any given service, with the true proportion of its physical and intellectual elements, will be indicated by the two parts of a line drawn through the proper point on the diagonal, parallel to the base of the square. The space thus included will also represent the relative



the physical portion of our service is at a maximum, the intellectual at the minimum, and the wages are, in consequence, of the lowest. Yet is it incorrect to say that the physical element alone, or the physical and the intellectual element together, determine the amount of wages; for we shall find there is a moral, or as it is best to say, a spiritual, element even in the labor of the trench-digger. If he should lean upon his shovel every minute the overseer's eye is turned, he would hardly find employment a single day. Honesty of purpose to do that for which he is hired, perseverance, and steadiness of application minute by minute and hour by hour are no less than sentiments and belong to character. But they lie so completely at the foundation as to be taken for granted in the lower kinds of service, hence are seldom recognized by an element in the wages, though these would be reduced to a very uncertain and shifting quantity without them. But digging trenches means eating one's bread by the sweat of one's brow. As there is less curse upon that labor which is less onerous, we aspire, we endeavor to reduce the physical and enlarge the directive or intellectual factor. We thus become carters, it may be, or artisans, and so upward, until we have reduced the muscular effort perhaps to the moving of a pen. If it be an expert accountant who wields the pen, the emolument will of course be large, though the service still continues intellectual, and so also if the wielder be an Edison, an Ericsson, or a Captain Eads. But suppose the paper over which the pen is moving be some manuscript of Tennyson. There

compensation such service will secure. Thus in the lowest forms of labor, in which the brain is hardly more than directive to the muscles, the intellectual portion is reduced to a mere point at the extremity of the line, and the compensation becomes indeterminate. In like manner, when the intellectual part of a service grows to the top of the diagonal, and the physical, reduced perhaps to an oral sentence or even a gesture of direction, in turn diminishes to a point at the extremity of the upper line, the compensation is of the largest. For, mathematically speaking, the part of the line cut off at the right by the diagonal is the intellectual factor of the service, by which the base is to be multiplied.

The third dimension, as will be later shown, serves to illustrate how the spiritual factor enters into a man's relations with society, and fixes his worth and station.

the intellectual element of the service becomes subordinate along with the physical, as we pay him twenty guineas a page, perhaps a guinea, two guineas, a line, or even a guinea a word. Why this discrimination against the head book-keeper? Because the service of a Tennyson or a Shakespeare does not remain upon the pages of a ledger, but enters into our consciousness and becomes an expanded part of our own selves. It is hardly worth while to inquire whether Paganini is or is not overpaid for his bowings and shiftings, or Patti for her trills, or Bierstadt for his brush-strokes. Muscular movements in each case there most positively and palpably are, but they can scarcely be graded under the head of labor. It also helps little to declare that such are non-productive services. The Chicago fire was one of the most unproductive events in the history of this country, yet has proved a means of most unexampled prosperity. There can be no adequate understanding of what 'productive' means so long as we ignore or belittle the moral element. Whatever evokes latent possibilities or exalts best energies, whether through delectation or calamity, is a benefaction. Whoever inspires men to come to their best, or brings them under the control of more ennobling ideals, is the greatest of benefactors. Thus we are brought to the difference between the honest purposes and the application of the trench-digger and the seership of a Tennyson. The one is a matter of trust and conscientiousness, in some degree common to all men, the other is a thing of inspiration. But both conscientiousness and inspiration are alike in being neither physical nor intellectual manifestations, but spiritual. The one is the factor of solidity which conditions and determines worth in the individual, the other tends to enlarge the factor and raise the average of character in society at large.¹

¹ The reference, in factor of solidity, is of course to the diagram already considered at the bottom of p. 241.

Man begins his career seriously in the world when he performs his earliest service. As a child he but played at merchandizing, or carpentry, or being doctor, or such other callings as he fancied he might engage in as a man. Now, having met with an actual demand for his labor, which he will in honor endeavor to supply, he constructs his square, and proceeds to make it of three dimensions by adding pro-

But character implies enlightenment and to some extent independent ability to read the open spiritual secrets of man and nature. In other words, a man's place and station are fixed by the degree of his better development, by his maximum of spirituality. In our Gothic civilization there has never been in reality any other division into classes than upon this principle of spiritual excellence. The old nobility in a gross and elemental way prefigured it; the idea of modern gentry postulates it very definitely. Even in Anglo-Saxon times estates and thaneship were held no substitute for worth, but unequivocally presupposed in the *hláford* and his lady the essential qualities of nobility. In early Scandinavia the only grounds of distinction were valor and minstrelsy; and titles are yet conferred, as on a Wellington or Nelson, a Macaulay or a Tennyson, for that Viking energy which has nerved and led men to victory and the saving of a state, or a Brage-literature that can edify and inspire for successive generations. But there is no patent of nobility save the reverence with which, by common consent, a Washington, an Emerson, a Shakespeare, and all others who reach the highest plane, are recognized and exalted.¹

Very absurd then is it to maintain there should be no castes, that all men without preparation or probation have a right to the same distinctions and prerogatives as the few. Man-made castes are one thing; but what of those which God has made? May they be abolished speedily? For some there are who would seem to insist

visionally at least one unit of volume. If he prove a man of constitutionally sterling and solid traits, and rises in consequence to successive positions of trust, the emolument of his service will increase proportionally, so long as the moral element continues objective. But if the sum of moral quality becomes energetic and rises to inspiration, the spiritual factor will rapidly increase and perhaps subordinate the intellectual and the physical elements together. Here, indeed, our diagram fails us; for with a Lincoln or Grant or Skobelev or Shakespeare, who lead men beyond themselves and change the current of destiny both of individuals and of states, the third dimension is no longer the side of a cube, but becoming indeterminate may approach infinity.

¹See pp. 102 and 94. Those who exhibit a high degree of spiritual quality in merely objective forms are signally respected and beloved by the community at large. Thus even here the processes of idealization begin.

that the trench-digger should work no more hours than Tennyson, and that both should have equal remuneration. Here we come down to the root of the matter. Why, indeed, should the one toil ten hours to the day year in and out on low diet and hard wages, while the other works but when he pleases on a princely income? Political economy aside, where is the justice?

Herein is a great mystery. How does it happen that we must all substantially give up our lives to labor? Why not instead have leisure? For man just as easily might have been so adapted to his environment, or his natural environment so adapted to man, as to give him perfect command of his time. Taking human nature as we find it, the answer is, clearly, because he would not have been good for anything without it. We think we should devote our time to self-improvement, but if we had absolute leisure we should not improve at all; for the more complex and exacting the necessity to work becomes, all the more do we do outside for self-improvement and the betterment of others. If there were no daily labor, there would be no momentum towards anything. The necessity to toil in order to secure food and clothes and shelter destroys native inertia and creates momentum. When after many generations this momentum can safely be counted upon as constant, that which produces it may be withdrawn, — that is, labor becomes more and more intellectual, and may end in leisure. Thus only is the opportunity for full self-improvement gained; for leisure properly means option as to what we shall do, never choice not to do at all. It is that condition of our fortunes which enables us to send another to perform what we do not care to do ourselves, and implies freedom to do that to which we are most anxious to give ourselves. When leisure has meant nothing but time-killing for a couple of generations, the old inertia is restored and work is needed — and generally comes, in order to release again from the restored inertia. Hence the obvious fact that each race or nation at any given time possesses in general all the wealth or leisure it deserves. It is only by the hard discipline of labor that we become fit to do without it. For the law of survival in

human society is something more than a convenient name ; it is an awful fact. Its operation in the physical stage cuts off all those who are unequal to the hard conditions of existence : we may say, it guards first the approach to the physical life. But when society has reached the stage of comfortable dwellings, well-cooked food, and somewhat of medical skill, when the plan of exchange of services has been evolved by each man taking some one thing to do for his neighbors as well as for himself and letting his neighbors severally according to their bent do the other things for him, — then the operation of the law is shifted to the next higher plane. It is now set to guard the approach to the intellectual life. The physically weakest may now, on account of great mental strength, become the fittest to survive, and the destroying angel passes their door-posts by. But those who have derived the lighter type of constitution adapted to brain work, but prove unequal to a place in the sphere of intellectual employment, must go down again to the physical whether they can endure existence there or no, and are thus either cut off, or becoming hardened in constitution prepare to try once more through their descendants to secure foothold in the plane above. There is no greater marvel in the working of this social law than the readiness with which means are provided for the rise from the physical to the intellectual plane when a race is ready. Even the dank and treacherous shores of the North Sea may become a Holland, even the bleak and barren wilderness of the Pilgrims and Puritans may become New England. There is no limit to the resources and expedients of nature for multiplying those wants and services which create wealth when a people can be trusted with it. On the other hand, there is also no limit to the devices of nature for excluding the unfitted from the 'plane of leisure. Even self-interest has a moral use. The selfishness of capitalists and employers keeps down the unworthy. The man who would spend ten dollars a day upon coarse pleasures if he could get it, in general will get but ten dollars a week. But suppose that he who has worked off the curse of toil spends his allotment of leisure still in the physical sphere. It is an anomaly, an anachronism, which

nature abhors. All such are soon cut off as cumberers of the ground—nay, are caused even to become their own executioners. To the brain-worker dissipation is more dangerous and deadly than the plague. The man for whom nature has made a place in the sphere of intellect and refinement, but whose home is in the senses, whose ideal of perfect felicity is dice and pipes and beer over an alehouse table, is by these very facts an outcast from his station. There are more reasons than one why the wealth-acquiring stage is not reached in any civilization until the people are substantially above the physical plane. In cases where it comes too soon, the possession of leisure is the means of destroying that leisure. When a millionaire leaves his estate to unworthy sons, it is soon squandered, and they must go to work again as common bread-winners. But their sons will perhaps acquire wealth again in turn, and will so endow their children that they can be effectively taught the uses and value of leisure, so that there shall be no more going backward. Nature punishes abuse of the power to command other people's services as inexorably as she punishes sensuality, though with a lighter penalty.

All this of course at first seems pitiless, and prodigal of human souls. But there is compensation. While society, almost like an animal organism, is continually eliminating whatever disturbs or irritates or poisons from its blood and tissues, each generation comes upon the stage with some inherent advantage over the preceding. Other things being equal, there is higher organic quality in the offspring than in the parent. Whatever is eminent in one generation, as speed in the horse, will be represented under proper conditions with greater eminence in the next. In the normal course of heredity, the son shows some certain advance over his parents in sharpness of intellect and fineness of susceptibility. Moreover, the common ideals, the common objects and ends of aspiration, are daily changing for the better. When time is ripe, some especial new enlightenment possesses the consciousness of each given generation. Certain minds, for example, find themselves aware of the iniquity of the slave-trade, and in

obedience to a common impulse the evil is crushed out. A generation later other minds awake to the conviction that property in slaves is wrong, and a sentiment springs up which removes the blot from the face of society. The operation of this principle, which, popularly speaking, we call the Law of Progress, can be traced everywhere in organic and inorganic nature, and governs each phase of development and change. As privileges increase, as temptations to abuse wealth, and influence, and leisure multiply, counteracting influences enlarge themselves in superior proportion. It is a law in many respects inscrutable, and can only be accounted for,—to borrow well worn terms, as an especial manifestation of the First Cause. But its effect is evident enough. It merely adds another to the multitude of parallel forces whose resultant makes toward the universal end. For it should now be no anticipation to say that all the normal forces of society,—indeed all the energy of the First Cause himself, so far as we can know it, is in operation to lift the race to the spiritual plane. Religion, and education, and art, and music, and literature are allied in operation to this universal end. Even the ordinary procedures of industry belong to the scheme, as will be later shown.

Here then we have the offset, the counterbalance, to the pitiless law of survival, which in some cases seems to deny the poorly endowed and unfortunate a fair chance in life. The new principle is as inclusive as the former is exclusive. It is clear that the purpose of this law is not merely the greatest good to the greatest number, but all good to every soul just so far as he shall be capable and willing to receive it. Moreover, it is a universal law, and holds good in every department of intellectual and spiritual expansion. In its operation there are always three principal steps or stages,—Revelation, the Elevation of a Chosen People, and the Calling of the Gentiles to the same rank as the chosen; or, to be more specific, the genius of the age proceeds first through the highest forms of art to reveal, then in an exclusive ex-cathedra science to organize and conserve, but finally

to popularize. We may trace an illustration from the history of modern letters and learning, since with these we are all doubtless most familiar. We go back, of course, to Homer and Hesiod, Æschylus and Pindar, the earliest models in literature, and Thales and Plato and Aristotle, the first seers or revealers of philosophic truth. It was truly with reference to the modern world an age of beginnings. To understand and appreciate these minds in their day required almost a kindred genius. Then at length, when there were no more Platos and Aristotles or Sapphos and Pindars, men set about the scientific study of what these had done. But only the choicest spirits might aspire to appropriate their work and be their interpreters to a wondering world. Hence we find in due time a self-constituted aristocracy of intellect and culture, and we know its period of supremacy in Athens, Rome, Alexandria, and Constantinople.

But when the scepter passed from these capitals of culture, the illumination of the first great minds was not extinguished. Though buried in a dead or disused language, it still shone upon the world, and it was not yet necessary that new revealers should appear. Scholastic learning sprang up; astrology, alchemy, and magic carried old dogmas and assumptions to logical and practical conclusions. One thing was most potently within the consciousness of the age,—that nothing but exceptional endowment or privilege could warrant admission to the guild of learning. When the Renaissance appeared, the splendor and perfection of the classic past were exhibited that the world might realize the necessity and worth of lofty standards. But all was Pharisaic exclusion and cant and pedantry. The Renaissance set copies for her school-boys, and modern literature was cramped or wrenched into its procrustean forms. In education it was thought rather an extraordinary accomplishment to know Greek. Not every scholar who tried could acquire it. The teacher, moreover, always assumed in his students the intuitive ability to discern and grasp for themselves all underlying principles. If they could not do this, the teacher gave up the case. To be a scholar

was to be one of the chosen. It was therefore no part of his task to develop the intuitive powers. His time was too valuable, his position too lofty to begin farther back than a ready-made aptitude on his pupils' part. Hence in the old learning the favored few, who were found able at once to appreciate and appropriate or imitate the great models, were brought into all possible prominence, while the slow-witted and the dullards were left alone in their discouragement.

But the period of the chosen people in learning and education has happily passed away. The Renaissance did its work thoroughly; and though it spoiled some generations of scholars and authors before its effect was reached, it has yet been of incalculable benefit to every mind. It would have taken centuries for the Gothic north to evolve its own correct and perfect models of literary form and style, which were thus borrowed ready-made. Then it would have taken centuries more to prepare the people for the common ideal of a free and universal education. Thus it has immeasurably hastened the calling of the Gentiles, the elevation of the masses toward the intellectual and the higher life. In education, the teacher is no longer a Gamaliel, selecting his pupils and proselytes by arbitrary preference; he has become all things to all men. He has changed the assumptions and postulates which underlie his work. He now assumes he does have time to consider the individual needs and endowments of his learners. He busies himself in so arranging the practical tasks he sets that even the most backward will discover and generalize for himself the involved and underlying principles. As a result, there is often found in the end little practical difference between the precocious and the plodding student. Little by little he brings the one as well as the other to the lofty plane where once the Aristotles and the Dantes stood alone. But perhaps in music we may see the fullest exhibition of development under the law last named, and all comprised within the limits of little more than a single century. First, the group of masters from John Sebastian Bach to Beethoven; then the period of organization and systema-

tization, or of reducing the new music from an art to a science ; then the present stage of popular appropriation, when talents below the average are equal to the execution and interpretation of the most difficult compositions, — when, indeed, a man without extraordinary musical gifts has become Richard Wagner. To think the thoughts of a master after him who can interpret life and nature to the ear is an accomplishment worth surely all it costs. Much is said against the education in music of the un-musical ; not a little also against the instruction in drawing and painting of those whose sense of form and color is not acute. But those who know what has been done for such, not only technically, but also spiritually, are silenced. It is clearly the voice of the times that all slumbering senses of spiritual beauty be awakened. When the blind can be made to see by surgery, we raise a purse to secure the surgical aid, in the name of a common humanity. No one, of course, insists that all should be trained with reference to becoming skillful performers or artists. It is not the purpose of the public schools to raise up Miltons or Macaulays, but to enable all to hold communion with such great minds if they will. Hence we feel it is little short of an imperative duty, for the sake of the general good, to enable every soul, according to its capacity, to find the inspiration there may be in any and every thing that possesses spiritual quality.

Hence among the forces which operate directly to the universal end, in what we may call a secular way, are art and literature.¹ Art has a province of the broadest, assumes a task no less than

¹ We make a distinction here between secular and religious spirituality, not because such difference exists in fact, but for convenience merely, since of the latter it is not our purpose or province to treat. God is not religious, but exists in a condition of consciousness which transcends religion. True culture consists in making man godlike, not in making him merely or exclusively devout. Until man can be led to apprehend the Divine in other things beside those which pertain to his soul's salvation, his spiritual life must be what is called religious exclusively. But there is no means by which a man may be physical in his touch and appropriation of the world, and religious merely in things beyond. If he has not been lifted out of the lower circles, he will be unable to read the open secrets of the higher life without an interpreter, and his spiritual equilibrium will be unstable.

interpreting the real and final meaning of all manifestations of hue and form in matter, whether lovely or unlovely. Whether there be really a universe of matter, or, as chemists and physicists are beginning to believe, only a vast aggregation of force centers, makes no difference. Indeed, upon the latter hypothesis, art would be interpretable more easily. To prepare the modern age for its attainments in the interpretative powers of art has been as long a process as the evolution of modern letters. The works of Raphael, like the works of Homer, do not to-day seem to us so great as we expect; they were the message to a past age, and not to us. We would not have the works of either repeated or multiplied to-day by living hands were this possible. The paintings and frescoes of Raphael, Michael Angelo, and their fellows were the opening miracles of the coming kingdom of art. Nothing less could strike the sense of their times. The art of the present, which teaches by its humble unheroic themes, which has come down from crucifixions and last judgments to slumberous meadows, with only kine and cowslips in the foreground, is as the still small voice after the whirlwind and the tempest and the fire. The greater and more moving spectacles opened the eyes and soul of their peculiar generation, when began the operation of the law which we know, though it has taken five centuries to reach our times. Then the kingdom of art came with observation. Now the kingdom of art is within ourselves. The common artistic sense is now aware, not only that every phenomenon of form, but also of sound, every slightest change in the world of matter, echoes across the chasm which separates flesh from spirit. No slumbering sense or capacity of the soul but may be awakened through some certain experience or analogy. The passing cloud, the patter of the rain, the patient sunshine, are all eloquent to the sentient soul, though there be no speech or language, though their voice is not heard. 'Poetry and art shall fail, the sentiments of the soul shall cease,' certain narrow, blinded scientists have said, 'because knowledge shall be all in all.' Is it not, on the contrary, clear that new material knowledge will but broaden the experiences of

the soul and multiply the avenues which approach it? No item of new knowledge but has such transcendent promise. To the keen spiritual eye of an Emerson, even the stakes of his Concord fences tell truths old before the foundation of the world.

While art tends thus to make outside nature spiritually significant to us, it is the office of literature to bring all men to each other, and make common each serviceable sentiment and thought. As we saw in the last chapter, it is institutionally adapted to give every man access to his fellows with whatever single item or element of truth may have been revealed to him alone. Moreover, in bringing all men thus together, literature will register and exhibit marked differences in types and personality. There is nothing which influences us so immediately and powerfully as character. A new characteristic may bring into operation a new ideal.¹ Even familiar traits in a new proportion may have all the effect of the rarest personality. Thus through literature — according to the realistic mode now being evolved in poetry and novels — the effect of common qualities, as the manliness and integrity of the trench-digger, may be utilized. All our ideals come from concrete forms. An abstract quality in itself may be very unattractive, or even incomprehensible, but seen in the actual may enchant all eyes. The types of womanhood in Shakespeare have changed the lives of many who had never found it possible before to believe in the truth and dignity of human nature.

But literature not only brings other men's thoughts and experiences to us; it takes us out of ourselves into the thoughts and experiences of other men. As was indicated in Chapter IX., selfishness is incident to the isolation and individuality of the ego, and cannot be eliminated from human nature. But it may be redeemed and ennobled when confined thus to its higher, spiritual aspects. To this end the transactions and engagements of everyday life contribute. Every dollar earned by the trench-digger helps put a dollar in the pocket of his employer, and helps save a dollar to the whole community which needs his services. Let each wage-

¹ See p. 94, par. 2.

earner spend less than he earns and save the daily difference. It may win leisure, if he deserve to have it, in his own lifetime,—should certainly secure it for the next generation. So each man in achieving leisure helps achieve it for his fellows; and leisure knocks, or should knock, on the door to the spiritual life. Again, the technical and systematized processes of business and of commerce, the indirect and generalized methods of recovering the value of services rendered, tend to minimize selfishness and enlarge the heart. Once each man shot his own venison, caught his own fish, cultivated his own grains, and at each turn of the hand selfishness was fostered. As he carried home the game upon his shoulders and felt its fat proportions, his anticipations were concerned but with the senses. All the time he was forced to contemplate some imminent good to his single self. But merely by the exchange of services society has thrust back self at least one remove from conscious sight. It may provoke a smile to say that the pleading of our lawyers, the attendance of our physicians, and the enterprise of our merchants are altruistic, yet, relatively, is this in effect the truth. It is far easier for a man to give gold from his pocket than an ox from his stall; it is far easier to give a check upon one's banker than gold from one's purse. It is indeed scarcely possible longer even for the miser to gloat over his heaps of gold; it must be rather the balance on his bank-book. But even his double-eagles on deposit are a blessing to others whether he will or no. Then there are the many and various services which put selfishness much farther than one remove away from the consciousness of those that do them. When a man gives his labor or his substance for no advantage to himself save the betterment of others, living in their experiences as they were his own, then is the higher life manifestly vigorous within. "He who findeth his life shall lose it" was once a most intractable dogma. I think we of to-day well understand how, even in a secular sense, he that shall lose his life in the material sphere shall more than find it in the spiritual.

✓ But literature and art are the most potent instruments of spirit-

ual progress ; and the time has come for their utmost of service. We have reached, as a nation, by no choice of ourselves, powerless to help or hinder, the wealth-producing stage. In half a century we shall be the richest people in history. How shall we use our wealth, what shall we do with our leisure? The nation that cannot rise to the spiritual life when its leisure is achieved, is doomed. We are coming inevitably, irredeemably, irrevocably, to the final test. Shall we rise to the stage next higher? Retreat is cut off ; advance we must or perish. Once Athens and Rome and Venice stood on the same intellectual and fatal plane, but they are gone. They proved their unfitness, and are rotting out their punishment. Shall the same gangrene seize us? There are many signs that our people are in most hopeful soundness, but we have many alien elements to sweeten and purify. Every native and organic energy must be exercised, if we are to save the whole body. The State must clearly find a way to open to all the influences of the highest and most helpful culture.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE LITERARY SENTENCE-LENGTH IN ENGLISH PROSE.

HAVING finished our inquiry into the principles and stages of development in the poetry of English Literature, and given some thought to the influence exerted through it, we turn next to the prose. Here the elements are fewer, and the intricacies much less perplexing; so that we may proceed more simply. Any one acquainted with the Elizabethan or ante-Elizabethan prose-writers is well aware that their sentences are prevailingly either crabbed or heavy, and that it is often necessary to re-read, sometimes to ponder, before a probable meaning reveals itself. Ordinary modern prose, on the other hand, is clear, and almost as effective to the understanding as oral speech. Let us commence our analysis by ascertaining what principles have been at work to produce the change.

We must now begin a new sort of investigation. We have hitherto considered literature principally with respect to meaning and spirit; we must now for several chapters study exclusively the form. We will first compare the style of a few passages from the earlier and from modern prose-writers. The following is a paragraph from Fabyan's *Chronicle* :—

In this season the legat vpon his partye, and the kynge of Romayns vpon ye other partie, for allyaunce that was atwene hym and ye erle of Glouceter, laboured so to the kyng that a reformacōn of peas was spoken of; duryng whiche treaty, the souldyourrs lyinge in Southwerke made many robboryes in Southery and other places, and rowed ouer to Westmynster, and spoyled there the kynges palays, and deuoured his wyne, and breke the glasse of the wyn-

dowes, and all other necessaryes to that palayes they destroyed and wasted; and somtymes came in lykewyse into London, and robbed there also. Of the whiche there was taken iiii. that bare ye conysaunce of the erle of Derby, the whiche the erle caused theyr handes and legges to be bounden, and than put into a sacke, and so cast into the Thamys. — Vol. II., Ellis' Edition, p. 363.

With these two paragraphs Spenser begins his *View of the Present State of Ireland*: —

Eudoxus. But yf that countrey of Ireland, whence you lately came, be soe goodly and commodious a soyle, as ye report, I wonder that noe course is taken for the tourning thereof to good uses, and reducing of that savadge nation to better government and civilitye.

Ireneus. Marry, soe there have beene divers good plottes devised, and wise counsellis cast alleready about reformation of that realme; but they say, it is the fatall desteny of that land, that noe purposes, whatsoever are meant for her good, will prosper or take good effect, which, whether it proceede from the very GENIUS of the soyle, or influence of the starres, or that Almighty God hath not yet appoynted the time of her reformation, or that he reserveth her in this unquiett state still for some secrett scourdge, which shall by her come unto England, it is hard to be knowen, but yet much to be feared.

As a sample of Hooker's style we may quote the following: —

What the Scripture purposeth, the same in all points it doth perform. Howbeit, that here we swerve not in judgment, one thing especially we must observe, namely, that the absolute perfection of Scripture is seen by relation unto that end whereto it tendeth. And even hereby it cometh to pass, that first such as imagine the general and main drift of the body of sacred Scripture not to be so large as it is, nor that God did thereby intend to deliver, as in truth he doth, a full instruction in all things unto salvation necessary the knowledge whereof man by nature could not otherwise in this life attain unto; they are by this very mean induced either still to look for new revelations from heaven, or else dangerously to add to the Word of God uncertain tradition, that so the doctrine of man's salvation may be complete; which doctrine we constantly hold in all respects, without any such thing added to be so complete, that we utterly refuse as much as once to acquaint ourselves with anything further.

— Bk. II. Chap. viii.

In the first and the second extract there is no sentence but would be out of place in book-English of the present day. But Hooker's first period, barring the solemn-style verbs, is wholly in

accord with modern standards, and may be used as the basis of comparison with the following passages. We quote first from Macaulay's *Essay on History* :—

It may be laid down as a general rule, though subject to considerable qualifications and exceptions, that history begins in novel and ends in essay. Of the romantic historians Herodotus is the earliest and the best. His animation, his simple-hearted tenderness, his wonderful talent for description and dialogue, and the pure sweet flow of his language, place him at the head of narrators. He reminds us of a delightful child. There is a grace beyond the reach of affectation in his awkwardness, a malice in his innocence, an intelligence in his nonsense, an insinuating eloquence in his lisp. We know of no writer who makes such interest for himself and his book in the heart of the reader.

The next example will be from Channing's *Self-Culture* :—

I know how hard it is to some men, especially to those who spend much time in manual labor, to fix attention on books. Let them strive to overcome the difficulty, by choosing subjects of deep interest, or by reading in company with those whom they love. Nothing can supply the place of books. They are cheering or soothing companions in solitude, illness, affliction. The wealth of both continents would not compensate for the good they impart. Let every man, if possible, gather some good books under his roof, and obtain access for himself and family to some social library. Almost any luxury should be sacrificed to this.

And, finally, this from Emerson's *Address before the Senior Class in Divinity College* :—

My friends, in these two errors, I think, I find the causes of a decaying church and a wasting unbelief. And what greater calamity can fall upon a nation than the loss of worship? Then all things go to decay. Genius leaves the temple to haunt the senate or the market. Literature becomes frivolous. Science is cold. The eye of youth is not lighted by the hope of other worlds, and age is without honor. Society lives to trifles, and when men die we do not mention them.

But more conspicuous if possible than the absence of normal sentences in the first set of examples is the great difference in number of words per period between the two groups of authors contrasted. Fabyan we find has put no less than 141 words in his

two sentences, Spenser 152 in the same number, and Hooker 179 in three; while Macaulay uses but 119 words in six periods, Channing 108 in seven, and Emerson 88 in eight. The averages in these are of course surprising, and we wonder whether they are at all characteristic of the respective authors. Presumably a considerable number of sentences must be taken as a basis. We try twenty-five, then fifty, then a hundred, and finally in five hundred periods seem to find the fact of a rhythmic law. For the averages of words per sentence, by consecutive hundreds, in the six authors respectively are these:—

FABYAN.			SPENSER.		
First hundred periods	68.28		First hundred periods	49.78	
Second " "	66.68		Second " "	50.24	
Third " "	56.12		Third " "	53.67	
Fourth " "	65.77		Fourth " "	47.56	
Fifth " "	58.26		Fifth " "	47.88	
Average,	63.02		Average,	49.82	
HOOKER.			MACAULAY.		
First hundred periods	43.98		First hundred periods	23.23	
Second " "	40.90		Second " "	21.26	
Third " "	37.12		Third " "	25.95	
Fourth " "	41.63		Fourth " "	22.20	
Fifth " "	43.40		Fifth " "	19.65	
Average,	41.40		Average,	22.45	
CHANNING.			EMERSON.		
First hundred periods	25.15		First hundred periods	18.06	
Second " "	25.51		Second " "	20.15	
Third " "	25.38		Third " "	21.01	
Fourth " "	26.80		Fourth " "	24.18	
Fifth " "	25.84		Fifth " "	19.52	
Average,	25.73		Average,	20.58	

Here is evidently a principle of some importance, and, if universal, not difficult to establish. Among authors that might be

used to test it there is none better than De Quincey, whose spontaneous and voluble manner is the furthest possible removed from anything stereotyped and mechanical. Finding his provisional average in the first five hundred periods to be approximately thirty-three words per sentence, we try if he sustains it in the remainder of the work. The hundred-averages vary considerably, as expected, yet are kept under control by some kind of centripetal force, as this summary will show : —

First	hundred	29.74	Twelfth	hundred	34.42
Second	"	38.62	Thirteenth	"	29.57
Third	"	29.82	Fourteenth	"	38.58
Fourth	"	31.22	Fifteenth	"	35.32
Fifth	"	34.21	Sixteenth	"	40.29
Sixth	"	29.09	Seventeenth	"	39.29
Seventh	"	30.39	Eighteenth	"	38.12
Eighth	"	32.93	Nineteenth	"	31.24
Ninth	"	33.92	Twentieth	"	30.76
Tenth	"	32.88	Twenty-first	"	33.57
Eleventh	"	34.09	Twenty-sec'd	"	32.09

The aggregate of maximum frequency, as we observe, is approximately 33 ; and the average of the whole, 2225 periods, we find is 33.25.

This is certainly satisfactory so far as it goes, and we turn to another experiment. Granting there is such a thing as unconscious sentence-rhythm, is it constant in different works of the same author, especially when written in different styles and at widely distant intervals? Nothing to the contrary appearing in De Quincey, we go back to Channing. The average of his *Self-Culture* — 749 periods, and written in 1838 — is 25.28, and this is sustained both by other late compositions as well as his earliest extant papers and sermons. We try now Macaulay, Emerson, Newman, Carlyle, and various authors, both in English and out of it, with results the same ; and the true significance of the principle begins to dawn upon us. It is in itself clearly of little value except as hinting how literature has developed, and how the course of evolution in it may

be tracked. It shows, what we partly knew before, that the individual mind is the unit of literary progress, and that progress must be studied in the units before it can be comprehended in the mass. But before proceeding on the assumption that each writer is throughout consistent in the elements of stylistic quality, were it not well to make a completer demonstration in some author of not too formidable proportions? For this purpose we select Macaulay. His average in the *Essays* is 23.4, and we try by it his *History of England*. We find some variation in the aggregates by hundreds, but the averages by larger divisions are constant, and simply repeat what was obtained before.¹

If, then, each author writes thus in substantial accordance with an individual and unwavering sentence-ideal, it will be a valuable first investigation to ascertain something concerning the range of sentence-length in English prose from Chaucer down. Does Fabyan write the longest sentences? Who writes the shortest? For there are reputable authors, as the student will quickly learn, that reveal averages considerably less than Emerson's. Each student should compute some available production of his own,

¹ The results of the computation are summarized in the following columns. Each entry is the average number of words in a thousand consecutive sentences, and in the place of footings are the averages by ten thousands:—

26.09	23.00	22.21	20.54
24.21	25.33	25.06	25.01
24.20	21.76	22.33	24.97
23.51	21.59	24.81	22.92
24.99	24.10	24.05	23.71
22.13	19.62	21.81	23.26
22.36	21.11	23.39	22.81
20.35	25.58	22.39	23.91
21.08	25.86	23.17	24.92
23.81	23.81	24.03	25.28
<hr/> 23.33	<hr/> 25.18	<hr/> 23.32	<hr/> 23.73

The whole number of periods in the *History of England* is 41579, and the aggregate of words in the remaining 1579 sentences, 38696. The complete sentence-average for the five volumes is therefore 23.43 words.

and find out the approximate tendency of his style. Let him test whether English writers incline more to crisp, incisive sentences, or the American ; also what is the prevailing sentence-character in the best book-English, and what in the more popular style of newspapers and magazines. Let him note especially whether the tendency is in the direction of further pointedness and brevity, and, if possible, find a reason.

CHAPTER XX.

THE DECREASE OF PREDICATION.

It is not necessary that we should carry the investigation suggested at the end of the last chapter very far to be convinced that through sentence-shortening great changes have been wrought in the prose of English Literature. It should be evident, moreover, that this shortening is in no sense a cause ; it is rather an effect, or incidental to an effect, of some cause or causes yet to be determined. Short sentences are not necessarily easy to read because they are short, nor are long sentences always heavy or obscure merely because they are long. Let us compare the following passages : —

And then we began to reckon amongst ourselves how many we were that were set on shore, and we found the number to be an hundred and fourteen, whereof two were drowned in the sea and eight were slain at the first encounter, so that there remained an hundred and four, of which five-and-twenty went westward with us, and two-and-fifty to the north with Hooper and Ingram; and, as Ingram since has often told me, there were not past three of their company slain, and there were but six-and-twenty of them that came again to us, so that of the company that went northward there is yet lacking, and not certainly heard of, the number of three-and-twenty men. And verily I do think that there are of them yet alive and married in the said country, at Cibola, as hereafter I purpose (God willing) to discourse of more particularly, with the reasons and causes that make me so to think of them that were lacking, which were with David Ingram, Twide, Browne, and sundry others, whose names we could not remember. — HAKLUYT: *Miles Phillips' Discourse*.

When Jane Austen went on Sundays to the fashionable Laura Chapel a few years later, she may have seen all these people at their devotions in that home of aristocratic piety, and near them the famous Mrs. Piozzi, short and

stout, with a patch of rouge on each cheek, or the Duchess of York, with brown hair falling about her face, but, let us hope, without the retinue of dogs of assorted sizes which usually attended her everywhere else. Almost any day she might have seen in the thoroughfares of Bath or in the Pump Room many of the famous men of her time on the occasion of her first visit, — Melmoth, the noted scholar, William Hoare, the Royal Academician, the brilliant Sheridan, the yet unappreciated Herschels, William and Caroline, and the host of their contemporaries in literature, science, and art, who were familiar figures in Bath in 1791. — OSCAR FAY ADAMS: *The Story of Jane Austen's Life*.

Predication, we remember, conditions the imagination, and in prose imposes on the imaging faculty the obligation of realizing with exactness the facts or relations affirmed. That style which leaves most to fancy in respect to the manner in which facts or relations may be apprehended, will be in so far the easiest to read. Of the above passages the first from Hakluyt we shall find contains no less than twenty-one distinct predications; while the second, from the recent work of Mr. Adams, and of nearly the same length, but six. Let us compare again: —

Discern of the coming on of years, and think not to do the same things still; for age will not be defied. Beware of sudden change in any great point of diet, and if necessity enforce it, fit the rest to it. For it is a secret both in nature and state, that it is safer to change many things than one. Examine thy customs of diet, sleep, exercise, apparel, and the like; and try, in anything thou shalt judge hurtful, to discontinue it by little and little; but so, as if thou dost find any inconvenience by the change, thou come back to it again: for it is hard to distinguish that which is generally held good and wholesome, from that which is good particularly, and fit for thine own body. — BACON: *Of Regiment of Health*.

Whence came this prodigy of power? What blood of England or Italy flowed in his veins? Neither he nor his seem to have known. He is our King Melchisedec, without father or mother, everything hid but his divine descent. We must claim for an American one whose patriotism would have made him equally ready with Franklin to argue in a foreign court, or with Farragut to lash himself to the mast in the harbor of New Orleans. He hated secession as Satan; and, while at home with foreigners of every nation, was proud of his native land as the crown of the globe. He was a case of

Nature's bounty in her most royal mood, and, himself a true sovereign, the head of every board at which he sat. — C. A. BARTOL: Father Taylor, in *Radical Problems*.

In the first of these quotations there are sixteen predications in four sentences, and no less than eight of the sixteen in the last period. But in the extract from Bartol, essentially of the same length as the preceding, there are eight sentences and eleven predications. Three of these sentences only have more than a single verb.

Here, then, is the hint of a reason for the decrease of the numerical sentence-length in English prose. Some principle of sentence-simplification is evidently at work, and its effect has been both to increase the number of simple sentences, and to reduce predication very materially in such as remain complex or compound. We turn at once to earlier authors and make comparison with the modern. The following are representative results, computed on the basis of 500 periods: —

CHAUCER. (<i>Melibeus</i> .)				HALL. (<i>Chronicle</i> .)			
	Av. Predi- cations.	Per ct. Simp. Sents.			Av. Predi- cations.	Per ct. Simp. Sents.	
First 100 periods,	6.16	4		First 100 periods,	4.09	6	
Second 100 periods,	5.25	6		Second 100 periods,	3.70	7	
Third " "	4.68	6		Third " "	4.70	11	
Fourth " "	4.66	2		Fourth " "	3.91	8	
Rem'ng 80 "	5.50	2		Fifth " "	5.01	5	
Average 480 periods,	5.24	4		Average 500 periods,	4.28	7	
SPENSER. (<i>View of S. of Ireland</i> .)				SIDNEY. (<i>Defense of Poesie</i> .)			
	Av.	Per ct.			Av.	Per ct.	
First 100 periods,	4.83	12		First 100 periods,	3.74	10	
Second 100 periods,	4.67	13		Second 100 periods,	4.35	10	
Third " "	4.86	11		Third " "	4.58	6	
Fourth " "	4.55	10		Fourth " "	3.43	13	
Fifth " "	4.49	7		Rem'ng 73 "	3.79	10	
Average 500 periods,	4.68	11		Average 473 periods,	3.98	10	

THE DECREASE OF PREDICATION.

HOOKER.

(Ecclesiastical Polity.)

	Av. Predi- cations.	Per ct. Simp. Sents.
First 100 periods,	4.36	13
Second 100 periods,	4.11	11
Third " "	4.41	8
Fourth " "	4.03	10
Fifth " "	3.58	7
Average 500 periods,	4.12	12

BACON.

(Essays.)

	Av. Predi- cations.	Per ct. Simp. Sents.
First 100 periods,	3.15	21
Second 100 periods,	2.91	21
Third " "	3.02	16
Fourth " "	3.27	22
Fifth " "	3.26	15
Average 500 periods,	3.12	19

BARROW.

(Sermons on Evil Speaking.)

First 100 periods,	3.93	12
Second 100 periods,	3.62	13
Third " "	3.56	14
Fourth " "	3.72	18
Fifth " "	3.84	16
Average 500 periods,	3.73	15

BUNYAN.

(Holy War.)

First 100 periods,	3.61	12
Second 100 periods,	3.69	1
Third " "	3.89	12
Fourth " "	4.10	7
Fifth " "	4.25	11
Average 500 periods,	3.94	10

ADDISON.

(Spectator.)

First 100 periods,	3.86	10
Second 100 periods,	3.95	5
Third " "	3.76	11
Fourth " "	3.49	16
Fifth " "	3.30	16
Average 500 periods,	3.67	12

BOLINGBROKE.

(Study of History.)

First 100 periods,	3.32	14
Second 100 periods,	4.01	12
Third " "	3.82	9
Fourth " "	3.75	15
Fifth " "	3.71	16
Average 500 periods,	3.72	13

SHAFTESBURY.

(Freedom of Wit and Humor.)

First 100 periods,	2.46	29
Second 100 periods,	2.53	25
Third " "	2.94	26
Fourth " "	2.58	27
Fifth " "	2.48	30
Average 500 periods,	2.60	27

DE QUINCEY.

(Opium-Eater.)

First 100 periods,	3.61	10
Second 100 periods,	3.70	19
Third " "	3.38	15
Fourth " "	4.31	7
Fifth " "	3.45	21
Average 500 periods,	3.69	14

MACAULAY.
(*Essay on History.*)

	Av. Predi- cations.	Per ct. Simp. Sents.
First 100 periods,	2.06	40
Second 100 periods,	2.23	40
Third " "	2.38	33
Fourth " "	2.20	35
Fifth " "	1.88	46
Average 500 periods,	2.15	39

NEWMAN.
(*Apologia.*)

First 100 periods,	3.44	13
Second 100 periods,	2.94	15
Third " "	3.01	20
Fourth " "	2.64	21
Fifth " "	2.80	13
Average 500 periods,	2.96	16

LOWELL.
(*Lessing.*)

First 100 periods,	2.84	21
Second 100 periods,	2.29	30
Third " "	2.54	14
Fourth " "	2.54	22
Fifth " "	2.40	29
Average 500 periods,	2.52	23

EVERETT.
(*Poetry, Comedy, and Duty.*)

First 100 periods,	2.94	22
Second 100 periods,	2.21	39
Third " "	2.07	40
Fourth " "	2.41	28
Fifth " "	2.31	33
Average 500 periods,	2.39	32

CHANNING.
(*Self-Culture.*)

	Av. Predi- cations.	Per ct. Simp. Sents.
First 100 periods,	2.59	28
Second 100 periods,	2.60	30
Third " "	2.55	26
Fourth " "	2.54	37
Fifth " "	2.55	35
Average 500 periods,	2.56	31

EMERSON.
(*History; Friendship.*)

First 100 periods,	2.45	37
Second 100 periods,	2.19	35
Third " "	2.36	40
First " "	2.17	37
Second " "	2.13	36
Average 500 periods,	2.26	37

GRANT.
(*Memoirs.*)

First 100 periods,	2.30	36
Second 100 periods,	2.40	33
Third " "	2.30	35
Fourth " "	2.44	25
Fifth " "	2.38	28
Average 500 periods,	2.36	31

BARTOL.
(*Radical Problems: Genius, etc.*)

First 100 periods,	2.04	54
Second 100 periods,	1.97	43
Third " "	2.08	38
Fourth " "	2.02	42
Rem'ing 62 "	1.89	48
Average 462 periods,	2.00	45

The above authors, it is believed, furnish sufficient illustration of the course and degree of sentential simplification down to the present generation. The student will extend the exhibit at pleasure. Other writers might be instanced who, on account of special modes of punctuation, register higher per cent of predication than is here given, and Ossian, which is not prose, will show a lower. But it is better to reserve inorganic aspects for later study. The student on investigation will easily prove to himself that the common average in the best writers of the day is practically little over two per sentence, and the per cent of simple sentences not much less than thirty-three and one-third. He will, moreover, discover that the principle which has hitherto led English writers to curb their hand and reduce their styles is still at work. It will not be difficult to find reputable literature, at least of the highest magazine grade, registering as low as 1.60 predications per period, and as high as sixty per cent of simple sentences. The average of Channing or Macaulay or Bartol would fall as low, were it not for the long sentences which they somewhat frequently allow. The reasons for this, as well as why Ascham and Bacon wrote so far ahead of their times, and some others of later date so far behind, will appear in a later chapter.

CHAPTER XXI.

CO-ORDINATION OF CLAUSES.

If we observe the speech of intelligent children just able to talk in connected narration, we shall find almost every item affirmed by itself on the same basis as every other. There is no articulation or subordination of statements. All verbs essentially are principal, and connected by 'ands.' There is no real division into sentences. The stop in each case is determined by no sentence-sense, and hardly amounts to more than a pause for breath.

It has been pointed out that there is a close parallelism between the development of the child-mind in the individual and the mind of the race. Each man in the earlier part of his isolated life is occupied to a greater or less extent in doing what the race to which he belongs has done in the development of its civilization. He is in a sense the epitome of his age and its attainments. While now inquiring into the nature and history of normal sentences we bethink ourselves of this fact, and wonder whether the earliest prose authors wrote in such inarticulate wise as children speak. The first volume available for examination is Sir John Mandeville's *Voyages and Travels*. Here in the opening sentence of the Prologue we count seven 'and'-clauses in thirty-five predications. In the first chapter there are fifty-eight finite verbs and verb phrases, of which twenty-five are preceded by 'ands'; also of these, twelve introduce their quasi-sentences. Of the forty-seven sentences in the second chapter, thirty-three are introduced by *and*. Chapter VII. begins with the following paragraph:—

After for to speke of Jerusalem, the Holy Cytee, yee schulle undirstonde, that it stont fulle faire betwene Hilles: and there ben no Ryveres ne Welles; but Watre cometh be Condyte from Ebron. And yee schulle undirstonde, that Jerusalem of olde tyme, unto the tyme of Melchisedeche, was cleped Jebus; and afre it was clept Salem, unto the tyme of Kyng David, that putte theise 2 Names to gidere, and cleped it Jebusalem; and afre that Kyng Salomon cleped it Jerosolomye: and afre that, Men cleped it Jerusalem; and so it is cleped yit. And aboute Jerusalem is the Kyngdom of Surrye: and there besyde is the Lond of Palestyne: and besyde it is Ascolone: and besyde that is the Lond of Maritaine.

This is not the maximum of co-ordination, though something very near it. Whenever each new period is introduced by *and*, or *or*, or *but*, and every clause essentially after the first in each sentence is joined to the preceding by one of such connectives, there will be evidently as many co-ordinate conjunctions as predicates. Such form is found consistently in early remains, as the Anglo-Saxon *Chronicle*. The following is a specimen from one of the latest entries, under date of A.D. 1137:—

In all this wicked time kept Abbot Martin his abbacy xx. winters and a half-year and viii. days with much exertion and provided for the monks and the guests all that was necessary for them, and maintained much charity in the house, and nevertheless wrought upon the church and assigned thereto lands and revenues and endowed it bountifully, and had it roofed, and brought them into the new minster on St. Peter's day with much honor,— that was *Anno ab Incarnatione Domini MCXL., a combustione loci xxiii.* And he went to Rome, and was there well received by Pope Eugenius and there obtained privileges,— one of all the lands of the abbacy, and another of the lands that belong to the sacristan's office, and if he might live longer he meant to do the same concerning the office of treasurer. And he made acquisition in lands that rich men held by force: of Willelm Malduit who held Rockingham castle he won Cotingham and Easton, and of Hugo of Walterville he won Irlingborough and Stanwick and LX. *sol.* of Oldwinkle per year. And he made many monks and planted vineyards and executed many works and rendered the town better than it was before, and was a good monk and a good man, and for that reason God and good men loved him.

There is evidently no organic reason why the interior periods should have been placed by the editors just where we find them.

There might just as well have been less, or more. Practically, however, we need no more extreme specimen of this manner as a basis of comparison than the example from Hakluyt's *Voyages* in the preceding chapter. In the paragraph from which that extract was taken there are one hundred and eighteen predications in twenty-one periods, connected within and without by forty-two co-ordinate conjunctions. Of subordinating connectives there are but twenty-six. Whenever, therefore, in a given composition the co-ordinate conjunctions amount to as many as one-third of all the predicates, and considerably outnumber the subordinating connectives, we may regard the clause-structure as co-ordinate. Clauses introduced by relative pronouns may, for the present, be disregarded. Of course if the number of 'ands' and other co-ordinatives exceeds or approximately equals half the number of predications, the co-ordinate character of the style will by that fact be sufficiently established.

Here, then, in the grouping together, without correlation, of distinct clauses representing concomitant or successive facts, we recognize the first step in sentence evolution. The first stage will accordingly be determined by the preponderance or prevalence of clause co-ordination. But the student must not suppose that the writers of English prose will rank in sentential structure where they fall chronologically. Each author indeed, as in poetry, goes through his preliminary stages in some fashion, but may stop far short of the highest development. The primal instinct of grouping predicates without respect to their relations can evidently be traced in the fondness of various writers for initial conjunctions not at all required by the sense. Even as careful a writer as Ascham begins sixty-one out of the three hundred and twenty-nine paragraphs of his *Schoolmaster* with *ands*, as well as numerous single sentences, — averaging more than twenty to the hundred throughout its 1093 periods, — without apparent reason. Though Ascham should be well beyond the co-ordinate stage, he exhibits only twenty-five normal sentences to the hundred, while forty-five of the remainder on an average are inorganic on account of a

loose, unarticulated structure. Often, until past Bunyan, and even Goldsmith, the absence of a reasonable punctuation will afflict the student. But he will soon discover that this is but incident to an incompletely evolved sentence-sense, whether in author, editor, or printer. Formless and unmanageable sentences cannot be redeemed by punctuation points, but, like the fossils of some order of extinct monsters, must stand as monuments of their era. The reader, finally, will note that this elementary mode of sentence-structure is by no means obsolete in literature or necessarily always crude and ineffective. The sublimity of certain parts of the Old Testament, pre-eminently the opening verses of Genesis, is largely due to the simple, balanced succession of the clauses. Homer's delightful garrulousness is not wholly of the matter, but much in the childlike manner, of his periods. The *Mabinogion* and William Morris' *Story of the Glittering Plain* owe at least half their charm to the quaint, oldtime associations of their co-ordinate style.

CHAPTER XXII.

SUBORDINATION OF CLAUSES.

AFTER children of the age considered in the last chapter have had four or five years of observation and practice in the ways of speech, they will begin to differentiate their statements according to the importance of the facts narrated or described. They talked at first in a strain fully as naive as this: 'We went to the Park, and it was night, and the moon was up, and we were afraid.' They will now say instead: 'We went to the Park when it was night; and, though the moon was up, we were afraid.' The mind here discerns in a logical way that the significant facts are, going to the Park when deserted in the night-time, and the experience thus occasioned to the speaker.

Apparently the first contact of the child-mind with its environment produces isolated impressions which, when responded to in speech, occasion ejaculatory utterances only. Later, when one's environment has impressed itself upon consciousness as a congeries of related elements, the mind essays in a *Dame Quickly* fashion to reproduce and realize to itself, after something like a natural order, the facts perceived. But with better developed powers of comparison, and through the example of mature speakers, it begins to discriminate between direct and indirect occasions, or first and second circumstances, and will endeavor to reproduce such distinctions in its speech.

Of course the earliest writers of English prose were not minds of the childish order. They were among the first men of their times, and spoke in sentences relatively as idiomatic and logical

as we do now. But, a fact to be fully considered later, there is a strange tendency in the first compositions of prose to go back to naïve and rudimental forms. In fact, very few of us in these days write as idiomatically and naturally as we speak. Our first school essays were far behind our attainments and facility in oral speech of the same stage. Men of polished business address and fertile in all forms and expedients of good fellowship in presence, cast their correspondence stiffly year after year in the stock-inherited phrases of their inferiors, in default of better invention. Among the thousands of brilliant conversers only some scores of men and women throughout the country discourse as charmingly with the pen as with the voice. Hence is it small wonder that the earliest prose monuments of English were so far beneath the culture of the times. Chaucer and Spenser wrote verse as good in structural clearness as the moderns,¹ while their prose is practically unreadable.

We may accordingly expect that subordinating conjunctions will abound in prose of the stage next after that considered in the last chapter. Children doubtless first apprehend the relation of cause and effect most clearly, for their early speech fairly bristles with *because*s. But cultivated men and women use — at least in oral speech — few illative conjunctions, comparatively few indeed of any kind. Hence it is interesting to find that Spenser's *View* in 500 periods shows 400 illative out of 550 subordinate conjunctions; while Bartol on the other hand, in the same number of sentences, only five from 90, or including co-ordinatives, from a total of 160. But in Spenser the co-ordinating conjunctions connecting sentences or clauses average one per period. Hooker is more ratiocinative, of course, than either of these writers, and

¹ Chaucer indeed better; see p. 291. Spenser's poetic sentences are nearly twice as heavy as Chaucer's, yet always organic and natural. The average of predication in the first 500 periods of the *Canterbury Tales* is 2.93, and of simple sentences, 23.6 (cf. results from the *Tale of Melibæus*, p. 265). The predication average in the first 500 periods of the *Færie Queene* is 4.93; per cent of simple sentences, 6.

his illatives considerably exceed theirs, though he falls behind in the general average. For the time and space relations we turn naturally to a work like White's *Selbourne*, in which the temporal conjunctions amount to twice the illative.

It is therefore a simple process to discover a subordinating style. We have but to examine the conjunction list of the given author. If the inferior conjunctions connecting clauses — that is, finite verbs fully expressed — preponderate, there can be no question how to characterize his mode. Applying the test, we shall be at once surprised what differences will be revealed even among the most polished authors of the present generation, some of whom have clearly lingered in the subordinating stage. On the other hand, we shall find writers like Emerson and Holmes and Bartol, who, though they may have relatively more subordinating than co-ordinating conjunctions, have yet passed all conjunctive stages. Such styles, however, we must leave aside for later consideration.

CHAPTER XXIII.

SUPPRESSION OF CLAUSES.

THE next step after co-ordination in the linguistic development of the child-mind is, therefore, unconsciously to discriminate between notions. It no longer says naively, 'I went home, and I saw my papa, and I saw my mamma, and I was very glad to see my papa,' etc., but, 'When' or 'after I went home, I did thus and thus.' In other words, the mind of the child separates the modifying from the modified ideas, and so holds the latter up to greater eminence. The principle everywhere is *economy and intensification of energy*. The instrument of speech is becoming more prehensile and effective. When the modifying and modified clauses are presented in mass, all on the same basis, the mind of the listener must not only receive and interpret these as literal declarations of fact, but also infer which are principal and which subordinate. This makes the business of hearing much more difficult than is fair to the hearer. It is the concern of the speaker to grade his notions before he sets them forth. This is done instinctively very early in the evolution of a child's powers of conversation. It is done much more slowly and self-consciously in the evolution of a child's ability to write or of a nation's; but the process is the same.

Subordination as a principle of speech manifests itself in various forms and stages. The next step in its operation with conjunctions reveals a new phase of the process, to which we can hardly give a better name than Suppression of Predication. There are no leaps or breaks anywhere in the continuity of change. The

child and the race alike join their first clauses with *ands* and *buts* really because they are not aware of better means. Later additions to this list of conjunctions can be devised or appreciated only when they are needed. So we see the *fors* and the *wherefores*, the *whens* and the *thoughts*, slowly coming into use as the mind point by point discriminates to itself and to its listener the relation of cause and effect, of concession, of condition, and of time and space ; till it finally takes the step of using some or many of these conjunctions without predicate at all. If we note the conversation of men dexterous with language, or the style of writers not too formal and self-conscious, we shall observe many expressions like 'when a boy,' or 'if in London,' or 'because of the failure,' etc. Each of these stands for what would have been expressed in the stage just before by complete clauses ; as, 'when I was a boy,' 'if I am or shall be in London,' 'because A or B failed,' and in a stage yet earlier by propositions joined by co-ordinate connectives. We have doubtless already noticed the absence of verbs after conjunctions in Hooker and Spenser and even Hakluyt, and this sends us at once back to those authors to trace the growth of the mode. Mandeville, we find, as we might have guessed, consistently writes out secondary and subordinate clauses in full, as thus : —

That Cytee of Alizandre is wel 30 Furlonges in lengthe: but *it is* but 10 on largenesse. And it is a full noble Cytee and a fayr.

And wytethe wel, that the Notemuge berethe the Maces. For righte as the Note of the Haselle hathe an Husk withouten, that the Note is closed in, til *it be* ripe, and afre fallethe out; righte so *it is* of the Notemuge and of the Maces.

Or put a Drope of Bawme in clere Watre, in a Cuppe of Sylver or in a clere Bacyn, and stere it wel with the clere Watre; and if that the Bawme be fyn and of his owne kynde, the Watre schalle nevere trouble: And if the Bawme be sophisticate, that is to sayne countrefeted, the Watre schalle become anon trouble: And also if the Bawme be fyn, it schalle falle to the botme of the Vesselle, as thoughe *it were* Quyksylver: For the fyn Bawme is more hevvy twyes, than *is the* Bawme *that is* sophisticate and countrefeted.

Of course we are not to infer that Mandeville *talked* like that. He simply did not feel warranted in writing with less formality. Hakluyt, whom we examine next, shows in a few instances like the following how the practice of implying predicates begins: —

The next morning we departed from thence with our two Spaniards and Indian guard *as* [has been] *aforesaid*.

Here we were met by a great number of Spaniards on horseback, which came from Mexico to see us, both gentlemen and men of occupations, and they came *as people* [come] to see a wonder.

We were also oftentimes greatly annoyed with a kind of fly, which, in the Indian tongue, is called tequani; and the Spaniards call them muskitos. . . . You shall hardly see them, they be so small . . . and if you kill them while they are sucking they are so venomous that the place will swell extremely, even *as one* [swells] that is stung with a wasp or bee.

No other conjunction than ‘as’ is observed with ellipsis of the predicate, except ‘notwithstanding,’ in one instance: —

. . . but our General, *notwithstanding finding* himself to have now very near the number of 500 negroes, thought it best without longer abode to depart with them.

Omissions of the verb in repeated forms — as “the water whereof is somewhat brackish in taste, *but* [is] *very good*” — are of course too elementary to be noticed. On the other hand, cases of the predicate fully expressed with ‘as’ occur, and even in conjunction with ellipses: —

In which three months the soldiers of Tripolis killed the said king; and then the king’s son, according to the custom there, went to Constantinople, . . . and took with him our said purser Richard Burges, and James Smith, and also the other two Englishmen which he the king’s son had enforced to become Turks *as is aforesaid*.

The next morning we departed from thence on our journey towards Mexico, and so travelled till we came within two leagues of it, where there was built by the Spaniards a very fair church, called Our Lady Church, in which there is an image of Our Lady, of silver and gilt, being as high and large *as*

a tall woman, in which church, and before this image, there are as many lamps of silver *as there be days* in the year, which upon high days are all lighted.

It is then from beginnings as insignificant and feeble as this that the present system of clause-evasion in literary English has been built up. Perhaps few of us realize how complete and wonderful it is. Let us compare a few specimens from a modern point of the development. We quote from De Quincey :—

To intercept the evil whilst yet in elementary stages of formation, was the true policy; whereas I in my blindness sought only for some mitigation to the evil when already formed, and past all reach of interception.

Perilous is that crisis for the young. In its effect perfectly the same as the ignoble witchcraft of the poor African *Obeah*, this sublimer witchcraft of grief will, if left to follow its own natural course, terminate in the same catastrophe of death.

Now, to any man who is acquainted with commercial life, but, above all, with such life in England, it will readily occur that in an opulent English family of that class, — opulent, though not rich in a mercantile estimate, — the domestic economy is likely to be upon a scale of liberality altogether unknown amongst the corresponding orders in foreign nations. Whether as to the establishment of servants, or as to the provision made for the comfort of all its members, such a household not uncommonly eclipses the scale of living even amongst the poorer classes of our nobility, though the most splendid in Europe — a fact which, since the period of my infancy, I have had many personal opportunities for verifying both in England and in Ireland.

These examples, as will be noted, are in the main of the same sort as those observed in Hakluyt. The condensation consists not so much in omitting, as — by aid of proper conjunctions — in implying, predication. This suppression of verbs through making conjunctions do duty for whole clauses is, therefore, analogous to the abbreviation of complete parallels in poetry. The mind in each case learns how to do its work with less assistance and greater concentration. It essays to withdraw from prominence whatever is not of first importance, so that what is eminent in the consciousness of the speaker may become at once eminent in the

consciousness of the hearer. Except in the most studied and formal discourse, men incline always to disburdened and contracted phrases, not only to save effort, but the better to keep pace with the thought within. They do not, save from some abnormal motive, prefer a labored to a simple style, or write a longer for a shorter sentence. Fine writing is distasteful even to the literary elect of this busy generation ; and elegance, so far as not consistent with both clearness and energy, must give place to either. The suppression of clauses and economy of predication, we cannot doubt, are further manifestations of the same instinct which, as we have seen, has relieved the English sentence of half its weight since Shakespeare's times, and is now interposing its veto against a higher average than two predicates per sentence.

Yet more remarkable condensation than is above illustrated, we shall soon see, has been brought about through the use of verbal nouns and participial or appositional devices. For the present we must confine ourselves to further inquiry into the history of conjunctive clause-suppression. Let the student trace the mode from Chaucer down ; search out extended examples in De Quincey ; and find, if possible, some superior among living names.

CHAPTER XXIV.

UNITS OF THOUGHT, AND OF EXPRESSION OF THOUGHT.

WE have seen how, in poetry, as the mind expands, analogies become significant in more and more highly condensed presentations, until comprehensible without the development of parallels, virtually upon mention. Likewise in prose-thinking, through progressive enlargement of the understanding, and reduction of symbols, the mind is enabled to carry on processes of greater and greater complexity and weight. The unit of comprehension may be thus enlarged to indeterminate limits.

Herein, of course, we read a principal difference between the philosophic and the ordinary mind. There can be no question that Newton and Locke and Humboldt reach their conclusions by longer strides, and dip from the springs of thought in vessels of larger measure, than the majority of their fellows. But this fact alone will not account for the heaviness of a style like Hooker's. Bacon was a contemporary thinker surely not less profound, though the *Essays* can be read by anybody. Emerson was as philosophical as Sir William Hamilton, but the plain people of his parishes understood him. The French metaphysicians are as easy to read as the historians and many of the novelists of that literature. However large the unit of their discernment, they grade the unit of presentation to the capacity of the reader, like a mother talking to her child. Indeed the philosophers, from Socrates down, in ordinary discourse, have used simple language. They do not put each large division of their meaning into a single period, but often make many sentences of a single thought. May

not, then, the difficulty in reading certain styles be due to some perversion in the unit of presentation?

The course of development in the child-mind again furnishes us a guiding hint. It begins with the cognition of single objects, as dog, or horse, or engine, which it considers a triumph of intelligence to point out to its superiors, and brokenly to name. In the next stage it perceives attitudes, or acts, some of which, like 'dog jumps,' 'horse snorts,' 'engine puffs,' as its uttermost of thought and speech, it will affirm to others. Thus, as its discernment of facts and their relations grows more and more complete, its sentences become more weighty and complex, until at maturity its speech, answering to the fulness of its comprehension, will be phrased after the flexible, articulate fashion of its kinsfolk and associates. And it will probably not be easy to discover wherein the forms of conversation employed by this new member of society differ from those in use about him. He will doubtless have certain expressions of his own; but unless he is 'queer,' or deficient in intelligence or culture, his peculiarities will probably escape ordinary notice. The sentences he exchanges with his fellows we shall note are seldom involved, sometimes curt, often at least significant for point and brevity. If he receive a literary education, we shall find his conversation but little altered. He will speak in sentences not much heavier or more complex. His vocabulary will be larger, but the idioms and forms, unless his head is turned absurdly, will remain, not those of books, but of living men. On the whole, he will probably speak with greater simplicity and clearness than before, yet with little to distinguish him from other right users of the same language, whether in his own community or throughout the English-speaking world.


Very different, however, is it when this man essays speech with the pen. As a schoolboy, and indeed at maturity, his written deliverances will be in the main unrecognizable by any characteristic of his oral style. If he achieve high culture, we shall find his literary sentences, though growing perhaps year by year less stilted and formal, still every way more involved and heavy than


his spoken. If he should commit to memory the letters he writes, and, instead of mailing, communicate their contents in person, he would be held from his manner of speech to have lost his mind. Yet his written English is neither better nor worse than most men's, nor more unlike their ordinary conversation than their own. But if he chance to be a man of affairs, and long accustomed not to write but to dictate his correspondence, we shall find at last substantial identity between the spoken and the written periods. The letters dictated will perhaps be recognized as his by those acquainted with his real manner. They will echo certain personal turns of phrase, but shun every sort of formalism, as well as all manner of approach or semblance to fine writing. They will not be colloquial, nor what is called conversational strictly, but easy, natural, and strong. They may sometimes exhibit a regrettably ambitious or bookish word, but such strange remainders or reminders of the self-conscious 'epistolary' manner will seem all the more remarkable from their isolation. Moreover, if we compare the dictated manuscripts or correspondence of a large number of persons, we shall find no great general dissimilarity, but productions of liberally educated or of minds of ordinary culture will have as little of difference and as much in common as the men themselves in their oral use of the mother-tongue.

In view of facts like these, there is little need of demonstrating formally that we all essentially write in a different language from what we speak. Most of us are probably conscious this is the truth; perhaps some have at times regretted that we cannot speak more nearly as we write. Whether this or the converse of it is the proper feeling, we shall perhaps be better persuaded later. At any rate, we have now a principle on which we can proceed with our comparison of styles. We are already well advised that the standard prose authors of the present generation do not resemble each other in their writings as their speech. Their sentences are cast in different proportions of complexity and heaviness, exhibit varying degrees of idiomatic ease and cleverness, as well as of intelligibility and point and force when read aloud. In similar wise,

Hooker differs greatly from Bacon, and De Quincey from Channing or Macaulay. The one seems to think aloud, to set forth his premises and conclusions essentially in the shape in which they pass before his mind in first cognition; the other manifestly re-thinks and re-shapes his thought to suit the convenience of his reader,—almost exactly as if speaking to him face to face. In other words, Hooker and De Quincey cast their discourse prevailing in the sentence-proportions of their thought; Macaulay and Channing reduce the unit to the oral scale. Macaulay, as we know, wrote at least his *History* with the deliberate and conscious purpose of being immediately intelligible to the humblest reader.

What, then, is the language of Hooker but the language of the closet and of books? What is the style of Bacon, or Macaulay, or Emerson, but in large degree the style of the ordinary intercourse of men? A single act may or may not signify with respect to character, but the sum of a man's deeds for a day or a week must unequivocally declare his ideals and other springs of action. Hence it is suggested that we find the sentences of maximum frequency for each of the styles in question. These for the first book of Hooker are twenty-three and twenty-eight words, but of Macaulay's *History* essay, fourteen,—as the accompanying curves respectively will show. The lower figures indicate the number of words in sentences; those at the side, of occurrences.






Furthermore, out of the 722 periods of Macaulay's *Essay on History*, 457 fall under the numerical average of twenty-three words per sentence. Of the remainder, there are 105 of more than thirty-five words each, 42 of more than fifty, 9 of over seventy-five, and 1 containing more than a hundred words. Of the 725 periods in the first book of the *Polity*, there are 442 under the sentence-average, 119 have more than sixty, 76 more than seventy-five, 37 more than one hundred, 8 more than one hundred and fifty, and two — of 210 and 268 respectively — more than two hundred words. Macaulay's commonest sentence-lengths of eleven, thirteen, fourteen, and fifteen words are demonstrably very close to the usual oral mode; but certainly neither Hooker nor any man of his times — except, perhaps, pedants and the euphuists — ever used thirty-seven, or twenty-eight, or even twenty-three, words in their spoken sentences of chief frequency.

The difference between the modes of oral and of written speech is apparently not difficult to explain. All men, from the complete individuality of their minds, use severally a distinct dialect of their mother-speech, though to detect personal differences of pronunciation, and intension of terms, requires minute observation. The centrifugal effects which come from individuality are offset in oral

speech by the desire to be immediately and completely intelligible, and to avoid all appearance of eccentricity. While the speaker looks without, and concerns himself with the impression made upon his hearer, the writer is shut up in his closet with his thought. Isolated from the compelling and inspiring presence of listeners, he may yield himself to various habits and tendencies peculiar to himself, of none of which, perhaps, he is aware at all: in short, he humors himself, and not his reader. Furthermore, he may take his time, — must, indeed, in the very nature of things, take more or less of it. For it is the defect of our civilization that we have not learned how to execute the chirographic part of writing much faster than the men of two thousand years ago, though the age abounds in miracles of time-saving. Thus it requires two minds to put down in legible shape with the speed of speech the thoughts of one. The mind can be trained to do its best with agility, but, permitted to brood over its task, is easily betrayed into introspection, self-consciousness, and finical revision. For the writer of these days has very likely imbibed the notion that there is something more to be done than to express his meaning plainly, completely, and strongly, and that this romantic something he is in a fair way by some vague stroke of fortune to achieve. Then what is written may be permanent, but spoken words are winged, and pass quickly away forever. So the writer is not so much concerned how to avoid seeming eccentric, as to appear distinguished. When literature is looked upon as a perverse and mysterious accomplishment, the man who fancies he detects some sign or promise of it in himself will become demoralized. He will consent to venture, on the chance of elegance, certain foolish and probably very feeble mannerisms. He will avoid so far as possible the associations and forms of living speech. He is anxious that his meaning should seem large, — would scarcely expostulate if it were taken at more than he intended, — so very easily swells his periods even past the unit of their sense, and thus, perhaps, doubly beyond what in less formal discourse he would think of using.

Moreover, in the times of Hooker there were reasons even stronger for the use of long sentences, or of the unit of thought as the unit of presentation, than now obtain. He wrote for educated readers, not for the people. It was the heyday of the new learning in England. Men of culture thought little of English, deemed it an ephemeral language, and cast their works as far as practicable in Latin. There was no necessity to be instantly and completely intelligible. Though there were intellectual giants in those days, it is not clear that Hooker was easy reading even to the little public that he addressed. Though it is much more convenient to put integral thoughts in single sentences, such form manifestly handicaps every reader to whom the thoughts are new. What I may have in my mind cannot be transferred bodily to another's. I can only use a series of signs from which the reader reconstructs the fabric I have builded in my brain. But before he can put together a thought identical with my own, I must evidently take mine to pieces, and signify to him each part, and how it must go into place. Thus, while the attainment of the meaning to be expressed is a synthetic process, the first step in the act of expression is clearly analytic. Here are, then, two impulses, one of which should prompt the author to reduce his meaning to simple sentences; the other will influence him to keep his periods open until the last clause or element of the respective thoughts has been expressed. Thus we are prepared to consider another phase in the styles of the authors we are trying to compare. For, while Hooker shows relatively few periods immediately intelligible on oral reading, Macaulay has a considerable number that address the eye to much better purpose than the ear. Some of his sentences almost rival Hooker's longest, while Hooker, as we know, writes some as simple as Macaulay's. Yet in spite of the fact that something like three-fifths of Macaulay's periods are under twenty words, the long sentences found in every hundred so counterbalance them that his sentence-average of twenty-three is a constant equilibrium. The following scheme of the first hundred periods of the *Essay on History* will illustrate: —



Here, then, are two forces working counter to each other, — what but the same of which we know? The one is unmistakably centripetal, tending to reduce the sentence to oral proportions; the other centrifugal, answering to the long book-periods of every literature. The evidence seems to indicate the operation of some kind of sentence-sense, some conception or ideal of form which, if it could have its will, would reduce all sentences to procrustean regularity. It is evidently this sentence-sense which chooses the oral structure, permits the few long sentences we have just noted, but excludes the scores of such observed in Hooker. The same principle seems also adequate to explain the strange persistence of sentence-averages under unlike conditions. In some chapters, for instance, of the *History* — which is more uneven than the *Essays*, being written with less ‘curious care’ — long sentences abound. But in spite of the greater centrifugal force the style keeps to its orbit. Again, after the dialogue passages, of which there are many in different portions of the work, by a sort of reaction full-rounded literary periods follow closely, restoring the average thus temporarily reduced.¹ The same is true, though generally in a degree less marked, of all modern styles. The manner in which the sentence-sense combats the synthetic impulse is also apparent in the fact that when Macaulay, or Channing, Newman, Ruskin, Emerson, and the rest, consent to a long period it is apt to be very long indeed. There are very few sentences of strictly average proportions. It would seem, therefore, that it is only when

¹ Compare these averages of consecutive hundreds from near the middle of the *History*. Ordinarily five hundred, or even three hundred, periods will reveal the rhythm.

23.74	23.87	21.02	19.20	21.55	19.46
26.08	21.11	19.78	26.78	25.36	24.44
21.64	22.13	22.82	28.60	21.14	22.52
22.12	19.33	23.52	26.95	17.93	22.78
22.61	24.00	24.88	23.90	23.29	21.20
22.54	21.00	27.13	24.70	19.66	21.05
23.97	27.48	22.87	25.68	28.04	26.06
23.25	22.70	23.14	25.11	22.42	22.50

a thought is so peculiarly complex or integral as to offer no ready division or easy rendition by instalments, that the mind attempts to grapple with it as a whole.

The literary sentence-sense seems to mean, 'Put in a single sentence only what the mind of the reader, or of the writer, re-thinking his meaning as his reader's proxy, will easily present to itself in a single view. When a thought is reached which refuses natural analysis, construct each clause on the same plan.' As we have seen, before the articulation of meaning all predications were in the nature of independent periods. Hence the clause has always been the natural unit of presentation. But the synthetic principle amounts to an impulse to develop the whole meaning potentially in the mind within the limits of a single sentence. Thus Chaucer, at the opening of the *Prologue*, wishing to express the idea that it was the return of spring that sent palmers and pilgrims forth upon their journeyings, brings all the different facts leading up or accessory to the final proposition into one period (quoted on p. 60) of eighteen lines. So Spenser in the opening stanzas of the *Faerie Queene* does not set forth single facts concerning the Red Cross Knight or Una in single periods, but would fain give not only plight but pedigree in one sentence of introduction. This, in accordance with what has been said above, is clearly because the whole character as well as history are at once potentially before the poet's mind pressing to be told; and, we may add, because there is yet no sentence-sense requiring him to modulate his strains to the maximum convenience of his reader. Compare stanza v. : —

So pure and innocent, as that same lambe,
She was in life and every vertuous lore;
And by descent of Royall lynage came
Of ancient Kinges and Queenes, that had of yore
Their scepters stretcht from East to Western shore,
And all the world in their subjection held;
Till that infernal feend with foule uprore
Forwasted all their land, and them expeld;
Whom to avenge she had this Knight from far compeld.

On the other hand, the dwarf has in Spenser's thought no traditions and no character save laziness, and is accordingly cut off with two predications, — the lightest sentence so far in the poem : —

Behind her farre away a Dwarfe did lag,
That lasie seemd, in being ever last,
Or wearied with bearing of her bag
Of needments at his backe.

But a poet writing in the style of Macaulay would have kept the integrity of the narrative equally unimpaired, yet presented Una and the Red Cross Knight in periods of the same kind. The unit of Macaulay's presentation is the proposition, answering to the single fact or judgment in the mind. In Spenser's synthetic style the unit is the integral meaning to be expressed, or what in prose like Macaulay's might constitute a paragraph.¹

Thus we may account for the confusion between the paragraph and period in our early authors. Even so painstaking a writer as Ascham, admits in *The Schoolmaster* 148 false paragraphs out of 329 total, and in at least 55 cases wrongly treats the period and the paragraph as one. Of course, the blame may not be Ascham's; but must, in any case, be charged to a rudimentary or unawakened sentence-sense. It will now doubtless be clear that we have been doing nothing but tracing the development of this sentence-sense since we began study in the prose. We have found a heavy book-sentence which came in with learning and the universities, and a light conversational manner which has appeared in conjunction with the Romantic or people's era in poetry. Moreover, there is practically no disputing as to which is better. Each of us uses both, probably cannot write a single letter without encountering

¹ Chaucer's poetic sentence-style, in spite of occasional long periods like the first of the *Prologue*, is not synthetic, but almost the counterpart of what Macaulay has reached in prose. His real average of words per sentence is under twenty-three, of predications perhaps two and a half, and per cent of simple sentences hardly less than thirty. (See Chapter XXXI.) Hence we see he has the book and the oral manner in almost modern proportion. His prose, on the contrary, as already shown, is wholly unoral and rudimentary.

ideas that do not seem to admit of analysis but must be set forth as wholes. The ideal style will have the colloquial unit of presentation, like the French, but a select diction, not stiff and not familiar, free from the associations both of pedants and of the vulgar.

With this clew in hand, it will not be difficult to go back and trace the growth of the popular style of modern prose. We find it in Mandeville in an almost childish strain, in Sir John Fortescue, and in Ascham. Yet each of these was in some strange way bewildered and overmastered by the consciousness of his task. Under the influence of the New Learning the English sentence was accommodated to the professional men of books, and grew, if not longer, certainly more ponderous and impracticable. As the units of thought increased, the units of expression increased also. Yet there were exceptions. Bacon, from the peculiarly analytical tendencies of his mind, shows a sentence-sense remarkable for his times, and by it anticipates the present century. The sentence-sense in literature is nothing but the sentence-sense of the common speech of men, and Bacon was great enough to divine the fact and write as he spoke. In the era of the town, when convictions died, and the small-talk of the gaming table fixed the pitch of thought, the sentence began to approach oral lightness and often simplicity. Yet though clauses became apprehensible, there was still no idea or instinct of an organic sentence. Dryden, famed as the first reputable prosaist, is almost as formless as Spenser.¹ Even Bunyan — unless the punctuation in his works

¹ Cf. the following from his *Essay on Dramatic Poesy*: "And that all this is practicable, I can produce for examples many of our English plays: as *The Maid's Tragedy*, *The Alchemist*, *The Silent Woman*: I was going to have named *The Fox*, but the unity of design seems not exactly observed in it; for there appear two actions in the play; the first naturally ending with the fourth act; the second forced from it in the fifth: which yet is the less to be condemned in him, because the disguise of Volpone, though it suited not with his character as a crafty or covetous person, agreed well enough with that of a voluptuary; and by it the poet gained the end at which he aimed, the punishment of vice, and the reward of virtue, both which that disguise produced." — *Prose Works*, Malone's edition, vol. I., part ii., p. 89.

is the printer's and not his own — fails of the highest excellence through wrong sentence proportions. Thus it was left for the same influences that rescued poetry from professionalism to redeem also the prose side of our literature. From the *Lyrical Ballads* to the present moment the language of books and the language of men have been growing rapidly alike.

CHAPTER XXV.

THE WEIGHT OF STYLES.

STYLES, as has been shown, are heavy in proportion to the number of clauses or predications they exhibit, as well as the number of words in their sentence-averages. It is evident, however, on a moment's reflection, that two authors showing the same length of sentence and the same number of finite verbs may be very unlike in weight: the one may bring before the mind twice or many more than twice as many notions as the other. It will then be necessary, after ascertaining the number of predications and simple sentences, to weigh the styles in some manner. This might be done by making an inventory of the respective ideas or notions introduced to thought. It may also be determined negatively by enumerating the number of relations or attributes left unaffirmed,—or, to use the language of grammars, 'assumed,' instead of 'predicated.' For present purposes, which are provisional merely, it will be sufficient to illustrate the latter method.

The simplest examples consist merely in the ellipsis of certain forms of the verb 'to be,' and implied subjects, with retention of conjunctions to mark the relation. Thus in the first sentence quoted on p. 279 from De Quincey a copulative 'was' is twice evaded. Chaucer, Spenser, and doubtless Dryden, would have cast it thus in completed predicates:—

To intercept the evil whilst it was yet in elementary stages of formation, was the true policy; whereas I in my blindness sought only for some mitigation to the evil when it was already formed, and past all reach of interception.

The mind of the well-appointed reader will derive all the sense-effect of the latter expanded presentation through the implied predicatives of the former, and will seem to itself to do it with less exertion. To the man inexpert with books De Quincey's sentence will be heavier as first quoted than in the form here given. The explanation lies in the fact that the energy of the soul cannot be measured in objective terms. Whatever it is disposed or can be stimulated to do in spontaneous, unconditioned activity, is easier than lighter matters essayed in conditioned ways through the operation of determinative energy or of 'the will.' Hence we must judge lightness so far as possible not by the objective proportions or weight of an idea, but by the subjective energy that the mind is through it incited to employ. When through familiarity with the symbols 'as' or 'when' or 'if' the mind at once attains the effect of the same in fully expanded clauses, yet is forced to lag through formal predications, its activity changes from spontaneous to determinative. The less intuitive or more obvious and formal the matter, the more determinative will be the act of reading. A proper employment of the sentence-sense in the author will have reduced complex notions to easily apprehensible elements or 'units,' and so subordinated or suppressed inferior predicates as to quicken and energize interpretation to the uttermost. But though the mind speeds faster and is incited to keener energy by the omission of such predicatives as it may subjectively supply, it is wholly evident that its action will be most intuitive and speedy, and its energy keenest, when both expressed and implied predicates are reduced to a minimum frequency per period. The speech of the speaker, the language of the writer, must flit from thought to thought according to the laws of association in his own mind, and in such organic sequence that the phantasy or imagination of the reader may pursue with no unequal speed. To make sentences that assist and accelerate such pursuit is of the highest art; but when so made they are found closely to correspond to the thought in the author's mind, and by their light unencumbered structure fairly to allure interpretation even with unprepossessed and indifferent readers.

But there are manifestly other ways by which the English sentence-sense has withdrawn from prominence all unimportant notions. Compare this further example from De Quincey : —

With a government capable of frauds like these, and a people (at least in the mandarin class) trained through centuries to a conformity of temper with their government, we shall find, in the event of any more extended intercourse with China, the greatest difficulty in maintaining the first equations of rank and privilege.

A hundred years before De Quincey the sentence-sense of prose English would have been content with this conglomerate of clauses : — ‘With a government which, as has been shown, is capable of frauds like these, and a people — at least so far as the mandarin class may be considered to represent them — that has been brought through centuries of training to conform their sentiments to the temper of their government, we shall find it a matter of the greatest difficulty, if it chance that we extend our intercourse with China, to maintain the first equations of rank and privilege.’

The second step after the use of ‘as,’ ‘when,’ ‘if,’ ‘though,’ ‘unless,’ and the like, with a noun, or adjective, or participle of the verb omitted in an appositional construction, was apparently to omit the conjunctive sign of the original relation. This, with the omission of the copula, covers essentially all instances of clause-saving in the present extract from De Quincey. It is, nevertheless, a powerful mode, and calls for no little culture in the reader. To comprehend a style which condenses clauses to phrases requires as much literary preparation as (p. 71) to read Keats. To estimate how much a style has been lightened by substituting nominatives absolute and appositive constructions for predicates, we have but to use all the relations affirmed or implied, taken together, as a basis or divisor, and the number of suppressed predicates as a dividend. We find accordingly in the passage quoted seventy-five per cent of clauses saved. Or we may illustrate with this simpler example from Geikie’s *Life and Words of Christ* : —

Thus the Korân, written in Arabia, is essentially an Eastern book, in great measure unintelligible and uninteresting to nations living in countries in any great degree different, in climate and modes of life, from Arabia itself.

Here are three omissions of the copula which, counted with "living" — for 'that live' — and the single expressed predicate, make 5 as the basis or divisor, while the dividend, or verbs avoided, is 4. The per cent of clauses saved is therefore 80. For extended passages of course the average will be greatly lowered. The following exhibit of per cents from Chaucer down will show the progress of the mode. We compute on the basis of 500 periods, or over, as before : —

Mandeville.003	Addison	3.09	Bacon	2 87
Chaucer.44	Bolingbroke	3.72	Emerson	3 01
Latimer.	2.78	Shaftesbury	4.02	C. C. Everett	3.31
Lyly	3.16	Dryden	4.88	Newman	4.50
Ascham.	4.31	Bunyan	5.96	Macaulay	5.17
Spenser	6.74	Goldsmith	6.35	Lowell	5.29
Hooker	7.77	Johnson	7.09	Channing	6.62
Sidney	9.27	De Quincey	7.25	Grant	8.93

The list seems to justify division thus into three groups. The first exhibits the beginnings and growth of clause-saving as far as the prose of Milton, Jeremy Taylor, and like stylists of unwieldy yet intelligible structure, represented here by Sir Philip Sidney.¹ As

¹ With these authors, considering their generation, the highest expression of formlessness in English prose is reached. Milton writes in periods as elephantine as Fabyan's, and seems on first comparison to have the instinct of sentence form even less developed. Taylor, if the periods which close his sentences are at all to be insisted on, goes even beyond the units of thought-presentation. With him semicolons mark the real divisions of meaning. Yet it will not do to make his semicolons periods, for he often, like Milton, reveals that he does not know his thought is finished. When an author is not ready to close a period, though his meaning is completed, his manner — much as the oral sentence sometimes finished, before the speaker is aware, with a wrong inflection — will betray him. A sentence is an organic thing, shaped and determined by the thought which prompts it, and there should be no more question as to where it begins or ends than what is its grammatical subject or predicate. It is a lack of sharpness in the sentence-

the sentence breaks in half and becomes practicable with Dryden and his followers, the aggregate of clause-saving is reduced with it, but rises as the structure becomes more organic and predication decreases. Finally, as the form shifts from synthetic to analytic, and simple sentences multiply, the average drops again, only to rise, on better interior articulation, as before.

Very remarkable are the results from Chaucer, which cover all his prose. In the last 286 periods of the *Persoun's Tale*, as well as in the fifth hundred from the beginning, not an instance of clause-saving by participles or appositives occurs. De Quincey shows the highest average for the second period, and for apparent reason. He represents the highest development of the synthetic manner, and is the dividing name between the eighteenth century stylists and the modern. It is especially interesting to study the means he can command to reduce the weight of his sentences, yet preserve their synthetic character. As we have seen, Bacon writes by anticipation in the analytic manner, and belongs in consequence in the latest column. Macaulay and Channing, from permitting still so many involved or synthetic periods, show per cents much higher than Emerson, who is almost colloquial in structural simplicity. As for consistency and range in clause-saving averages, the following from 5000 periods of Macaulay's *Essays* will illustrate : —

History, 722 periods . . .	4.40	Addison, 1331 periods . . .	4.61
Madame D'Arblay, 918 periods,	4.74	Atterbury, 240 " . . .	5.05

sense,—almost developed in his generation, that keeps Bunyan back from his true place in the scheme of development. This fact, as well as many other points in line with the above, becomes clear on a little inquiry into the use of the semicolon in eighteenth century and earlier prosaists.

Of course there are those who will take issue with me here, and insist that Milton, Jeremy Taylor, and even Hooker, are ideal stylists. While admiring these authors in a manner as much as anybody, I see not how more can be claimed for them, in respect to form, than I have done, except by denying there has ever been such a thing as development in the art of writing. The prose of Chaucer differs from Milton's only in degree, but not in kind.

Goldsmith, 263 periods . . . 3.83	Milton, 895 periods . . . 4.21
Bunyan, 245 " . . . 3.79	Machiavelli, 693 periods . . 7.42 ¹

But no just estimate can be made of the decrease in the heaviness of styles without taking note of further devices. The instinct to reduce clauses to phrases manifests itself most directly by the change of conjunctive meanings to prepositional, or the substitution of other prepositions therefor. Clauses like 'since I returned,' 'because I suspected,' 'unless I approve' are cut down to 'since return,' 'because of my suspicion,' 'without my approval.' Moreover, clauses may not only be reduced to phrases, but also variously condensed to single terms. The prepared mind is fond of contemplating actions without recognition of the actors. It finds a palpable gain in thinking 'coercion' rather than 'men coercing.' It saves energy by reducing agency to a mere status or relation. It needs but points, not superficialities of meaning. It was made clear in Chapter X. that the poet condenses the literal and the spiritual by making the latter stand for both. In Chapter XVII. was shown how the highest art makes feeling also potential of what is to be known. In like manner, though not for emotional ends, prose art takes the spiritual for the literal. Through familiarity with his subject-matter, the author, unless in an expatiatory mood, sets up points, both to himself and to his reader, potentially

¹ The *Machiavelli* Essay shows more remarkable results than any other composition of Macaulay yet examined. The per cent of simple sentences rises to 47.5, and of predication correspondingly falls to 1.83. Its nearest rival is the *Milton*; simple sentences 38, predication average, 2.07. To encounter higher averages of clause-saving we have but to turn to the poetry, of which a representative exhibit is here added:—

Thomson . . . 20.92	Chatterton . . . 12.67	Pope 5.59
Wordsworth . . 20.27	Spenser . . . 11.65	Donne 4.81
Coleridge . . . 18.24	Milton . . . 10.30	Arnold 4.53
Hood 13.68	Browning . . . 8.38	Shakespeare . 3.97
Keats 13.21	Dryden . . . 8.04	Chaucer . . . 2.54

Further evidence of Chaucer's and Spenser's oral manner would seem unnecessary, though stronger proof abounds. For this, as well as the difference in general between the above and the former results from prose, see Chapter XXXI.

equivalent to the whole expanse of meaning. As was earlier observed, he can by no means *convey* his thoughts. The reader must think them after him through signs; and that style which uses fewest and most nearly approaches the speed of common thinking is most business-like and best suited to this age. We no longer read for the sake of reading, or write for the sake of writing. We bring before the mind in a single view what the co-ordinator must spread over a succession of clauses. Men once might have written 'The garrison proposed a truce, and the enemy refused it, and the garrison was dismayed,' but 'Refusal of the proposed truce dismayed the garrison,' is the style, if not of polite letters, at least of busy minds.

The array of instances is endless. In addition to the very abundant employment of native verbals, we have perhaps more examples in formal English of the Latin *-ion*, *-ment*, and *-ure* derivatives. Further, the use of infinitive nouns with a subjective or objective genitive—Shakespeare's favorite expedient of condensation—or phrase with *of*, for verbs with subject or object, greatly assists the vigor and speed of style. Any modern with book-traditions will show examples. Compare this random passage from Geikie :—

At his first appearance, though still a young man, without the sanction of success, or the weight of position, or the countenance of the schools, Jesus bears himself, with calm unconsciousness of effort, as altogether superior to his visitor. A born Jew, he speaks as the Lawgiver of a new theocracy which he has come to found, in place of that of Moses, whom they almost worshipped. He lays down conditions of unbending strictness as indispensable to an entrance into the new community thus to be established, though he has nothing to offer but privation and self-denial as the earthly result of joining it. He moves at his ease amidst subjects the most august and mysterious: demands the personal homage of those who would enter his kingdom, and promises eternal life as the reward of sincere acceptance of his claims. Repudiating the aids to which others might have looked, seeking no support from the powerful, or from the crowd, to facilitate his design; he speaks of himself, even now, when obscure and alone, as a King, and shows a serene composure in extending his royalty over even the souls of men.—Vol. I., p. 508, American edition.

Though this is bookish in sentential length and structure and by no means English in other respects of the best sort, it is remarkable for speed, and if not for lightness, at least for the quality of being thoroughly unladen. Only the essence, the spirit of the meaning, we may say, is left aboard. The first sentence, realized over in detail as one should stop to ponder, would show no less weight than this: 'When he first appears, he is still a young man, for whom no success has won sanction, to whom no position lends weight, no schools give countenance, Jesus bears himself, calmly unconscious that he is putting forth any effort, as altogether superior to the man who has come to visit him.' Of course the passage might have been cast, with the effect of greater precipitance but with less detail, in sentences of the oral sort. Compare the following from Bartol: —

The third mark of genius is *communication*. In Taylor this was perfect. "Her very foot speaks," says Shakespeare. But in most persons not a tithe of the frame bears witness. His marvellous suppleness of fibre and organ made his whole body a tongue. He was as ingrained an actor as Garrick or Kean. He did not believe in preaching from notes; and, making a speech at a meeting of his brethren, he took off a clergyman confined to his manuscript, looking from his page to his hearers, gazing one way and gesticulating another, to the convulsive laughter of the victims he scored. I remember his impersonating a dervish in his spinning raptures, so that to see that Oriental character one had no need to travel. There was in his word a primitive force none could withstand. — *Radical Problems*, p. 328.

The analytic manner communicates as we have seen by points, but has nothing to do with making the points large or small, frequent or widely separated. It is the business of the reader to fill them out to a superficies of sense. A style may be rapid, though it microscopically take cognizance of every item in the meaning that the reader might supply, but it will not be strong. Herein we see the essential difference between the condensed book-style and the condensed oral. The one, like Geikie's, gains speed by leaving meaning to be implied within the sentence, the other outside of it. The longer periods of the former in one way or another

prescribe all that the mind shall cognize, the simpler units of the other enable more suppression of the sense between. How it is that the momentum of an author can carry the mind through the effect of what is omitted we cannot consider here. But it is certain that Bartol in the last extract seems in some way to keep in communication with us after a sentence is closed, and in the pause between empowers our fancy to assist in the characterization he is carrying on. Though there are not many verbal nouns or subject-possessives in Bartol's passage, yet in the first hundred periods of the paper, among which our extract falls, there is not less than 10.91 per cent of clauses saved.

So then the Suppression of Predication is something more than the dropping of predicates, or the substitution of a possessive for the subject or the object of a verb. It is doing what the stenographer does when he makes a single stroke mean a whole thought. A sentence may represent either the intuitive view that the mind has of some fact or truth, or a reflective and determinative reproduction of the same fact or truth considered in detail. In oral speech the sentence is more likely to be born of the former, in written diction an empiric, adjusted representation of the latter. The instinctive, spontaneous utterance of intuitive cognition is by exclamation, that is by simply naming the object or relation mentally discerned. There is no predication connected with intuitive acts of the intellectual faculty; it is only when the thinker proceeds to turn the perception over in his mind, — that is, to realize it to himself as a thought, by the aid of language, — that predications come naturally to his lips. Casting one's meaning in formal sentences, affirming, as to another what one has perceived or felt, is in some sense supererogatory, like talking aloud to one's self, will involve some degree of over-expression, or repetition of obvious meaning. Some things or parts of things that are self-evident will be affirmed on the same basis of importance as the rest. The prevailing fault of the synthetic style is therefore the affirmation of the obvious. Moreover, the reader prefers and expects intuitive ideas and sentences, that is, products of intuition

which he may intuitively re-discern — just such as he would hear from the brilliant talker. But the tendency in reflective composition to revise and refine away and even repeal first impressions gives rise to many sentences that consciously or unconsciously *irk* and *repel*. Intuitive thought is intermittent, and connects itself by electric leaps, by a certain spiritual contact which needs no formal links. Hence the ideal style will have a maximum number of intuitive sentences ; and that style is lightest that comes nearest to the first impressions of the mind.¹

¹ Analytic or intuitive styles differ according to the leap or omission of thought between. It is the length of the leap rather than the shortness of the periods that makes an author seem *laconic*. No one is conscious of Bartol's staccato quality in passages where his thought is most sustained. Channing, when he writes sentences as short, but with lesser gaps of meaning, seems as smooth as Newman.

CHAPTER XXVI.

THE NEW ARTICULATION OF CLAUSES.

ON further examining any author, as Bartol, Holmes, or Munger, of simplest oral manner, we are struck by the general absence of conjunctions, and are drawn to make comparison with other styles. We accordingly collect data under the heads of initial and interior connectives, — and, to increase the significance of the figures, of subordinate conjunctions. The following are the results for 500 periods : —

	NEWMAN.	D. G. MITCHELL.	PATER.
Initial	131	111	78
Interior	<u>1566</u>	<u>1407</u>	<u>1191</u>
Total	1697	1518	1269
Subordinate	884	335	424

	ARNOLD.	HOWELLS.	HIGGINSON.
Initial	137	28	110
Interior	<u>1117</u>	<u>1076</u>	<u>869</u>
Total	1254	1104	979
Subordinate	601	318	263

	IRVING.	GLADSTONE.	LOWELL.
Initial	44	125	59
Interior	<u>915</u>	<u>823</u>	<u>861</u>
Total	959	948	920
Subordinate	264	331	196

	EMERSON.	THEODORE PARKER.	BARTOL.
Initial	30	55	91
Interior	<u>821</u>	<u>736</u>	<u>684</u>
Total	851	791	775
Subordinate	109	101	140

	HAWTHORNE.	T. T. MUNGER.	O. W. HOLMES.
Initial	66	41	5
Interior	<u>647</u>	<u>614</u>	<u>342</u>
Total	713	655	347
Subordinate	157	245	270

Here again are significant differences, and, in the light of the development already traced, not difficult to explain. An examination of the authors designated by low totals makes clear that they indicate the relation between clauses and sentences in some way without the use of conjunctions. They seem to be under some sort of restraint to articulate their periods by interior appointments rather than outward signs. They suppress the *for* or *because* that earlier authors use so willingly, and signify the causal relation by making the clause sustaining it simply precede or follow its effect. Parallel or level notions are given consecutively as they come to thought, without connectives. As there are no conjunctions in the mind—that is, no pictorial or symbolic representations of them as ideas—the style that most nearly follows thought will omit them when possible, or where formal merely. The omission of causal conjunctions is characteristic of all oral literature. Instances like the following are frequent in Homer:—

Yet even thus will I give her back, if that is better :
I would rather see my people whole than perishing.¹

¹ ἀλλὰ καὶ ὥς ἐθέλω δοῦναι πάλιν, εἰ τὸ γ' ἄμεινον·
βούλομ' ἐγὼ λαὸν σὺν ἔμμεναι ἢ ἀπολέσθαι.

Iliad, I., 116, 117.

Stranger, to thy cost dost thou shoot at men :
 Never again shalt thou enter such a contest :
 Now is swift death assured thee.¹

Compare also this from Cædmon : —

Pale lingered
 Over the archers the sheer flames,
 Shields were gleaming, shadows vanishing.
 Profound night-glooms could not nearly
 Hide the lurking places: *heaven's candle was burning!*²

We saw in the last chapter that the most effective prose styles by a kind of momentum carry the meaning forward over gaps between the thoughts expressed. As in poetry, parts are used with the effect of wholes ; the prepared intelligence cognizes a maximum of meaning from a minimum of text. The vital element in the art of prose writing is to minimize the expressed or material part of the meaning, yet carry the reader through the effect of all. From the above exhibit it may be fairly questioned whether Newman and Pater and Arnold do not use the subordinating mode, as it is evident Emerson and Parker do not. Again, Munger and Holmes are clearly not subordinators, although the subordinate connectives to the sum of all are as 3 : 8 and 4 : 5 respectively, for evidently principal conjunctions have been generally omitted. In common oral parlance men drop conjunctions

¹ ζεῖνε, καὶ ὡς ἀνδρῶν τοξάζεαι· οὐκέτ' ἀέθλων
 ἄλλων ἀντιάσεις· νῦν τοι σὺς αἰπὺς δλεθρός.

Odyssey, XXII., 27, 28.

² From the description of the Pillar of Fire, *Exodus*, 111-115. See also ll. 135-137, and 164-169. Among even better samples from the *Beowulf* compare the following (ll. 516-518) : —

Git on wæteres æht
 Seofon niht swuncon. Hæ þe æt sunde oferfāt:
hæfde mære mægen.

Ye two a sennight strove
 On the domains of the deep. He overcame thee in swimming, —
Had greater strength!

in short sentences, and gain by the omission. For like significant and pointed phrasing compare the following from Munger's *On the Threshold*:—

Young men should govern themselves strictly in this thing. Don't play in the cars; gamblers do, gentlemen as a rule do not. Never play in public places; it is the just mark of a loafer. Refuse to devote whole evenings to whist; life is too short and books are too near. Rate the whole matter low, and have such uses for your time and faculties that you can say to all, I have other matters to attend to.

This is, of course, informal if not familiar, and need not be insisted on as the model style. But the standard English of the future is sure to be as close as this to the spoken norm. Why should men be stiff and self-conscious in written speech while they are at such pains to avoid all suggestion of such quality in the oral? The written sentence is demonstrably growing shorter year by year, while the spoken does not palpably alter. This means, not that the literary sentence will continue to grow shorter and shorter as long as the language lasts, but on reaching approximately the oral form and structure will there remain. Men used to wear, on high days and all public occasions, stately suits of broadcloth of which they were unavoidably very conscious and in which pitifully uncomfortable. We have come now, so to speak, to wearing holiday clothes in our every-day writing and correspondence, and to making our Sunday suits as sensible and comfortable as our common. In other words, the language of books is fast becoming as idiomatic and unconstrained as the language of men, while the language of men is growing daily richer in vocabulary and more refined in associations.¹ The ideal style would then approximately combine the characteristics of an

¹ There can be little question that spoken English receives from year to year a large accession of Latin terms, inasmuch as each generation of children meets with a considerable increase of book-words, over the preceding, in the mother tongue. As we saw in Chapter VI. no words will seem far-fetched or forced or call up literary associations that have been learned experientially and orally, and not from books.

Arnold and a Channing. Nothing can surpass the easy, almost colloquial manner of Arnold, yet he is a man of book rather than oral traditions of diction, and, as his figures show above, is too formal in structure and correlation of sentences. Channing, on the other hand, is, at his best, of almost faultless form, although his synthetic sentences are too classical in spirit and smack too much of the pastor's study. The style of Macaulay somewhat similarly impresses us as too little spontaneous, too much considered. His habits of deliberate and prolix revision could not but ensure this quality. His analytic sentences, though crisp and incisive, seem often hardly better than oracular or declamatory. Macaulay the conversationalist is by no means Macaulay the essayist and historian. If he could have trained himself like Spurgeon or Beecher to oral swiftness and sureness of phrase, he would have been doubtless the best prosaist of the century. No author that in any wise keeps the reader from thought of living words and tones, but makes him see only a moving pen, and breathe the air of a cloistral chamber, can in these days be held as without a rival.

Articulate periods are then more dependent on interior correlation than upon formal conjunctions. We have seen how the causal relation is signified by mere juxtaposition of clauses. To some extent temporal relations are similarly indicated,—‘I went to his house; he refused to admit me,’ instead of ‘when I had gone to his house,’ etc. Concessive clauses may be also lightened by suppressing connectives. ‘Though I nursed him faithfully, yet he never so much as thanked me’ may drop ‘though’ and ‘yet.’ Conditions are indicated without an ‘if,’ as in German, by putting the subject after the verb: ‘How he would have been pained, could he have known.’ In each instance the mind apprehends the relation between the facts affirmed without being told what to do or how to do it. Of course to the inattentive and unsympathetic reader the conjunction in each case might seem a help. But, as we have learned, it is not what a writer succeeds in expressing objectively and absolutely that makes his strength. It is rather what he can incite the reader to think and experience and know

along with himself, in some sense independently and yet in co-operation, *while withheld from him*. The greatest writers, as the most brilliant conversers, leave out most between periods, yet are best understood. The omission of conjunctions when due to the swiftness and strength of thought is no obstacle, rather an inspiration. Everything that sheds the odor of formality tends to repel. When a man is the same to the world that he is to himself, the influence of his personality will be strongest. Hence whatever helps bring his reader into the oral presence of an author adds to his power.¹

Along with the reduction of conjunctive clauses we note likewise the infrequent use of relatives in oral styles. The true place of relative clauses in the new articulation comes thus to light. In the synthetic manner we have doubtless in late investigations been perplexed over the apparently numerous cases in which they take the place of principal statements. It will now be clear that they are used to aid in the synthetic structure, as well as in obedience

¹ The asyndeton structure in English, as in the classic languages, is much assisted by absolute and appositional constructions after the manner already considered in preceding chapters. But the use of the present participle and of perfect active participle phrases for temporal, conditional and concessive clauses is for the most part inorganic and unoral. Moreover, the asyndeton mode does not consist in omitting merely the conjunctions that would be used in more expanded and formal styles. It is inspired, as has already been more than once implied, by great activity and energy of the mental forces. Out of the whole meaning in the mind the author indites such selected clauses as will show their own structural relations and include to the understanding what has been left unsaid. The following first paragraph of a letter will furnish one of the simplest of illustrations:—

I send herewith the paper for the . . . promised long ago. I have tried to make it the barest scientific record of experiments, with what success you will yourself determine. I hope there will be no difficulty in getting it accepted. I have had at least great difficulty in putting it together. This is the sixth attempt.

The last sentence not only gives an explanation of the preceding but tells potentially very much besides. To have introduced it by a 'for' or a 'since' would have spoiled the whole. It enables the imagination to comprehend the labor undergone far better than an eighteenth century epistle describing it in detail. Tennyson's and Browning's transitions in poetry are similarly cogent, like those of the Anglo-Saxon and Northern poets, to whose school they belong.

to the instinct of subordination. For example, in the last period in the quotation from Hooker, on page 257, the affirmation introduced by 'which' is principal in importance and might have filled a separate period, but is, on the contrary, through the use of the relative as a link of synthesis, and adjectively, in place of a demonstrative pronoun, made subordinate. For a more striking illustration of both uses, compare the following from Raleigh's *History* (Book II., Chap. VI.) :—

The Bridg finished, and the Army brought near to the Sea-side, *Xerxes* took a view of all his Troops, assembled in the Plains of *Abidus*, being carried up, and seated on a place over-topping the Land round about it, and the Sea adjoining: and after he had gloried in his own happiness, to behold and command so many Nations, and so powerful an Army and Fleet, he suddenly (notwithstanding) burst into tears, moved with this contemplation, That in one hundred years there should not any one survive of that marvellous multitude: the cause of which sudden change of passion when he uttered to *Artabanus* his Uncle, *Artabanus* spake to the King to this effect: That which is more lamentable than the dissolution of this great Troop within that number of years by the King remembered, is, That the life itself which we enjoy is yet more miserable than the end thereof: for in those few days given us in the world, there is no man among all these, or elsewhere, that ever found himself so accompanied with happiness, but that he oftentimes pleased himself better with the desire and hope of death, than of living; the incident calamities, diseases, and sorrows whereto mankind is subject, being so many and inevitable, that the shortest life doth oftentimes appear unto us over-long; to avoid all which, there is neither refuge nor rest, but in desired death alone.

In the most radical forms of the oral manner, in which the average of predications is under two per period, it is evident that the average of relative clauses cannot be so much as one,—in Bartol, for instance, .26. In the oral discourse of our most idiomatic and clever conversationists it is still less. As the literary or written sentence is continually shortening in obedience to the impulse, 'Write as you speak,' we can form some notion of the place relative clauses will one day fill. Very few writers longer use it merely as the substitute for co-ordinate clauses or distinct periods, though it is still the instrument of subordination in many

book-styles. Its principal office is to identify objects ('restrictive'), and to set forth incidental attributes or time and space relations when too important to be left unpredicated, but not vital enough to be affirmed in periods of their own. Thus in the first two lines of Bryant's poem considered in Chapter XVII., the first circumstance, "midst falling dew," is left merely suggested or 'assumed'; but the next "While glow the heavens with the last steps of day," as of greater prominence is set forth under predication, or on the authority of the speaker.¹ The first phrase in the line following, being again only accessory, falls back to the 'assumed' form. When object of the verb in its clause the relative is often omitted, as in object clauses the conjunction 'that.' Finally, the oral mode with relatives is to set forth sharply and strongly one or two main circumstances that shall provisionally suggest the rest. In general, the analytic manner makes up for the slowness consequent upon using smaller units of presentation by its pregnant omissions: and the secret of the 'momentum' which carries the reader's mind through what is left unsaid is mainly, of course, association.

The reader must not suppose that the use of the oral manner in written discourse includes the use also of oral matter. The occasions of writing may be brought more fully under the control of common sense, but should not be popularized or lowered by the author's style. Some oral writers go so far as to introduce colloquial contractions and elisions into their most serious and considered compositions. This when done to avoid the appearance of professionalism is commendable in spirit, but must be deprecated on account of the associations brought in from the market and the street corner. Standard prose English has little in common with the voluble English of newspaper styles — which spreads a modicum of meaning over a maximum of space — and is destined to have still less. There is an analytic manner that tends through padding to become synthetic. The literature of this busy age must be as

¹ See page 219. The more quaint and naive co-ordinative manner would run: 'The dews are falling, and the heavens are glowing with the last steps of day, and I descry thee afar in their rosy depths. Whither art thou pursuing thus thy solitary way?'

condensed and energized as its thought. So far as this may be we are trying to make words do the work of sentences,—as we have seen is Browning's and Tennyson's mode in poetry. We reduce 'if one were to speak with strictness' to 'strictly speaking'; and we shall cut down 'strictly speaking,' to 'strictly,' if we can get our generation to accept the symbol; so with 'clearly,' 'manifestly,' and the rest. Literary English, in short, will follow the forms of the standard spoken English from which it comes. No man should talk worse than he writes, no man writes better than he should talk. The element of unerring, instant selection,—when it is lacking, is the only difference.

Why, then, do we call the oral construction of clauses the New Articulation, if it is as old as Cædmon, or the *Beowulf*, or the folk-speech of the race? Because we have been so unaccustomed to the clearest and simplest forms of speech in books of prose that the mode seems novel. But our greatest masters of poetry have not ceased from the oral manner; and from this fact more than any other, Chaucer and Shakespeare remain inimitable. On the other hand, the prosaists from not daring to use common forms, but going after strange gods, have cost the race a thousand years of wandering in the wilderness. We have gone far enough in our era of transition and return to the oldest or 'Gothic' forms at least to understand our history. We are not to write always in terse and intense forms. The intermediate modes are normal both to those who have as yet not passed beyond them, and upon occasion to all of us.¹ The oral sentence is clearest because it is the product of millions of daily efforts to be clear and strong. It represents the work of the race for thousands of years in perfecting an effective instrument of expression. But frequently according to the governing mood, it is necessary to go back to the childlike co-ordinative manner. Indeed, the ideal style is either co-ordinative, subordinative, suppressive, asyndeton,—and at times even, for a little, perhaps synthetic, according to selective acts of the mind that are indeterminate, or at least not yet determined.

¹ Cf. pp. 80 and 134.

CHAPTER XXVII.

FORCE.

THUS far we have concerned ourselves only with Clearness as an element of style, or with those forms of the sentence which progressively enable or ensure it. We shall now, passing from the form to the spirit, consider the quality of Force..

As we have marked the efforts of the mind to reduce the instrument of speech to the lithest and most prehensible form, we may have been reminded of certain stages in the evolution of some weapon of defence, — as the loaded cane: first the rough club, broken off by the wind from some tree in the forest, picked up in the moment of danger, but dropped again when the dreaded enemy disappears; then the dandy's walking-stick, carved, polished, betasselled, valueless for strength or weight; finally the rod of steel, spring-tempered and covered with leathern disks, adapted equally to complete the toilet of a gentleman or to brain an assailant, — if such need shall be. The new articulate or asyndeton sentence in English prose is a like instrument of defence or attack. It will impart an infinite deal of energy, but the energy must come from without and beyond itself. We have seen how in certain authors there is a kind of momentum which carries the mind of the reader through the effect of things not said. This is not the quality merely of suggestiveness. A suggestive style makes us *see*, opens up diverging vistas of meaning to the understanding or to fancy. Force makes us *feel*. The momentum in and between sentences is wholly subjective, and not resident in the words as singles. Styles showing this momentum will be

found full of Force, that is, will abound in words carrying what was called in Chapter IV. the *emphasis of sympathy*. It is only through the arrangement of the force-words, or their relations to each other and the rest of the sentence, that the enthusiasm of an author is made apparent to us. He must embody the usual sentence-associations in his style, or his energy cannot be inferred or apprehended by the reader.

Thus while Clearness is in the main an objective quality, it is in its highest development dependent upon Force. Likewise Force for the most part is conditioned by the objective forms of sentence structure. Clearness is a quality resulting from the impulse to put forth thought as nearly in the shape it has taken in the speaker's mind as possible. Force in oral speech is the sum of impressions concerning an author's enthusiasm or conviction or concern produced through expression or mien or gesture, and the pitch, inflections, and modulation of his voice. Force in written discourse consists in so many of these signs as the author can make us discern subjectively from the printed page. We appreciate and appropriate it in precisely the same manner as the effect of metric or sentence rhythm is apprehended in the unoral reading of poetry. From the way the given composition impresses us in printed lines, we infer how it would sound if spoken,—just as the musician “reads” music. If we are in the audience of a speaker whose tones we cannot distinguish, or of one using a language we do not understand, we infer the degree of fervor from the expression of his face and the energy of his movements. If we can hear but are cut off from sight, we interpret the manner of his tones to the same effect, and supply in the eye of the mind the expressions of face, the gestures and bodily movements which accompany his words. But if we are excluded also from the tones and may only read the words which the stenographer reproduces, how do we find out his force? Evidently by a process of the same kind: through association we *hear* the words he utters, so to speak, in the ear of the mind. We have been many times in circumstances where we have seen men use speech in a similar way,

and have thus become familiar with the impassioned mode. We are especially quick to infer energy when emphasized terms come thick together, for we know consciously or unconsciously that excited speakers often utter whole clauses with stress on every word. With the imagination a part is potential of the whole. The object that has been the occasion with us of a past experience will, if re-encountered, bring back that experience to our consciousness. This is the kind of association considered in Chapter VI., and may be called by the old name, — Association of Ideas. In examples of impassioned and hurried diction — such as were considered in the last chapter — in which the mind leaps over from unlike statement to unlike statement without hint of the relation between, we recognize another species of the same activity. When we come upon sentences like “He is risen. He is not here,” the relation of the second affirmation to the first is clear from the mind’s habit of hearing and uttering thoughts in precisely the same relations. We may style the species thus illustrated the Association of Thoughts. We observe, finally, that Force is detected and apprehended through certain salient features in the arrangement of words and grouping of stress which serve as schemes or formulæ to the mind’s cognition. We, therefore, name this mode the Associations of Sentence Rhythm, or Associations of Sentence Structure.

This brings us to the consideration of the laws of stress in oral English, and of the mental principles and habits on which they rest. We are all aware that in common discourse we distinguish the noun from its word or phrase adjunct, and the verb from its adverb, by a slight increase of stress. This serves to guide the mind of the listener to the main points in the speaker’s thought. Of these points, of course, the principal are always the subject and chief predicate word in every clause. Compare the following illustration : —

High Olympus bows his head. — Women are born atmospheric reformers. — The railroad car is the place where your danger is greatest. — Air and water are, of course, the principal substances on which we feed.

The copula as such does not receive the predicative stress. So likewise of other verbs that are in the main but substitutes for the copula, as in these examples:—

Perfection, as culture conceives it, is not possible while the individual remains isolated.

Whereas if thou prove gentle, I shall borrow
Sufficient strength of thee for new-year's sorrow.

It has been already pointed out in Chapter IV. that this sort of stress is merely grammatical, since it serves chiefly to mark the eminence of the primary parts of speech or of the sentence over the secondary or subordinate. Hence it is thrown also upon the first element in compound nouns, and the separable suffix of certain verbs:—

A wood-fire cheers the room.—In disgust I burned-up the manuscript.
—The valuables were turned-over to the police.—Lay-aside your cloak and hat.—Goods at half-price to close-out.

A considerable list of compound verbs like the last might be compiled, as also of such as contrariwise keep the stress upon the verb-word, — like 'send-for,' 'aim-at,' 'come-by,' etc. There are likewise compounds, as 'go-away-from,' 'come-in-for,' 'send-out-for,' 'sit-down-under,' 'find-out-about,' in which two adverbial suffixes are united, one of them drawing off the stress from the verb. In like manner it will be noted that, while the grammatical stress falls generally upon the object of a transitive verb as well as on the verb itself, it is often found upon the object only. As examples of such single stress the following are among the most familiar: 'give heed,' 'take note,' 'send answer,' 'offer aid,' 'find reason,' 'strain a point,' 'force an issue,' 'have an impression'; but the list may be extended indefinitely. Similarly also the stress seems almost to desert the verb for the leading adverb in sentences or clauses like 'I see clearly the difference,' 'I sought the truth diligently.' Finally, the stress seems to rest by preference on the last word of a sentence, as

indifferently in these examples on 'truth' or 'diligently,' 'difference' or 'clearly,' according as the noun or the adverb is put last of all.

The cases last considered really introduce us to another species and mode of stress, which may be styled Emphasis of the Thought. The reason that 'offer *aid*,' and 'strain a *point*,' emphasize the object but not the verb is in the fact that, being figurative expressions, the last element is of chief significance. No one would think of denying stress to the verb in '*I made a boat*,' '*I took the medicine*,' or of admitting it in '*I made money*,' '*I took advice*.' In the last examples the mind notes the ideas of 'making' and 'taking' but lightly, and puts stress upon their objects from contrast with literal transactions. When we wish to designate to our hearer some one thing rather than another, or to show that one idea is the right one and another the wrong, we point, so to speak, at the right one with the voice, we utter the word which is its symbol with greater energy. This new sort of emphasis is in general stronger than what we have called Grammatical Stress, hence will augment it when coinciding with it. On the other hand, Thought-Emphasis will subordinate principal words distinguished by Grammatical Stress, even to their modifiers, — as in these sentences: —

Woman requires *more* air, or at least *purser* air, than *man*.
She is the *first* to faint in a crowd; *she* takes to her fan in *distress* before a *man* begins to be *uncomfortable*.

Here 'woman' receives more than a grammatical stress because, in addition to being subject of the verb, it is in specific contrast with the last word of the sentence. 'More' and 'purser,' from taking thought-emphases, are made stronger to the ear than the nouns they limit, and 'distress' is superior to 'takes' because in contrast with 'uncomfortable.' 'She' is in the first instance in implied, in the second in actual, contrast with the subject of the last clause.

It follows that all facts or principles that in any point or rela-

tion run counter to the general assumption will be signalized in such point or relation by Emphasis of Thought. All truths or conclusions which the ego would intellectually insist upon to itself or others will be kept distinct from other truths and conclusions by the same oral means. Thus what we have called Grammatical Stress, as affording to the ear in a given period a first clue to the sense, is quickly covered by the various swells and falls of thought emphasis differentiated into a strange but perfect harmony. The subject of the first clause will not challenge the ear in just the same manner as the second, no predicative will be equally eminent with another, and each sentence will have its own array and pitch of stress. All masters of oral English, whether on the platform or in the drawing-room, abound in unique and various illustration, as also those artists of style who can make their pages speak as with the natural voice. To choose a single example, we shall perhaps hit upon nothing better than this admired passage from Arnold's *Culture and Anarchy*: —

Religion says "The Kingdom of God is *within* you"; and *culture*, in like manner, places human perfection in an *internal* condition, in the growth and predominance of our *humanity proper*, as distinguished from our *animality*. It places it in the ever-increasing *efficacy* and in the general harmonious *expansion* of those gifts of *thought* and *feeling* which make the peculiar *dignity*, *wealth*, and *happiness* of human nature. As I have said on a former occasion: "It is in making endless *additions* to itself, in the endless *expansion* of its powers, in endless *growth* in wisdom and beauty, that the spirit of the human race finds its *ideal*. To *reach* this ideal, culture is an *indispensable* aid, and that is the *true* value of culture." Not a *having* and a *resting*, but a *growing* and a *becoming*, is the character of perfection as *culture* conceives it; and *here, too*, it coincides with *religion*.

The final reason of grammatical as of thought stress is not far to seek. The speaker does not signalize the subject and predicate of his clause merely because he would have his hearer note them eminently, but because he has already sensed these objects

with greater vividness pictorially in thought, and would have his hearer do the same. For example, in '*Planing* makes the *board smooth*,' the mind of the speaker sees more or less completely a picture of some hand or person moving a plane, and of the smoothed surface of a board as the result. Hence in announcing what he has thus seen mentally to another, he instinctively increases stress on the names of things most prominently discerned. So in '*A wood-fire cheered the room*,' that which stands out most clearly to the eye of the mind is not the fire but the wood burning in it. In precisely the same way thought-stress corresponds to a major experience had in thought with what the emphasized word stands for. '*Planed* boards are *smooth*' is apprehended not only through some pictorial representation of planed boards, but also with a sort of potential or felt comparison with unplanned. Similarly the perception of smoothness is accompanied by a subjective or incomplete apprehension of the unplanned condition as a basis. In other words, on discerning in thought *planed* boards, the mind accompanies it with a realization of what they would be in the *unplaned* state, or discerning smoothness, remembers the quality of roughness also, and answering to the double activity, utters the words concerned with double energy or higher pitch. The explanation of stress upon the preposition rather than the verb in compounds is the same. In '*I burned-up the manuscript*,' the one thing sensed by the mind is the completeness of the destruction. In '*the books are on the shelf*,' the speaker sees mentally the relation, the real contact; while in '*the cloak of the general*,' since it is not what the general is really wearing but only what he has the right to wear, the relation is apprehended much less distinctly, perhaps with most minds not pictorially at all. Hence '*on*' in the first example receives stress, '*of*' in the second does not.

We see thus more plainly that the difference between Grammatical Stress and Thought Emphasis is one not of kind but of degree. Moreover, it will be easy to convince ourselves that this difference of degree is not greater than between the strongest and

the slightest stress of the thought-kind. In examples of compounds like 'wood-fire,' 'half-hour,' 'state-college,' the stress is from implied contrast with fires supplied with coal or coke, with a whole hour as the usual unit of time, and with private or corporate institutions of learning. It might indeed be urged that these cases should be entered under Thought Emphasis. But what should then be done with 'well-fed,' 'far-sighted,' 'oft-repeated,' and like compounds that imply no more contrast than any noun over its adjunct or the verb over its adverb? Now Force stands, objectively speaking, in much the same relation to Thought Emphasis as Thought Emphasis to Grammatical Stress. It is outwardly manifested by much the same increase of energy as distinguishes the one of these from the other. Cases may occur in which Emphasis of the Thought will fulfil the outward conditions of Force itself. In pronouncing some long phrase, like 'on account of this outbreak through the criminal neglect of the quasi-quarantine commissioners,' the speaker, through miscalculating the eventual stress, will perhaps expend relatively too much upon the earlier words. To indicate the true prominence of the last ideas will require a progressive increase of emphasis that will seem Force when the end is reached. The hearer if denied sight of the speaker, that is, if restricted merely to the indications of sound, will judge the words to have been spoken with an *animus*, and be misled; but if he can see the eyes or expression of the speaker, sets himself right at the first glance. Force in this case could only come from impatience or indignation, which if felt by the speaker would be evident by more immediate signs in the face and bearing. 'Force' is simply a manifestation of aroused energy in the ego, and may come from any emotion, as delight, pain, indignation, contempt, wrath, ecstasy, and the rest. The secret of its power in literature lies in the fact that the ego has the profoundest sympathy with all strong emotion. Whenever it sees the feelings of another aroused, whether from mere physical suffering or from an experience of the sublime, it enters in greater or less degree into a like frame or condition of

emotion. Moreover, every phase or sign of strong emotion it comprehends as an 'effect,' precisely as we have seen in Chapter XIII. is the law in Art. Art is emotional, and is dependent upon the same powers and principles of imagination as are in exercise in the commonest experiences of daily life. In other words, passion or emotion of whatsoever kind, whether enacted or actual, if *true*, appeals to the imagination; and all signs of it are instantly interpreted in both directions, — back to the cause, and, so far as fancy can penetrate, forward to the last consequence.

The imagination does not interpret or regard all signs of a given passion; it will take the one in which it recognizes the fullest meaning, and let the rest alone. On this fact rests the efficacy of Art; the artist need present — if he select rightly — but an atom for his whole of truth. If we could have seen Carlyle, for instance, in his almost agonizing realization of certain truths he wrote while he wrote them, we should not care for his lines to read his spirit. But we have never seen the man in presence, and are restricted to the mere signs he has left upon the printed page; yet will imagination to the uttermost find out his frenzy. We note a swift and unexpected recurrence of stress, which we are sensible is neither grammatical nor logical. Imagination is on the alert for the new and strange, and reads in these thick and ponderous strokes an 'effect' of passion. If we have never read this author, or learned anything of his power, we may know both in a single sentence. Can any mature mind fail to discern, not only the Force but the personality, in such a passage as this from "The Sphynx," in *Past and Present*?

In this God's-world, with its wild-whirling eddies and mad foam-oceans, where men and nations perish as if without law, and judgment for an unjust thing is sternly delayed, dost thou think that there is therefore no justice? It is what the fool hath said in his heart. It is what the wise in all time were wise because they denied, and knew forever not to be. I tell thee again, there is nothing else but justice. One strong thing I find here below: the just thing; the true thing.

We note, again, that the ultimate reasons of Force lie in the experiences of the mind itself. We have seen that Grammatical Stress and Thought Emphasis are inspired by greater vividness of apprehension or realization in the mind of the speaker, and tend to produce or enable like vividness of perception in the hearer. In other words, Emphasis and Stress come from the understanding and are addressed to the understanding. In much the same way Force proceeds from the emotions and is addressed to the emotions. The man who is incensed is tempted to make a 'personal' remark — one, that is, which will incense another. He may not yield to the impulse, but the potential force in his emotion is likely through the usual signs of passion to be discerned, and, being interpreted, to be in some degree responded to. So also of any other strong feeling, whether by a physical or a moral occasion. If the emotion discerned be pain, and manifested through groans or screams, the hearer will partake subjectively in the suffering and pity the sufferer. If the emotion be moral enthusiasm of some sort, we share in the feeling and admire — that is, in some degree idealize — the person who has thus responded to a noble occasion. But if it become apparent that the emotion in either case is feigned, — either because the occasion is unguenuine, or is unguenuinely responded to, — the sympathy stops and influence ceases. Force, let it be remembered, is a manifestation of strong emotion, whether in the *Nibelungen Ring*, the *Laocoön*, or the *Inferno*. In a literary sense it is, of course, confined to what can be expressed through words and sentence forms.

We thus come, finally, to a consideration of the question, What signs does the ego find on the printed page equivalent, through imagination, to the oral marks of spoken energy? The answer, of course, is simple. From childhood it has been familiar with the various modes of emotion. It is perfectly, though unconsciously, aware of the utterance natural to employ under the various forms of excitation, and can read the all of each in its smallest part. In a moment of astonishment at not being understood, it will echo the surprising word or words, slowly, with a slide, and

balanced emphasis, as in the following from a line already familiar:—

I? What I answered?

Thus from the associations of tone-stress we infer the speaker's feeling,—and from this as an 'effect' comprehend the speaker's character. If we do not hear the words pronounced, and so miss the slide and poised emphasis, we shall catch the sense and spirit no less quickly. Even the listener would be struck first of all by the '*I*,'—evidently put in amazement for 'Do you mean *me*? Do you suppose *I could* answer?' In other words, the hearer, in oral presence, will interpret the line first and chiefly from the associations of sentence structure,—just as we ourselves thus interpreted it,—probably without knowing,—on page 15.¹ Similarly in Carlyle's passage, the hyphen which proclaims the stress on 'God's,' in the first compound, gives the potential hint as to the spirit of the whole. Thought emphasis is addressed to the understanding, but force must be spiritually discerned. When once the imagination has apprehended the presence of force, it idealizes both the emotion causing it, and the man (page 96) as capable of the emotion, or of being wrought upon by his theme. Moreover, when force is discerned, and the imagination of the reader fully engaged, the interpretation becomes and continues spiritual rather than intellectual. The ego will refuse to recognize any such thing as thought emphasis, but will interpret all marks of stress as emotional. As in appropriating the effects of rhythm (page 49), it will resist and disown all signs and hints addressed to the intelligence merely, as impertinent and out of harmony. Hence, objectively speaking, to produce force as to produce rhythm, it is only necessary for an author having the inspiration to write in idiomatic English that one may comprehend beginning at any line. It is not the nice and sustained arrange-

¹ We doubtless noted, while studying the *Count Gismond* in Chapter IV., that this line is said as a rejoinder to an unhappy and perhaps perfunctory inquiry of 'Adela.' Compare the implied interrogatories of the Duke's visitor in *My Last Duchess*, page 205.

ment of stress that counts after the reading is begun. Force once discerned, the given passage will 'read itself.'

It is then no wonder that Shakespeare is full of force: no man has ever written more perfectly or completely in the forms of living speech. It is also no marvel that so many prose writers of his time are almost wholly devoid of it. If we attempt to read aloud a page of Raleigh or Lyly or Hooker, we find it not only difficult to understand what our lips are saying, but still harder to indicate to a listener the grammatical and the thought emphasis, — to say nothing of stronger stress. Force is, of course, impossible when there is no separation of the sense into organic comprehensible portions. Poetry in the Elizabethan days was strong because of the many who could write like Shakespeare in simple oral rhythm; but the array of force in prose included only Bacon and the Authorized Version of the Bible. Bacon's practicable sentences came, as we know, partly from the analytic tendencies of his mind, in part from the common sense that seems to have exposed to him, among other follies of the times, the cult of book or euphuistic English. The short sentences of the Bible represent, of course, the strong, sharp periods of the original, — the work in most cases of men who were speakers rather than writers of their respective tongues. No wonder, with such a model, prose English gathered to itself such strength in the next half-century. There is even yet no more perfect force than pervades the Psalms, the Prophets, the Gospels, the letters of Paul, — in short, the greater part of both the prose and poetic books.

The secret of Force is the same as the secret of Clearness, — *Write as you speak*. No wonder beginners in composition fail to divine it, when young England in all her sixteenth-century strength could not avoid becoming sophomoric. Professional book-styles cannot compass force. We have but to compare Bunyan, or John Wilson, or Dr. John Brown, — not to say Carlyle, — with Shaftesbury, or Chesterfield, or even Macaulay,¹ or Phillips' style with

¹ Compare Macaulay's *Lays of Ancient Rome* with *Civil Disabilities of the Jews*, or any other of his strongest pieces. It will then be clear how labored and unspontaneous in comparison is his best prose manner.

Everett's, to be convinced. Grant White has well said concerning the first sentence of Christian's fight with Apollyon, as described in *Pilgrim's Progress*, "A man cannot be taught to write like that."¹ He may, indeed, learn, but will learn, if he do learn, only by learning to *feel* strongly, — to have convictions, as well as clear, right thoughts.

¹ *Words and Their Uses*, p. 65.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

ALL MEN'S AND EVERY MAN'S BEST STYLE

WHEN men in writing have regard especially to the form in which their readers would have them couch their phrase, a new factor, not hitherto considered, enters into the product of their pens. We have seen that the prose of any early writer, as Chaucer, Sir Thomas More, or Hooker, is cast in sentences convenient chiefly to the author, because of an instinct to follow closely the character and proportions of his thought. We have observed that the modern or analytic sentence-structure, which gradually grew out of the synthetic, and became current soon after the beginning of the 'people's era,' is a product of the same impulse coupled with the purpose to be immediately and completely intelligible. We have now to note that the model style is the resultant of three forces,—these of wishing to communicate in the very forms of thought, and to be clear, and the desire to please or suit the reader further in a special way through the manner of presentation.

It is evident that a universally best style of whatsoever sort is a generalized ideal. It represents certain principles on which a whole race or all the races of a civilization, through long experiment and conviction, have become agreed. The forms and usages of good society are one set of conclusions of such sort, and make up the universally best style of common intercourse. The best part of mankind has long since been persuaded as to what is the most appropriate and becoming garb for either sex; and it is these common generalized notions concerning dress which form

the basis of what is called fashion throughout the world. What is termed usage in language affords a nearer illustration. We all learn to speak in certain gross particulars of grammar, idioms, and vocabulary, like other people, but upon that common foundation build freely our own sentence combinations. There is a similar fundamental or primary style on which we build, or should build, our individual manner of speech and composition.

The paramount characteristic of such a literary manner is its plain substantiality. If a person addressing an audience were to use high-sounding language but in reality utter little sense, all would alike remark the absence of a vital element,—perhaps to the point of considering the speaker's presence an impertinence. When man speaks singly with man he takes care to say what is worth hearing; much more if he speak to many. In books, where the speaking is made perpetual, an empty manner is the more intolerable. The universally best style is not a thing of form merely, but must regard the expectations of the reader as to the spirit and occasion of what is written. It is not addressed to the learned, but to all minds. Avoiding book-words, it will use only the standard terms and expressions of common life. It is organic, eschewing strange or strained turns of phrase like 'New York's militia,' 'the castle's overthrow,' 'the life which we exist.' It will not run in long and involved sentences that cannot be readily understood. Correct in all respects, it will not be stiff; familiar, but safely beyond all associations of vulgarity. It will reflect what is best generally in the deliberate second-thought oral speech of the English race. It is that style, in short, which we have seen has been re-evolved in our prose literature. It is the style which the teacher of composition in our schools and of rhetoric in our colleges is trying to bring his students to acquire. It is what all men, in school and out of it, accept as standard and would fain achieve. It is not the best that any exceptional stylist may in the judgment of his narrow circle reach, but is the best attainable for him in the appreciation of all. We may, therefore, call it *All Men's and Every Man's Best Style*.

It is evident that no idea of such a style can be at once evolved, — more than of a national costume or a mode of building. The American Indian constructs his tepee or wigwam after a certain stereotyped fashion, not because he has proved it the best, but because little by little, through scores of generations, his forefathers devised it as the most practicable form of shelter. In the days of Sidney, and Raleigh, and Hooker, there was no approved best style. No one of the Elizabethan prosaists wrote like any other: no one was a fit model for the rest or for the times. From the days of Chaucer until that era each man who essayed to write prose English had written in his own way, standing far aside from his fellows in almost every point of manner. These authors to-day show the same generic differences that one sees in a pile of essays written by students of the ninth grade. Though they speak their mother tongue essentially alike, they write it with as great differences as learners of foreign birth. The distance at which each author stands from his fellows in all respects of style is the most significant fact in our early literature, and may well give name to the period. We may call the stage of development from Mandeville to Bacon, or the middle of Edward Third's reign till James, the *Isolating Period* of English prose.

But the process of conventionalization had begun. An acquaintance with the polished prose of Livy and Plato, gained at the universities, had brought to the consciousness of educated Englishmen how crude and unsettled was the written idiom. Many of the native words had low associations, which the rising taste would not tolerate in books. All cultured men felt there was one right best way, among many wrong inferior ways, of speech and diction. As we have learned in preceding chapters, no such thing as sentence-simplification was yet possible. To write as they spoke would have seemed preposterous; they strove rather to speak as they wrote. Thus the effort to refine the English book-vocabulary reached even the common speech of the gentry and the learned. The taste for letters that had come with the Renaissance — no doubt in part its cause as well as its effect — was quickening

the literary sense of Italy, and France, and even Spain. But before the Hôtel de Rambouillet had begun its work in France, Euphuism had passed its prime in England. • It was on the one side an absurd affectation—here and there echoed and mildly satirized by Shakespeare, as in Osric's talk with Hamlet,¹ in the last scene of that play, and in the eighth paragraph of the *Winter's Tale*; on the other, an honest effort to give such dignity to the language as the times demanded. What, indeed, should be the standard? England was more fortunate than France,—which had already, but only, its Malherbe. No one man's taste or judgment can determine for a people what shall be its universally best style; if it come as an immediate and formal product, it must be the work of a congress of culture. Hence King James's plan of producing a version of the Scriptures that should in every verse embody the best idioms and terms and phrasing that fifty minds could agree upon, was not fortunate merely, it was an inspiration. Thus All Men's and Every Man's Best Style as an objective fact and thing of influence in English literature, dates from 1610.

To overestimate the influence of the King James's version upon modern English would not be easy. No other literature ever had such a book, no other people ever achieved in the compass of a single exemplar so complete a realization of its notions concerning stylistic worth. Here is a work no phrase of which, barring certain defects in reaching the meaning of the original, and occasional forms lost to present English sense, has ever challenged emendation. The universally best style is not only the best possible style that any given writer, as determined by the verdict of all readers, can attain. It is not, of necessity, a neutral thing, but may introduce felicities and even elegant turns in so far as these

¹ It scarcely need be pointed out that Hamlet's talk for three paragraphs after Osric's euphuistic deliverance concerning Laertes (V. ii. 105-110) is bald travesty.

It should be borne in mind that affectation has likewise its better aspects, since it argues a convalescent self-respect. It testifies to a consciousness of defects, and a desire to keep their existence a secret from the world. It happily but seldom lasts, in literature or out of it, through a second generation.

are absolute and make all readers wish they had been their own. Any expression so ideal that all minds recognize it as what themselves would have chosen above all others, belongs to All Men's and Every Man's Style. A significant feature of this style is the readiness with which utterances cast in it cling to the memory. This is true not only of phrases of Scripture, but in the main also of 'saws' and maxims that once heard are never forgotten, — and that not so much for the truth or wisdom in the matter, as the cleverness of the manner. They have survived and are all men's best, because all men adopt them and make as if they were originated by themselves. Outside the Bible we have only broken passages of such literature, as here and there parts of Jeremy Taylor and Bunyan — who owe their excellences principally to the influence of the great model. Correspondingly in poetry we name most confidently the opening of Chaucer's *Prologue*, certain passages of Milton's *L'Allegro* and *Penseroso*, and of Shakespeare.

We thus establish a conventionalizing period in English literature lasting from James I. to Anne, or from the printing of the King James Bible until *The Tatler*. There was now an established All Men's Best Style. Addison, Steele, Swift, Arbuthnot, Pope, Budgell, contribute for that publication or its successor in so nearly the same strain that only expert critics can distinguish the unmarked or unsigned papers. From now until the end of the century we may recognize a true conventional epoch. But in gross division it is well to consider the whole period from King James to Coleridge as the conventional stage, or Era of Conventionalization. Then with the new century and its tremendous issues men begin to arise above convention and assert their individuality. They will write in the main like Steele, but the personality appears beyond. The universally best style becomes yet more universal. The review, the magazine, with the daily and weekly press, instruct an army of writers and correspondents into its secrets, and bring all the world into familiarity with its character. The schools and colleges likewise have made it the shibboleth of culture. It has come to be, in short, little more

than an accomplishment, much like the ability to read three centuries ago, — almost something to take for granted. The real power and character of literature have risen to a height far beyond. It has fallen to our lot to live in the Age of Individualization in literary history.

The Universally Best Style is the language of the understanding and reason, or of men in common life. The Style of Individualization is the language not only of men but of the man, not of the understanding but of imagination, the moral nature, or, as we say, the soul. The English race is no longer satisfied with a style that does not reveal character, that does not reflect this highest part of man. The All Men's and Every Man's Best Style as a foundation is of little worth if nothing be built upon it. We shall recognize that this foundation stands for the principle considered in Chapter XIII. under the name of Classicism. The Individual Style which is formed upon it is of the essence of what in the same chapter is called Gothicism. Thus we come to another phase of that grandest of Teutonic facts, the emancipation and exaltation of the individual. Nothing in the history of our race is more remarkable than this latter-day vindication and triumph of first race-principles. Grant and George and Lowell and Emerson and Holmes and Hawthorne wrote at first like all school-boys, in a colorless, neutral way, until they acquired the general manner. Then, when their manhood came, each asserted it in his own way. England has restored Gothic supremacy in the field of poetry. It has fallen to the lot of America to do the same in prose.

CHAPTER XXIX.

STYLE, AND VARIETIES OF STYLE.

It will, no doubt, be clear that in the principles brought to light in the preceding chapter, we have ultimate grounds on which to make a classification of the vast body of prose in the world's literature. We have seen that the fundamental differences of style are generic, very like such as may be noted in any department of zoölogical history. The horse has a distinct physical type, illustrated by every individual of the class. There is in form and structure,—or what in a large sense we may call *Style*,—much more that is common to all than is differential with each. Moreover, in each young foal it is hard to detect anything distinctive. The figure is yet so ungainly and unsinewed that any save the expert breeder's eye will hardly identify the given individual in a group except by markings or color. But as growth advances, the generic or universal style of the horse seems to give place to the individualistic. The neck arches, the breast swells and broadens, the varied outlines and proportions of form develop. Points in spirit and disposition become apparent, and items like these, to the eye that can ignore or take general characteristics for granted, identify and distinguish the individual with the greatest distinctness and precision.

We see thus illustrated some of the unconsidered uses to which the word 'style' is put. No wonder there is so little comprehension of its meaning as a literary term, and so much perplexity as to what it is to 'acquire a style.' A little reflection will make clear that we employ the word in a generic and a specific sense,

and with reference to form as well as spirit. To illustrate, — beginning with the last-named application, by the same example, — we say concerning one horse of finest nerve that we like its style better than another's, as exhibited, of course, in action. In a different case, when height, build, trimness, are under consideration, we like or do not like the style of this or that, — purely in respect to form. Then, as to larger or generic differences, one might speak, popularly, of the style of the elephant and of the gazelle, of the lion or the giraffe. As to a specific or individual application of the word, we may illustrate best by changing the example. The rose-fancier who cultivates in his conservatory all the leading species, distinguishes each, of course, by recognized differences of color or structure. But he very possibly admires most a particular variety, of which he has a dozen or twenty specimens. Of all the flowers he cultivates these are his favorites. He is attached to them in a sort of personal way, and comes to know the peculiar form and hue and habits of each so intimately as to take the common for granted, and see only the individual. It would not be strange if, responding to the perception of such differences, he found himself calling each rose by a name of its own — as for like reasons we name our pets. Now the respective shades in the hue of stem, or leaf, or flower, the curves of the stock, the height and pose of the buds or blossoms, constitute in each case the *style* of the individual plant, — are its specific mode of being the rose it is. There are no duplicates in nature. Even the ultimate atoms may be unlike; and it is according to our nature to recognize the solitariness of all things that we can know. But we do it in our own way, one looking along one line of differences, another another. To the connoisseur in roses, sensible chiefly to color, the lusher hue of the stem, the warmer or fainter tint in the petals will mean more than all the rest. To another alive rather to form, the upright sturdiness of one plant or the droop of another will make up its style to him, to the exclusion of all other distinctive points. All apprehension of individuality, indeed, is only relative. The rose-lover who calls his plants pet

names would have found stronger grounds and been made to think of quite different designations, if he had used a microscope. On the other hand, the South-Sea savage, if set down suddenly in our streets, would find it well-nigh impossible to distinguish one man or woman from another in the passing throng. Give him ten years among us, and he will begin to distinguish individuals.

In much the same way the child or youth, on first attempting to read Hawthorne or De Quincey, will fail to discover individuality and get no pleasure, but instead be bored. He needs the school-master's assimilating and moulding hand. He must be made to drop his isolated mode in writing as he has long since dropped it in oral speech ; he must be trained to the fundamental, universal manner. He must learn to appreciate some masterpiece in that same manner, like the Bible or *Pilgrim's Progress*, — as he is very like to do. In no long time we shall find him enjoying Swift and Goldsmith and Addison, as well as De Foe, and advancing from those conventional styles toward De Quincey and Macaulay and the later individualists. If he can follow the course of development discerningly, and sympathize with each phase of change, he will soon overtake even the newest literature, and take his chief delight in Hamerton, or Howells, or Henry James. Style to him will be at first a generic thing, distinguishing what he can read from what he cannot, or what is 'dry' from what is entertaining. Eventually it becomes individual and stands for the distinctive delight derived from the personality of a Ruskin, or Arnold, or Holmes, or Emerson. The connoisseur in roses, beginning, perhaps, with the gross preference of some one variety over all others, will end, as we have seen, in getting delight no longer from purely common characteristics, but only from what is peculiar to each specimen alone. So style in literature — analogous to the sheen on the coat of a horse, or the gloss or smoothness or tint of green in leaf or stalk, or the vegetableness of hue in a rose blossom — is some last touch of grace or beauty by which each author is individualized. It will be, perhaps, in any given case, neither the sole nor the chief excellence, but the one recognized by the

reader's imagination. As was pointed out in the late chapter on Force, the mind selects what it would idealize. In style, as in other things, it is very likely to choose the little rather than the great, yet in the little experiences substantially the pleasure of the whole.

Style, then, in a proper sense, is any one element or manifestation by which the mind potentially interprets and idealizes individuality.¹ One of the most telling of such manifestations, as we have seen, is Force. In a composition, as of Carlyle's, showing that element, with no matter what accompaniment of peevishness and intolerance, we enter through imagination into a spiritual companionship with the author which real acquaintance might not have rivalled. Other such elements and manifestations as determining severally our impressions of style are endless. With one author it is the unrelaxing seriousness and reserve that prompt the reader's idealization. In another it is his chaste and perfect delicacy in the associations of words admitted; or his confident and sure precision; or dread of the sensational and irrelevant; and in another the perfect fearlessness, or grace, or facility, or strength. In the style of one writer we note nothing but his inability to say things in an expected way; in another, we are conscious only of his concern lest he utter them in other than the approved fashion. We enter the author accordingly in our list of acquaintances, admitting him to influence in the degree, agreeably to our interpretation, of his worth.

It is evident that we may classify prose literature either according to the mood and purpose of the author, or the character and quality, in each case, of the product achieved. Upon either basis the first step will be to ascertain at what remove the author or his work stands from the All Men's and Every Man's Best Style.

¹ It will be noted here that Individuality — which the mind readily exalts (pp. 64, 65) to Personality — is one of the absolute types that the Teutonic race, in common with every other race at the proper point in its development, finds inherent within. Compare p. 94. Hence the part it plays not only in art and letters, but even in commercial life. Personal signatures, because wholly unique and representative, are negotiable, and bind the *whole man* to the last responsibility.

Some men make it a point to keep close to the accepted norm, others to go aside from it as far as possible. The one class is composed of professional or lay purists, who wait for a word to be entered in the dictionary before venturing to use it, at least in writing; the other is continually stretching and straining the meaning of approved and standard terms, though, perhaps, only in a small way, and on the safe side of positive objection. These two classes furnish a nucleus of names, respectively, for two great divisions of all prose authors. The one, including all who adhere to the universally best style and are content to be merged in it, we may call Classical. The other, composed of minds too original and self-assertive to accept authority, might be styled Romantic, or Individual.

Minds inclining most, either as authors or readers, to the forms of literature called Classical in Chapter XIII., will generally, in preference and taste for terms, be classical also. On the other hand, minds inclining most to romanticism in matter will be romantic in manner; that is, will dislike to say the same phrase twice, or be held at all to the obligation of precision. Of course, both modes are right, and both equally far from being the one right way. Not only is it true that under ordinary circumstances we must use words as other men use and have used them, but equally true that under extraordinary circumstances we must put upon them an office or a burden they have never borne before. When we attempt to express our deepest meaning, we find that words used upon lighter occasion share in the stronger significance of the whole thought uttered. Every interjection which carries forth a cry of agony comes from pain never quite the same before, and is, in reality, a new word to the world. Those who wish or need only to repeat former petitions may well enough go to the prayer-book; but all who cry out for help in a moment of new distress use prayers of their own which were never heard before, and no word of which ever meant quite the same as now.¹

¹ Of course, every man's vocabulary is unlike another's even with respect to the logical intension of separate terms. We have seen in Chapter VI. how it differs

All men, no matter of what pursuit or station, are in some sense either classicists or romanticists. They are intolerant of change, and consent readily to authority, or welcome innovation in an enthusiastic or radical way, and care nothing for prescription. The apprentice who can learn to do anything that any one else does, or make whatever has been made, in his shop or factory, is a good example of the one class. He assumes that the world is going to remain substantially as it is, and accepts it as good enough without expansion or amendment. But there are in every machine-shop and manufactory apprentices of a very different sort, who, on learning the theory and methods of their craft, see at once where labor may be saved, or how less material may be used, or more power be made available for the purpose intended. The counsellor who knows all the decisions, and can at once advise a client in a case repeating past conditions, is an example of the one cast of talent. The judge, who, with great clearness, points out the application of the law to a new instance not contemplated by the statutes has a mind of the other order. The same is true not only among the leaders in thought and action, but in society at large. In one aspect of things there seems nothing but advancement, development everywhere. In every department of industry we note changes almost every day. In agriculture and the arts, in trade, the professions, education, old methods are giving place to new. Factory and farm machinery in use to-day will next year or the next after give place to forms yet more complicated but more efficient. On the other hand, when we turn our eyes backward we are impressed with the slow and ungeneral nature of our progress. Some fields are yet mowed and reaped by hand, some shops are still worked without the simplest of modern appliances, many homes lack yet the sewing-machine. Thus we see it is the labor of half of society to introduce and

in associations, or the experiences had with that which each word stands for. Now, finally, it differs in the *experiential occasions* for employing it. In other words, each man's instrument of expression differs greatly in all respects from other men's, but the uses to which he must put it differ yet more.

make general the ideas and practices long since left behind by progressive minds. Change requires inertia, progress demands conservatism. Otherwise there could be no proving of the new, no holding fast the old until its better come.

In poetry among the moderns we might set up as opposing examples of classic and romantic diction, Wordsworth and Browning. Wordsworth never used any term or expression not of good and regular standing in the speech of his day. On the other hand, Browning often fails of easy intelligibility because of the impulse not to say things as they have been said before, or in other people's ways. To go back further, of course, Shakespeare is the supreme autocrat of his own will with language. Correspondingly Pope is the chief among purists and precisians in our poetry. Among prosaists we may first set Addison over against Bunyan. Addison, perhaps, came nearest being merged in the Universally Best Style,—or, one might say, to falling into the sun; Bunyan's orbit surely is the broadest among all the planets of his era. But his centrifugality of diction does not consist in material departures from the sentence norms. His periods are too long,—probably, as has been elsewhere observed,¹ through no fault of his, but otherwise differ not greatly from those of the Bible, which was his only model. His individuality is manifested chiefly through novel expressions so superb and striking, like 'spill thy soul,' in the sentence of Apollyon, quoted (p. 325) above. Here we find the type of the modern romantic manner, which without fear or restraint will speak its mind by all the resources and power of speech. We easily identify the mode from Coleridge and Wilson down. The Scotch School helped romanticism of manner, since most who wrote in it were inspired by romanticism of matter. It was the ballad method extended to

¹ Page 288. The 'conventionalizing' punctuation of the 17th and 18th centuries is responsible for the abuse of the semicolon,—not yet corrected fully, which disfigures Bunyan's style. The sentence-sense not yet developed, printers seem to have conceived punctuation as merely an affair of mechanical proportions. Compare the sentence from Dryden, quoted on p. 286.

prose. What has been called New England Transcendentalism is but another manifestation of the same race-spirit.

But we may begin analysis nearer our own times. There are, of course, two extremes in literary tendency, the stiff and conscious-conventional, — represented we will say by Bancroft, and the lax and sensational as evinced by the dialect-humorists and in slang. The latter is the Marinism of English prose, the former is classicism pure and simple. Among living writers there is no other such eminent example of the correct manner as Walter Pater. Perhaps no piece of writing in our literature comes quite so near the ideal of classicism as the first paper in his volume named *Appreciations*. It is of the essence of Marinism to attempt sensational effects by form. The most celebrated example is the *Biglow Papers*. People in their day were led by the language to read the matter, and with results of influence that perhaps could not otherwise have been achieved. With authors having no loftier purpose than to amuse and thereby put money in their purse, Marinism is the only claim to literary notice. Lowell had other resources. His essays and other serious prose productions incline in some respects to classicism, but are so full of feeling as to carry them across to the romantic category. When a man gives way to the impulse to be personal and particular, and to speak his mind, his emotion will find its own avenues to expression. Lowell, knowing grammar and rhetoric, and recognizing all obligation thereto, lets his conviction do its work in its own way, and so writes in the true romantic manner. The mere humorist or slang-inventor, since wanting moral purpose, writes far below it. So also must any author whose inspiration does not in the main absorb anxiety for neat turns of phrase. A noble emotion will always find the worthy word without lucubrating search. Classicism begins with great models that were shaped in the heat of passion.

It is well known that the judges who apply old laws to new instances are producing perhaps as many fresh enactments as the law-makers. Somewhat similarly it is the romanticists of diction that are rivaling all other contributors of new meanings to our

dictionaries. They are continually making old words bear new burdens, they are incessantly attaching new elements of intension to well-tried terms. Moreover, while trying experiments upon old words, to make their intension different, they are also, for variety's sake or other reasons of their own, treating words with recognized shades of difference as synonymous. The successful experimenter must one way keep well within the bounds of purity and propriety, though in another (compare Holmes's 'atmospheric reformers,' p. 315) he go surprisingly beyond; and he must win acquiescence in advance. Some of these expressions will remain a marvel for their brilliancy and daring; others, like "good form," meeting a felt want, will be adopted into daily speech. Of the romantic manner in its latest phases, James and Howells are eminent representatives.

A style will then be classical when the author is concerned rather to meet the expectations and suit the general taste of his public than to speak his mind. People who are concerned about the impressions they make, try to speak and move in such ways as observers will approve and perhaps admire. A style will be romantic when the speaker or writer does not subdue himself to the lower pitch of his audience, but aims to raise them to his own enthusiasm. It will be marked specifically by the frequent words that stand out in some personal wise from the All Men's Best Style forming the basis of his mode. If he descend to dialect writing or to slang, he will expect to be ephemeral, and he will have his reward: but it will not be influence, and his work will not be literature. Extremes lie generally within the bounds of truth; hence truth in essence is likely to be found at some equilibrating point between. So far as criticism can forecast or control, the master of style should evince the union of both tendencies. He should be classical almost to chaste severity, yet obey an inspiration that insures expression for its whole of meaning. Classicism is thus exalted to something like individuality, while passion is generalized to the universal heart. Yet, practically, some Titan, some Byronic or Jean-Paul nature, is liable at any

moment to overthrow all prescription and declare a new literary dispensation. It is not classicism, in the last analysis, but romanticism, that makes authority.

The classification of prose literature, with reference to the purpose for which it is produced, need not detain us long. The most usual prose is, of course, what is called narration or description, constituting the bulk of the daily and weekly newspapers, as well as of the literature known as fiction. Here facts are told in such wise as to produce in the mind of the reader as nearly as possible the same impressions as the original experiences of them. There is little use of the imagination, and — except in fiction — little effort to arouse it. The mental mode is phantasy, and aims only at bringing before the mind what has been actual. When the author's purpose is to discuss the causes or effects of certain facts somewhat exhaustively, he will produce an essay or monograph, and write in what is called the Essay Style. History is both philosophic and annalistic, hence is written in a style formed by the union of the narrative or descriptive and the essay manner.

The oratorical style remains to be considered. The oration, like poetry, is emotional. It does not aim merely to kindle the imagination and produce the higher experiences of delight, but to occasion motives and enable some determinative state of the ego. We have already noted (p. 235) how nearly the exalted states of imagination are related to what is called Will. The orator aims to arouse such enthusiasm as will carry determinative effects with it. Since oratory is pre-eminently oral, it has followed that the oratorical style has differed materially from the book or essay style, — which, as was shown in Chapter XXIV., is generally cast in thought-units. The oratorical style uses the lower every-day units of presentation, and in form is of the simplest.

CHAPTER XXX.

THE PROSE USE OF THE IMAGINATION.

It was pointed out in Chapter II. that a main distinction between prose and poetry lies in the behavior of the ego or conscious principle under the given excitation. If the occasion of its activity be some appeal to the understanding or the reason, the effect is subject-matter for prose and not for poetry. If we apprehend in the occasion any considerable element of obligation to truth in material aspects, or to time and space relations, we *realize*; if not, we *idealize*. In other words, where the mind encounters or recognizes any element of duty, it consents to service. When it is stopped by no consciousness of duty, it seeks delight.

The inner mind or soul of man lives two lives, — that in which it does its work, and that in which it experiences its natural or chosen delights. The artisan, the lawyer, the merchant, have their place of business, their hours when they see and serve the public. When these are over we see them return to the other sphere, which we call the Home, where the really enjoyable part of life is lived. If it chance that the lawyer, the doctor, or the merchant have no family, yet his bachelor quarters are the real home and centre of his life. Here he is surrounded with objects adapted or selected to his taste, here he reads his favorite books, here entertains his friends, here in a large and various sense enjoys the comforts that his lot affords. There is an instinct which makes us enjoy what goes to make up our home, irrespective of what or where it is, simply because it is a home. Even the beasts of the

field and of the forest have their dens and lairs which they love as consecrated ground. They go forth to prowl and ravage, and wrest from nature by dint of strength or cunning their daily meat, then hie back to the joys of security and quiet. The soul or ego even of savage beasts, so far as these have any, must have its own home-life, and its own place to live it in.

But the home-life of the ego or soul of man is a large affair, and by no means bounded by what it may experience within four square walls. All that it can appropriate to itself of ultimate beauty, all that it is persuaded can be made to yield genuine delight, it claims as its own. So of its two lives it is ever trying to reduce the one to a minimum, and to expand the other to a maximum. The man of business who, in the day of small things, was his own bookkeeper, as a matter of course puts that work off upon a hireling just as soon as his profits will allow. In other words, he cuts down his hours of service and adds to his hours of comfort. To be sure, some men become so accustomed to work that they work for work's sake, are sorry to leave their counting-room or office when the day is done, but gravitate back thither evenings and Sundays, and all like times when other men are glad to stay away. But that is abnormal, and indicates some derangement or perversion of the natural mind. Of course, there are vocations, as the artist's, in which the work-a-day life of the ego is merged and blended with that of its delights. Such would be the ideal existence if there must be work at all. But the ego would fain eliminate such obligation altogether. To consent or submit to it, is not a native but an acquired characteristic of the mind. Proof of this we carry in our very consciousness. As children our natures demanded constant, uninterrupted joy. It was a slow, unwilling task to divide the life of diversion and sport, and give part of our energies to work. We have lately noted that, to the end there may be development or progress, there must be inertia to overcome; and, to overcome inertia, we must conquer our environment physically, intellectually, and spiritually. If we had gone on from childhood doing nothing but trying to find

diversion, life would long since have ceased to furnish us even requisite amusements. Both the lives of the ego must be lived, each as the complement to the other. Too much relaxation and pleasure-seeking breed spiritual sluggishness and *ennui*. There is but one class of human beings equally deserving of pity with those who have become jaded and aimless and dispirited, because overprivileged, — and that is the class who have no privileges at all.

Life, then, has for us both its poetic and its prose side. The ruling principle of the prose-life which we lead is Duty, the principle of the poetic is Delight.✓ The ego, when it is at work, in service, is under constraint and grave ; when it feels permitted to give itself up to delight it tries to make the most of its occasion, would turn every opportunity to account.} We feel under all circumstances that joy is our birthright, and that work, hard, insistent, honest work is meritorious, and should bring some superior compensation in rest and joy. It is instinctive with us to assume that life means something good and substantial in enjoyment, that, though we submit to service, it is not the end of being. Even in earliest childhood we were inclined to resent the sensations of pain as a perversion of our rights. Thus is Delight not only as one of the inborn types, all hints and elements of which prompt to idealization, but is a generic name for all the types or ideals themselves, from which come our experiences of joy. Thus is the inner spiritual life of the ego demonstrably its native primal mode, while the outer or material is but disciplinary and incidental. If the Monistic Philosophy shall prove that even outer, material things are but spiritual phenomena, though of a provisional accessory kind, on what grounds can we doubt that the spiritual life is also the ultimate mode of consciousness?

Admitting, at any rate, that both the poetic and the prosaic modes are normal and necessary forms of the mind's activity, let us proceed to distinguish the one from the other in literary wise. That we do this practically and unconsciously in even the simplest mental processes needs but a moment's thought to prove. A man

rises to speak before us, — we will say, Stanley, — come to tell what he saw and did in Darkest Africa. We find ourselves accordingly taking every statement from the first literally and seriously, and trying to realize it through the language he uses as a letter of directions ; but suppose, without giving us notice of his intention, he stops his narration and begins quoting some poetical passage related in matter to his theme. We at first take this like the rest and try to realize the language literally, until we note the meter or the rhyme. Immediately we check and correct ourselves. We stop trying to represent in thought just how the objects mentioned looked or seemed, but instead cognize them as elements or signs of types through which we may experience or have experienced spiritual delight. We take these shreds and fragments of spiritual experiences as potentially spiritual wholes, or through them — in other words — idealize. We no longer care for material truth. The speaker has himself released us from the duty of realizing exact physical relations, hence we with him seek delight. We have passed from the world of fact and obligation to the world of ideals. Though it is but for the moment, though in the next breath he will go on with his prose narration, we are yet glad he authorized the relief, perhaps wish that it were longer. But if the same poetic sentences had been spoken by another — heard, for instance, at the identical moment from without the room, we should have disregarded their purport, and controlled our attention to the prose words of our own speaker. We should cognize the rival sentences intellectually, no doubt along with the next utterances of our lecturer, but wholly deny them the idealizing effect that they, in the other instance, would have had with us.

The two activities of the mind thus illustrated are distinguished as Phantasy and Imagination. When the ego restricts itself to the imaging of facts, refusing to look beyond into their quality or their final meanings, the operation is Phantasy. If we bring back to mind a face, merely as composed of certain features, and not as beautiful or repulsive, or think of a grand cathedral as of such and such proportions, but not as the embodiment of an idea, we

exercise only phantasy. (But the complete unrestricted activity of the ego adds to intellectual perception or judgment the discernment also of spiritual quality, and permits the exercise of the resulting or accompanying emotion.) When we construct in fancy not only the physical features of a face, but also make the spiritual type appear, so that the character, the soul, is most vividly cognized, the process or activity is imagination.) In the former mode we keep our minds more or less completely from recognition of moral excellence or beauty, and its consequent effect upon the feelings, because bound to give strict heed to material proportions or relations. In the latter we disregard all exterior or material considerations except in so far as they enable or contribute to delight. All our delights come from or through the types by idealization. Imagination is the generic name of the common emotional element in each of its processes.)

The term imagination is often used loosely to designate the process of representing in thought what is not present or apparent to the physical eye. The true relations of phantasy and imagination may be easily illustrated by comparing the procedures of the historian and the novelist. The task of each, we will suppose, is to exhibit the life of an earlier generation, as in a *Reign of Queen Anne*, or a *Henry Esmond*. The historian will examine the records of court and parliament, read the books of the time, with private letters and journals. He will study the dress, the cuisine, the etiquette, the social habits of that day. When the known of fact and truth, in parts and fragments, has been exhausted, he will begin to piece out from them the wholes which they potentially represent, much as the paleontologist completes the skeleton of which he has found dislocated and sequestered portions. But he will take great pains not to ascribe parts to wholes to which they never literally belonged. His first business is to be, not spiritually but materially, true. His mind is

¹ Even the physical appetencies in their way are 'types,' and include, in greater or less proportion, a spiritual element.

continually rising to states of imagination as he detects in some fact or circumstance the suggestion of a type that may have been present actually in the life. But he will keep all such fancies, however delectable, out of his pages. Like the paleontologist, tempted to see an advanced, anticipated characteristic or function in the fossil remains before him, he refuses to consider what he cannot demonstrate objectively. The novelist, on the other hand, will sacrifice no such opportunity. He is writing to the sensibilities, not the intelligence, of his readers; and they expect him to exhibit personages which they can get into sympathy with, such acts or qualities as will enable idealization and bring delight. If the author be of such imaginative enthusiasm as would fain override all material limitations, he will shape his novel chiefly of romantic happenings. If he be, like Thackeray, realistic, he will find pleasure for himself and for his public in more ordinary circumstances and experiences, entirely such as may well enough have been actual in the times considered. In any case it is the author's own ideals of truth or excellence that will hold sway, and the more realistic the less impracticable and distorted. Even those of us who are not novelists do continually, in our own minds, the same things that Thackeray has done in *Henry Esmond*. Or, to consider an especial illustration, if one should attempt to figure to one's thought of what sort must have been the New England Puritan Sabbath of the seventeenth century, he will begin, like the historian, by representing certain fundamental and necessary facts, but afterwards add in detail other facts or objects or characteristics entirely of his own choosing. He will put before his consciousness, perhaps, some village he has seen that was actually existent in that day, altering the picture to square with ancient types and conditions, then add the sky and sunshine, the hills, and trees, and faces which he loves to see. If he admires the stern Puritan devotion to principle, he will represent certain of their ascetic acts or practices, and idealize from them. Or, if he be of those who can see nothing grand or noble in the New England character, through representing the same things, he will derive

for himself an agreeable experience of the opposite kind.¹ In any case, it is clear where phantasy ends and imagination begins. What we put in as essential for truth's sake is of the phantasy, what for our pleasure, of imagination.

There is thus evidently a principle by which the ego in controlling its states is enabled to determine precedence of types. That principle is the supremacy of truth over beauty, and of duty over delight. We saw in Chapter XVII. that ideals in the last analysis are made up of the two elements of ultimate truth and ultimate beauty. There is no such thing as absolute truth or beauty in this material world, as we know it. The ego will not have it so, but insists on taking any sign of the existence of either as a proof and earnest of its presence in unconditioned forms. Here is a fact which explains, so far as explanation is possible, the operation of the mind alike in figures, idealization, and art (pp. 67, 94, and 130). *(The ego in imagination sees the consistent whole which each part argues and postulates.)* Men, for example, are not perfect as they should be, else would each element of the faultless character be an earnest of the whole indeed. But imagination insists on assuming so and acting upon the assumption, so that a single good deed is at once referred to a perfect motive as its cause, and then the whole character or soul of which this should be a part is conceived and contemplated with delight. Imagination thus, or the ego in its undiverted, unconstrained activity, subjectively cognizes ultimate truth and ultimate beauty as one.

It was further observed in Chapter XVII. that there is no such thing as ultimate beauty apart from truth, and that final truth can never be wholly devoid of beauty. But the mind is constituted with such limitations that it cannot discern ultimate truth and

¹ The essential fact to be realized is, that which is presented to the mind in such case is what the mind wants to see. This may be, as in the work of the artist, what it delights to behold, or is stirred to opposite tragic feelings in contemplating. But it will be what exalts the emotions. Were there not the one or the other effect, it would not involve imagination.

beauty in the full significance of each together ; it must often cognize the two elements separately. Idealization could not well go on in this imperfect world if the whole of truth were apparent in each phase or circumstance of beauty. Thus there is opportunity for the seer to give himself to aspects of truth, while the poet supplements by interpreting aspects of beauty. The ego in seership seeks the elimination of mysteries, and the cognition of objects in definite relations. The imagination projects objects out of definite into indeterminate situations, and would fain exchange comprehended relations for mystery. Even the mathematical or the scientific consciousness can easily suspend in thought the operation or obligation of actual laws, and conceive the inauguration of new forms of force. It is wholly natural for the ego upon occasion freakishly to swing loose from the exactions of fact and of fixed relations. When some pretender offers to break a drouth and produce abundant rainfall, on notice and for hire, do we find it so very difficult for the moment to conceive the transaction actual? The ego, in other words, insists in spite of itself upon the possibility of the impossible, assumes that some occult principle may have been or might be reached potential of such effect. It seems intuitively aware that the scope and range of spiritual force is infinite, and that the limitations of its daily world are only apparent, not absolute or actual. Hence the familiar paradox that a thing may be both false yet true. A Desdemona may tell spiritual truths to an Othello, who, expecting literalness, will pronounce them arrant falsehoods. This is, of course, the philosophy of what is called fiction. The facts and the relations may be unactual, while the essential truths may be of the eternal verities. Ultimate truth discerned with reference to its laws and limitations produces Science ; spiritual beauty apprehended in pure forms inspires to utterance in Poetry.

It is demonstrably impossible to engage in any new or untrite intellectual procedure without some participancy in it of the feelings. There must indeed be feeling always, in its degree, no matter how prosaic or insignificant the transaction, and whether new

or old. The modes and varieties of emotion are well-nigh endless, and often shade over into each other in almost imperceptible ways. We have already noted, as far back as Chapter VI., that there is Association of Moods as well as Association of Ideas, though the latter is dependent upon the former. To assure ourselves of the swift and incessant changes of feeling, we have but to watch the expression of any person known to be emotional while he talks or listens in ordinary conversation. Man differs signally from the lower orders in possessing such control of the muscles of the face as enables him to reveal the state of his feelings without use of the voice. Civilized society would scarcely indeed be possible if he were without the power to laugh or frown, or were not enough developed emotionally to require it. There is, moreover, always some certain degree of emotion permissible in every prose transaction of whatsoever kind. Sometimes it must not change or color the action in the slightest,—as of the surgeon's sympathy in a delicate operation. If he realize what he is doing, he will be unnerved. Sometimes, and most frequently, it is desirable that the action be colored and perhaps embellished through effect of the emotion. The business man may have a handsomely appointed counting-room, and even hang valuable pictures upon its walls. But these should not be of the old masters, or otherwise savor of what we call pure art. That would be what is termed 'bad taste,' which phrase assumes that there is some right proportion in which business or duty may be mingled with delight, and insists upon that proportion. When that proportion is found, we declare that it is an exhibition of 'good taste,' or that the thing is done handsomely, or gracefully, or daintily. But when an act or process involves imagination not incidentally but essentially, or in such wise that the element of emotion controls instead of being controlled, we have a set of terms much stronger; we say that the affair is 'perfect,' or that the feat has been 'splendidly,' or 'brilliantly,' or 'superbly' achieved.

The ego sternly controls the degree of imagination in all modes of intelligence or judgment, so that emotion may not be para-

mount over reason. The craftsman must not carve or enchase his product until spoiled for use. The building must not sacrifice its purpose to beauty. The clerk fond of rhyming must do his lines at home, and not in his employer's day-book, while he should engross. Furthermore, this control of the ego over its states not only suppresses strong emotion for cause in prose circumstances, but grades the lesser element of feeling according to seemliness, — this also one of the inherent types of the mind. The man who in narrating some little incident should essay to be pathetic would be ridiculous. The pathos of nature is always in order; the pathos of man waits upon the sense of the assembly. No matter how moving the spectacle to be described, if the circumstances or temper of the listeners are too prosaic to warrant the speaker's giving way to sentiment, he must tell his story as an affair of fact, and let the condition of imagination come to his hearers' minds, if it will, of its own motion. When by common consent the outer conditions are adjusted to the imaginative pitch, the voice of emotion may be heard. It is not in order to pronounce a panegyric in a factory or a cornfield, — or indeed preach a sermon or recite a poem, unless the audience invite. Misjudgment as to the degree of imagination to be indulged in the prose-presence of our fellows is an irretrievable calamity. It not only fails of awakening sympathy, but provokes derision; whereby influence is forfeited forever.

In literature taste manifests itself not only negatively, by excluding what would be inappropriate to the theme or the occasion, but also positively, in seeking out and incorporating proper refinements and adornings. The first and simplest of its manifestations, just as in the control of personality in social presence, is what has been called Dignity, or Tone. Here, indeed, we approach close to individuality; so that when this has its chief expression in tone or dignity, the latter quality becomes synonymous with style, as considered in the last chapter. Clearly dignity or tone are negative manifestations, since they prevent the use of terms too low or too familiar in their associations. As for

positive or contributive manifestations of taste, these are spoken of for the most part generically under the name of Elegance. Even in so prosaic an affair as saying 'good morrow' to a neighbor, taste, both negative and positive, may be exhibited. The reporter's item in the newspaper descriptive of some local happening should be concise, and business-like, and true, and very properly might, — indeed, in all likelihood one day will, — be characterized both by dignity and elegance. But histories, and essays, and lectures, and sermons, should employ imagination in the form and to the degree called elegance without fail. It is a source of power which no reader of Fiske, or Hawthorne, or Lowell, no hearer of Curtis, or Phillips Brooks, needs to have identified. It consists in such selection and employment of experiential, figurative, and associational words or phrases as will keep emotion at its proper pitch throughout.

But for writers essaying Elegance there are numerous pitfalls, which only wary minds escape. When the temptation to introduce the element of fancy in undue proportion is yielded to, the result is what is called 'fine writing.' Or, we may say, it is the consequence of attempting to work off products of the imagination as proper prose matter, of taking advantage of a prose occasion to say what might perhaps, under proper circumstances, have risen to the dignity of poetry. Practically the fault is committed much less frequently in the use of poetic matter than of the poetic manner. Here, also, the common sense of every writer effectually prevents the use of solemn style verb-forms in *-est* and *-eth*, together with terms strictly poetic, like *morn*, *ope*, *oft*, — except playfully, or to the extent of a phrase or two. The evil is confined for the most part to figures calling for more than a prose-exercise of the imagination. The proper use of a figure in prose is not to draw the feelings into play by showing the spiritual, truer, or superior in excellence to the literal, but by making the literal plainer in its literal relations. Hence figures that cause emotion to stand between the mind and its thought, defeat their purpose and introduce an element of weakness. A diction that

interferes with the prose progress of the reader by use of poetic figures is called 'florid,' or 'flowery.' Yet metaphors and other figures once highly experiential may, through loss of emotional potency, by long use have become prosaic merely. A correct spiritual discernment within, reinforced by much acquaintance with best literary instances without, can alone determine whether a given word appeals to imagination too strongly for prose employment.

CHAPTER XXXI.

THE INTER-RELATIONS OF PROSE AND POETRY.

It was pointed out in Chapter XVII. that there are two fundamental principles in the universe which the mind of each of us is bound to recognize and regard, — which principles are ultimate truth and ultimate beauty. Both these are but imperfectly apprehensible to the natural mind, but in so far as recognized produce the attitudes or modes of consciousness called respectively Duty and Delight. In the last chapter it was also indicated that the sum of all activities in society, whether in æsthetic, scientific, or industrial lines, are governed or inspired by motives belonging, in the last analysis, to the one category or the other. There is no piece of literature, properly so called, that is not the outcome of a purpose either to disseminate truth or impart enjoyment. The mind that has discerned truth in a Bacon's way will for truth's sake formulate it, and cast it in a shape available for present and after time. The seer that discerns ultimate truth in less conditioned forms, after the manner of an Emerson, is prompted to give to the world even his lesser illumination. So a Shakespeare or a Browning, who feels the exaltation of beauty, is moved to share it with his fellows, and receive the reward, or temporary opprobrium, of being its exponent or apostle. All literature is, therefore, in an important sense sentiment-literature, and is in itself a record of what men have felt.

But while Duty is deliberative and exhibited through some form of determination, Delight is spontaneous and eager. The literature of the imagination will be more sprightly and free than prose

proper. We may look for dissimilarities in the form of prose and of poetry beyond mere rhyme and metre. We saw in Chapter II. that poetry abounds in exclamatory expressions, in which a single word does the work of a whole prose clause. In Chapter X. it was made clear that the tendency in imagination is to reduce analogies, and even allegories to single terms. Facts like these cannot but affect the sentence proportions of poetic styles. It was pointed out on page 291, we shall remember, that Chaucer's prose periods differ greatly from his poetic. The average number of words in each period of the *Melibeus* is 48.99; but of the *Prologue*, 285 sentences by Skeat's punctuation, 23.49 words per sentence. Most of the periods in the *Prologue* are of the simplest oral kind, like ours in modern prose; and Skeat is undeniably right in taking out the semicolons by which Tyrwhitt, after the fashion of his century, tried to reduce so many of them to inorganic component clauses. Applying the same principles of punctuation to the *Knights Tale* and *Legend of Goode Women*, as also to the *Dethe of Blanche* and the *Parlament of Foules*, we find the above average sustained in each with the final result of 23.35. The difference, moreover, in predications and simple sentences is not less marked, as the following exhibit by hundreds will show:—

<i>Prologue, Knights Tale.</i>				<i>Melibeus.</i>			
	Predic- ations.	Simp. Sents.			Predic- ations.	Simp. Sents.	
First 100 periods,	2.49	32		First 100 periods,	6.16	4	
Second 100 periods,	2.44	31		Second 100 periods,	5.25	6	
Third " "	3.05	19		Third " "	4.68	6	
Fourth " "	3.56	22		Fourth " "	4.66	2	
Fifth " "	3.12	14		Rem'ing 80 "	5.50	2	
Average 500 periods,	2.93	24		Average 480 periods,	5.25	4	

Spenser has also differences of the same sort,—though the punctuation apparently disguises the organic sentence proportions in both exhibits:—

<i>Faerie Queene.</i>			<i>View of the S. of Ireland.</i>		
	Predic- ations.	Simp. Sents.		Predic- ations.	Simp. Sents.
First 100 periods,	4.40	6	Sixth 100 periods,	5.07	10
Second 100 periods,	4.81	4	Seventh 100 periods,	5.73	5
Third " "	5.92	6	Eighth " "	6.47	4
Fourth " "	4.59	9	Ninth " "	5.99	7
Fifth " "	4.91	5	Tenth " "	7.00	2
Average 500 periods,	4.93	6	Average 1069 periods,	5.44	8

Furthermore Dryden, it will be interesting to note, writes lighter sentences in poetry than in prose, with almost as large per cent of simple sentences as Chaucer.

<i>Absalom and Achitophel, Part I.; Hind and Panther.</i>			<i>Dramatic Poesy.</i>		
	Predic- ations.	Simp. Sents.		Predic- ations.	Simp. Sents.
First 100 periods,	3.75	12	First 100 periods,	6.14	4
Second 100 periods,	3.10	22	Second 100 periods,	5.86	1
Third " "	2.81	26	Third " "	4.73	8
Fourth " "	3.03	15	Fourth " "	3.78	8
Fifth " "	3.45	13	Fifth " "	4.04	9
Average 500 periods,	3.23	18	Average 521 periods,	4.91	6

As the prose sentence descends to organic oral proportions it will naturally approach more and more nearly, and perhaps fully reach, the poetic limit. It has in fact crossed this and become yet shorter. No poet save Chaucer has written in averages so low as those found in Macaulay's prose,¹ and since Shakespeare sentential

¹ "Ossian" excepted. Moreover, in Chaucer's sentence length and predication average as just exhibited may we not read the chief reason he has remained inimitable through so many generations? No poetic writer, save Shakespeare (cf. p. 358), even distantly approaches him in naïve simplicity and brevity of sentence form. How could poets writing in numerical and predicational averages twice as great resemble him? Here we have the criterion that promises to settle definitively the question of Chaucer's authorship of the doubtful poems. The *Flower and the Leaf* and *Chaucer's Dream*, for instance, show numerical sentence averages of not less than 47.47 and 48.94 words respectively. The requisite data from the *Romaunt of the Rose* are now in hand but await verification.

development in poetry has been going the other way. It seems hardly to be questioned that a terse prose style will be exchanged for a somewhat diffuse poetic, when a prosaist essays to write seriously in verse. Suggestive evidence to this effect is found in Shelley and Macaulay. Unfortunately neither these nor other reputable authors have written sufficiently in both prose and verse for a final test. An examination of such poetry from prose hands as is available gives rise to a strong presumption that the prose manner under all circumstances is distinct from the poetic. For instance, Arnold's *Sohrab and Rustum* and *Essays* exhibit these differences :¹—

<i>Sohrab and Rustum; Balder Dead.</i>			<i>Milton; Wordsworth; Byron.</i>		
	Predic- ations.	Simp. Sents.		Predic- ations.	Simp. Sents.
First 100 periods,	4.30	15	First 100 periods,	2.73	24
Second 100 periods,	4.61	16	Second 100 periods,	2.54	22
First " "	3.81	15	Third " "	2.93	15
Second " "	3.57	15	Fourth " "	2.82	18
Third " "	3.96	8	Fifth " "	2.82	20
Average 500 periods,	4.05	14	Average 500 periods,	2.77	20

We may compare also, as a poet of more popular accomplishments, Holland :—

<i>Kathrina; Bitter Sweet.</i>			<i>Plain Talks.</i>		
	Predic- ations.	Simp. Sents.		Predic- ations.	Simp. Sents.
First 100 periods,	3.42	15	First 100 periods,	2.99	25
Second 100 periods,	3.34	17	Second 100 periods,	3.51	13
Third " "	3.56	15	Third " "	3.23	23
First " "	3.64	24	Fourth " "	2.64	24
Second " "	3.60	19	Fifth " "	2.78	19
Average 500 periods,	3.51	18	Average 500 periods,	3.03	21

¹ With these results compare (p. 267) the exhibit from Lowell's prose. The average of predications in the *Cathedral* and other long-lined poems,—not burlesque, is at least 4.30; of simple sentences, 13.

To illustrate how closely great poets adhere to their sentence norms, even at widely removed periods of composition, we may instance further averages from Shakespeare and Browning:¹—

Love's Labor's Lost.

	Predications.	Simp. Sents.	Clauses Saved.
First 100 periods . .	2.97	21	6.11
Second 100 periods . .	2.54	32	4.90
Third " " . .	2.65	29	1.48
Fourth " " . .	2.75	25	3.50
Fifth " " . .	3.02	24	4.43
Average 500 periods . .	2.79	26	4.08

Tempest.

First 100 periods . .	2.46	30	8.20
Second 100 periods . .	2.84	31	3.40
Third " " . .	2.93	27	3.30
Fourth " " . .	2.53	34	.78
Fifth " " . .	3.21	20	3.63
Average 500 periods . .	2.79	28	3.86

Sordello.

First 100 periods . .	3.49	19	16.50
Second 100 periods . .	3.71	30	12.50
Third " " . .	3.05	27	8.95
Fourth " " . .	4.38	27	8.94
Fifth " " . .	3.47	22	10.79
Average 500 periods . .	3.62	25	11.54

Ring and the Book (Guido).

First 100 periods . .	3.49	29	5.93
Second 100 periods . .	3.58	29	2.71
Third " " . .	3.77	17	4.56
Fourth " " . .	3.43	32	6.79
Fifth " " . .	3.12	23	5.17
Average 500 periods . .	3.48	26	5.03

¹ Averages obtained from the prose of these authors are as follows. Shakespeare: predications, 2.76; simple sentences, 31; per cent clauses saved, 4.46. Browning: predications, 3.19; simple sentences, 23; per cent clauses saved, 11.

It is interesting to note that the abnormal condensation of the *Sordello* manifests itself only in the third column of the above results from Browning's poetry.

There are material differences between the earliest and the modern poetic manner which in a measure explain the remarkable exhibit from Chaucer above. It was indicated at the opening of Chapter II. that poets of the present day incline rather to epithets than verbs in the effort to indicate experiential quality. This was not the case in Chaucer's times. The poetical unit of thought with him is yet the mediæval allegory; and sometimes he makes this unit of thought the unit of presentation, — as at the opening of the *Prologue*.¹ But oftener his unit of expression is the allegory in clause presentation. This is the explanation of many passages that now seem to us so strained, — like

The bloode was fled for pure drede
Doun to hys herte, to make hym warme.

Cultivated readers of this day apprehend potentially in fancy all that Chaucer predicates as if literal transactions, or calls by personifying names. As we saw in Chapter X., our poets have found out how to make a single element of an allegory, or single word, like "astray," from an allegorical sentence, carry the effect of the whole. We saw also that midway between word and clause analogies come fifth-class phrases, which Chaucer scarcely knows. The fifth-class phrase consists of two points in which the imagination sees two parallels as if produced indefinitely; or rather discerns, looking along the line of one of these potential parallels, the act or quality belonging to the other. Naturally Chaucer, who always projects his parallels, has little use for them shut up in two phrase-terms, or 'points.'

When with Shelley and Keats and Landor the day of phrases is fully come, the periodic oral structure now so nearly reached

¹ In the age before Chaucer the allegory was both the unit of thought and of presentation. Chaucer uses this unit of thought as the unit of presentation in the *Deeth of Blanche* and *Parlament of Foules*, but exhibits, more especially in his latest poems, some unconscious dissatisfaction with a unit so unwieldy. Hence apparently his attempt to condense his allegoric thought to clause-presentation in the first eleven lines of the *Prologue*, and other more successful examples in the *Knights Tale*.

in prose gives way. The loose epithetic or appositional construction found in Anglo-Saxon poets, and so frequent in Spenser, again appears. Thus good and sufficient reasons why Chaucer comes more nearly the modern norm of prose structure than any other poet of reputation suggest themselves. He is full of poetic feeling, discerned allegorically, and must give expression to it in categoric wise, like the prosaist, in clause presentation. He fairly may be said to *talk* his poetry, so anxious is he to avoid seeming oracular or professional. Thus, though he cannot be simple and oral in his prose, he cannot help being for the most part periodic in his poetry. It is the instinct in speech that the mind, after delivery of a judgment, rest for an infinitesimal point of time, and the space between sentences on the printed page permits that pause. It is like the blacksmith's setting his hammer upon the anvil every few seconds. It is a very slight respite, but it is enough. The sentence point is an organic thing, and marks the fact that the writer's mind has let go its hold for this infinitesimal space. The child that reads over periods, and stops for breath without regard to sense a word or two beyond, has not yet learned to rest, since, indeed, it has not yet learned to work, its mind. If the modern book, written to economize time and energy in the new-articulated style, were printed with semicolons for periods, all readers would quickly tire, though they might not quite know the reason. Realizing facts by determinative control of the imaging powers is wearisome; and other things equal, the oftener the periods the oftener the relief. But when the imaging powers are not controlled by prose obligation, they go on unfatigued much longer. In states of imagination the mind sees one spectacle, in panoramic fashion, give place to another without very definite division. In prose, the course of phantasy is stopped and started by the "Will," and even in whimsical exercise is more or less under the determinative control of the ego. On the contrary, in sleep the phantasy is left to unrestricted action, and on sufficient occasion from without or from within may rise to imagina-

tion.¹ Poetry like Chaucer's has all the course of phantasy and imagination mapped out; Shelley's is more dreamy, each mood growing, as in dreams, out of the preceding. While Chaucer sometimes makes a sentence with eleven predications, he will offset the effect by many periods containing each but a single verb. Shelley, on the other hand, writes phrases for twenty lines, and but seldom closes a period with a single predicate. We are therefore not surprised to find the later poet writing periods much longer, numerically, than the earlier, and averaging fifty per cent higher in predications.

It is, then, evident that the simple-sentence sense which appears fairly developed in Chaucer's poetry, and is evinced about as prominently in Shelley's prose, is not much at work in the poetry of the phrase school. Shakespeare we find is in sentence proportions, as in all other points, inimitable. He uses Chaucer's clause presentation as well as Shelley's phrase forms, and at will wields also, by anticipation, the tremendous word analogies of our day, yet without varying his structure. He is the only universal master of style,—seemingly because he never found the pen a greater obstacle to perfect expression than the voice. As we have seen, the period-stop, a respite in prose, if freely used in poetry of Shelley's sort, would break the trains of association too rudely. But Shakespeare so girds the loins of his mind as to need the same serious virile manner both in prose and verse, and in *Midsummer Night's Dream* as well as *Hamlet*. The language of the emotions is simple and cast in the living forms of speech. Why then should not poetic diction show more of the simple-sentence structure? After phrases give place to the tremendous concentration of the word analogy, the sentence should grow back

¹ Proof that the states of phantasy in sleep may rise to imagination seems present in the fact—established by the recent experiments of Professor Mosso—that the temperature of the brain perceptibly rises through the occasion of noises made near enough to a sleeper to be noticed, but not so loud as to awaken. The heat is manifestly not the result of hearing, but of interpreting, the sounds.

towards its proportions in the *Beowulf*,¹ as it apparently is doing. A consistent repointing, according to modern principles, should reduce the predication average in Browning, who is an eighteenth century punctuator, at least a third.

The differences between prose and verse in sentence forms are therefore not easily apparent or of immediate concern. The vital distinction was long thought to consist in metre and rhyme, or the absence of the one or both. It was pointed out in Chapter VII. that the real basis of rhythm is the relation or distribution of the marks of thought emphasis or of force. The more cultivated the ear and the mind the less necessity of metronomic rhythm; and perfect prose may be more harmonious than mechanical poetry. The untutored negro seems incapable of religious emotion save through the occasion of certain swift recurrent sounds. The child in the nursery likes only the rhymes and jingles of sharp, quick rhythm. Little by little the mind, discovering the sublime harmony of dashing waves, or the swell and lull of storms, cares less and less for stereotyped and clock-tick regularity. It is a sign of the times that Homer and Dante are admittedly best translatable into rhythmic prose. The imagination demands ceaseless variety and tires soonest of repetition. The rhythm of art approaches nearest the rhythm of nature when least calculated and inflexible.

Moreover, while prose has outwardly been growing more and more like poetry in oral organic manner, and poetry like prose in free and varied harmony, each has been approaching the other also in interior aspects and character. The authors of our earliest prose English, to wit, the Anglo-Saxon *Chronicle*, had much ado to put down the mere fact of a battle or the sacking of some town; they could by no means achieve accompanying hints to the reader of the anguish and heartache and misery that their annalistic facts implied. Even in the generation before Shakespeare

¹ In the first episode of that poem, according to Skeat's principles of punctuation, there are 518 periods and 1039 verbs. The second and the third division, from the inferior manner and quality of the 'effects' employed, are demonstrably of different authorship.

there was yet no emotional prose. It is not until we reach the beginnings of novel-making in the *Arcadia* and *Euphues* that we come upon anything like what we may call a sympathetic prose. This after the rise of the 'Scotch School' becomes a power in the world of books, and reaches its acme of effect perhaps in Hawthorne. The rise of the novel marks the beginning of what we may call interpretative prose writing, — that is, such prose in narrative or essay forms as gives not only facts or judgments, but communicates to the reader at least the pitch of emotion properly attendant upon the theme. Here begins a new epoch in the history of influence, the communication of sentiment along with fact, so that even in science the savant will fail not to give his reader along with ultimate truth the clue in each case to somewhat of ultimate beauty as well. A hundred and fifty years ago even poetry was composed of conceits, not feeling. To-day even prose is made up in good degree of sentiment along with thought, with few or no conceits at all. Conceits are properly the product of what in rhetoric is called invention. The age is too busy to regard what through 'invention' *might* be said professionally on a given theme, is concerned only with what *must* be said and known, and is not above admitting to its sympathy everything worth sympathizing with. Even the morning newspaper often addresses the sentiments rather than the understanding, not only in the editorial columns where it is partisan, and in the topics pages where it is interpretative, but even in the telegraphic paragraphs. We need but recall the Associated Press dispatches concerning the death of Mrs. Harrison, or the cablegram descriptive of the last moments of Tennyson, for illustration.

While prose has been becoming the vehicle of emotion to a degree in excess of some poetry of earlier times, poetry has appropriated in the mode called Realism not a little of what was long considered the domain of prose. Realism takes the world as men find it, and even in annalistic details brings to light the ultimate truth or beauty. Thus the essential differences between prose and poetry lie clearly beyond the form, within the spirit, and can

scarcely be categorically declared. When the ego may give itself wholly to delight, its literary diversion will be poetry. When it must deal with facts in the prose way, there may be incidental pleasure so far as consistent with the given obligation. It was made clear in the last chapter that all literature of the present time includes just as much of imagination as the theme or the occasion will allow. Poetry is becoming an open book to all readers for the same reason that prose is becoming interpretative and emotional,—namely, because the facts of life and of the universe are beginning to take on their spiritual significance. Perhaps discipline has in us its perfect work when we restore the unity of ultimate truth and beauty by finding a cardinal delight in duty. There is no difference between the world of prose and of poetry save in the attitude and cognition of the sentient soul.

It is often said that this is an age marked by the dearth of poetry. To be sure, the century has produced only two poets of the highest class, but the rediscovery and appropriation of Shakespeare are equivalent to the addition of a third. It would seem this were enough. The truth is that while there is less new poetry abroad in books, there is vastly more old or common poetry potentially within. We still have need of great poets, who shall keep in advance of spiritual expansion, and reveal what after generations are to appropriate and realize; but there is no place for professional imitators and copyers of earlier or later masters. There are no duplicates in nature, nor in art of the highest kind. We should look for no new poets until the spiritual culture of the times has overtaken those we have already. The poets of the past are still doing their work, directly or indirectly, with the masses of men. The reader who enjoys Scott but not Shakespeare, is father of the man who will read not only Shakespeare but Tennyson. The poetic joys of our ancestors could be induced only by fierce metaphors, violent personifications, or the marvels of man and nature. But exceptional experiences wait upon exceptional conditions or occasions. The poetic delights of the Aryan chief or tenth-century viking were but sporadic and adventitious.

We through our finer sensibilities may enjoy poetry every hour. Moreover, the power to derive a poetic experience out of each normal aspect of our environment has been developed in us through the poetry or the effects of poetry in minds that have influenced us ; for ideals come to us through books, not men. So, instead of saying this is an age marked by the decay of sentiment or poetry, let us call it the day of its triumph and enthronement. There are few poets, perhaps, that we specifically admire ; but this may be because we are more fond of poetry than of poets. It is the era of common minds and culture, of average men and women ; and though these may not possess select libraries of verse, they are quicker in sympathetic perception of the beautiful than many technical lovers of poetry alone. They should be drawn, and in the next generation will be drawn, to know the fuller inspiration of the loftiest minds. But they have a better experimental knowledge of poetry than their betters in culture of a century ago. A century hence, statisticians tell us, the speakers of English will number not less than a billion souls. It is surely no accident that the greatest inspirer by forms of art that ever lived, and the two most dynamic poets that ever wrote, cast their works in the English tongue.

We have reached the end of our attempt to analyze the elements and the sources of power in English prose and poetry. We end as we began, with the observation that only those books capable of *being something to* those who read them belong to literature. The use of literature is not knowledge, or diversion, but influence. Men resist such influences as they find unwelcome, or are not in sympathy with by inward preparation. But what men are prepared to receive, whether by grace or culture, they accept most gladly. The man who cannot read is cut off from the world of influence except so far his daily environment can furnish it approach. The end of reading is not to provide a cosmopolitan accomplishment, but to bring the universe to each man's door. Men do not exist in order that they may know Dante or Shake-

sppeare or Goethe ; but Dante and Shakespeare and Goethe have lived and written that men might know them, and through them all secular spiritual things. The world's literature at best is but an ephemeral and paltering attempt to declare the truths of man and nature, or interpret universal beauty, and was not called into being for its own sake. A law library does not exist for itself at all, or that men may master its contents, but in them learn how to read as open secrets the rights and obligations of mankind in the world without. Poets do not fulfil their mission in raising all men to the accomplishment of knowing and admiring their work. Only a small part of possible spiritual delight is revealed or evinced in them. They are only models by whom all may learn how to be their own interpreters, and see the open secrets at first hand for themselves. Men cannot learn ultimate truths as individuals, without co-operation, but only through literature, which focuses all minds on each. *Every man his own seer and poet* is the end of culture and the consummation of society.

NOTES.

CHAPTER I.

PAGE 5, par. 2, l. 16. See De Quincey's *Letters to a Young Man*, No. III. For a more complete discussion of the departments of literature, see the last two chapters of this volume.

P. 5, par. 2, l. 18. For a convenient reference, if the student need, let him compare Macaulay, in *Essay on Milton*, after the introductory paragraphs. But as to the decline of poetry there affirmed, he should bear in mind that the same conditions are discussed, later in this work, with a quite different conclusion.

CHAPTER II.

PAGE 6, l. 1. But, strictly, nothing is or can be *conveyed* from one mind to another. The speaker merely uses *signs* which the hearer *interprets*; and the writer, visual representatives of such spoken signs.

P. 6, l. 6. The intention to produce in the hearer's mind precisely the same fact or judgment had in the mind of the speaker is a prose-purpose. This requires, on the part of the speaker, definite and advised selection of signs to designate accurately the *things*, as also the *states* or *relations*, in which they are described or contemplated. It requires on the part of the reader, not only the operation of conceiving pictorially or symbolically the objects named in their specific plights or relations, but also the effort of restricting or correcting the products represented according to the organic unity recognized in the meaning as a whole. This may be illustrated in the ordinary use of the deaf-mute alphabet. No two persons make the signs exactly alike, or with any thing like absolute precision; but the observer, intent upon getting the communication, refuses to regard individual peculiarities, and sifts out of recognition everything but what he knows is part of the intended meaning. This intended meaning he identifies in part from what he understands already, partly from what he infers should be its organic or logical complement, or exactly as he would make out the sense of a passage in Greek or any other foreign tongue. The operation of the mind in conceiving or representing objects

under such restrictions as are imposed by the author's language or his inferred intention is called Phantasy, or "the imaging faculty."

P. 6, par. 4, l. 4. That the mind has two distinct attitudes towards a speaker or writer, according as he has a prose or a poetic purpose, is shown by its change from the one to the other as the speaker's purpose changes. If while we are listening to a lecture or similar prose deliverance, and intent only upon reproducing his meaning accurately and completely, the speaker without notice proceeds to quote half-a-dozen lines of verse, we shall continue interpreting by phantasy as before. But when, after a line or two, we recognize from the rhyme or some other feature of form that what we hear is no longer prose, our minds instantly throw off the restraint of literalness. The lines may be only prosaic after all; but we recognize the speaker's purpose to be poetical, and change our attitude accordingly. But the mental mode called Phantasy, when released from the obligation of time and space relations, or of literalness for the sake of idealizing something, becomes Imagination. There is, moreover, another attitude of the mind assumed towards a speaker whose purpose is persuasive, hortatory, or imperative. This attitude involves some degree of the mental activity called "Will," and may range from mere expectancy or unconsenting curiosity to a genuine animus against the speaker or his theme. Answering, therefore, to the three purposes which may actuate a writer, and to the corresponding attitudes in the reader, three departments of literature may be recognized. The literature of the Intellect, or prose proper, proceeds from those who are leaders in thought or knowledge, whose knowledge or wisdom the world at large wants to use. The literature of the Emotions, or poetry, proceeds from those who are our leaders in select and refined experiences. The literature of the Will proceeds from those who use their personality to effect a change in the principles or acts of men.

P. 7, par. 2, l. 2. In general, the intellect addresses the intellect, the emotions, the emotions, and the will, the will. ~~Declarative sentences, speaking generally, are the language of the intellect and reason; exclamatory, of the emotions; and imperative, of the will.~~ The interrogative sentence is substituted for either of the preceding when the speaker for any reason wishes to consult his hearer. When the superior knowledge or rival judgment of the hearer is inquired of, the use is intellectual. 'Questions of appeal' are addressed to the emotions. When the purpose is to bring to a resolution, as in alternatives like 'Do you consent, or do you refuse,'—or, indeed, in either inquiry alone, it is the language of the will. The presence of the indicative predicate accordingly argues the calm and deliberate operation of judgment, as also the seriousness and sincerity of the speaker. The omission of it amounts to notice that deliberation has been overcome by emotion, that reason gives way for the moment to the feelings. 'There is a fire,' 'murder is being com-

mitted,' are propositions intended and adapted for abstract consideration by the intellect or reason. But in 'Fire!' 'Murder!' the intention is to prevent or waive deliberation, and produce immediate effect upon the feelings. Hence, in general, the suppression of the predicate is interpreted by the reader as indicating a purpose on the part of the author to deal with the emotions more directly.

P. 8, par. 2, l. 6. The mention, without predication, of an object that has refined associations, prompts the fancy to revive the best experiences had from or with that object. The presence of predications, obtruding annalistic facts, or judgments, interferes with idealization, and tends to reduce imagination to the mere imaging process. The predicate always conditions the imagination. Thus mention of 'The Lark' leaves the mind free to use any of its past experiences at pleasure. But 'The Lark leaves its nest, and mounts aloft' forces the mind to revive its delight along the indicated line of action only. Moreover, the chief value of epithets consists in the fact that they strike chance chords of association, some one of which alone may render a whole poem potent to the reader. The prose adjective is used to identify or describe an object for fact's sake; the poetic to bring experiential qualities before the mind. Hence the use of the latter in prose tends to interfere with the literal processes of phantasy. (Cf. pp. 39 and 352.)

P. 11. It is to be noted that, even if the reader has never been in England, he will yet at once, in recognition of the author's poetic purpose, on hearing the challenge to fancy in *Thames-like*, summon his own best experiences of river scenery, and idealize out of them what will be a Thames *to him*. It may, indeed, be questioned whether, if his fancy is normally alert, he have not the advantage of one who has seen that river at its best, except the latter have had some specific delight therefrom.

SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER. — The student should now search out, in the accepted poets of the century, two or three good examples of suppressed predication, each passage showing consecutive omission of verbs, if possible. The extracts, with definite citation, should be written upon the blackboard for comparison by the whole class. Each student should then go to the board, and supply the omitted predicates in his selections. The teacher may now, by having each set of original and rewritten extracts read and compared in turn, secure a judgment from each pupil as to what passages still appear to be poetical, and what pass over unmistakably to prose. He may then inquire similarly as to what passages among the latter owe their poetic effect to form. To increase the interest, he may take a more formal expression of opinion, summing up and correcting at the close. Such students as are slow at appropriating the effect of the first exercise should be given further individual tasks in the same line as the examples on page 7.

CHAPTER III.

PAGE 12, par. 2. Similarly 'phantasy' is a generic term, covering the various processes of imaging to order. The cardinal difference between imagination and phantasy, as before indicated, is in the aim and attitude of the ego. When an artist reproduces the principal features of a landscape in a literal sketch, the mental mode is phantasy; when he begins to paint out from this, recognizing and making salient the elements of delight, a finished picture, the process involves imagination. But if, unbending from the strain, he should draw, idly combining incongruous or exaggerated elements for whimsical or burlesque effect, a "cartoon" sketch, the process would again be phantasy, and the product, 'fantastical.' All three are seen to be operations of the same kind, but differing in the frame of the ego, *i.e.* in the degree of mental soberness or intensity. Moreover, phantasy is readily and easily subject to summons, while the exercise of imagination is dependent upon a number of physical and psychical conditions which often cannot be induced, or sometimes, indeed, prevented, by the conscious will.

Imagination, therefore, like wind, heat, light, electricity, etc.,—each of which is popularly conceived and talked of as a specific thing,—is the name of a certain mode and degree of energy. Wind, for example, is air in motion; but there must be some apprehensible degree of motion, or the word cannot be used. The sources may be as various as the rotation of the earth or the rise and fall of a lady's fan. In like manner, imagination may be enabled by large or little happenings. Whenever the ego begins, though never so slightly, to idealize, the mode has become imagination. Perhaps 'heat' furnishes the best of all the parallels, since in this also the lower forms of the mind's representative energy are illustrated. Heat is properly a name for the relative intensity of molecular motion. When the molecular activity in any substance is above the temperature of the normal body, we call it 'warmth,' if below, 'cold.' But there is heat, absolutely speaking, in any case, since molecular motion, in some degree, is a necessary mode of matter. Similarly, when the ego is conscious of enthusiasm in an act of idealization, there is said to be 'warmth of fancy'; but when a theme fails to arouse the expected emotional interest, or exalt the mood, we call the product 'cold.' But whether 'warm' or 'cold,' whether in the degree of 'imagination' or 'phantasy,' there is always representative energy in the mind. The production of images is never suspended, even for a moment; but incessantly, in sleep or in waking, so long as there is consciousness and life, the march of thought goes on. This law of the mind is called Association of Ideas. See, if necessary, either Porter, McCosh, James, or Encyclopædia Britannica, upon this topic.

For convenience, imagination is often spoken of as a 'faculty,' and will perhaps be found so referred to in this work. But the practice of thinking and speaking of imagination as a capacity, and not a state or mode of the conscious principle, is most unfortunate. Nothing tends more to deepen and perpetuate the mystery of literature than regarding the mind as dependent upon specific faculties, like a workman upon his tools, to achieve its ends. The ego in the various manifestations of 'intellect,' 'feelings,' and 'will' is *one*, and acts through all in a character or with characteristics which come far short of being recognized in the name of any generalized activity. Further characteristics of imagination are noticed in chaps. IV., XI., and XXX.

P. 13, l. 2. 'Glade,' 'grove,' 'woods' show progressive decrease in suggestive quality. A suggestive word may be either out and out poetical, as *ope*, *oft*, *morn*, *eve*, etc., or have also more or less prose currency. Hence we may recognize three grades of suggestion, — poetic, semi-poetic, common. Sometimes a 'common' word acquires suggestive quality on account of an unusual relation to some other word, as in *burst*, *shrieking*, in the third and the sixth of the lines from the *Inn Album*, below.

P. 13, par. 2, l. 11. A practical understanding of 'intension' — or 'connotation' — and 'extension' should be sought from the encyclopedia or some good manual of Logic, if the student has not pursued that study. Logical intension, it will be seen, includes those qualities which phantasy brings before the mind in the form of a concept. What there is over and above this in such words as *gladden* represents the action of imagination. 'Residence' and 'home' have essentially the same intellectual intension; but the latter includes qualities which cannot, except with difficulty, be represented in thought, but must be emotionally appreciated or discerned. Hence the difference between phantasy and imagination, which we have been considering, really lies in the fact that in the latter the feelings are in conscious exercise, but in the former remain unaroused. The qualities in words which involve the sympathies or 'feelings,' and thus raise the mind's representative activity to the degree known as imagination, may, for convenience, be styled their emotional or poetical intension. The reason why the emotional content of words is perhaps more unerringly apprehended than their logical will be considered in Note to p. 33, par. 2, l. 12, in chap. VI.

SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER. — The class may now confirm itself in the distinction between prosaic and suggestive words by making comparisons between poems made up prevaillingly of the one and of the other sort. Let each member be first directed to report the passage showing greatest number of suggestive words that he can find, with their ratio to the whole number. Of course Shakespeare, Coleridge, Wordsworth, Shelley, Keats, Browning,

Tennyson, Mrs. Browning, Arnold, and the Rossettis will be quoted most constantly. Let the various ratios, with definite citation, be placed upon the blackboard for comparison with the authors later to be examined, as well as with each other. When any student or the class at large is in doubt concerning the suggestive quality of any word, the teacher should help draw off the conceptual significance from the emotional residuum, if there is one. Let each student also copy upon the board the two or three best lines of his passage, and proceed to write over each suggestive word a logical but unpoetical equivalent, keeping to the number of syllables and accent in the former. This will effectually illustrate how easily the element of imagination in *parts* of sentences may be lost. Then, in another exercise, results should be exhibited from Denham, Dryden, Pope, Johnson, and other poets conspicuous for the absence of suggestive terms. The ratios should be put upon the board with those obtained before, and also the best lines — or the worst — from each selection. The residue of the hour may well be spent in general suggestions as to how the bald, prosaic plainness here and there might, by suggestive equivalents, have been relieved and brightened. Finally, the time of at least one other exercise and preparation should be given to the question, when the suggestive manner really began in English poetry; and a provisional examination from Chaucer through Milton will bring significant facts to light. Above all, the teacher must not ignore or underestimate the element of time. If his class have not already achieved a good degree of discernment in literary matters, he must be patient, and multiply tasks accordingly. He will, indeed, do well if he require the student in all cases to distinguish the three grades of suggestive words in at least the two extracts given, according to the note on p. 13, l. 2, above.

CHAPTER IV.

PAGE 15, par. 2, l. 2. The student needs to realize at the outset that, in considering the quality and effect of force, the question is not whether the poet's emphasis is in good taste, but *what* it is. What the poet feels, and intends shall be felt by others, must be accepted as a fact. His delicacy and judgment in this are proper subjects for criticism, but not while his meaning is being determined. In art generally, it is well to consider what the artist might or should have made of his subject, but not until it is definitely settled what he actually has accomplished.

P. 15, par. 2, l. 5. Not a few poets, consciously or unconsciously, attempt to produce more effect from the theme upon the reader than they feel themselves. One of the commonest effects is turgidity. This consists mainly in distension of sense and affectation of emphasis. Less sense but more ostentation, with greater obtrusiveness of force, constitute 'fustian' or bombast.

When the false emphasis becomes vociferous and extreme, rant is produced. The principal quality in the following passages respectively, if not turgidity, bombast, and rant, will be recognized as something very near it:—

“The North-east spends his rage; and now, shut up
 Within his iron caves, the effusive South
 Warms the wide Air, and o'er the void of Heaven
 Breathes the big clouds with vernal showers distent.
 At first a dusky Wreath they seem to rise,
 Scarce staining ether; but by fast degrees,
 In heaps on heaps, the doubling Vapor sails
 Along the loaded sky, and, mingling deep,
 Sits on the horizon round a settled gloom:
 Not such as wintry Storms on Mortals shed,
 Oppressing life; but lovely, gentle, kind,
 And full of every hope and every joy,
 The wish of Nature. . . . Hush'd in short suspense,
 The plummy People streak their wings with oil,
 To throw the lucid moisture tickling off;
 And wait the approaching sign to strike, at once,
 Into the general choir. Even Mountains, Vales,
 And Forests seem, impatient, to demand
 The promised sweetness. Man superior walks
 Amid the glad Creation, musing praise,
 And looking lively gratitude. At last,
 The Clouds consign their treasures to the fields,
 And, softly shaking on the dimpled pool
 Prelusive drops, let all their moisture flow,
 In large effusion, o'er the freshen'd world.”

THOMSON: *The Seasons*, Spring.

“Night, sable goddess! from her ebon throne,
 In rayless majesty, now stretches forth
 Her leaden sceptre o'er a slumbering world.
 Silence, how dead! and darkness how profound!
 Nor eye, nor listening ear, an object finds;
 Creation sleeps. 'Tis as the general pulse
 Of life stood still, and nature made a pause;
 An awful pause! prophetic of her end.
 And let her prophecy be soon fulfill'd:
 Fate! drop the curtain; I can lose no more.
 Silence and darkness! solemn sisters! twins
 From ancient night, who nurse the tender thought
 To reason, and on reason build resolve—
 That column of true majesty in man—
 Assist me: I will thank you in the grave;
 The grave your kingdom: there this frame shall fall
 A victim sacred to your dreary shrine.
 But what are ye?”

YOUNG: *Night Thoughts*, Night I.

"O highest lamp of ever-living Jove,
 Accurs'd day, infected with my griefs,
 Hide now thy stained face in endless night,
 And shut the windows of the lightsome heavens!
 Let ugly Darkness with her rusty coach,
 Engirt with tempests, wrapt in pitchy clouds,
 Smother the earth with never-fading mists,
 And let her horses from their nostrils breathe
 Rebellious winds and dreadful thunder-claps,
 That in this terror Tamburlaine may live,
 And my pin'd soul, resolv'd in liquid air,
 May still excruciate his tormented thoughts!
 Then let the stony dart of senseless cold
 Pierce through the centre of my wither'd heart,
 And make a passage for my loath'd life!"

MARLOWE: *I. Tamburlaine*, V. ii.

P. 16, par. 1. l. 4. The student should also carefully distinguish *force* from *heaviness*. When a composition that should engage the imagination or the spontaneous energy of the mind requires to be read by determinative effort, we call it 'heavy.' (Cf. p. 295.) When without such effort of the will it arouses energetic emotion in the reader, we acknowledge the presence of force. Heaviness is not due to overmuch natural emphasis, but too little. The first extract above from Cowper is 'heavier' than the one from Browning, as also the passage from Blackmore on p. 46, than the extract following it from Shakespeare. See the discussion in connection with the last two quotations, and the Notes.

P. 17, par. 1, ll. 9-16. The emphasis of thought, ignoring structural emphasis, may fall upon the most unimportant word grammatically of the whole sentence, as in 'This is *from* the subject,' 'Whiston's is *the* translation.' Sometimes thought-emphasis will elevate a whole clause to significant prominence, as Shakespeare's hint as to the occasion of Lady Macbeth's somnambulism, "*Since his majesty went into the field*" (V. i. 3). Finally, as all stress is relative, the emphasis of force may disregard, upon occasion, both the structural and the thought-emphasis. Moreover, in force-emphasis different words may receive different degrees of the supreme stress, as *but* and *again* in the last sentence but one from Carlyle. For further treatment of all these points, see prose chapter on Force.

P. 18, par 2, l. 5. Force is, therefore, a manifestation of the ego in high and sustained energy of the same kind as is aroused for the moment by single suggestive words. See chapters XI. and XXX.

P. 19, ll. 2, 3. Supreme suffering does not in every case take hold of us, but only such as is sympathetically, not intellectually, discerned. We read daily of catastrophes by sea and land perhaps with only intellectual interest

or attention, except we find the name of some friend or acquaintance in the list of victims. Hence the plan of the poet is always to make us first feel towards a Lear or a Sordello as if he were our own, and then to introduce his experiences to imagination.

P. 19, par. 2. l. 6. Some readers dislike what they consider the *overfervor* of authors like Browning and Carlyle. They think these writers parade too much their own feelings, and really feel much less than they pretend. Of course this is largely a matter of taste, as of sympathy with the author and his purpose, but it is largely also a matter of discernment. There is no way of imparting to those who cannot distinguish force from rant or bombast the ability to perceive it. The unedified should not too heedlessly declare their unbelief in the sincerity of men like those just named, even if sometimes their fervor seems unduly demonstrative. Moreover, it is observed that, on closer approach to such minds, dislike and prejudice generally give way. The student should herein take warning not to judge an emotion intellectually. Let him also remember that there are supreme experiences in human life, that none of us can escape his share, and that it is of the essence of art to make us swift of sympathy with our fellows in them. While as Anglo-Saxons we dislike on principle to see strong feeling too consciously exhibited, we none the less recognize the sacredness of deep emotion.

P. 20. To facilitate thorough study of the *Count Gismond* as a whole, the poem is here repeated, and a diagram analysis of the force, line by line throughout, subjoined:—

COUNT GISMOND.

I.

Christ God who savest man, save most
Of men Count Gismond who saved me!
Count Gauthier, when he chose his post,
Chose time and place and company
To suit it; when he struck at length
My honor, 't was with all his strength.

II.

And doubtlessly ere he could draw
All points to one, he must have schemed!
That miserable morning saw
Few half so happy as I seemed,
While being dressed in queen's array
To give our tourney prize away.

III.

I thought they loved me, did me grace
To please themselves; 't was all their deed;
God makes, or fair or foul, our face;
If showing mine so called to bleed
My cousins' hearts, they should have dropped
A word, and straight the play had stopped.

IV.

They, too, so beauteous! Each a queen
By virtue of her brow and breast;
Not needing to be crowned, I mean,
As I do. E'en when I was dressed,
Had either of them spoke, instead
Of glancing sideways with still head!

V.

But no: they let me laugh, and sing
My birthday song quite through, adjust
The last rose in my garland, fling
A last look on the mirror, trust
My arms to each an arm of theirs,
And so descend the castle-stairs—

VI.

And come out on the morning-troop
Of merry friends who kissed my cheek,
And called me queen, and made me stoop
Under the canopy—(a streak
That pierced it, of the outside sun,
Powdered with gold its gloom's soft dun)—

VII.

And they could let me take my state
 And foolish throne amid applause
 Of all come there to celebrate
 My queen's-day — Oh I think the cause
 Of much was, they forgot no crowd
 Makes up for parents in their shroud!

VIII.

However that be, all eyes were bent
 Upon me, when my cousins cast
 Theirs down; 't was time I should present
 The victor's crown, but . . . there, 't will last
 No long time . . . the old mist again
 Blinds me as then it did. How vain!

IX.

See! Gismond's at the gate, in talk
 With his two boys: I can proceed.
 Well, at that moment, who should stalk
 Forth boldly — to my face, indeed —
 But Gauthier, and he thundered, "Stay!"
 And all stayed. "Bring no crowns, I say!"

X.

"Bring torches! Wind the penance-sheet
 About her! Let her shun the chaste,
 Or lay herself before their feet!
 Shall she whose body I embraced
 A night long, queen it in the day?
 For honor's sake no crowns, I say!"

XI.

I? What I answered? As I live,
 I never fancied such a thing
 As answer possible to give.
 What says the body when they spring
 Some monstrous torture-engine's whole
 Strength on it? No more says the soul.

XII.

Till out strode Gismond; then I knew
 That I was saved. I never met
 His face before, but, at first view,
 I felt quite sure that God had set
 Himself to Satan; who would spend
 A minute's mistrust on the end?

XIII.

He strode to Gauthier, in his throat
 Gave him the lie, then struck his mouth
 With one back-handed blow that wrote
 In blood men's verdict there. North, South,
 East, West, I looked. The lie was dead,
 And damned, and truth stood up instead.

XIV.

This glads me most, that I enjoyed
 The heart of the joy, with my content

In watching Gismond unalloyed
 By any doubt of the event;
 God took that on him — I was bid
 Watch Gismond for my part: I did.

XV.

Did I not watch him while he let
 His armorer just brace his greaves,
 Rivet his nauberk, on the fret
 The while! His foot . . . my memory leaves
 No least stamp out, nor how anon
 He pulled his ringing gauntlets on.

XVI.

And e'en before the trumpeter's sound
 Was finished, prone lay the false knight,
 Prone as his lie, upon the ground:
 Gismond flew at him, used no sleight
 O' the sword, but open-breasted drove,
 Cleaving till out the truth he clove.

XVII.

Which done, he dragged him to my feet
 And said, "Here die, but end thy breath
 In full confession, lest thou fleet
 From my first, to God's second death!
 Say, hast thou lied?" And, "I have lied
 To God and her," he said, and died.

XVIII.

Then Gismond, kneeling to me, asked
 — What safe my heart holds, though no word
 Could I repeat now, if I tasked
 My powers forever, to a third
 Dear even as you are. Pass the rest
 Until I sank upon his breast.

XIX.


Over my head his arm he flung
 Against the world; and scarce I felt
 His sword (that dripped by me and swung)
 A little shifted in its belt:
 For he began to say the while
 How South our home lay many a mile.

XX.

So 'mid the shouting multitude
 We two walked forth to never more
 Return. My cousins have pursued
 Their life, untroubled as before
 I vexed them. Gauthier's dwelling-place
 God lighten! May his soul find grace!

XXI.

Our elder boy has got the clear
 Great brow; though when his brother's black
 Full eye shows scorn, it . . . Gismond here?
 And have you brought my tercel back?
 I just was telling Adela
 How many birds it struck since May.



It will be noted that when both lines drop or rise together, the author shifts from Saxon to Latin words, or *vice versa*. The force of the poem will best be shown, finally, by reducing the two broken lines here given to a single curve. Note what an ideal scheme of force it is. It could scarcely have been improved if the author had drafted it for his poem in advance. Yet Browning was almost certainly unaware, in this respect, of what he did.

SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER.—In case of immature students, it may be necessary to adapt work from the prose-treatment of this topic. If the class can begin at once, without such study, it will be well, on giving out the present chapter for preparation, to dictate half-a-dozen common sentences—care being taken to exclude thought-emphasis—for the students to copy and take away. The pupil should be directed to determine and mark the place of every grammatical emphasis, and devise half-a-dozen like sentences of his own, to match in place of emphasis each of those given. When the class

has been quizzed upon the chapter, and questions have been answered,—so far as possible by the class itself,—let each student write upon the board the sentences he has prepared, for criticism and revision by the rest. When the class is sent away to make its first independent study of force in some simple poem—like Browning's *The Patriot* or *Last Ride Together*—dictate to be first studied, as before, half-a-dozen sentences, showing various emphases of thought. If the class is large, it will be well to assign, besides general study of the whole, particular stanzas to particular members for more concentrated study.

When the class again assembles, call for a diagram of each stanza, to be put side by side upon the board, and set the other students having the same at amending and revising, but indicating all differing interpretations under the force-marks for the several lines. Then go over the stanzas with the whole class, making each student declare, so far as advised and confident, what the force of each expression is to *him*, and take a census of opinions. This will furnish a good object-lesson in the method by which questions of this kind can alone be settled,—by the general spiritual sense of the world at large. Point out to the class that in this way only has the meaning of the Bible, of Shakespeare, as of every masterpiece in art and music, been established; and that, when a once-accepted interpretation is amended, the change is made because the common spiritual sense can no longer reconcile itself to such a view. So much will consume the time of one exercise; and if the last idea is fully grasped, it will be enough. The student, with some sense of his place and share in the great ecumenical council of thought and culture, will go back to the poem with a more earnest spirit and larger mind; and on the second day of trial it shall go hard if the teacher do not find an essentially unanimous understanding of the poem.

The teacher, even if wholly inexpert in the experimental method, will hardly need further suggestions on this topic; the needs of the class will furnish them. It will be well, before taking up another poem more intricate than *The Patriot*, to begin serious study of the *Count Gismond* with the diagram, three or four stanzas at a time. The interpretation there given should be carefully considered, and, if departed from at any point by the united sense of class and teacher, should be traced to the overmuch or the insufficient sympathy that seems to have produced it. Let the class particularly consider the thirteenth stanza, in which the present writer is inconsistent with himself, having—from doubt whether the student will, at first, enter fully into the spirit of the passage—made the force point 30 in the stanza diagram, but, in better agreement with his own feeling, raised it, in the second, to 32. When the analysis of a poem is complete, each member of the class should work the word-line and the force-line into a single curve, determined at each point by dividing by

whole number of words the number emphasized. Each tangible process of this kind helps make a very subtle quality more determinate to the average mind. To ensure full mastery, the study of this topic should be continued after the main work of the class has been advanced to chapter V.

CHAPTER V.

PAGE 24, l. 9. Here, as before, is evinced the same eager, restless energy of the mind. From signs of merriment the imagination passes to that experience in advance, or rather takes the sign of its presence in others as a sufficient occasion to produce it subjectively in itself. In like manner, the sounds of grief produce a sympathetic sorrow in the mind, in advance of knowledge concerning it. In each of these cases the ego, from recognizing the sounds through their origin, is conscious of what it does. But in tone colors proper, though the imagination may be almost equally aroused, the mind, unless trained to observation, is in general only vaguely aware of such activity, or of what calls it forth.

P. 24, par. 2, l. 22. For the relation between openness and obstruction in vowel as in consonant utterance, see Whitney's *Life and Growth of Language*, chap. IV., and especially p. 62. For illustrations of the position of the vocal organs, and changes in tension of the vocal chords, perhaps Max Müller's *Lectures on the Science of Language*, Second Series, Lecture III., will be most available; or, cf. Browne and Behnke's *Voice, Song, and Speech* (a manual for singers and speakers, pub. G. P. Putnam's Sons).

P. 25, Note. If that monumental work is available, the student may well consult Helmholtz's *Sensations of Tone* (translated by Ellis, pub. Longmans, Green & Co.), p. 11 ff.

P. 25, l. 8. Cf. for several evident effects of this kind, Othello's speech to the senate (I. iii.), and notably ll. 158-161.

P. 26. In the first example the tones do not much suggest the speaker's feelings, but are corroborative, almost imitative, of that which is described. In the second we catch the spirit at a glance, and before aware begin to read in pure tones. The same in still greater degree is true of the last quotation; while in the third, the hate and spite are so extreme that we can almost hear the hisses in which Guido speaks.

P. 28, par. 2, l. 2. It seems to be taken for granted now-a-days that anybody can enact the part of the ghost in *Hamlet*. There is no evidence that Shakespeare thought so. Assuredly, to produce the effect he seems to have intended, there is room for as much study and preparation as many actors give themselves before attempting the title-character in that play.

SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER. — The object of this chapter, as of the two preceding, is to bring to conscious, reflective understanding what is apprehended intuitively and unconsciously by the critical genius, and to a greater or less extent by all of us. How the critic takes account of tone quality we may illustrate from an experience often had, — for we are all geniuses by gift or acquired facility in some certain thing or things. Looking for a title in an index, glancing rapidly down the columns, we are suddenly conscious it is there, though we do not *see* it, have not yet *found* it. We then more deliberately go over the names in that column or part of the column till we *locate* the name we wish. The explanation is, the mind *did see*, or *take cognizance* of the title, but in a perception so incomplete, or wanting in time-and-space definiteness, as to be of none effect. We wish in this chapter to appreciate reflectively one of the first things the critic catches at a glance as he reads a poem. It would, in fact, do him sometimes no harm, in the matter of tone colors as well as of other elements of poetic power, to know more consciously what he does, and why he does it.

The effect of the study in this chapter should enable each student to recognize the general spirit of a poem and the quality of tone in which it should be rendered, without reading any of it aloud. More specific associations of tone should suggest themselves in more careful unoral reading. The teacher will hardly need definite hints how, with a given class, to reach these ends. It will be necessary, in case of some students, to begin at the bottom and compute the tones of one kind and of another before they can be made to realize the range. With all, work of this kind on some one point or other will be necessary. I know a teacher who accomplished good results with quite young pupils, by requiring them to underscore all tone letters or syllables in the poems studied. With some classes it will be possible to begin at once with differences between organic and imitative tone effects, and work thence into the specific qualities of the former without very minute analysis. The teacher will do best to follow, as teachers will, the course his own mind took in working out the subject. Let him test occasionally the progress of his class, by having all open, for instance, almost anywhere in Shakespeare's *Coriolanus*, and after a moment's glance up and down a page, shut the book, and write their impressions of the tone colors. Though it is not quickness of perception which is sought, an occasional exercise of this kind will tend to keep the work from being too deliberate and mechanical. Finally, the teacher should give some time to the question when tone colorings become an integral part of the effect in English poetry.

CHAPTER VI.

PAGE 31, par. 2, l. 7. Mother tongue, *i.e.* the language we learn from parents and associates in childhood, apart from books, and at first pre-eminently from the *mother*. The phrase is employed in this significance throughout the volume.

P. 33, par. 2, l. 12. We may here consider a further difference between phantasy and imagination: phantasy preferably shows us a generalized, abbreviated 'concept,' but imagination, a complete individual image. The more familiar objects become or the more frequently they are used in common thinking, the less often they will engage the imagination. Hence the philosopher, thoroughly confirmed in the habit of generalization, will use only concepts in his thinking. But, in general, the most prosaic of men think certain objects, not by concepts, but reconstructed or 'remembered' images of individuals. So perhaps 'father,' 'mother,' 'brother,' 'sister,' 'hearthstone,' 'fireside' are apprehended in imagination instead of phantasy with all of us. In case of the poet, the same is perhaps true of most words. He thinks, not by concepts, but fully imaged individuals, each being taken as the representative of a class. Mention of the word 'chimney,' for example, calls up a picture of the object of that name he saw first or most frequently as a boy, or the one on his present home. It would seem that we all do this prevaillingly in childhood, when we are near the first touch of things; and from investigation, I am led to believe the habit by no means uncommon with mature minds. We may begin early to generalize, yet do not much use the products of generalization until considerably later.

P. 33, par. 2, l. 15. In illustration it is only necessary to recall the words of Mr. Darwin concerning his lost enjoyment of poetry and fiction.

P. 34, l. 24. A poetic word is one that by natural selection has been set aside for use when the emotions are in ascendancy; that is, by association certain words come to have a strong emotional element of meaning, and are thus eschewed when the emotion they arouse is incongruous or not wanted. The man who uses them in a manner not in harmony with the preoccupation of the hearer's mind provokes ridicule. Many of these words were, not long since, prosaic, or even common, like *kine*, *hearth*, *troth*. When the emotional intension of a word has been fairly recognized, it will often materially increase in poetic potency. Thus it has chanced that many forms and expressions in the Bible or Prayer Book, once even trite, are acquiring great power with the emotions. "Dust to dust" and "Till death do part," from their solemn associations, have gotten far beyond the ordinary phrases of poetry. There seems little question it is this associational quality that Wordsworth somewhat vaguely had in mind as essential in words proper for poetic use.

With reference to the poetic quality of words as such we may recognize four general classes. There are of course many notions that never acquire any noteworthy emotional intension, as *clod, brick, pasteboard, pencil*; and the names of all such, as prose-words merely, we assign to the first class. Of words that do acquire an emotional intension there are evidently two classes, the one made up of the names of things and qualities that have occasioned experiences directly through the sense-perceptions, as *burn, clang, harsh, thrill*, which will constitute the second class; the other, including the names of objects experiential by association only, as *griffin, fasces, joust, knight* — or, to those who have not seen them, *castle, armor, spear*, etc. — will make up the third class. A further class is necessary to include words experiential because used in some transferred or 'figurative' significance. We may also set up a sub-class *b* to class iii., to distinguish words like *ope, oft, morn*, associational only by form, from those which, composing sub-class *a*, are associational from inner meaning.

P. 35, par. 2, l. 3. It is, for example, well established that 'candy' comes from the Sanskrit *khand*, 'break,' through the Arabic. Some, apparently, of those who inveigh against the "un-Saxon" part of our vocabulary have failed to observe that no inconsiderable number of the commonest words in their mother tongue — also many of these monosyllabic — are not even European; that *tea* and probably *silk*, for instance, are Chinese; *camel, alphabet, jack, sack* are from the Hebrew; *sofa, syrup, mask, cotton, cipher*, from Arabic; *shawl, peach, sash, lilac, turkey, chess* are Persian; *barge, gypsy, and paper*, perhaps Egyptian; and that the wholly illiterate use *dubious, iota, system, relation, purple, purpose, latitude, omnibus, 'botheration,' 'confab,'* etc., as well as the etymologists. It is the words which stand for things *their eyes have not seen, or hands handled*, that most perplex those ignorant of books.

P. 37, l. 5. Cf. Cædmon's

"hræfen gōl
deāwigfethere ofer driht-nēum,
won wælceāsega."

Exodus, 162-164.

P. 38, par. 2. The student may be glad of a further hint or two in the superior passages. Note how in Hamlet's first soliloquy our feelings are turned against the queen and Claudius by the associations called up. On the other hand, observe how, by the associations of the language used in the queen's account of it, we are prevented from feeling the death of Ophelia. Yet, a little earlier, keeping Hamlet from our sight and mind, Shakespeare melts us with pity for the same Ophelia — until he has adequately justified Leontes in his revenge — largely through associations in the words she insanely utters. Observe how Leontes, in scene ii. of *Winter's Tale*, secures from us some

helpful justification by applying 'paddling palms' to what was here an innocent, and in Shakespeare's day a permitted, freedom. Find similar points in the same situation, not omitting the effect of Mamillius's 'smutched nose,' used most ingeniously, for the moment, against his mother. Study also the associations in the curses of King Lear, and note how Othello is assisted in our sympathy by the terms he uses. But the array is endless.

P. 39, par. 1, *ad fin.* If the student reads Italian, let him contrast the effects of association in the *Inferno* and the *Purgatorio*, or *Paradiso*, of Dante. Of course, only native readers can know the experiential intension of Italian words. Yet those having but a dictionary acquaintance with the language will find the difference very marked. In like manner let the reader attempt a contrast of the *Ecloques* or the *Georgics* with the *Aeneid*, or, in general, of the *Iliad* with the *Odyssey*.

Let it be borne in mind that, after we become expert readers, many excellent associations are derived at second hand from books. Few of us appreciate "temple-haunting" or "battlements" from actual sight of a temple or a castle. Yet what well-appointed mind can fail of the poetry in a passage like this from Tennyson's *Passing of Arthur*?

"So all day long the noise of battle roll'd
Among the mountains by the wintry sea;
Until King Arthur's table, man by man,
Had fall'n in Lyonesse about their lord,
King Arthur: then, because his wound was deep,
The bold Sir Bedivere uplifted him,
And bore him to a chapel nigh the field,
A broken chancel with a broken cross,
That stood on a dark strait of barren land."

Here the mind pieces out, bit by bit, from what it has gathered up in legends and pictures since early childhood, substantially the interpretative experiences it needs. If the described event has, in integral parts, actually passed before the eye, it will be more vividly apprehended, though inferior in intrinsic interest, as this second passage from the *Idyls* will show:—

"But nothing in the sounding hall I saw,
No bench nor table, painting on the wall,
Or shield of knight; only the rounded moon
Thro' the tall oriel on the rolling sea."

P. 40, l. 12. Of course the potency in 'deep' is due to various experiences of fright had in escapes from falling, or exposures on shipboard or in unprotected places,—long since specifically lost from memory. Book-words cannot command associations like these, registered in our very nerves.

P. 40, ll. 13, 14. The effect is still worse when objects that have well-marked and consecrated associations are brought in contact with others wholly incongruous. Cf. the following from George Eliot's *Agatha* :—

“ One long summer's day
An angel entered at the rose-hung gate,
With skirts pale blue, a brow to quench the pearl,
Hair soft and blonde as infant's, plenteous
As hers who made the wavy lengths once speak
The grateful worship of a rescued soul.”

The *Endymion* of Keats abounds in faults of this sort, chiefly through mingling the human and superhuman too carelessly. Much of the effect in comic or burlesque poetry is produced, not dissimilarly to the above, by bringing into conjunction the lofty and the common. There is no mark of a great poet so unequivocal as instinctive respect for the unities of association.

SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER. — The object of this chapter is primarily to differentiate the ‘suggestive words’ of chap. III. into those experiential directly through the senses and conscious memory, and those experiential by association. Chapter IX. is necessary to complete the treatment; and if the class comes to the work with some knowledge of the figures, the full analysis outlined in note to p. 34, l. 24, may be carried out. In case of mature students the last-named chapter may be read here in advance. But experience will probably show that it is better to leave, with any grade of pupils, all unliteral words, on recognition, out of account until the governing principle is reached in course. The first work should then be the careful analysis of some short poem, as Tennyson's *Dying Swan*, or some passage like the ‘Hymn to Pan’ from the *Endymion*. Let the per cent of words experiential directly and experiential through association be exhibited by curves, as in Force. If time permit, at least three exercises should be devoted to simplest analysis of the above kind. Then the teacher, selecting further poems, should so change the exercise as to enable the student to identify so far as possible the associations that unconsciously affect him, or turn the current of his emotion into strange and unexpected channels. Many of these in other departments we have learned to trace. For example, an orchestra in the rendition of a symphony starts a choral strain. • Immediately we are back in fancy to the church of our childhood, where the only instruments accompanying the choir were bass-viol and violins. Though it is night and winter and the concert-hall ill-lighted, it seems a summer afternoon and a room full of sunlight, — all, as we realize, because certain tones of the orchestra bring back not only the choir, but the sunshine and the summer in the midst of which the music was first

heard. In a strange city we suddenly begin to feel ourselves at home, either because we have seen some building of the same material or proportions as one familiar to us at home, or because we have observed a face or two strikingly resembling those of folk we know. All this we easily think out and understand in principle: the part of an experience revived tends to bring back that experience as a whole. Knowing how such experiences arise greatly increases their effect in us. The more the mind can be drawn into a given emotion, the more absorbing that emotion will become. Understanding how the imagination has been aroused tends to introduce another occasion of that activity; and it will be remembered that imagination needs only occasions, not causes. Hence the great profit if the student can be helped to revive the experiences that make association. This may be done by eliciting from each member of the class the scenes or objects or recollections the associational words bring back. It will be found that also many of the common prose words are attached to some exceptional experience. Discuss and compare differences of individual impressions and effects.

There is no end of work that may be done in literature along lines suggested in this chapter. After some time has been spent on the second point above, the class should consider the use and effect of associations in other than purely incidental forms. Let it determine what those in the earlier lines of *Locksley Hall* have to do with the poem as a whole. Set the students to study out what manner of man Othello is or Hamlet from the associations of the language in the first long paragraph uttered by each in the respective plays. Finally, whether the time is longer or shorter, there should be at least two exercises devoted to investigation of unadvised and mixed associations in inferior poets. The question also of the rise of art in the use of associational terms, if of necessity postponed, should be by no means forgotten.

CHAPTER VII.

PAGE 42, Note 1. See White's *Schmidt's Rhythmic and Metric*, pp. 19, 20, 80-82. The latest important word on the other side of the question known to me at this writing is Kawczynski's *Essai comparatif sur l'origine et l'histoire des rythmes*, the main positions of which are cited by a reviewer in *The American Journal of Philology*, vol. XL., pp. 358-371.

P. 44, Note. The marks of long quantity in Dante's lines designate metric stress when conjoined with the grammatical or thought stress of a clause. The numbered syllables show the organic rhythmic stress allied with both. The following is an approximate rendering of the passage in the same rhythm: —

Nēssūs | hād rēached | nōt yet | thāt ōth|ēr side, |
 Whēn wē | hād bēnt | ōr steps | wīthīn | ā wood
 Thāt bȳ | nō sīn|glē path | wās mārked | āt all. |
 Nōt lēaves | ōf green, | būt ōf | ā dusk|ȳ col|or;
 Nōt brān|chēs smooth, | būt īn|tērtwīned | ānd knot|ty;
 Nōt āp|plē trees | wēre thēre, | būt thorns | wīth pois|on.
 Nō fōr|ēsts thick | ās these | nōr yēt | sō tan|gled
 Hāve thōse | fiērcē sāv|āge beasts | thāt hōld | īn hate |
 Tilled lānds | bētweēn | Cēci|na and | Corne|to.
 Hēre hāve | thē fil|thȳ Har|piēs mādē | thēir nests, |
 Whō drōve | fōrth frōm | thē Stroph|ādēs | thē Tro|jans
 With sād | prēdic|tiōn ōf | āpproach|īng dam|age.

Note the interchange in the original of the 4. 8. 10 and the 6. 10 scheme of rhythm and its effect upon the ear. The harmony of the lines is perfect even to one knowing nothing more than the sounds of Dante's vowels. It is little wonder that Gabriel Harvey's system of meters did not prevail when England had already such form as this. No scheme that disregards organic emphasis can succeed with a Teutonic people. All Northern blank verse agrees with Dante's structure.

Evolution is often absurdly regarded from the objective standpoint only. It would be of a piece with some scientific thinking to say that, since rhyme is only complete alliteration, it has been evolved from the forms of it found in Anglo-Saxon and Old Norse poetry. The fact is, evolution goes on until *the type in the mind is realized*. The Northern alliteration was only a partial satisfaction of this type or ideal of harmony, as likewise the Southern stereotyped recurrence of stress had in itself proved to be nothing better. Meanwhile the type, growing constantly more lofty and exacting, perhaps prompts to yet more refined and complete approximation. Among noteworthy efforts to realize a more perfect rhythm are to be reckoned the new measures of Runeberg and Malmström. How types change will be illustrated in the course of chapter XI.

P. 45, par. 2, l. 22. The student will note that the *Prologue* embodies Dante's rhythm. The metric scheme for the first eleven lines is as follows:—

(1)	—	υ		υ	4		υ	υ		υ	8		υ	10		υ
(2)	υ	—		υ	—		υ	6		υ	υ		υ	10		υ
(3)	υ	—		υ	—		υ	6		υ	υ		υ	10		
(4)	υ	—		υ	—		υ	6		υ	—		υ	10		
(5)	υ	—		υ	υ		5	υ		υ	8		υ	10		υ
(6)	υ	—		υ	4		υ	—		υ	8		υ	10		υ
(7)	υ	—		υ	4		υ	υ		υ	8		υ	10		υ
(8)	—	υ		υ	4		υ	—		υ	8		υ	10		υ
(9)	υ	—		υ	—		υ	6		υ	—		υ	10		υ
(10)	υ	—		υ	—		υ	6		υ	—		υ	10		υ
(11)	υ	—		υ	υ		υ	6		υ	—		υ	10		υ

It will be found, on careful rereading, that the lines from the *Parlament of Foules* follow the same scheme in a rudimentary way. Of course in Chaucer's latest work there are apparently, even by the best texts, some forced accents, yet in the main the rhythm is not subjective, but organic and obvious.

P. 47, ll. from Shakespeare. The sentence-rhythm here is clearly the same fundamentally as Dante's above or Milton's in *Paradise Lost*, or as in any other save mechanical blank verse. But beside the fundamental 4. 8. 10 or 6. 10 emphases there is in Danté other subsidiary or supplemental stress; and the present passage is rich similarly in completed harmony. The following is a full scheme for the first nine lines:—

(1)	2		6		9	10
(2)	2	4	6	8		10
(3)		4	6		9	10
(4)	2		6			10
(5)	2		6			10
(6)	2	4	6			10
(7)	2	4	6	8		10
(8)	2		6	8		10
(9)		4	6	8		10

As was indicated in chap. V., it is not the purpose in this volume to consider elements that address only the ear except so far as apprehensible in unoral reading. But we may note here the effect of raising the pitch on the ninth syllable in the first and the third line, as indicated by the italicized figures. Among all poets who ever wrote Shakespeare is most wonderful next to Dante in the skill by which he forces upon the reader's consciousness just the emphasis intended. In his most prosaic passages he refuses to fall below the rhythmic level of the most lofty. Compare with the above quotation Hamlet's lines to Horatio, III. ii. 70-82. Finally, we should note that the fixed scheme above illustrated is wholly analogous to the regular four- and eight-bar divisions of the melody or motif in musical compositions.

P. 50, l. 5. For an accessible summary of the results of investigation in Shakespeare's form, and the evidence respecting his development, see introduction to the 'Leopold Shakespeare.'

P. 50, ll. 10, 11. This seems much to say, yet it is manifest that since Wordsworth poets of almost any grade in respect to matter seem able to command the knack of blank verse in its best run-on forms.

P. 50, par. 2, l. 12. Compare

"Here grouped in superb frigidity
The blasts of the North repose,
Proud spirits of stern intrepidity,
Whose wings with clangors unclose.
In their saturnine eyes crepuscular
Cold hatreds bitterly glow;
In the girth of their dark arms muscular
Lie shipwreck ruin and woe!"

Let the student in this connection consider how far the rhymes in Hood's *Bridge of Sighs* are a source of power or weakness.

SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER. — It is assumed that all students attempting this chapter will have mastered the general principles of prosody, and can identify the ordinary measures at sight. If the class is ignorant of metric feet and cæsure and the difference between end-stopped and run-on quality, the work must begin back with the elementary units and the construction of the simplest measures. Approaching the subject proper of this chapter the teacher should, first illustrating the main principles as usual by examples and explanations of his own, assign the pages of the book and set the class for its first work the identification of the fundamental or sentence-rhythm in easy passages from Milton or Shakespeare. When this can be done infallibly, more erratic and unskilled examples may be assigned; particularly cases of departure from the 4. 6. 8 to a 5. 7. 9 rhythm or some part of it, as in the fourth

and sixth of Dante's lines. Let the students investigate the condition of the rhythm in authors that read well but scan ill, and *vice versa*. Let the fundamental rhythm be determined for the trochaic measure of *Hiawatha*, and also in dactylic and anapaestic lines. Of course it would be absurd to attempt to do more with this vast subject than simply make the student in some degree aware of his experiences from the form of poetry. It were well, however, if he can be set to investigate the rhythm of the *Beowulf* and succeeding monuments, if he can read Anglo-Saxon and early English to *Piers Plowman*, as he ought. Then exercises should be set upon points later in the chapter. Let perfect specimens be sought upon each point, and then the effect of elisions, rhymes made by repeating the same word, as well as of other blemishes, be tried. It will be observed that the result of introducing elements that seem incongruous is the same as is produced by the presence of a prose book-word in the rhyme, since in both the subordinate, or merely intellectual, activity becomes principal. Finally, it will be interesting to go back to Surrey and Lyly and other first writers in blank verse, and watch the growth in regularity of rhythmic stress.

CHAPTER VIII.

PAGE 53, l. 26. Note how Shakespeare here escapes every sort of responsibility by putting all into the mouth of Oberon, and making even him qualify his assertion by "might."

P. 55, par. 2, l. 19. Epithetic phrases have considerable poetic potency with young readers, but on learning the use of the imagination they quickly eschew such weak excitants. See p. 86.

P. 56, ll. 3-11. In Spenser the instinct is to reach imagination by imported terms, especially archaic and provincial. Shakespeare sometimes seems to use Latin rather than Saxon words from the pedant's sense of their piquancy. The literary taste of the times was not yet exacting; a quirk or pun satisfied where these are as onions and garlic to moderns. The hot, spicy style of 'ominous horse,' 'tyrannous and damned light,' and alcoholic metaphors like 'roasted in wrath and fire,' 'o'ersized with coagulate gore,' pleased the general palate. Shakespeare in his maturer years was far enough away from such figures to use them in a manner not unlike Chaucer, in effective satire. But with him Latinisms and Gallicisms to a great degree satisfied the instinct that prompted to what have now become fifth-class phrases. Even the genius of Shakespeare could not quite learn how to use elements of speech nearer to his hand, such as Tennyson in our own day relies upon. Milton with ampler foreign resources discriminates much more clearly between what was organic or idiomatic English and what was not. Shakespeare would not

be trite or common, but to avoid such quality ran not seldom into the fault of abnormal and strained phrasing.

P. 56, l. 17. All phrases like 'violent property,' 'royal hope,' 'weak supposal,' 'eternal blazon,' in which the adjective is equivalent to a noun of the same meaning governed by 'of' or 'from,' are of course to be entered in the third class.

P. 56, l. 34. This is clearly 'the Tyrian dye — fished up first by Keats, by dealing in which after-poets have grown rich' — of Browning's *Popularity*.

P. 57, l. 5. It was at first suspected that Shelley's dramatic pieces would yield results less remarkable, but *The Cenci* sustains the proportion of phrases found in the *Alastor*. Phrases of the first or prose class are much more numerous than in *Alastor*, but the ratio of fourth class and fifth class phrases to all is approximately 13:20.

SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER. — The work in phrases will be simple and will present few difficulties, except in connection with the fifth class. It will probably be best, even with maturest students, to reserve serious study of this division until the next two chapters have been gone over. The work may be so conducted as to include complete mastery of the first four classes and not omit recognition of phrases of the fifth kind. The student may learn to identify any phrase by inquiring if it is of class i., or if not, of class ii., and so on until its place is found. Any phrase not disposed of through the first four classes may be passed as of the fifth, on noting the verifying fact that both its elements are literal words. The instructor will of course see that compound phrases are entered according to their elements in the simple classes, as for example in the fourth line of p. 59, 'trumpet's bray' in class iii., 'dreadful bray' in class i., and 'harsh-resounding trumpets' in class iv. Every element through which the sensibilities receive an impression must be recognized in the analysis. It will be quickly discovered that class i. will require further division into sub-class *a*, to include all phrases like 'left hand,' 'eight years,' 'west wind,' 'idle thought,' etc., that — except from extraordinary associations — are hopelessly prosaic, and sub-class *b* for the residue, which upon occasion can carry emotion. Of the latter, 'dreadful bray,' 'morning star,' 'gray grass,' 'chapel bell,' are good examples.

CHAPTER IX.

PAGE 60, par. 2, ll. 4–11. The question will very likely be asked, Is not this mixed metaphor? The answer is, No, because the whole is allegory, — or rather a succession of clause allegories. The reasons will be given in full later on (p. 393), but had best not be considered here.

P. 62, l. 4. Ps. lxxx. 8.

P. 63, par. 2, l. 10. In other words, the mind blends Pharisees and vipers after a fashion not dissimilar to composite photography. The image of the figurative object, we may say, seems superimposed upon the literal, rather than *vice versa*.

P. 63, Note 2. Tegnér's fancy does not incline usually to figures quite so strained. The first two lines here of course are allegory. See p. 393. Compare this from the opening of his *Song to the Sun*:—

I will sing thee new lays,
O thou Sun ever bright!
In cerulean night
Round thy throne of high state
The worlds placed by thee wait
As thy vassals, each sphere
In thy sight bending near;
But in light are thy ways.

A still fairer example is his *Elden*, 'To Fire.'

P. 64, par. 2, l. 12. But sometimes a thought already clear may be re-illustrated with considerable effect by an expanded analogy (see p. 84). Compare Horace, *Carminum*, IV. xiv. 25-34, for a good example.

P. 67, par. 2, ll. 10, 11. Some best illustrations occur in Browning's *Sordello*. Compare the following from near the close of Book II.:—

Heart and brain
Swelled; he expanded to himself again,
As some thin seedling spice-tree starved and frail,
Pushing between cat's head and ibis' tail
Crusted into the porphyry pavement smooth,
—Suffered remain just as it sprung, to soothe
The Soldan's pining daughter, never yet
Well in her chilly green-glazed minaret,—
When rooted up, the sunny day she died,
And flung into the common court beside
Its parent tree. Come home, Sordello!

Here the Soldan's daughter: the seedling spice-tree :: minstrelsy: Sordello. Likewise, seedling spice-tree: common court and parent tree :: Sordello: Goito. Cf. also ll. 11-18 of Book III. The student will generally find his difficulties with analogy clear if he will take the trouble to cast thus in formal terms. (See p. 400.)

P. 67, par. 3, l. 8. It will be found convenient to revive the designation 'trope,' for adjectives applied thus, like 'brave,' to nouns to which they are not literally or logically applicable, and the word will be used in that sense in later notes.

P. 68, Note. The extent to which figures have been indispensable in lan-

guage is seen in the fact that there are no roots signifying other than physical acts or qualities.

SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER. — Let it be remembered that the object of these analyses is not at all to afford mental discipline or to discover what ingenious distinctions may be insisted on in language. In so far as any exercise shall prove intellectual rather than emotional, it is to be deprecated. If it does not bring the given element to bear more palpably and strongly upon the sensibilities, it is a waste of time. There are other ways of sharpening the wits and acquiring grammatical facility with which this study should in no degree or sense come into competition. The object is solely to bring to consciousness what goes on in the mind when we read poetry, and to enlarge or deepen the various experiences. The simplest way to determine the presence of a figure is to make literal inquiries, — as thus with Chaucer's lines above: Can April *pierce*? Evidently not; hence figure number one. But admitting that April might pierce some material thing, can it pierce a *drought*? Thus we find figure number two. Yet, admitting that April might pierce even a drought, can it pierce one *to the root*? Since not, we have figure the third. But if April were to pierce a drought to the root, could this be done if the instrument used were *showers*? Thus figure the fourth is revealed. If showers might be conceived as the instrument of such an action, could there be such an instrument as *sweet* showers? Thus we demonstrate that *sweet* is a trope, making the fifth figure; and so on to the end of the passage. After the student is able to work confidently by himself, he should be set to make a complete analysis of some short poetic composition, as Coleridge's *Hymn in the Valley of Chamouni*. Let him summarize his results and place them upon the blackboard for comparison. Let the proportion of prose terms to poetic be indicated, also the per cent of purely experiential words, of associational, as of word figures, with each class of phrases and all clause figures. Finally, let further discussion concerning the interrelations of the figures, as of Apostrophe to Personification, or of Hyperbole to Synecdoche, be encouraged. In the latter case of course the conceivable whole is put for the actual part. The consideration of Irony is reserved for chap. XV.

It will, moreover, be quickly apparent that there are classes of clauses just as of words and phrases. There are experiential facts as well as associations of fact, besides facts declared by way of personification and metaphor. All exclamatory sentences or clauses, like 'How beautiful this night,' are either experiential directly, when the hearer shares the experiences of the speaker from being present with him, or associational, when the reader constructs from like experiences had at first hand a second-hand realization of what the given experience must have been. We may thus recognize 'direct experiential' and

'associational' clauses, which will include many declarative sentences and some interrogative. As examples of associational clauses in declarative or interrogative form, cf. 'it was a clear bright day'; 'immediately the cock crew'; 'who hath believed our report?' 'what help was there left me?' Simple declarations of fact corresponding to first-class phrases will include also a sub-class *b*, to distinguish sentences capable of carrying emotion. When the content of a sentence is intrinsically poetical beyond the effect of specific elements, it should be entered as a poetic clause. But if the poetic quality in the thought is more than incidental and comes from the theme, it must be recognized under the classifications of chap. XI. Literal transactions described or narrated by figures should be called metaphoric clauses, or clauses of simile or personification, to distinguish from these several figures in phrase form, or, in the case of personification and metaphor, from word-forms. Allegorical sentences, and such as correspond to fifth-class phrases, should be left for treatment in the next chapter.

CHAPTER X.

PAGE 71, l. 2. Lord Kames (*Elements of Criticism*, p. 369) well distinguishes the first two figures in the following definitions: "A metaphor is an act of the imagination, figuring one thing to be another. An allegory requires no such operation, nor is one thing figured to be another: it consists in choosing a subject having properties or circumstances resembling those of the principal subject; and the former is described in such a manner as to represent the latter; the subject thus represented is kept out of view; we are left to discover it by reflection." Yet this critic, disregarding his own distinction, takes the passage (Ps. lxxx. 8-11), from which the two clauses in the text are quoted, as an example of allegory, and thus remarks: "A finer or more correct allegory is not to be found than the following, in which a vineyard is made to represent God's own people, the Jews." Though the Jewish people is not literally mentioned, it is yet not kept out of view or discovered by reflection, but identified immediately and positively through use of "heathen." The allegorical transaction cannot be consistently conceived with persons in place of the uprooted native vine. Furthermore, in the perfect allegory there is no direct or literal identification of the chief actor in his true personality. If the "thou" were in this case indeterminate from the context, it would be in keeping; but as unequivocally addressed in preceding verses to Jehovah, is inconsistent with the figure in question. To be clearer on this point, we may compare the opening stanzas of the *Faerie Queene*. If Spenser had written Elizabeth instead of Gloriana in l. 20, the true form would have been departed from. The perfect allegory here consists in representing the efforts of certain

personages in behalf of the Reformed Faith under other names and in other actions than the real. If the actual things done by Elizabeth had been here described or declared, but as accomplished by 'Gloriana,' the poem would not have been an allegory. When the actor only, or the action only, and not both together, is figured as something else, the result is metaphor. Thus, while 'Jack Frost paints the windows' is allegory, either 'the frost traces figures' or 'Jack Frost whitens the pane' are metaphors. If there are successive clauses to the same effect, the combined product is what has been already styled running metaphor.'

P. 72, l. 3. The *Faerie Queene* or *Pilgrim's Progress*, for example, to the youthful reader gives most delight as a consistent story; it is apprehended along the literal parallel more fully than upon the spiritual. But as the mind grows more accustomed to the spiritual view, the delight from literal reading becomes subordinate to that derived by interpretation. Moreover, a little of the allegory becomes potential of the whole. To the youth, on first reading, *Faerie Queene* is the name of a poem made up of romantic adventure. But at thirty or forty these words will perhaps have become to him only a fifth-class phrase, yet will mean as much, and indeed more, than if he thought of the contents of the volume in detail. The two parallels — the knightly adventures or exploits and the literal happenings of Elizabethan days — have been gradually shortened in his consciousness to the two points 'Faerie' and 'Queene,' and indeed coincide, are fused in his fancy into one. There is in fact no difference between fifth-class phrases like this and 'Pharisees' and 'vipers' conceived, after the manner explained in the last chapter, as spiritually identical, save that in the former the mental activity is on a larger scale. And it is not only with fifth-class phrases which like 'Faerie Queene' have afforded full original experiences that the mature imagination attains its concentrated delights: it is by its training enabled to interpret new instances at sight. It will have of course been noted that in case *Faerie* above is realized (cf. Chaucer's 'Femenye,') as the domain of fairies, and not 'fairy' in antique spelling as popularly understood, the expression will descend in experience from a fifth-class to a fourth-class phrase.

P. 73, par. 2, l. 9. It will be interesting for the reader to ascertain in what form he thinks the works of the great poet. He will perhaps remember that the picture in his mind was first the big quarto volume he used to see in childhood. After he came to read and know the plays it was perhaps the Chandos portrait. Now, through long and great familiarity, it may have become merely an image of 'Shakespeare,' the printed name.

P. 75, l. 2. That is, if rhyme and meter had permitted. A poet like Tennyson would no doubt have crowded the couplet into a single line, or less.

There are three classes of allegories, — the *sustained* allegory, running

through a whole volume or poem, or at least two consecutive periods; the *sentence* allegory, taking up one complete period; and the *clause* allegory, preceded or followed in the same sentence by other, either literal or figurative, clauses. The whole analogy may also be given in a clause presentation when a single metaphor or single simile is expressed by predication. If the analogy requires more than one clause, we distinguish it as running metaphor. When the simile is extended through several predications, we may style it sustained simile. See p. 400.

As to Chaucer's analogies, the *Deuthe of Blanche* shows the following summary: allegorics, 32; running metaphors, 27; clause metaphors, 46; similes, 8; comparisons, 12; fourth-class phrases, 4; third-class, 38; second-class, 21; fifth-class, 0; compound terms, 2; experiential words, 9; associational, 17. When we remember that Chaucer grew to full poetic manhood and died before the *Miracle Plays* gave place to the *Moralities*, and that the latter approximately overtake merely the imaginative development registered in *Piers Plowman*, we can more easily realize how far Chaucer was in advance of his century. In Langland allegory greatly preponderates.

P. 77, prose l 1. Similar concentration of means for addressing the imagination is found of course in music. First we enjoy perhaps but the melody, then the melody supported by a bass. Next, we think melody barren without the alto third and the tenor fifth. As yet there is no appreciation of harmony proper. But in time the unit shifts fully from the melody to chords.

P. 79, pr. ll. 1-5. See *Pauline*, last paragraph. The chief characteristic of Teutonic poetry is neither form nor art, but force. It is evident how concentration contributes to power through increasing the proportion of emphatic words. Another effect of condensation is swiftness. By the use of abbreviated symbols for full analogies a poet may attain marvellous swiftness. (Cf. Swinburne's remarks on Browning's obscurity in his introduction to *Works of George Chapman*, conveniently quoted in Rolfe's and Hersey's *Select Poems of Robert Browning*, p. 28.) The course of evolution in literatures kindred with our own has been similar, tending to concentration of analogies and intensification of energy. As will be later shown, Teutonic and Northern poetry is reverting to the character of the *Beowulf* and saga forms. *Beowulf* is wanting in similes, because the minstrel mind was too energized to see mere resemblance. It saw complete spiritual identity (p. 62) or nothing. Figures of the metaphoric kind are surprisingly frequent,—sometimes thirty to the hundred lines,—and many of them equal to Tennyson's or Browning's best. But incidental or unpredicated similes are not wanting. Cf. 'likest a bird' (*i.e.* swan, of *Beowulf's* ship), l. 218.

P. 84, par. 2, l. 4. Epithet and even tautology may have the effect of poetry, especially when assisted by the reader's attitude. (See chap. II., and

Notes.) Great poets put great thoughts into figures, not for embellishment, but to bring them before the mind in concentrated shape. To call night a 'goddess,' or a night-cap 'the innocent accomplice of falsehood,' is of the mediæval spirit that would fain hear simplest facts told in allegory.

P. 85, l. 3. Perhaps it is not too much to say that obviousness is as great a fault as obscurity. The poet should leave the reader room to be a poet too, not do the work of his imagination for him.

P. 85, pr. l. 14. To realize somewhat of the expatiation in which Pope abounds, the student has but to turn some characteristic passage into prose.

P. 86, par. 2, l. 10. Doubtless some of our enjoyment proceeded from the frequent use of the abstract for the concrete in poets of this class. As the young mind first learns to generalize and appreciate abstract terms, it will find satisfaction in the conceits of eighteenth century poetry. Let the student examine Johnson's *London*, and note the expatiation, and absence of concrete ideas.

P. 86, last line. *Two great schools of poetry.* And, for that matter, of prose also. Cf. p. 312.

SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER.—The work in this chapter may as well begin with compound terms. Let the class, if capable of appreciating Tennyson, take some part of *The Princess*, and collecting the compound nouns, extend each to the phrase, and then to the clause form to which it is equivalent. For instance, concerning 'furrow-cloven falls,' in l. 192 of vii. of that poem it will be said that this stands for the phrase 'falls cloven in or by furrows.' In the clause form the thought will be 'falls that have been plowed—cloven—into furrows.' The next step is back to the full allegory that has been potentially in imagination from the first; for furrows imply a plow or, at least, a plower. Thus the whole idea if charted out to fancy would be 'falls that frost has cloven into furrows.' As we have seen, an allegory may fill a whole volume, like *Pilgrim's Progress*, or a series of sentences, or may be confined to one period, or even clause. The only difference between an allegoric clause and a clause metaphor is the fact that in the latter there is a literal element that draws the mind away from allegoric thinking. For example, in l. 178 of the same part of *The Princess*, above referred to, we read 'What pleasure lives in height and cold?' As we come to the ideas successively on first reading, we recognize 'pleasure' as an abstraction, represent it in thought symbolically, and coming next to 'live' appropriate it as a figure equivalent to 'is.' Thus the sentence passes through our mind as a metaphor. But if the line had been printed 'What Pleasure lives,' etc., we should have at once cognized 'pleasure' as a personification, and applied 'lives' literally. Thus the sentence would have given us the experience of an allegory, though con-

finéd to one transaction. If the Twenty-third Psalm had run 'The Lord is a shepherd. He maketh his sheep to lie down in green pastures. He leadeth them beside the still waters,' it would have produced in the last two sentences a sustained allegory. But the use of 'my' and 'me' interferes with the imaging of a consistent allegorical transaction. If the reader does not persist in introducing himself in the usual literal way, but can figure himself under some new form consistent with 'shepherd' and 'leads,' the first two verses are to him allegory still; if not, they are running metaphor. Likewise in VII. 177 again of the *Princess*, — 'Come down, O maid, from yonder mountain height,' — though a poetic word, we take 'maid' literally, that is, see in our mind's eye some person in actual identity. Put 'nymph' for 'maid,' and the line will be allegory to every reader.

The only question in any kind of difficulty should be, What does the mind cognize? In ll. 294–305 of the *Deithe of Blanche* we read as follows:

I was waked
With smale foules a grete hepe
That had affrayed me out of my slepe
Though noyse and swettensse of her songe.
And al me mette they sate amonge
Upon my chambre roofe wythoute
Upon the tyles oveal aboute,
And sonne, everych in hys wise
The moste solempne servise
By noote that ever man I trowe
Had herde; for somme of hem songe lowe,
Somme high, and al of oon acorde.

Is not this allegory? The answer depends solely on what we *see* as we read the lines. Do we apprehend the transaction through the representation of a choir, or of birds on the tiles? Clearly the latter; for Chaucer was so explicit in the first lines that we pictured to ourselves birds very distinctly; and though the language after suggests singers 'by note' in a cathedral, the image first conceived remains. Hence the passage is not allegory, but running metaphor. The opening lines of the *Prologue*, on the contrary, are not cast in metaphor, but are allegorical. But they are inconsistent, since there are three distinct agents, 'Aprille,' 'Zephirus,' and 'yonge sonne'; hence there are three distinct allegoric thoughts. On the other hand, in ll. 764–8 of the *Deithe of Blanche* —

Dredeles I have ever yitte
Be tributarye and give rente
To Love, hooly yiith goode entente,
And throgh plesaunce become his thralle
With good wille, body, hert, and alle —

we find only a succession of metaphoric clauses. If, forgetting the real meaning, we conceive the speaker as in ultimate identity the knight he has been declared, the subject of the clauses is literal to us, and no allegory is possible. If, interpreting the poem as the allegory it really is, we are conscious the while that John of Gaunt is the real person whose grief is described, the clauses are still metaphoric merely. But if the thought had run, 'I have been ever a thrall that has done service with good will, body, heart, and all to Love,' the result after the first clause would have been an incidental allegory, or an allegory within an allegory, since our mind would have seen the knight,—or John of Gaunt, for the moment in a new character; that is, in the guise and person of a thrall indeed.

It will thus be clear why there can be no fifth-class phrase if either of the words is unliteral, for each phrase of this class is a potential allegory. If one of the words is poetic, the imagination will be occupied too much with its experiential quality to use it beyond itself. If one of the words is figurative it will not serve as a point to be 'produced,' parallel with the other, to allegory. But 'angel offices' will make the mind cognize figures of the genus named by the first word performing ministrations,—a complete allegory, though its effect is appropriated in a single flash of fancy. It will perhaps be early noted that the fifth and the first class are most nearly related. This is well illustrated by an experience met with over the phrase (*Princess*, II. 373) 'trash, but with a kernel in it.' On asking a student to what class this belonged the answer was, 'the first,' which, before I had time to inquire the reason of the judgment, was changed to 'fifth class.' As I then elicited, the phrase had been cognized first objectively as *trash* and *kernel*; but, immediately, as the mind saw the housewife and broom which the heap of litter and the poor solitary kernel implied, the spiritual meaning was fused with the literal. In other words the two ideas taking position as points developed into parallels, which were then made to coincide. If the illustration had been less 'homely,' and lain a little nearer imagination, the process would have been reversed; the sweeping and the lecturing would have been condensed in fancy to two points, and these spiritually cognized as one.

After the class can carry compound terms past phrases to clauses, the chief difficulty of this chapter will have been conquered. Such as in the clause form produce only metaphor should, if this can be done conveniently, be extended to allegory by expressing the subject, if that be literal, through personification or similar disguise of identity, or if the predicate is literal, by making it metaphoric. A metaphoric clause may be turned to allegory by ridding the subject, in thought, of every mark of its actual identity. When an action has been figured under the form of some other action, and by an agent in other than his proper person, the mind has had the effect of allegory, whether in one sentence or a whole *Pilgrim's Progress*.

Analogy in word-presentation, if the preceding is thoroughly understood, will not be difficult to distinguish. Metaphor consists in seeing one thing spiritually identical with another thing. Here the concentration has become as complete as possible, but has only united two *objects* in one character, not two distinctive series of transactions, or two various lives in one. To do this in full would produce allegory *par excellence*, for though we may indicate character in an allegorical way, the instrument is evidently heavier than the case requires. Now to reduce an allegory of transaction to a phrase or still more curt presentation requires the greatest power as well as skill. It would seem that but few clause metaphors can be reduced to word analogies; for in these the mind must see but *one* thing, not two things distinct literally, and united spiritually. Any metaphor in which the agent can be suppressed in thought and only the action cognized will afford an example, as Chaucer's "*it snewed in his house of mete and drinke*" (*Prolog.* 345). There are essentially three degrees of energy in poetical cognition. Imagination is exercised in the lowest of these degrees in simile, when only resemblance (p. 62) is recognized. It rises to the second degree in the spiritual mode called metaphor, when resemblance is raised to identity. In simile the mind perceives two objects as separate in an act of comparison; in metaphor it perceives two objects, each with equal vividness, spiritually identified. In the highest degree of energy which the mind is capable of employing the literal is more or less completely merged in the figurative. The composite mental photograph, formed by projecting the spiritual upon the actual, gives place to an intense new image of the former, that fills completely the mental field of view. This is most apparent in such states of imagination as force vent for themselves in noun-interjections like *Traitor! Thief! Fox! Viper!* If a man have true occasion to use, for example, the last-named epithet, he will see in his mind's eye nothing but a viper vast enough to fill it, and indeed utters the name without accompanying word because it is the sole thing of which he is conscious. The identity of the person to whom the word is applied seems, in the speaker's transcendent subjectivity, dissolved and lost in the spiritual identity of the object named. To say *Thou viper!* means, or should mean, the presence in consciousness of both objects (after the manner of p. 62), but in the strongest form of metaphor known to the mind. To use the predicate 'thou art,' etc., indicates far less excitement, with some participation of the judgment. There are word analogies otherwise produced; in less impassioned and more intellectual states of imagination occasioned by a conviction of beauty rather than of truth (cf. chaps. XVII. and XXX.) there may be the same merging of the literal in the spiritual. So thoroughly is the ego aroused by the surprising felicity of certain phrases — like (p. 83) Shakespeare's '*burned on the water,*' — it scarcely conceives pictorially the literal

fact or relation, but seems to cognize it in some less conscious way. Only one of the parallels is produced or followed, though potentially with the effect of both. Even the modifier of a predicate, as was illustrated by *astray*, may fill the mind with an experience of this kind (p. 77).

No doubt the best illustrations of the mind's action in this mode are to be found in noun-interjections like *Traitor! Thief! Fox!* etc., which should be successively reduced in vividness through metaphor and simile to allegory. To expand these epithets into the metaphors 'Thou traitor,' and 'Thou art a traitor!' etc. will, as we have seen, vastly reduce the intensity of imagination; and this perhaps chiefly through dividing the mind's attention between the literal and the spiritual. Allegory is to metaphor in about the same relation of strength as the formal syllogism to common thinking,—except in curt proverbs like 'a rolling stone gathers no moss,' which are cognized without determinative energy. In weaker examples there is no test by which word analogies can be distinguished from mere metaphors save the experience in the mind. Whenever an expression like any of the superb analogies in the extract from *Paracelsus* or the *Princess* produces such experience of the spiritual as to absorb the literal, and this experience is occasioned by a single word, the fact of the mind's superior energy is proved and a word analogy identified. A proper classification of all figures in the second and the third degree of imaginative energy would be the following:—

IMAGINATIVE PROCESSES IN WHICH SPIRITUAL IDENTITY IS DISCERNED.	IMAGINATIVE PROCESSES IN WHICH SPIRITUAL LIKENESS IS DISCERNED.
Sustained Allegory	Sustained Simile
Period Allegory	Period Simile
Clause Allegory	Clause Simile
Running Metaphor	Comparison
Clause Metaphor	Spiritual Proportion
Personification	Phrase Simile
Metonymy	Trope
Synecdoche	
Hyperbole	

'Periodic allegory' and 'Periodic simile' differ from 'sustained allegory' and 'sustained simile' on account of the interference or co-operation of the author's sentence-sense. Compare examples pp. 81–83. Clause simile is confined to a single item of resemblance, and generally introduced by *like as*, *as if*, or *as when*. 'Comparison' is an effort to realize resemblance in degree; as, 'it is as cold as is usual at this season.' 'Spiritual Proportion' seems an

appropriate name for resemblances too intricate or subtle to be expressed, save in the most formal way. See Note to p. 67, par. 2, ll. 10, 11 for a proper instance; though cases as elemental as Chaucer's

Me thoght the felawshyppe as naked
 Withouten hir that saugh I ones
 As a corowne without stones (*Blanche*, 978-80)

should be included under this head. 'Phrase simile' is illustrated especially in the *Beowulf* examples, 'likest a bird,' 'likest flame,' and all such. 'Trobe,' in the sense in which the word is used in this work, is clearly a word-simile. To declare some person to be a *fox*, or *swine*, is to use metaphor; to say *fox-like* or *swine-like* is to use terms indicating imaginative energy of the third degree; and the tropes 'foxy,' 'swinish,' are every way equivalent to these respectively. Contrariwise, adjectives like 'strong' applied to 'hope,' or 'keen' to 'intelligence,' indicate respectively qualities like strength in man or keenness in points or edges; and both may be thought under the form 'strong-like' or 'keen-like.'

The chapter involves no end of topics and points for study, since with chap. XIII. it includes in essence the whole of literary development. All who would teach the subject of figures with success must study them each for himself, not only in modern authors, but historically from *Piers Plowman*, and even *Beowulf*, down to present times.

CHAPTER XI.

PAGE 87, ll. 3-5. Prose comparisons, of course, excepted. Let the student collate the figures in the *Prologue* under the various heads, and note if any word-analogies (besides 'snewed,' p. 399) occur.

P. 89, ll. 12-16. Cf. Lessing's *Laocöon*, sects. xv., xvi.

P. 91, par. 2. The spirit which inspired these times is well shown in Kingsley's *Westward Ho*. For a more profound as well as subtler study of the inner influences that had already been two generations at work, see Brown-ing's *Paracelsus*. The effect of the War of the Rebellion in our own day was an expansion and energization of thought not dissimilar.

P. 92, par. 2. With this and following paragraphs having to do with the progress of sentiment in English literature, compare Professor Corson's paper on the 'Spiritual Ebb and Flow,' in *Introduction to the Study of Browning's Poetry*, pp. 3-31.

P. 92, par. 2, l. 16. After the printing-press must come lay reading of the Scriptures; thus every reader became a theologian. The effect was bad at first. Sects have since multiplied; but the general result has been to advance the development and spread of truth more rapidly.

P. 94, par. 2. The function of religion here is to refine and correct ideals. Regeneration is a reformation or renewal of inherent types. All ideals in their degree postulate the Infinite; that is, Unconditioned Truth or Beauty. See chapter XVII.

P. 96, Note 2. The 'high seriousness' of course comes from the types found in the theme, and is the effect of these upon the author.

P. 98, par. 2. The student is no doubt familiar with the idea that English history is but the history of the emancipation and rise of the 'people,'—the 'third estate.' The reign of Edward III. shows us palpable beginnings of popular rights, of the people's religion, of the people's language as a national idiom, and of the people's literature, which now prevails. The whole course of evolution in both our prose and poetry was first away from the norm of oral speech, then back to it. See pp. 312, 361.

P. 98, par. 2, ll. 5-7. Gray, Collins, Thomson, may be said to represent the movement to reform poetry from within.

P. 100, par. 2, l. 6. The two romantic revolutions of English literary history should be carefully compared. Both were enabled by a religious purification of ideals, by a bracing moral atmosphere, each established a supremacy of the spiritual.

P. 101, l. 4. Wordsworth's fault was what one might call lack of perspective in looking at his themes. He was filled with emotion over the smallest of poetic things, as well as the largest, and in this his own generation could not go with him. In the age before even poetry was not emotional; in ours even prose involves as much exercise of imagination as the theme permits. See chapter XXX. Wordsworth belongs to the end rather than the beginning of the nineteenth century. Like Browning, Tennyson, Shakespeare, he was an anticipation.

P. 101, par. 2, l. 1. For a good illustration of Scottish feeling as a literary element, we may name Lockhart's *Life of Scott*. No such book had ever been written by an Englishman. That Keltic influence has been more pronounced and general than is commonly realized, we may be easily convinced on noting the authors after 1750, wholly or in part of Irish or Scotch extraction. The list will include Byron, as well as Scott and Burns. The Keltic element in the new England did not produce the new Shakespeare, but prepared for him an audience. It is only of Teutonic stock that a Dante or a Browning can be born. Cf. in this connection Arnold's *Celtic Literature*, pp. 78, 79.

P. 102, par. 2, l. 9. No genius that has left record of itself has ever equalled Shakespeare in art (see chaps. XIV., XV.), or surpassed him in knowledge of human nature, or in complete and easy mastery over the resources of expression. But in the matter of ideals or types there has been no inconsiderable advance in the last three centuries. The heart of man has been enlarged,

finer tastes and capabilities of emotion have been evolved. It is quite evident that Shakespeare was far in advance of his times in these respects, but in these, and these only, is perhaps now rivalled by some first minds of our own day.

P. 103, l. 13. Of course Luria 'failed,' as the world counts failure. But according to the economy of the universe, to make Florence realize in the midst of her dismal and sordid distrust that one true man had lived and served her loyally, and so cause her to repair her deranged ideals, was worth the life of a Luria.

P. 104, l. 6. Dr. Berdoe has shown (*Browning's Message to his Time*) that Browning accurately divined the mystery of Paracelsus long before his career was studied out by the savants. See pp. 102, 103 of the above-named volume.

SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER.—The class will quite likely have had not a little acquaintance with the general subject of the Theme. It will, however, do no harm to begin at the beginning. Let simplest poems be given out for full analysis in writing, each member if the class is small reading his judgment before the rest. Or, if the students have had systematic study of Browning and Tennyson, they may begin with the lyrics of the former, after the manner suggested by the interpretation of *Count Gismond* at the beginning of this chapter. After a pretty thorough consideration of the best of Browning's and Tennyson's lyrics the class may advance to the dramas of both these authors. It will be found that the interpretation of the theme in lesser poets is more difficult in general than of the greater, if the reader is able to comprehend the latter at all. With students not yet well acquainted with the principles of literary development, the historical parts of the chapter may be for the time passed over. Indeed, practically there will be few classes with which it will be best to follow the book in course. The principal object of this topic is to bring the student to realize, in an especial way, that the theme in poetry is always paramount, and in truly inspired poems, whether relatively as small as *Count Gismond* or great as *Luria*, can be reduced to a single thought. If especial preparation for this chapter is necessary, the various editions of selected poems from Tennyson, and the 'introductions' or 'hand-books' for the study of Browning will furnish all needed aid.

CHAPTER XII.

PAGE 107, par. 2, l. 5. Conquering one's environment physically means overcoming gravity, weight of the atmosphere, and perhaps of the ether. We are overmastered by these forces in sickness. In death the victory of the cosmic over the bodily forces becomes complete,

. P. 110, par. 3, l. 1. 'Poetry,' 'poetical,' have both an active and a passive significance. In the latter they indicate states of imagination, or products of such states; in the former, occasions of those states.

P. 111, l. 18. Of course the idea has long been familiar theologically, but unrealizable to thought. The doctrine lately recognized that even the small amount of matter once supposed necessary as the 'substance' of the molecule is a gratuitous assumption, — that atoms are but units of force or force-centres, rules out everything from the universe but a personal will, or, as we saw on p. 103, a personal character. This theory of complete solidarity of the so-called material as well as intellectual and spiritual forces has been given the very appropriate name of Monism.

P. 112, l. 8. See pp. 211, 213, in chapter XVII. Compare also Nettle-ship's *Browning: Essays and Thoughts*, p. 373 ff.; and Browning's *Sordello*, Bk. III. par. 6 from end.

P. 113, l. 3. How much spirituality had our Aryan ancestors attained prior to the great migrations? The following stanzas from a celebrated hymn (I. 25) of the *Rig Veda* will in some measure answer the question. Varūna (οὐρανός) is the all-enveloping firmament, noblest of the Indic deities.

Considering that we violate thy precepts,
O Varūna, from day to day, as subjects,
Subject us not unto the deadly weapon
Of him who hateth us and would destroy us.

Let us unloose thy mind and heart to pity
By these our songs of worship and devotion,
As doth, O Varūna, the chariot-driver
Unloose his steed from chariot and harness.

The god who knows the region of the heavens
Where fly the birds; who knows the ocean's pathways;
Who knows the months, the twelve, and all their fruitage;
Who knows what one is born unto the others;

Who knows the winds, the mighty, the majestic;
Who knows their goings and who ride upon them:
This Varūna hath fixed his throne with wisdom,
And rules thereon in absolute dominion.

In state with golden mantle on he sitteth,
The spies have also set themselves about him.
Away my meditations go, and fondly hasten,
Like kine to pasture, seeking the far-seeing.

This of course is not intrinsically literature to us, but it serves to show what were the best thoughts and sentiments of our Indic kindred fifteen hundred years, or earlier, before Christ. A work of such a character, containing the

oldest preserved poetry of our race, undoubtedly deserves the place in universal literature accorded to it.

P. 114, par. 2, l. 24. There is in literature at least some effort to recognize proprietorship in ideas of an isolated kind, and in poetic figures.

P. 115, par. 2, l. 21. Marinism as a mode is wrong really because it sets at nought the law of spiritual equivalences.

P. 116, par. 1. The stanzas here quoted are the third and fourth of the poem. The following are the first, second, and fifth, respectively:—

I wonder what those lovers mean, who say
They have given their hearts away.
Some good kind lover tell me how;
For mine is but a torment to me now.

If so it be one place both hearts contain,
For what do they complain?
What courtesy can Love do more
Than to join hearts that parted were before?

For of her heart he from the flames will find
But little left behind.
Mine only will remain entire;
No dross was there to perish in the fire.

P. 116, par. 2, l. 5. When the Marinistic spirit manifests itself only or chiefly in petty overstrained analogies and exaggerations, the result is 'slang.'

P. 116, par. 1. With reference to the potency of intellectual poetry through the reader's attitude and expectation, see note to p. 6, par. 4, and p. 86.

P. 119, l. 2. Of course *Sordello* was purposely crowded with meaning to escape another such verdict of 'thinness' as had been pronounced upon *Paracelsus*. (See Miss Wilson's *Primer on Browning*, p. 8.) But the point is, if Browning had wholly passed his intellectual stage, he could scarcely have constructed a poem, in its essence so genuinely romantic, on the plan of a philosophical monograph. It might have been concise and pithy, and yet have been throughout a poem.

P. 119, par. 2, l. 3. 'Didactic,' as applied to poetry, contains upon its face a mischievous assumption; as if literature must preach in order to teach, as if Shakespeare's *Macbeth* or *Othello*, because there is no declared moral, were defective in point of instruction.

P. 119, par. 2, l. 5. *Artificial poetry*. Pastoral poems in which there is no substantial sense, and all the *raison d'être* is in the form, are surely artificial. When there is important meaning, as in 'July' of Spenser's *Shepherd's Calendar*, the spiritual effect is more or less conditioned by the form. In the purer type of pastorals, as in the love-idyls of Theocritus and Tasso's *Aminta*,

the fiction of *naïveté* is carried too far for best effect with the imagination. We admire the product, not for its truth, but the artistic skill that has executed it.

P. 120, Note. Or see Howell's *Modern Italian Poets*, pp. 25-50.

SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER.—Students may begin the work of distinguishing the three classes of poetry by searching at random through anthologies and other such collections. Certain poems will at once declare themselves as of one or the other kind. In the first exercise the teacher may require of every student two good and undoubted examples of each sort. These, or characteristic extracts, he should have read before the class, and a statement made, or, if need be, a defence, of the grounds for each decision. All the preparation for the exercise, as in previous chapters, should be made in writing, that the instructor may examine the work of each student by itself in full. After discussions and explanations, the class will be ready at the second or third exercise to decide the character of assigned poems of every description. In selecting these it should be borne in mind that most classes will do best if put first at work on eighteenth century poets. When sure and confident of judgment in the intellectual sort, let the students be given poetry of the Marinistic grade. As soon as its nature is comprehended, they should be set at search for this kind through all library as well as periodical literature of the lighter sort. They should also be required to make comparisons, as between Goldsmith's *Traveller*, or *Deserted Village*, and Johnson's *Vanity of Human Wishes*, to determine how far either is intellectual merely, and how far real sentiment. If the students are already readers of good poetry, it will not be difficult to handle this topic from either end; if they do not yet appreciate poems beyond the grade of *Lucille*, the next step will be hard to take. It will be best to study *One Word More*, or the lyrics from the *Princess*, or the first paragraphs of 'Pompilia' in *King and the Book*, as a basis of comparison. If the previous chapter has been well treated, not much time will be needed here. If the class is wholly immature, this topic must be passed for the time being. But if the chapter is studied at all, it should under no circumstances be passed until each member of the class understands what true poetry is, and can distinguish genuine from false sentiment, whether in verse or novels. There should be serious study of other points suggested in the chapter, so far as possible, as of pastoral poetry, and satire, and burlesque. Let the class be set to determine the true character of some poet who writes in both the serious and the humorous vein. Let it be inquired why Hood's pathos is not more effective, and why with such wit and play of fancy his poetry is not to-day more considered.

CHAPTER XIII.

PAGE 123, l. 13. The two principles are well illustrated in oratory. By the one method the speaker exerts himself to the uttermost to give direct and complete expression to the emotion belonging to the theme; by the other he makes no effort to do justice to it, but seems to use all his force in resisting its effect upon himself. The latter is in general the more effective—at least to Anglo-Saxons, apparently through appealing to the imagination more directly. The latter seems to concern itself too fully with the senses. See pp. 130, 131, below. In further illustration we might compare the symphonies of Berlioz with Beethoven's.

P. 124. This translation, with some amendments, is from the work of Miss Louise Pound and Miss Minnie H. De Pue during sophomore study of Anglo-Saxon in the University of Nebraska. In this institution a little time is given before leaving the subject to rendering parts of the *Beowulf* into Saxon rhythm, and finally in alliterative lines, such as the above.

P. 124, prose l. 9. The Northern idea of rank was based on superior bravery and daring; and any man who demonstrated his superiority in these respects might be raised, as Scyld seems to have been, to the kingship of his tribe. For peculiar facts concerning the death and burial of Scandinavian chieftains, see explanations and notes to Canto II. of the author's translation of *Futhiof's Saga*. For a complete version of the first fit of the *Beowulf*, with observations on several points of interest, see Earle's *Deeds of Beowulf*; or, for a good rendering merely, Garnett's or Hall's translation.

P. 125, par. 2, l. 6. With respect to perfection of form Petrarch is of course the first name in modern letters. The student should clearly understand that Boccaccio, Petrarch, and Dante laid the foundations, and produced the models, of the literature that now prevails. Boccaccio first dared to break away from allegorical and bookish forms, and put forth literary matter on its merits simply. Dante had already produced poetry more remarkable for force than anything since written until the present century. Petrarch, who spent months upon a single sonnet, taught the world the worth and effect of form.

P. 125, par. 2, l. 11. The student will probably not need to be told that the three parts of the poem in question contain thirty-four, thirty-three, and thirty-three cantos respectively, and that each canto, no matter how tremendous the incidents narrated, is condensed into essentially the same compass.

P. 126, l. 3. In other words, poets wrote not because they had strong feelings that must have vent, but merely because they had read poetry in books, and could make poems or books similar. The great poets of a literature, like Chaucer, Shakespeare, Milton, Keats, Wordsworth, have always been men who make poetry *unlike* what they find in books.

P. 126, Note. The one comprehensive principle of Gothic art is, that which is to be felt must do duty also for that which is to be known.

P. 129, l. 13. *Twined, 'bereft.'* For the history of this ballad see Child's monumental work, *English and Scottish Popular Ballads*, Vol. I., p. 170. The text here is essentially Motherwell's version.

P. 129, Note. So far as I am aware justice is nowhere done in histories of England to the Scandinavian element and the influence it has exerted in making the English nation. When we think of the large number of Danish invaders forced to take up their abode in the island among the natives before the eleventh century, and the large immigration that is known to have taken place during the reigns of Sweyn and Canute, it is less difficult to understand the maritime supremacy of England in later times. Chaucer's Shipman, 'whose beard has been shaken in many a tempest' (*Prologue*, 388-410), is of no Anglo-Saxon type, but a fourteenth-century viking. Moreover, the Northern imagination is more active and powerful than the Teutonic, as the Sagas testify. It is quite clear that we should not have had chivalry as history knows it if Scandinavian blood had never coursed in the slower pulses of Southern tribes. Just how much English literature owes to Northern minstrelsy, and how far the Border Ballads are Keltic, are vexed questions, but will undoubtedly be worked out when investigation shall have been sufficiently turned that way.

P. 130, par. 2, ll. 12-15. The best illustrations may be drawn from art. In a portrait the lines of the face are 'effects given,' which produce by imagination conceptions of character as the sufficient cause of each. So the pose, the look, in sculptured forms.

P. 131, l. 7. Cf. *Paradise Lost*, I. 228-238. Wherein is Milton's method different?

P. 131, par. 2, ll. 6-8. Of course Dante's ultimate purpose, as essentially in every canto here, is to make us imagine, in some measure, the plight of the souls in the several circles. He begins by showing simply how the spirits were attracted to him; but before he gets thus far he fills us potentially with the idea of the heat and the sensations it must have caused to him. The final effect is of course a step beyond—how must the spirits have felt! This is attended to formally in XXVII. 49-51, where Dante says on entering the flame,

Come fui dentro, in un bogliente vetro
Gittato mi sarei per rinfrescarmi;
Tanto er' ivi l'incendio senza metro.

When I had entered, into boiling glass
I would have cast myself to cool my heat;
So greatly was that burning beyond measure.

Of course the flame described was not really red, — unless the light from the sun was more intense. The apparent redness was only the mind's inference, just as on bright days sometimes, in contrast with the electric flashes under motor street-cars, common sunlight will seem ruddy. Dante knew nothing of such intensity of light as is to-day produced in various ways, but marvellously divined some of the phenomena now so familiar to us.

P. 131, par. 2. The relative importance of the three notions, *logically*, would require that the circles marked 'common cause' and 'experiential effect intended' should exchange places and names. That the examples here do not involve intellectual inference merely will be apparent after a few comparisons, for instance *Beowulf*, ll. 59-63 (Garnett's translation): —

To him were four children, reckoned in order,
Born into the world, to the prince of the people,
Heogor and Hrothgar and Halga the good.
I heard that Elan was wife of Ongentheow,
The warlike Scyfling's bed-companion.

Here the purpose of the last two lines is evidently not to cause us to know whom Elan married so much as to let us know there was such a person, — that Healfdene had one daughter as well as four sons; and the reader's mind does not let go the meaning until it has made an inference to that effect. With this compare the example at bottom of p. 126. See also Professor Huxley's paper, *Zadig's Method Applied to Science*, Nineteenth Century, VII. 929. The undeclared attentions of the wooer serve as 'effects given' to the imagination of his inamorata, who reads in them an abiding preference, as well as the happiness of betrothal and marriage. Likewise 'faith,' in the best sense, — to vulgar minds nothing but blind credulity, is in reality discernment of this same spiritual sort.

Practically, in literature as well as art, there may be several 'effects given,' each of which shall consecutively and progressively cause imagination to apprehend the 'common cause.' A good example of the simplest sort is found in the Danish Ballad *Elvehvi*, 'Hill of the Elves.' The principal stanzas illustrative of the present point are these: —

I was a youth who rode wooing one day
Through rosy valleys at will.
I rode till weary I laid forlorn
My head on the fairies' hill.

I laid my head on the hill of the elves,
My eyes were as lead to see.
There came three fairies trooping forthwith,
And fain would they speak with me.

One struck up a song at the word;
So sweetly did she begin,

The rushing streams in their rocky beds,
They paused and were still therein.

The rushing streams in their rocky beds,
They paused and were still therein,
And the little wee fish in the salt-sea flood,
He rested upon his fin.

The little wee fish in the salt-sea flood,
He rested upon his fin,
And the many wild deer that roamed the wood,
They forgot all their springs to spring.

And the many wild deer that roamed the wood,
They forgot all their springs to spring,
And the little wee birds in the tree-tops sat,
And essayed not their songs to sing.

Here is a very simple problem,—how to hint to imagination the charm of a fairy's singing; and here is the true solution. A simple 'effect given' will not answer the purpose; the imagination must be kept to the thought until sufficiently aroused. Hence the successive 'effects,' and the repetitions. This is also the method in musical compositions of the highest class, and in painting. Moreover, an 'intended experiential effect'—as conspicuously happens later in this ballad may serve as the 'effect given' of another process, and another 'experiential effect intended.'

P. 132, l. 7. *Empiric*. Thus it is clear why 'experimental' is well applied to the operation of imagination in such cases. The mind can only try to comprehend experiential truths. But it cannot utter so much as it experiences, directly. "The highest cannot be spoken." But the imagination can be communicated with to the uttermost of a poet's meaning through indirect means, or 'effects.'

P. 133, Note 1. See Ency. Brit.; Vasari, I. 93-122; or Quilter's *Giotto*, p. 32. The last-named work thus relates the incident referred to: "Boniface VIII. was desirous of adding to the decorations of St. Peter's, and sent one of his courtiers from Treviso to Tuscany to ascertain what kind of man Giotto might be, and what were his works. On his way the messenger received designs from various artists in Siena, and then came to Giotto, told him of his mission, and no doubt showed him the elaborate designs which he had received from the Sienese artists. Whereupon Giotto drew with one sweep of his arm a circle in red ink, of perfect accuracy, and gave it to the messenger, refusing to send any other design; 'whereby,' says Vasari, 'the Pope and such of his courtiers as were well versed in the subject perceived how far Giotto surpassed all the other painters of his time.'"

P. 134, par. 2, l. 12. *Iliad* III. 121-244. Note the length of the dialogue. A full exhibit of Gothic instances—or rather of nearest approximation to the

Gothic manner of art—in the classic poets is being prepared. No other example so genuine as the one just referred to has yet been found. Such instances as *Il. I.* 7, 49, and 52 are not properly 'effects' at all, rather items of 'sympathetic' or 'interpretative' description. (See p. 363.) Homer is first and chief among poets who say high things by the direct method. But he does not speak the highest,—perhaps is greatest in that he does not try. In this connection cf. Carlyle, *Lects. on the Hist. of Lit.*, p. 77. How Gothic aspiration has manifested itself in learning, in contrast with the spirit of Alexandrian and Byzantine scholarship, is excellently illustrated by Browning in *Grammarian's Funeral*.

P. 135, l. 6. The principle in Gothic art is the same as we have seen underlying all figures,—the law of spiritual equivalences. Hence the small may be taken to indicate the great. See p. 348, par. 2.

P. 138, ll. 8–11. The history of the change from Romanticism to Realism, though much has been written about the 'nature school,' the advance to probability, the 'Life school,' etc., is yet but imperfectly comprehended. Of course, the only complete data for the study are found in novels. The types do not chronologically succeed each other, but often prevail together. Realism has its beginnings as far back as Chaucer, who indeed outrivals some exponents of the movement that stand high to-day.

P. 141, l. 20. Realism does not consist, as by some supposed, in choice and treatment of ugly and forbidding themes. It finds the good and true in humble and unexpected quarters. Perhaps there is no better example than Tolstoi's *Cossacks*. It is not denied that the Frenchman may get satisfaction and even delight from the novels of Zola, but the Anglo-Saxon cannot. Naturalism cannot be a mode of art, because it cannot inspire. It may influence, but not like painting, rather as photography.

Under Gothicism, apparently, until further characteristics are developed, must be included products of the Russian school in literature, art, and music.

P. 141, par. 2, l. 4. Shakespeare seems not to wish to cast destiny, but only to interpret it,—to separate and identify its threads. It has been said that Shakespeare makes but few plots, and in so far is wanting in originality. Is it not because he was too great a realist? Given the web of a destiny already woven, he is glad to unravel it. But he is not rashly willing to attempt weaving one.

P. 142, par. 2, ll. 1–3. Moreover, a distinctively Gothic spirit, in spite of the lightness of the theme, pervades the *Parlament of Foules*.

SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER.—Work in this chapter will depend, in a greater degree than even hitherto, on the maturity and attainments of the student. If thoroughly prepared to study the chapter as a whole, he may be set at any topic included in it, at the choice or pleasure of the instructor. In

the main, it will probably be found best to follow the points as given, commencing with the direct expatiatory manner of the *Mabinogion* or *Ossian*, as contrasted with the indirect and suppressive mode of the *Beowulf* and the Sagas. When the topic of 'effects' is reached, let the students, so far as possible, have rein. Show the class by one or two examples from actual observation that there is nothing in the process at all peculiar, — that it is the method of business as well as poetry. A merchant, for example, advertises for an office-boy. Twenty-five applicants answer the call. The merchant watches the movements and demeanor of each, and finally makes a selection. He has observed various 'effects': in one, neatness of dress; in another, well-bred civility; in another, scrupulous care of hands or hair; in another, signs of the cigarette habit or reckless companions. In each of these 'effects' he reads the 'common cause,' and from that interprets the 'experiential effect,' or the serviceableness and efficiency of the candidate. After the principle has been made clear, send out the class to find two examples, one, the best obtainable, from books; another, — if possible within the range of personal knowledge, from practical life. By all means prevent the student from associating these principles with some certain page or chapter of a book: make him so clear in his first experiences with them that they will become a part of himself, that he will refer them to his own consciousness as the last authority. As to the Ballads, the 'schools,' the history of architecture and art, so much time and attention should be given as is consistent with the maturity of the class. Let further exercises be set, in which the student shall find such and such illustrations where he can. If there is a gallery of paintings accessible to the class, have each member interpret, in writing, the 'common cause' or character from the expression or pose or mien of some significant portrait or statue, and determine the impressions he has as to what such a person under given circumstances would do or say.

CHAPTER XIV.

PAGE 145, l. 2. As to the almost Christian conception of this divinity, see Anderson's *Norse Mythology*, or Ency. Brit. Concerning the question whether this myth is a product of the Northern mind or only a far-off reflection from the Christ of the Southern or Eastern Church, it is hardly possible to refer to anything in English. The subject has been long under investigation by Scandinavian scholars, who will doubtless one day find out the truth. The latest contribution known to me at present writing is Sophus Bugge's *Studier over de nordiske Gude- og Jettasagns Oprindelse*: Christiania, 1889.

P. 145, l. 8. The notion that our modern civilization is a compound of merely 'Hellenism' and 'Hebraism' has been scarcely challenged since Arnold's *Culture and Anarchy* appeared; and one sees it repeated in various

forms. It is not true that the Jews were a race of high ideals outside the religious sphere. Monogamy, chivalry, and 'honor' are in no sense of Hebrew, or even of Grecian, inspiration.

P. 146, par. 2, l. 23. The imagination perforce turns simple facts into mysteries. By appealing to this preference for fancies over fact, not only Shakespeare and like artists accomplish their ends, but also unprincipled men in practical life. The vender of nostrums has but to produce testimonials of marvelous cures, and half the public believe, though admitting that real evidence is wanting. The chief success of magic in its day was the readiness of people to believe subjectively in what was objectively impossible. It is only through experience that the ego learns to be skeptical. It is no fault in the imagination that it so readily kindles at a hint of the mysterious. It is endowed and adapted for higher verities alone, and is not content in any-case that the spiritual element should be unapparent. See p. 349.

P. 147, par. 2, l. 14. Compare Shakespeare's treatment of Coriolanus in the fourth scene of that play. Here Macbeth's strength and daring are relative and incidental. In the former play it is the main purpose of the author to exhibit Coriolanus as in these characteristics without a rival. To have made Macbeth a Coriolanus would have rendered him too insensible to remorse and fear of vengeance. It would have been easy for Shakespeare to give us a stronger Macbeth and Lady Macbeth, but such could not have met the conditions he later wants. They could not have suffered enough to make the tragedy he intended.

P. 148, par. 2, l. 5. This is of course what is often called 'reading between the lines.' Nothing that belongs veritably to art is interpretable otherwise than from 'effects,' through implied causes, to conclusions.

P. 151, par. 2, l. 7. The student will be assisted in understanding Duncan's character by reading Holinshed, as quoted by Furness (*Var. Macbeth*, p. 355 ff.), or the introduction in Clarke and Wright's, or Rolfe's, edition of the play.

P. 154, par. 2. Shakespeare's greatness is demonstrated not more completely by the things he does than by the things he leaves undone. To have had Leontes and Hermione exchange a syllable at the close of the *Winter's Tale* would have spoiled the play. To have shown the banquet here, or to have allowed the audience to see Duncan again after he entered the castle-gate, would have weakened the after-effect immeasurably. But what dramatist, save Shakespeare, would have left these things undone?

P. 157, par. 3, l. 7. Compare the repeated calls of Horatio and Marcellus to Hamlet (I. v.); of Emilia to Othello (V. ii.); also the last paragraph but one in *Sohrab and Rustum*. Let the student find similar expedients in like situations.

P. 159, par. 2, l. 4. It is by no means certain that Shakespeare intended that we should see the crown of Scotland on Macbeth's head at all.

P. 169, par. 3, l. 8. This peculiar means of arousing imagination or the feelings is an example of the 'negative method,' for which see Chapters XV. and XVII.

P. 173, par. 3, ll. 5-8. It is well and proper to study Elizabethan English for the sake of better understanding Shakespeare, hardly to study Shakespeare merely or mainly for the purpose of knowing Elizabethan English. Aside from the preposterousness of making the sublimest of all works of genius merely the occasion of language study, the subject is apt to be repellant, and the student in consequence leaves Shakespeare as Shakespeare ever after severely alone. On the other hand, I have observed that when a student has come to feel the power of Shakespeare he will consent to any drudgery the better to know his meaning.

P. 173, Note. Shakespeare, it will be remembered, has caused the Doctor in our hearing to give the order (V. i. 75) "Still [*i.e.* constantly] keep eyes upon her." If she had "by self and violent hands taken off her life," the fact would not have been surmised merely, but certainly known. If her death had been made to occur at night, it might appear that she had outwitted her keepers; but it is clear that it takes place in the day time. It is hence evident that the last paragraph of the play is inconsistent with what has gone before, and must have been added by a different hand.

SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER. — Let it be remembered that this is not a chapter, more than the preceding, to be simply read, — and under no circumstances should it be *recited*, — but is given to form the basis for full study of all the 'effects' employed. If it is not possible to study the play as a whole, select certain integral parts, as scenes iii., iv., and v. of Act I., ii. and iii. of II., iv. of III., and i. of V. Choose some special 'effect' and see that every student comprehends it fully. If the class is strong enough, it may be well to select ll. 28-51 — already considered (pp. 36, 37) for their associations — of I. v. The principal 'effect' here is of course Lady Macbeth's excitement over realizing how great is the burden she proposes to assume. If she can thus realize the awfulness of the deed beforehand, *yet will do it*, there must be a sufficient cause impelling her, — to wit, ambition. In this, indulged at such cost of pain before the crime is actually committed, we read what will be the real experience after it. The whole of the coming tragedy is contained potentially in this scene, and this situation in the scene. When the student has comprehended so much, he can understand anything in the play. If the play cannot be taken entire, the analysis of separate parts may be assigned topically. If the work is essayed from the beginning, it may be well with young

learners to postpone the first two scenes and make the opening exercise start with iii. 38.

CHAPTER XV.

PAGE 174, par. 2, l. 17. The student will of course have noted that Francisco is a common soldier, but Bernardo and Marcellus, who are to stand on guard responsibly during the later hours of the night, are 'officers.' Thus Shakespeare justifies the presence of men who shall be worthy companions of Horatio, and also of Hamlet later.

P. 175, l. 14. The loftiness of tone with which Marcellus begins his story is a culminating 'effect.' We say to ourselves, 'what has this man *seem* to make him feel thus?' And just as we have begun to imagine something portentous enough to explain it as the 'cause,' the ghost appears to intensify even this impression. There is nothing in Shakespeare more inimitable than the skill here shown.

P. 175, par. 2, l. 13. In case of Banquo's ghost, that first comes in leering and shaking its gory locks, it is possible to make the objective aspect more terrible, as is done (p. 162) on its return. But here the ghost of the elder Hamlet is clothed in such majesty that no like change is possible. The deepened effect must therefore come subjectively through preparation of the audience.

P. 177, par. 2, l. 13. The reader should study with care the various 'effects' used by the author in getting Hamlet before our minds. We note him first standing silently with his eyes upon the floor. The court is in gaudy dress, befitting the recent nuptials of the king and his mother, but he dares appear notwithstanding in inky garments. When time comes that he speak, his first words publish his fearless intolerance and contempt. And so on to the culmination in the paragraph of effectual rejoinder to his mother.

P. 179, l. 9. Ophelia obeys her father because of his assertion that her fair fame is in jeopardy. People, he has said, are remarking her conduct. That is enough, though the statement is mainly false, and Ophelia knows it utterly unjust. This scene is put together largely to enable Polonius to refer to Mrs. Grundy and give his order. That Ophelia should not vindicate her rights in any proper way, but wholly avoid Hamlet's sight, as she now does, is an 'effect' which fixes her place with us at the outset.

P. 179, par. 3, l. 6. It is doubtless clear that these are further preparations of like sort with those remarked before the return of the ghost in scene i. It will not do to make the third appearance of the ghost merely a repetition of the second. The imagination of the audience must be aroused to see in this visitation what it has not known before. There is evidently little that can be used but contrast; but how much the author finds of that! So far as I know,

it is not customary, in rendering this scene, to attempt producing the sound of ordnance; but that is a mistake. The most telling of all the effects should not thus be singled out for omission.

P. 180, l. 2. *Ghost from hell*, or rather from purgatory, as ll. 11-13 make clear. Shakespeare apparently permits some vagueness here, that the imagination of his Protestant audiences may unreflectively make the most and worst of his hints. Cf. ll. 3 and 93 of this scene. In the last reference Hamlet, it will be noted, is reluctant to "couple hell" with the rest of his apostrophe, because of his father's supposed sojourn there.

P. 183, l. 3. After the ghost appears and Hamlet acts insanely, *the king suspects*.

P. 183, par. 2, l. 9. A *positive* 'effect' causes us to infer experientially a positive cause. A *negative* 'effect' causes us to infer there is no such cause as we supposed existed. Lady Macbeth declares to her husband that if he will but 'look up clear,' she will do all else. Here is a positive 'effect,' in which we read such tigress-like ferocity that we are persuaded she can and will do the deed alone. But after we believe and expect, she proves—even with the help of drink—unequal to the murder. Through this *negative* 'effect' we conceive instead of fiendish cruelty the tenderest sensibilities, and are thus prepared for the sleep-walking scene in the last act. As has been pointed out, p. 185, when we find ourselves deceived in our assumptions, we amend them by taking their contrary. The imagination insists on seeing the whole of that which to our chagrin we have proved true in part. We expect good news because we think there can be no miscarriage of our schemes; but when the first ill rumor comes, we declare there will be no success at all. If we believe evil reports concerning some stranger that turn out to be false, we shall probably later think of him more highly than we are warranted.

One of the commonest uses of the negative method with imagination is seen in Irony. In proper forms of this figure that which ought to be true is set forth in face of its evident contrary.

P. 183, par. 3, l. 7. The reader should here consider whether it would have been possible to make Othello a hero by the positive method. When he has thought this out he will understand that all like characters, to reach the sympathies, must be handled in the same way,—that *Hiawatha*, for instance, if constructed on the negative plan, might have succeeded.

P. 186, l. 3. Of course the secret of the effect is in the associations, as also in Hamlet's first considerable utterance (I. ii. 76-86). Compare later the Duke's paragraph with Othello's (iii. 221-239), noting the inorganic, pedantic phrases of the former. Observe that both of Othello's deliverances are clearly 'effects,' in which we read a magnificent self-respect. Note in comparison how the like characteristic paragraphs of Coriolanus, through the associations of the language, evince a vitiated self-respect.

P. 187, l. 32. Brabantio now disappears from sight, soon to die from bereavement and chagrin. Shakespeare is no doubt hard upon the man who is the victim of relentless fate. He has no fault but pride, a permissible failing under the circumstances; but Shakespeare keeps him essentially as far from our sympathies, and for like reason, as Polonius himself.

P. 188, l. 17. *Not so much personal*, etc. Othello's words, "I loved her that she did pity them," are an 'effect given,' in which we read the kind and degree of his affection, and also, as the 'experiential effect intended,' the wreck of his felicity. He was flattered by the preference of such a woman; but love her for truest spiritual reasons, he did not and could not. He never understood the real difference between Desdemona and other women of half her worth; hence, when she is accused to him of grossness, finds no *evidence within* of its absurd impossibility. Thus the author persuades us potentially in advance that no such Moorish husband will be happy with a Venetian Desdemona. The real Othello may not meet with an Iago who will traduce his wife in the first week of married life, but he will encounter misunderstandings enough to make the union null. The play, as a whole, is not to be interpreted as a mere study of race-differences, rather of a spiritual misalliance.

P. 188, Note. Is it creditable that such a man as Othello ever existed? In so far as he is idealized beyond what we may believe actual, he is a romantic character. If we decide there is nothing in him beyond what may be or may have been evinced in a single person, it is a realistic creation. Let the reader consider how far the play, in its different characters and situations, is cast according to the one or the other mode of art.

SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER.—The object of this chapter has been in effect made clear already. It affords means for the study of more complex 'effects' of the positive kind, as also of beginning the analysis of the 'effects' called negative. If the instructor can take his class no further in the respective plays than through Act I., he will, if the work can be done thoroughly, enable his students to interpret the rest of each, as well as other plays of Shakespeare and like masterpieces of literature, without further aid. If time forbid the study of both plays, at least take up the negative effects in Othello.

Note there is scarcely any use of the positive method in this play. We first infer from Iago's and Roderigo's talk that Othello is a man of no brains and no character; on this theory we account for his elopement. But at first sight of Othello we see the inferred cause does not exist, and begin amending our assumptions, which we keep on doing to the very end. At the beginning of scene iii. Shakespeare gives us a lively experience of the dignity and importance of the Venetian Signiory, so that we think Othello will be abashed on

attempting to excuse his marriage. Again, we anticipate from Desdemona a very shamefaced and lame defence of the step she has taken. And so on to the end. We do not expect Roderigo will, at close of IV. ii., so boldly assert his rights. We find ourselves mistaken in assuming that Emilia is too sordid to appreciate Desdemona, for she offers up herself a sacrifice to the truth and goodness of her mistress. We are even wrong in believing Desdemona dead after Othello's hands have been at her throat, for she revives and is heard to speak again. We think Othello disarmed, and begin to wonder what the Venetian Senate will adjudge a fitting punishment, when he ends the tragedy with his life. It was not necessary that the play should be built up thus throughout of negative effects. After Othello is made our hero, the play might have proceeded on the positive plan, but Shakespeare is not minded to shift his method.

It is doubtless unnecessary to give further suggestions concerning study of this chapter. Let each student write out all the impressions he finds come to him, and identify each in its separate 'effect.' No one student will by any means find all: but by combining all of each with the teacher's supplements, the work should be essentially complete. Aim to possess the student with such command of the modes and confidence in interpretation as will keep him at work in Shakespeare after class-work has ceased.

CHAPTER XVI.

PAGE 191, par. 2, l. 9. *Tithonus* and *Psalm of Life* will be recognized as names of poems by Tennyson and Longfellow respectively. The monologues whose titles follow, of course are Browning's.

P. 191, par. 3, l. 2. The stage soliloquy is, of course, a clumsy and absurd expedient, in that it assumes that men do or might sensibly talk thus to themselves just as to others.

P. 193, par. 2. The peasant girl understood at once from the circumstance of the glove that there was a patriot in distress. None but a nobleman would have a glove to throw, or occasion to attract by it the notice of a peasant woman except for help against the common enemy.

P. 195, par. 2, l. 2. As is pointed out in Chaps. X. and XXVI., the conscious principle is all the time learning to work with lighter tools, and thus devises means to stir the imagination as much by the talk of one character with implication of answers by others, as by the whole cast in formal acting. There is, however, still room for finished and complete stage impersonation, which shall bring out subtle hints of meaning and reveal 'effects' or types not generally revealable to the closest reader.

P. 195, last line. The society of the Carbonari had disappeared in Italy

before the present poem was published, but Browning has undoubtedly that organization in mind.

P. 197, ll. 9-15. Of course the poem could scarcely be complete without some hint of the heat in the Southern blood.

P. 201, l. 21. *Uncanny stanzas*. The student will note that weird circumstances serve as 'effects' to imagination, or as indicative of occult forces in operation. Cf. pp. 146, 349.

P. 204, poet. l. 6. Note as the chief 'effect' of character that the Duchess is not above the least of her serving-folk in spirit, but recognizes true worth everywhere. Cf. like traits in *Flight of the Duchess*, and *Colombe's Birthday*. Browning shows little variation of type in his best female characters.

P. 204, poet. l. 16. What 'effect' in the implication she would not "let herself be lessoned so"?

P. 204, poet. l. 21. The revulsion of feeling in the messenger at this last hint is splendid. He has already, with true Italian tact, found out by his inquiries that the Duke is jealous and exacting, — but the thought of possible 'commands' for his young mistress! Yet the marriage will take place just the same.

P. 205, poet. ll. 1, 2. Of course it must come out somewhere why the Duke has led this visitor up stairs, or the poem will be inartistic. It is a first principle of art that everything that happens shall be accounted for *from within*. Likewise the reason of the Duke's obtrusive courtesy ("Will't please you sit and look at her?"), which ensures proper detention till the story can be told, and at the end a deft return to the earlier subject is not omitted.

P. 206, par. 3, l. 4. See Ruskin's remarks upon the poem, *Modern Painters*, vol. iv. p. 359 ff. Am. ed.

P. 206, par. 3, l. 6. The poem abounds in 'effects' of the negative kind. Note (l. 19) the terrible business-like "God curse the same!"

P. 207, l. 3. For another example of the same method in monologue, cf. *Andrea del Sarto*. The necessity of good incentives and a noble inspiration was never shown more powerfully.

SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER. — This chapter is intended not only as an aid to the interpretation of Browning's lyrics in general, but especially of his concentrated 'effects.' Each of the poems here discussed should be taken up, and, just as in the exercises suggested for the last chapter, exhaustively inventoried for hints and impressions. If it is necessary to begin even lower down, the teacher may start with *Home Thoughts from Abroad*, requiring first that each student give, in writing, the 'theme' or purpose of the poem. Let him have enough discussion on this point to bring out all there is to be said about

the poem as a whole. When it is clearly understood that Browning meant to put his reader in subjective possession of the experiences one would have in England in April, and to suggest his own unlike surroundings, set the task of ascertaining how the subjective experiences are induced. Follow this plan with *The Boy and the Angel*, or *The Patriot*, and thus approach the more intricate poems. The many handbooks and introductions to Browning's poetry will supply what to different students or instructors may be lacking. As a good poem for the final study of 'effects' with mature scholars, *Caliban upon Setebos* may be attempted. As with the preceding chapter and the two following, the work here may be postponed or omitted with junior learners. With all classes fitted to pursue it, the teacher should require that each student sketch out a plausible expansion of one or more of the monologues to the regulation five-act form.

CHAPTER XVII.

PAGE 210, par. 2, l. 13. Dante once declared that neither rhyme nor metre had ever forced him to say aught in a manner different from what he would. Shakespeare, no doubt, might have made the same boast; but what poet else in the world's literature? Poets of the second class have been often known to put up with bad form rather than impair their meaning, being unable to compass both. But poetasters are generally content to put up with bad meaning rather than forego available rhymes and striking phrases.

P. 211, par. 2, l. 12. A seer is, of course, in strictness, a prophet; but the term has come to be applied to any one who can discern the open secrets of man and nature, and in general the ultimate meanings of things intuitively. It is, indeed, not clear but that, in the inspired sense of the word, the prophet reads the future in the present.

P. 212, l. 3. Truth effectually apprehended produces righteousness; beauty, love. But these two are one, though the mind, on account of its limitations, must conceive them separately. The Good is a term by which we recognize what is of benefit to man. What does not conduce to the edification or profit of the individual or the race cannot be called by this name. Some flowers and animals are beautiful, but not good. In the last analysis, the True, the Beautiful, and the Good, and their contraries, indicate only modes of the mind's cognition. See p. 348.

P. 212, l. 4. But neither poets nor seers are by any means so narrow as they seem. Keats has said, 'Truth is Beauty, Beauty Truth.' Even Carlyle, rugged and harsh in his John-Knox nature, could have been a poet, as his *Heroes and Hero Worship*, *Burns Essay*, and *French Revolution* prove. In no poem ever written was there more use of what is to be felt for what is to

be known than in the last-named work. As history it is, of course, a failure; but that is true of other attempts than his, and oftener because there is too little feeling than too much. The man who writes only generalizations, without giving first the facts, writes history to as little purpose as Carlyle. If we are first to know the facts before we read our history, Carlyle's volumes are as good as Green's, and, as interpretative literature, far better. See p. 363.

P. 212, l. 5. Many will insist that Browning should be added to this trio, and I am not sure but that the claim is just. It is not his defects of form, but undoubted inferiority to Goethe, and all three, in intuitive apprehension of scientific truth, that would raise a doubt. In the *Sordello* he outlines the main principles of development with great clearness many years before Spencer's or Darwin's theories were put forth. Yet his genius is essentially poetic, — that is, imaginative, emotional.

P. 212, par. 2, l. 15. Taste implies some exercise of the imagination, but not the highest; hence is not generally applied to its activity in the sphere of poetry and art. See Chap. XXX.

P. 215, par. 2, l. 23. Of course it is not intimated that the man who has written one book shall not write another if he have true occasion, or a thousand, if he honestly believe they will each serve some need. But the author who has 'made a hit' with one book should not try if the public will endure another, unless sure he has another message. Otherwise it is like to prove a wasteful method of oblivion. If he care for fame alone, let him be considerate of his public. Manzoni's single novel will always be read with wonder, while some of Scott's twenty-nine are already considered 'children's stories.' The ethics of authorship is no less merciless and exacting than even the ethics of behavior.

P. 216, l. 4. There are few men of normal endowments and proper culture but have matter for a chapter, or page, or at least a line, too invaluable to be spared, that will never be given to the world except by them. The assumption that a few men are to do the thinking and make the books and articles for the rest of the race is very foolish. The time no doubt will come when the common mind with a single new idea will be able to contribute it to society, and when professional authors will find it hard to publish, merely upon their reputation, books of no intrinsic worth.

P. 216, par. 2, l. 1. Civilization, our Christian-Teutonic civilization, is a strange mosaic, into which Hebrew, Greek, Roman, Gothic, Celtic, and numerous other elements have entered. In coming time doubtless all races will touch each other, and appropriate as well as impart all best knowledge and inspiration. Cf. p. 365.

P. 218, l. 16. It is, of course, these types that take-offs and travesties are

based upon. It may be noted that of all men who ever wrote in 'high seriousness,' Shakespeare has been travestied least.

P. 219, par. 2. The author might have hinted much beside, — as the height at which this bird flies for reasons of security, and the distance to which it migrates in the northern solitudes that it may be unmolested in its summer haunts by animals or man. Bryant has indeed suggested both these things to such as are expert in ornithology. To have brought them to the attention of other readers would have spoiled the proportion.

P. 222, par. 2, l. 14. In other words, direct quotation, under whatsoever circumstances, is of the essence of dramaticism.

P. 227, l. 3. But the author has already hinted to our fancy that this is no bullying suitor, but a man of ideals, in Gaucelm's "I'd noticed he had a brow," and Adolf's preceding and following paragraphs.

P. 227, par. 2, l. 5. Compare Shakespeare's method with Hermione, Imogen, — indeed, with every other of his women. There is no effort to idealize, only selection of the manner and the moment of presentation. Browning's 'strokes' are not concealed as strokes. Shakespeare understood women even more perfectly, if possible, than men, and portrays them with a larger sympathy.

P. 234, l. 9. To be convinced that Shakespeare perfectly understood the difference between the Rome of the older days and of Cæsar's, one has but to study *Coriolanus* in connection with *Antony and Cleopatra*.

P. 235, par. 3, l. 8. Cf. p. 253, par. 2, *ad fin.*

P. 237, l. 12. Nothing would, perhaps, so condition Cæsar's greatness to the fancy as making him at this point hold his hand to his ear to catch Antony's words. Shakespeare has not ventured such an expedient here, but takes the next safe substitute. The devices used thus far to Cæsar's disadvantage are no doubt, literally speaking, exaggerations, but spiritually true nevertheless. Shakespeare merely withholds from us for the time being the contrary types of strength and greatness which we know are in the man, and indeed are permitted to see in turn, after we have consented to his death, near the end of the second act.

P. 237, par. 2. One of the worst of the few inconsistencies permitted anywhere by Shakespeare occurs in the representations of Casca. Here he drawls, and seems both scant and slow of wit. In the next scene he has lost his bluntness, and speaks in such wise that his account of the storm can be used as a sublime premonition of the events to follow.

P. 237, par. 3, l. 8. It might appear, on unconsidered reading, that the author here introduces a cause too great for the effect secured. It is evident that Portia is one of the strongest and noblest of Shakespeare's women, yet appears only twice, and exerts only an infinitesimal part of the influence

native to her personality. On closer study it becomes clear that the author keeps her from further presence in the play to avoid making her the real centre of interest. How important was to him the task in hand is seen from the fact he introduces and uses even a Portia to secure our sympathies for Brutus and the cause he represents.

SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER.—The highest literary culture must include consideration of the questions, how is literature made; what materials are proper to choose; how should they be handled; and this not at all for the purpose of training students for authorship, but of enabling them to realize more fully and effectively the power of letters. As has been implied already, a knowledge of art does not consist in the power to *produce* through intuitive inspiration, but reflectively and discriminatingly to *comprehend* and *appreciate*. The man who gets most from music, outside the joy of creation, is not the composer, nor even the performer, but the understanding listener. The power to interpret art of any sort is not to be taken merely as an accomplishment, but as the means of reading influence at first hand in the outside world.

As to methods of putting this chapter into effect, advice is no doubt unnecessary. The topic calls but for a co-ordination of what has been learned in preceding chapters. Students may be set first at search for a list of poems or dramas illustrating the lowest form of art; namely, such as serve up for the reader only palpable spiritual truths. When different examples and degrees have been adequately discussed, poems of the next grade may be called for, and should include, so far as may be, the examples used for study under especial heads preceding. Let the openings of prominent poems be compared, and relative excellence through obedience to the principle referred to on p. 221. Finally, according to time at disposal and capacity of the class, examples of the highest form of art should be sought out, and some one or more studied with especial care.

CHAPTER XVIII.

PAGE 240, l. 6. But the child's first notions of its environment are wholly spiritual. It credulously and even superstitiously clothes every object it has not yet comprehended with mysterious, perhaps with dangerous, powers. At length, better advised, it corrects its subjectivity, but with the effect, as always by the indirect method of imagination, of recognizing nothing phenomenal anywhere. Then the true education begins, discovering little by little the ultimate truths of man and nature.

P. 242, l. 16. We begin life and knowledge in the physical sphere, where we learn the inviolability and inexorableness of material laws. If certain con-

ditions are not met, death ensues. In answering the exactions of physical existence, discipline begins.

P. 244, l. 19. It is not merely education that ensures reverence, but that which education is presumed to enable,—power to read the ‘open secrets.’ The man who can do that, even if Carlylean in disposition, is at the head of things. It is an ideal, not of knowing what others know, but do *not* know, that admits men to this standard. In the last analysis it is only the power of recognizing ultimate beauty or ultimate truth.

P. 246, l. 4. The curse of labor is in the fact it drags the soul down to the muscles, harnesses it, as it were, to a pick or shovel. Yet there is compensation in the compound increase of earnings saved. Physical labor is the foundation of wealth; and by thrift before marriage the well-advised young man may save what in middle life will raise him from an employe to an employer, and give him leisure in later years. The hope of mankind is not in the abolition of labor as such; for unless society were ready for leisure it would prove a universal bane, as the police-record of our holidays in itself makes clear. Idleness has long been known to be a most fertile source of crime. The abolition of household cares by a co-operative system would reduce domestic expenditures one-half, but family discipline would be undermined. Yet the race is gradually being adapted to conditions in which there is less need of grinding physical labor to keep under the violent and sensual.

P. 249, l. 10. Science changes intuitive knowledge of the single mind to the reflective knowledge of all. Great ideas or works of art produce classicism. In other words, classicism is the mode between successive revelations. Romanticism is a collective name for such revelations. Realism extends the bounds of the select and inspiring by closer estimation of common things.

P. 249, par. 2, l. 13. ‘Renaissance’ is used here and later as a name for the general effect on the Northern mind of full contact with classic culture. This sense of the word is recognized in the *Century Dictionary*.

P. 250, par. 2, l. 24. Illustrations of how the discoveries of the few tend to become the commonplaces of the many abound in the industrial or professional not less than the æsthetic side of life. Hardly a generation ago dentists were in general self-made, having first studied in the office of some successful practitioner, and then perfected their skill by their own ingenuity and observation. Now all points and processes are taught in schools and discussed in journals.

P. 252, l. 3. This is hardly a fair statement. Scientific thought already recognizes that there can be but a single principle in the entire cosmos, and is at present perplexed only concerning its relations with inertia, or what inertia must be in nature, to consist with that one element. This single or ‘monistic’ principle we may call Energy, or Will, or (p. 103) Character. See p. 344; also p. 337.

P. 253, par. 2, l. 2. I do not mean to say that literature is such a serious matter to everybody. There are some men who take nothing seriously; but even such owe most of what they are in their sensibilities to books. They may not themselves read poetry, but they are the sons of fathers or of mothers that have read poets, or at least been influenced by them. Men whose emotional nature is undeveloped will of course eschew poetry; but it does not follow that all who avoid poetry are wanting in sensibility. There are those who have in a sense outgrown the poetry of books, even if they have never read it, but find sufficient occasion for the full exercise of æsthetic feeling in the outside world incidentally every day. (Cf. p. 365.) Let us remember that books are not an end, but a means; that they are to be used, and that their chief use is to make their use unnecessary.

P. 253, par. 2, l. 15. 'Morals' are the generalized ideals of an age or race, or so many of the types (p. 94) found in each mind as are common to all. 'Ideals' represent such types as are left over and above what is included in 'morals.' 'Character' is the sum of a man's habits, or so much of his ideals as he can approximately actualize in his living, but generally has reference to such part of them as are called 'morals.' What he is further, with respect to ideals proper, is generally spoken of under the name of 'personality.' 'Individuality' is a term which, in strictness, designates a man's points of differences from other men.

CHAPTER XIX.

PAGE 259. *Exhibit of averages.* The part of Fabyan counted begins at the second paragraph of p. 363, vol. II., Ellis' ed. Hooker's hundreds commence with the first sentence of the *Polity*. The average of the first book, 725 periods, is 42. *Self-Culture* was the paper of Channing's computed, 749 periods: average of all 25.28. Spenser's figures are for the first 500 periods of the *View*. Macaulay's *Essay on History*, here used from the beginning, contains 722 periods: average 23.03. The exhibit from Emerson includes the *Divinity College Address* and a part of the *American Scholar*. The average of both, 733 periods, is 20.70.

SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER.—A good method for this chapter, if the whole of the prose part of the book can be gone over, is to set the students first the task of ascertaining their individual sentence-averages. Ask them to count with care three hundred sentences from their most recent themes or essays. When the class meets, have the individual averages by hundreds put upon the blackboard, with the final average, and compared. For the second exercise, assign each student some early writer of considerable sentence-proportions, from whom to select and count a passage of three hundred

sentences. The results from these should be reported in the several hundreds and compared as before. In the third exercise, select modern authors of short-period styles, requiring five hundred sentences of each student. If the work in this part of the book must be hurried, the class may be passed to the next chapter. Otherwise such further investigation of points suggested on pp. 261, 262, may be added as, in a given case, may seem most profitable.

CHAPTER XX.

PAGE 265, par. 3, l. 8. We take 500 periods as the basis of comparison in this chapter and following topics, not because it will in all cases furnish the true average, but one near enough for practical purposes. For example, compare with the exhibit from Macaulay below the following, from over 5000 periods of the *Essays*: average of predications, 2.17; of simple sentences, 36.

The results in predications and per cent of simple sentences here given, as also in clause-saving in chap. XXV., are from the investigations of Mr. Gerwig. (See Preface.) The figures in the main have not been verified, but it is believed will be found correct, having been computed with especial care. The student will note that as the averages of predication descend, the per cent of simple sentences rises. Let him observe whether there seems any sustained proportion between the numerical and the predication average in different authors.

P. 268, l. 3. With the work of examining the course of sentential change in English in this and following chapters, belongs also inquiry into the history of development in other languages. The tendency in Latin to use the ablative absolute and save indicative assertions by throwing other men's statements into infinitive and subjunctive constructions, and the necessity in Greek of expressing antecedent actions by aorist participles, are products of the same instinct to reduce predication. Homer averages about three predications per period; Virgil, a little over. Cicero's *De Senectute* shows predications 3.22; per cent-simple sentences, 21; Herodotus, predications 2.63; simple sentences, 30.

SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER. — Each student should be set the task of determining the average of predications and per cent of simple sentences, on the basis of 500 periods, for some author of an earlier century, also for one of the standard moderns. After this, which will take the time of two exercises, it will be well to have him compute his own predication average and per cent of simple sentences. All results should be written upon the blackboard for comparison and discussion. For further investigation, the class may work at some prominent author, co-operatively, to determine his exact averages, or attempt comparison with styles outside of English.

CHAPTER XXI.

PAGE 269, l. 1. The first step, we may say, in sentence development is ejaculation or exclamation, in which there is one verb or force-word per idea. Children begin to talk by using the names of the objects they desire, or the actions they wish performed, as interjections.

P. 271, l. 9. If in a given passage there are two hundred finite verbs, it is evident there might be as many as one hundred and ninety-nine co-ordinate conjunctions connecting them. Practically, however, it is seldom that the average of these will be greater than one-third the whole number of predications.

P. 271, par. 2, l. 14. Ascham has also twenty-four paragraphs beginning with *but*s, and six with *yet*s.

P. 272, l. 6. There is, of course, no objection to tinkering the punctuation of any text, when our object is to make the given author more practicable; but the pointing in such case will be our own, not his. When we make a writer to have ended a sentence where according to our sentence-sense he should have closed it, but where we know he did not mean to have it stop, the punctuation is inorganic and untrue.

P. 272, l. 10. It would seem that in states of imagination which we call sublimity, the mind reverts to the simplest, most child-like modes of expression.

SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER. — For the first work under this head, let the best examples of the mode within reach be sought out, and degree of co-ordination determined. If the members of the class know Greek, they may be sent first to the *Odyssey* for their maximum illustrations. After each has had an experience of his own as to how far co-ordination is used in literature, he may be set some specific task in determining its prevalence and decline in our early writers. The survival of the instinct, as seen in initial *ands* and *buts* in modern writers, should be likewise considered.

CHAPTER XXII.

PAGE 274, l. 7. And, we might add, of college training. Perhaps it is not seldom one sees, as I have seen, consecutive letters from reputable graduates begun with the stereotyped "Your esteemed favor of the — — is received, and contents noted." But the stenographer and type-writer are fast obliterating the differences between oral and written English in the commercial sphere. See p. 283.

P. 274, l. 15. That Chaucer and Spenser talked like other people of their respective generations there can be no doubt. Chaucer's 'prologues' to the

various *Tales* and Lydgate's *London Lickpenny*, with other like specimens, show what the speech of men in the fifteenth century was like.

SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER.—The work in this chapter is simple, rather than scanty. The method of subordination should be traced from Mandeville or earlier to present times. The best examples of authors writing in this style from different centuries should be sought out and compared.

CHAPTER XXIII.

PAGE 276, l. 17. Perhaps most children use good subordinated and logical language at ten years. At fifteen such as are quick to imitate the idioms of their elders, or incline to books, will have learned the method of suppression.

P. 277, l. 20. Sir John Mandeville's *Voyages and Travels* in the form in which we know it doubtless follows the sentence proportions of the Latin original,—if there was an original,—but lacks the participial and absolute constructions it would have in a close translation. How excellently it serves in illustrating the beginnings of clause-saving, through use of appositive phrases, is seen by a glance at the exhibit on p. 297.

The student may compare Morley's edition in the Cassell National Library, as the only easily accessible form of the above work. Unfortunately the editor has incorporated various changes beyond modernization of the spelling, in some cases omitting verbs in true suppressive fashion. All the conjunctions without predication in his edition occur with verbs in the original.

P. 278. The passages here quoted from Hakluyt, for convenience of the student, are given as in Morley's edition (Cassell's Nat. Lib. vol. i. No. 24), except certain errors are corrected. The sentences respectively will be found on pp. 150, 153, 142, 122, 59, and 152 of that volume. In the passage on p. 263 Morley (p. 141) has set off several lines from the beginning of the original in a sentence by itself.

P. 280, l. 9. Compare the condensation of figures developed in Chap. X. It is especially interesting to trace, in this connection, the change of conjunctions to prepositions, and the operation of the suppressive instinct by such a process as the extension of *because* to *because of*. *Unless*, the dictionaries tell us, is always a conjunction, and *except*, a preposition; and we apprehend clearly the difference in examples like 'she was destitute of accomplishments, except music,' and 'she had acquired no accomplishments, unless [she had acquired] music.' Just so long as the mind is conscious that *unless* carries with it the effect of the verb preceding it will remain conjunctive. But as soon as through familiarity the minds of speaker and hearers stop being

aware that *unless* in such case is the sign of clause contraction, it will have become a preposition.

SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER.—To do good work in this chapter the class should have access at least to Mandeville, Chaucer, Fabyan or Hall, Latimer, Ascham, and Lyly, among old writers. The instances of verb-omission with all subordinate conjunctions in each of these authors should be noted. Then a similar group from among modern stylists should be studied. When the mode is fully comprehended, one or two authors of both the older and the later age should be examined exhaustively by co-operation, to determine consistency of usage.

CHAPTER XXIV.

PAGE 281, par. 2, l. 10. It turns out, naturally enough, 'since all things come by France,' that the French is the first of modern literatures to abandon a specific book-style, and adopt oral-sentence proportions and structure. Literary prescription in France has had to do rather with terms than larger elements of meaning, though in England, where there has been no Academy to settle questions of propriety, the contrary has been true. At any rate French is the most easily intelligible of all idioms, because it is the most analytic. All complex or abstruse conceptions *must* be divided and simplified before they can be expressed in that language.

P. 283, l. 12. If the reader has never observed the facts here considered, let him compare the dictated letters with the deliberate autographic missives of some friend or acquaintance.

P. 285, l. 12. It is, of course, not easy to find what is the sentence of maximum frequency in oral speech. Different minds will, of course, exhibit personal degrees of curtness or prolixity. A little observation will, however, convince us that in general such sentences will not range much below ten words nor much, if at all, above that number.

P. 289, l. 4. Examples of book-periods put into the mouths of common speakers will aid in making the distinction clear. Compare the dialogue sentences in the novels of Charles Brockden Brown, or Cooper's *Pilot*.

P. 292, par. 2, *Bacon*. See pp. 297, 298.

SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER.—The task is now to ascertain what authors among moderns still incline to synthetic writing, what among earlier stylists helped bring in the analytic manner. Diagrams should be prepared including in distinct curves the several features, — as sentence-length, predication-average, per cent simple sentences, and of clauses saved, — already determined in prominent authors, and the analytic or synthetic quality now to

be added. In each case the number of sentences below the numerical average, as well as those above, should be counted up. The analysis should not close until some comparison of newspaper or magazine English with standard book-styles has been made. Among the latter some member or members of the class should be set at search for the shortest sentence of maximum frequency extant.

CHAPTER XXV.

PAGE 295, l. 6. The native perceptions of the mind are intuitive. When it cannot immediately handle its matter, its activity becomes reflective, and is held to its task by determinative energy. When by a reflective process the mind has once attained its cognition, it thinks or knows the product intuitively ever after. Hence, deliberation supplements intuition, and makes up for the mind's limitations, but is not resorted to except when intuition fails.

P. 297, ll. 1-3. Vol. I. p. 17, Am. ed.

P. 297, Note, l. 3. Cf. the opening lines of Book II. in the *Paradise Lost*. Here Milton has clearly no suspicion of his opportunity to make one of the finest periods in the poem by placing full stop at 'sat,' or, if the emphasis is on the following phrase, at least at 'eminence.'

There is no denying that Milton's prose is powerful; but the power is in spite of, and not in consequence of, his sentence proportions. A giant may brain a bear with a beam or a hogshead, but how much more effectively with a respectable club. Cf. p. 313.

P. 298, par. 2, l. 3. The following are the results by hundreds: 1st, .20; 2nd, .18; 3rd, 1.73; 4th, .55; 6th, .24; all other averages, 0.

SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER.—This chapter is continuative of the work already done in chap. XXIII. The authors there examined may be taken further in hand, to ascertain how the use of verbal nouns and other expedients increase the per cents already found. Then the question of the group to which each belongs should be taken up, and further investigation of authors representing each stage engaged in. Numerous points besides those named, both here as well as in later chapters, will challenge attention.

CHAPTER XXVI.

PAGE 305, par. 2, l. 15. No reader will need to be reminded that the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* and the *Beowulf*, no matter how changed in many respects, are oral and not written products. Very different are the *Æneid*, and the *Elene*, not to say the *Antigone*, or *Paradise Lost*.

P. 307, par. 2, l. 7. The oral sentence is growing gradually shorter through

the general effort to economize effort in utterance. One of the most recent clippings is the change of *often* to *offen*, in the standard pronunciation. See Whitney's *Language and the Study of Language*, pp. 69, 70.

SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER. — Here, surely, is no lack of points for investigation. To make sure that the students understand the principle, it may be well to require for the first exercise a large number of examples like those given at the beginning of this chapter; and at the same time they may go back to Homer, in the same parts read for co-ordination, to note omissions of illative conjunctions. They should then trace the history of the oral manner of joining clauses. Mandeville has something of it. Chaucer has much in poetry. Has he any in prose? Has Spenser, or Hooker, or Bacon? After this inquiry has been pushed sufficiently, let the students co-operatively examine into the frequency of active participles in English after Latin and Greek idioms, and determine in what author they are used in an organic way. There should be a similar inquiry into the use of the relative pronoun in various authors and periods from the *Bedwulf* down, and some use made of the evidence in determining or defining normal usage. The students should be set also to compute all conjunctive words in some early and some latest standard writer, and if possible in a dozen other authors of reputation, that differences such as suggested by the exhibit at the beginning may be cleared up. Here are already topics enough for a single chapter, probably more than can be used in any general survey of the whole field. Yet at this point room should be found for an examination of informal styles, and some notion formed as to whether condensation and clause suppression have gone too far, or may go too far, for the best effectiveness of speech. Let examples of paragraph writing—like this following, from a daily newspaper—be collected, and faults pointed out:—

"Mrs. Teal Bouton was saved at her home near Casnovia by prompt medical treatment to offset effects of some aconite she took with suicide in view. Farmer's wife."

Is there or is there not too great condensation in such a style? Is it too difficult for instant comprehension? What would be the best cast of this meaning for newspaper readers? What changes would be necessary to raise it to the standard of literary English?

CHAPTER XXVII.

PAGE 313, par. 2, l. 3. The evolution of the bicycle furnishes a better illustration. Anybody that has seen or tried to ride the 'velocipede' of twenty years or more ago will find the analogy complete. After the structure

is perfected and the uttermost of lightness secured, the vehicle is ready to sustain and utilize all the force that any user can command.

P. 315, l. 17. The way in which the part of a whole is logically potential of that whole is illustrated by the fact, peculiar to everybody, that in the effort to recall a name, if we can but think of the surname, or an initial letter, or even the post address we may have seen with it, the whole will come back. So of quotations.

P. 317, par. 2, ll. 6, 7. In 'I took advice,' the mind sees 'took' only symbolically; in 'I took the medicine,' it sees the action pictorially and literally. In general, the voice slips over the names of what the mind does not see vividly, passes the stress along. Organic emphasis is differentiated on different words according to the intensity with which they are mentally discerned. Poetry, other than the most impassioned, follows the same rules. Cf. l. 2 of the translation on p. 386, in which, because 'bent' is not conceived literally, the stress goes over to 'wood.' Thus it is the line is made to conform to the 6.10 instead of the 4.8.10 scheme.

P. 322, l. 22. *Sympathy stops*. Except with emotion enacted upon the stage, wherein imagination discerns the inner verity and ignores the outwardly fictitious.

P. 322, l. 24. *Nibelungen Ring*. Or more specifically, *Sigfrid*, the second division of that work.

P. 323, l. 3. Irony, sarcasm, doubt, anxiety, are discerned in the same manner through the associations of tone and structure.

P. 323, Note. Cf. p. 169, par. 3, ll. 7-9.

P. 324, par. 3, l. 2. Cf. Macaulay's observations, often quoted in part, on the style of Johnson. "His conversation appears to have been quite equal to his writings in matter, and far superior to them in manner. When he talked, he clothed his wit and his sense in forcible and natural expressions. As soon as he took his pen in hand to write for the public, his style became systematically vicious. All his works are written in a learned language, in a language which nobody hears from his mother or his nurse; in a language in which nobody ever quarrels, or drives bargains, or makes love; in a language in which nobody ever thinks. It is clear that Johnson himself did not think in the dialect in which he wrote. The expressions which came first to his tongue were simple, energetic, and picturesque. When he wrote for publication, he did his sentences out of English into Johnsonese! His letters from the Hebrides to Mrs. Thrale are the original of that work of which the *Journey to the Hebrides* is the translation; and it is amusing to compare the two versions. 'When we were taken up-stairs,' says he in one of his letters, 'a dirty fellow bounced out of the bed on which one of us was to lie.' This incident is recorded in the *Journey* as follows: 'Out of one of the beds

on which we were to repose started up, at our entrance, a man black as a Cyclops from the forge.' Sometimes Johnson translated aloud. 'The Rehearsal,' he said, very unjustly, 'has not wit enough to keep it sweet;' then, after a pause, 'it has not vitality enough to preserve it from putrefaction.' — *Essay on Boswell's Life of Johnson.*

325, l. 4. Not every one who feels strongly can make his force stand out from his lines. On the other hand, the strongest thoughts seem to find expression through a momentum of their own. False force, moreover, though correctly rendered so far as sentence associations are concerned, betrays itself through unsoundness or shallowness in the matter. True emphasis or force in prose needs no italics. The considerable use of them betrays the fact that the author finds his lines do not read as he means them, — that the emphasis refuses to attach itself to the right words. But if he is not strong enough or genuine enough to put in organic emphasis, italics will not save him. It may be noted, finally, that the more eclectic and scanty punctuation of these days seems due to the oral shaping of sentences, so that they 'read themselves.'

SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER. — The present chapter is of course properly supplemental to the preceding. The same authors as were there discovered to have assisted in bringing into prevalence the present mode of writing should be carefully compared, and per cents compared. Then each of the important points developed in the chapter should be experimentally verified.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

PAGE 328, par. 2, l. 13. *Renaissance.* See Note to p. 249, par. 2, l. 13.

P. 329, ll. 1, 2. For the *Cultismos* of Spain see Ticknor's *History of Spanish Literature*, vol. II., pp. 519-533. For the influence of the Hôtel de Rambouillet see Morley's *First Sketch of English Literature*, pp. 630-632. The previous development of French literature is succinctly sketched in Darmesteter and Hatzfeld's *Le Siècle de Louis XIV.*, pp. 96 and 200 ff. Compare also chaps. XXVII., XXVIII., of Demoguet's *Histoire de la Littérature Française.*

P. 329, l. 10. If the student is not aware that the French Academy has been the source of authority in French letters since 1636, he should study the history of that institution.

Authority, as we have seen (p. 248), is the natural effect of revelation, or of recognizing genius and its work. Until Protestantism, the means of determining and dispensing it was through Chosen Peoples' councils. The French Academy is a survival of the medieval mole. In English literary authority is vested in the preponderance of usage and opinion, in the consensus of culture wherever found. (See Suggestions to the Teacher for chap. IV.) In

France it has been the custom for centuries to recognize Paris as the head and source of authority in all matters. Though the French has had the aid of no single model, like English, it has yet developed under its peculiarly favorable conditions a universally best prose style not inferior to any, and perhaps superior to all others.

P. 329, par. 2, l. 7. The Revised Version, as all know, has proved unsuccessful, and only for the reason that the English-speaking world will not exchange the phrases of which it has become so fond for mere accuracy of translation. Aphorisms and proverbs do not keep current because they are all men's wisdom, so much as because they are couched in all men's and every man's best manner. Classicism at its best makes men quote. The style of the King James Bible is in the main oral, so far as sentence proportions and clause articulation are concerned. It is also the generalized style of schoolmasters and of books.

P. 330, par. 2, l. 4. The student should bear in mind that Addison and Steele are by no means the most eminent among eighteenth-century prosaists. As compared with Bolingbroke and Shaftesbury, they are popular rather than polished writers.

P. 331, par. 2, ll. 20, 21. France is still classical in poetry; Germany to a great degree in prose. Italy in the main has been Gothic since Dante's time.

SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER.—The student should be first led to realize that the Universally Best Style, negatively speaking, is free from barbarisms and solecisms, and avoids all erratic and inorganic expressions, and positively includes so much of best phrasing, essentially, as is common to all cultivated writers. The whole list of our prosaists, from Bacon down, should be examined, to determine who properly constitute the class distinguished by no other characteristic so prominent as ability to write in this mode, who fall short of it, and who have elegance or other excellencies beyond. It would be well, if the members of the class consent to the test, to have the school compositions of some sub-year brought in and mutually inspected and judged upon these points.

CHAPTER XXIX.

PAGE 333, l. 18. So of blooded stock, entered and published in the Herd-books. Each animal is named and registered, and though generally undistinguishable from others to the common eye, is definitely individualized to the breeder or owner.

P. 335, par. 2. It is therefore clear that we cannot in any proper sense

'acquire' a style. We can only rid ourselves of what is uncharacteristic and ungenue. To have a style is nothing but, invariably and under all circumstances to be one's self. Hence, while we cannot acquire, we may develop, individuality. To try to do more is either to go backward toward being merged in the universally best style or to imitate another. It is not given to many men to be mirrors of fashion, whether in dress or letters. This is not the age of Beau Brummels or Shaftesburys. It is not the worst fate in the world to fail of immortality through the *manner* of one's writing. If we can but have the *matter*, the manner, with proper training, will come along with it of itself. If we cannot command the matter, what profiteth the manner? If we cannot be Dantes, there is little use in trying to write with Dante's power. If one have not Addison's ideas, he will scarce come upon Addison's method of expressing them, even with days and nights of search. There is no such good destiny as to be and become one's self to the uttermost; there is no such good ambition as to aspire, not to repeat other men's achievements, but to make one's own career. A fundamental mark of greatness is an absence of the instinct or desire to imitate great men.

P. 336, ll. 11-13. Form, within certain limits, is necessarily classical. To have comfort or enjoyment the mind must feel to a certain extent that it is in habituated circumstances, or that what is done is done decently and in order. Anomalies or liberties of form are due either to weakness and unskill, or to romantic impulses. Cf. Schiller, Victor Hugo, and Browning, for illustrations of the last-named sort.

P. 339, ll. 1, 2. New England Transcendentalism, which means much more than the name has been taken to imply, was a revolt against authority, both ethical and social as well as literary, in the name of a "higher law." True Romanticism is always such revolt against outgrown Classicism, or 'authority.' See p. 341, l. 2.

The earliest of the Transcendentalists, in the true sense, was Benjamin Franklin, — the first American great enough to take the Universally Best Style for granted, and write in accordance with it, but not be conditioned by it. The man who, in the face of standard literary tradition, could write such English as we find in his autobiography might be expected to take the court of Versailles by storm with his good-natured unassuming self-sufficiency.

P. 340, l. 6. Why are certain songs and tunes at once popular, while others fall flat? The public sense determines, but on what grounds?

P. 340, l. 8. What is the meaning of the phrase 'atmospheric reformers'? Suggest an equivalent literary expression for the first word. Find other phrases similar in the same writer.

P. 341, l. 2. *Last analysis*. Or in first instances, as Dante's poetry, which laid the foundation of Italian and modern, as Chaucer's of English, literature.

SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER. — Here the class should take up the specific study of leading styles. Assign some characteristic passage, say, of De Quincey, requiring of each student, in writing, a full statement of all elements or 'manifestations' that constitute the style to *him*. Let the various elements be written, under the respective names, upon the blackboard, and compared, and such as are common to all collected in a group. After two or three exercises it will be found that the reports will be essentially identical. When the student can thus readily detect the true elements of style and has acquired some confidence in judging, let him begin the distinction of romantic and classical prosaists. Here, if there is any vagueness, set him at work inventorying the classical and romantic elements in Hamerton, or Ruskin, or Howells. Then literature of various sorts should be classed under proper departments, following p. 341. Finally, some investigation of the differences between the essay and the oration should be entered on. Let the emotional and other elements of an oration of Phillips and the same in an essay of Macaulay be statistically compared, along with consideration of sentence weight and articulation of clause structure.

CHAPTER XXX.

PAGE 342, par. 2, l. 6. *Home*. The instinct to have a place peculiarly one's own in which to enjoy one's comforts is a 'type.' The types are imprinted. We find them in consciousness, and can improve, but never quite eliminate or debase them.

P. 343, par. 2, ll. 25-28. *Lately noted*; see p. 337. *Conquer environment*; see pp. 107, 108, and 245-247.

P. 344, par. 2, l. 19. The Monistic hypothesis, as has been earlier pointed out, is already accepted, but awaits a practicable theory of Inertia. It is doubtful if there can be any such mode or condition as in the purely spiritual sphere. Consciousness, as we know it, can neither be stopped nor started. At least there could be no environment for the ego without inertia. It brings the material in a measure under the control of the spiritual or of will.

P. 345, ll. 2-15. This contrast has already been given in a preliminary way in the first paragraphs of Chapter II., and accompanying Notes.

P. 348, ll. 1-4. Hence poetry has the utmost of truth consistent with beauty, and prose of beauty consistent with truth. Imaginative activity without recognition of the actual is hardly more than castle-building.

P. 349, l. 13. It is hardly necessary to call attention to the popular belief of the Greeks in dryads and river gods, or of our own ancestors in fairies and were-wolves and magic. Science, with all its revelation of occult principles, has not yet banished the fear of ghosts and witchcraft from vulgar minds.

With the whole habit of looking at nature changed, we must yet daily hold ourselves back determinatively from giving credence to most preposterous facts and theories.

P. 350. The student may well note incidentally that 'seemliness' or 'propriety' is the type on which the very existence of society depends. It is the first step of ascent from the plane of animalism. Moreover, he should not be confused in his apprehension of 'taste' from its occasional use in the sphere of art. We say a young performer plays with taste, meaning he is able to add to the mechanical a considerable emotional element. When he has mastered his instrument no one thinks of using that word. Finally, when the type of propriety or taste is used in the negative mode, the mind proceeds to idealize not upward (p. 94) by constructing a perfect spiritual whole, but downward (p. 120) in an inverted idealization. The upward idealization ends at the sublime; the downward in the physical paroxysm of relief called laughter.

P. 352, l. 2. Elegance may be either spontaneous or studied, natural or elaborated, according to the gifts or culture of the writer.

P. 352, l. 7. The day may not be far distant when the public will demand, and be willing to pay for, a literary newspaper. The first volume of the *Atlantic Monthly*, in the papers upon issues of the day, illustrates with what effect elegance may be used in common circumstances. But the country was ready for no such periodical in 1857.

P. 352, l. 12. The associations of book language and structure, in their degree, may contribute to elegance, but in oratory far less than in the essay style. But the elegance of Webster, who was of the school of the *Federalist*, of *Junius*, and eighteenth-century British orators, is not so effective as that of Phillips, the model orator of this generation.

P. 352, par. 2, ll. 2-8. Euphuism is plainly but a species of fine writing.

SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER. — We have already considered the elements of poetry as isolated each from each. It will be well now to examine some poem with reference to what parts are addressed only to phantasy, and what to imagination. This should be followed by like analysis of at least one chapter in a standard novel. Then a careful study of the differences between prose and poetic figures should be undertaken. *E.g.* 'The debate was wound up,' — why is this not poetic? 'Such is the scheme of effects aimed at and secured by Shakespeare's art,' — would this be admissible in prose? Is it a good figure for poetic use? May personification be used in prose? After sufficient search and comparison of poetic figures in prose and prosaic figures in poetry, the class may advance to Taste. Compositions illustrating every phase, good and bad, should be passed upon by the whole class individually in writ-

ing. Finally, the subject of true elegance and false elegance (fine writing) should be carefully studied.

CHAPTER XXXI.

PAGE 355, l. 10. The numerical sentence-average of the *Melibeus* was computed several years ago, with some amendment of punctuation, from the text of the Riverside edition. The exhibit from the *Knights Tale* and *Melibeus* below was prepared by Mr. Gerwig, as he informs me, from the text (punctuation unaltered) in Blackwood's Universal Library. If the number of the sentences and number of words were identical in both texts, the numerical average of *Melibeus* according to the pointing of the latter would be 34.70, or, for both prose tales, 36.11. On the other hand, admitting the punctuation of the former, we find that the average of predications in the *Melibeus* would be 7.41, instead of 5.25. The numerical average 23.35 from the poetry was computed in the Riverside text, with the pointing altered to square with Skeat's recent edition of the *Prologue*. It will be difficult to do anything ultimate in the study of Chaucer's form until a consistent punctuation has been agreed upon and introduced throughout. A strictly modern pointing would reduce his poetic sentence-length to less than twenty words per sentence, and predication average to about two and a half.

P. 356, par. 2, l. 4. The question is often forced upon us, Why do poets keep so far asunder, while prosaists are individualized within much narrower limits? The answer seems to be that prosaists, following more or less closely the oral norm, approach the public by a common path, but poets by way of imagination, which is distinct for each. There is no universally best style in poetry, as in prose, because the element of imagination is not conditioned to 'taste.' See p. 351.

P. 358, Note. Shakespeare apparently wrote as he spoke, both in prose and verse; and in this, as in other things, stands alone.

The *Life of Strafford*, attributed to Browning, does not square with the figures here quoted from Browning's prose, but yields a predication average much lower.

P. 359, l. 7. The following is an exhibit of the figures from the *Parlament of Foules*, itself a consistent allegory: incidental-sustained allegories, 4; periodic allegories, 4; clause allegories, 15; running metaphors, 9; clause metaphors, 46; similes, 5; comparisons, 1; second, third, fourth, and fifth class phrases, respectively, 78, 32, 11, 0. These results, as also those from the *Dethe of Blanche* (p. 395), are from the analysis and summary of figures in Chaucer by Mr. Peterson (see Preface.) The sum of allegorical predicates in the latter poem is 123, of metaphoric, 145; in the *Parlament* correspondingly 488, and 73. Why the *Parlament of Foules* shows less development than the *Dethe of*

Blanche,—considered to have been composed much earlier,—is a question likely to be settled. It is evident that metaphor is nearer to the literal fact than allegory, at the same time not less grateful to the mind, since it both requires and enables greater energy of imagination.

P. 360, ll. 16, 17. More specifically, the blacksmith rests the weight of his hammer on the anvil, that he may relax, for the instant, the muscles of his arm. In like way the reader must release attention from his author's thought. What of the meaning his mind may hold or dwell upon, in the stop between periods, will not tax but (p. 295) stimulate mental energy. Attention is either spontaneous or determinative, directive. From the former the mind seeks no release, from the latter it must have respite.

P. 361, l. 3. We have already noted that Chaucer insists on doing the work of imagination for his reader; cf. *K. T.*, ll. 1118–1122. Make note of similar examples.

A fundamental difference between Chaucer's and modern poetry is his use of the adjective and noun, which is essentially prosaic. In prose we identify and describe for fact's sake; in poetry, having identified and described sufficiently for the facts or thought, we join epithets and appositives to bring experiences to the mind. Likewise prose phrases serve to define or limit or identify a given object. Poetic phrases, the object having been sufficiently identified or defined to phantasy, serve to indicate experiential qualities. Chaucer seldom uses the phrase in the latter way; Shelley, seldom in the former.

P. 362, par. 2, ll. 13–18. The tendency is to return to Anglo-Saxon forms of rhythm, and even — as Walt Whitman illustrates — to go beyond.

P. 363, par. 2, l. 4. This means simply that the ego tends to enter states of imagination on less occasion, to enjoy environment with less formality, just as it finds it. Carlyle has said (*Lectures on Literature*, p. 50), "It is not until a nation is ready to decline that its literature makes itself remarkable." This is undoubtedly true when such nation is passing the point where its spiritual life should begin, but has not begun. Strong poets will appear — seemingly as a last organic effort against the disease within — just at the point where a race that has risen to the intellectual plane commits itself to resensualization. (See p. 255.) But a nation without new Pindars or Virgils may owe that temporary dearth to its normal and growing spiritual-mindedness, such as (p. 365) on the whole, in spite of much regrettable sordidness and shallow thinking, we believe is true of our own country.

Romanticism is, in the last analysis, associational, but Realism directly experiential. All men are romantic in youth when the paramount experiences of life are yet to reach, but become realistic in later years after those experiences are passed. A literature is not great in direct proportion to the amount of imagination involved, but of truth embodied. Schiller's *Don Carlos* is not

inferior to Goethe's *Hermann and Dorothea* because the one is romantic and the other realistic. According to the common notion of 'imagination,' or Macaulay's idea of poetry (p. 367), the *Don Carlos* is much superior. Imagination is not Pythian fury, or any other form of 'mental unsoundness,' but is the soul itself in the act or attitude of appropriating final truth.

SUGGESTIONS TO THE TEACHER. — The student should be given such work as will enable him to realize the main points of difference between clause and sentence forms in prose and poetry, and the nature and use of phrases as well as of adjectives and appositives in each. There should be search for such forms of rhythmic prose as, in point of form, may fairly be classed on the other side of the poetic line, — with incidental inquiry how far 'good taste' is evinced or departed from. A complete analysis of all the elements in a given prose passage or composition may now be made, and should include consideration, side by side, of the experiential, — or poetic, and the logical terms, phrases, and clauses. A most important subject for investigation, if the sources are available, is the origin and growth of sympathetic and interpretative prose. Here is, of course, work that can only be done with thoroughness by seminary students; yet co-operatively a class of ten may in two weeks' study get an edifying notion of one of the greatest facts of literary history. There should be added in each case all possible comparison of like development in other literatures, as exhibited, for example, in Thucydides and Tacitus, and moderns like Tolstoi and Taine and De Amicis.

QUESTIONS ON THE ART OF SHAKESPEARE'S MACBETH.

[The following questions are intended to be suggestive rather than final, and include, except in the first four scenes, only 'effects' not considered in the text. The references to lines, both here and in the body of the volume, follow the numberings of the *Cambridge Shakespeare*.]

ACT I.

Scene I. — What power has raised this storm? Could the witches of themselves have raised it?

2. Should you like to hear these witches proposing to meet *you* on the heath?

3. What, then, may the unknown personage they mention expect as a result of the meeting?

4. How does this talk make you feel toward this unknown person?

Scene II. — 5. In the eleventh century what was especially expected of a king in times of war?

6. By what expedient does Shakespeare let us know that a battle is in progress?

7. Why is not Duncan at least in sight of the battle?

8. What difficulty did Malcolm get into in the battle, and how did he get out of it?

9. For what sole reason is the sergeant not now in the battle?

10. In consequence of these facts, which of the three characters stands lowest in your esteem? Which second? Which third?

11. How do you explain the excited, disconnected character of the sergeant's discourse? May it be due to excess of enthusiasm for his hero?

12. What unknown individual stands higher in your regard than even the sergeant?
13. Is this the same personage that we saw was of such importance to the supernatural world?
14. How do these considerations dispose you toward Macbeth?
15. Where is Macbeth, and why does he not appear?
16. How does this circumstance of Macbeth's absence affect your feelings towards him?
17. What is the rank of Ross?
18. Is he overcome with enthusiasm like the sergeant, or does he seem cold and formal?
19. Does the king, in line 33, seem to have similar feelings?
20. What is the effect of this coldness on the part of the Scotch nobility, coupled with enthusiasm on the part of the sergeant, upon your feelings regarding Macbeth?

Scene III. — 21. Do we recognize these witches? As determined to influence whom?

22. How did the first witch come by the pilot's thumb?
23. What is the least and what the most horrible mischief they have been doing?
24. Is there, then, any climax in the arrangement of the details in this scene?
25. If they can singly do such things as we see and hear, why should all three have taken pains to come together now? Is it probably on less or greater concerns than have occupied them this afternoon?
26. Against whom is all this awful power to be directed?
27. Now that Macbeth is at last to appear, what sort of man do you wish to see, — a self-satisfied general merely, or a man of aspirations and insight?
28. Do his first words disappoint you?
29. Are your impressions at all affected on noting the contrast with what Banquo says?
30. Why does Macbeth "start and seem to fear"?
31. Are you displeased that he should be bold enough to be ambitious?
32. Macbeth wants to know more (l. 70). Do you? If so, why do you?
33. Are you at all impressed at the sudden fulfilment of the prophecy that Macbeth was to be thane of Cawdor?

34. Do you understand that the "instruments of darkness" are in the habit of interfering after this fashion with the fortunes of any and every Scotch nobleman?

35. If the one prophecy can come true, are you at all curious to see if the other will?

36. Line 127. Which do you desire to see win in the argument—Macbeth or his conscience?

37. Would you like to see Macbeth king?

Scene IV.—38. Do King Duncan's remarks betray a vigorous and energetic character, with ordinary or extraordinary penetration?

39. Is Malcolm's account of Cawdor's death indicative of unusual heroism or energy on the part of either himself or Cawdor?

40. Is Macbeth's bearing at all in contrast with the general effect of pious effeminacy that we get from Duncan and his surroundings?

41. Are you pleased with Macbeth now?

42. Do you find yourself choosing between him and Duncan? Which would you prefer to see king?

43. Does not the expectation that Duncan will be murdered prevent your desiring to see Macbeth king?

44. If not, point out the sum of 'effects' by which Shakespeare has achieved this astonishing result?

Scene V.—1. From Macbeth's first words, what has his mind been occupied with during the ride from Forres?

2. Does he tell his wife his plan of murder, or only hint it? Why?

3. Does she honestly fail to see the hint, or does she merely attempt to shift the burden of first mentioning this horror to her husband's shoulders?

4. How does he evade this responsibility?

5. Which of them finally leaves evasion and first comes to the point?

6. Why should Macbeth be so unresponsive to his wife's enthusiasm? Is it from a desire to lay it all on her?

Scene VI.—1. Is Duncan a kind, good old innocent man, or in any of these particulars the reverse?

2. Yet are we willing that Duncan should be murdered in order that our hero may get the crown?

3. Would it be as tragic if we were made willing that only a common villain should be murdered?

4. Why, then, the first part of this scene?

5. Was there any danger that such a characterization might have been overdone, and our sympathies thus shifted from Macbeth to Duncan, to the spoiling of the play?

6. Would this happen if we should see Macbeth, suave and smiling, come out before the castle to receive the king?

7. Why, then, is Lady Macbeth made to appear? Why, also, is Macbeth made timorous and vacillating in the preceding scene?

Scene VII. — 1. In a domestic scene under circumstances similar to these, does the woman usually begin her upbraidings with a remark like Lady Macbeth's in line 39?

2. Would she perhaps next make the imputation of line 43?

3. Would the husband, upon having his manliness called in question, probably answer as Macbeth does in lines 45 to 47?

4. How much does Macbeth yield in line 59?

5. But what does Lady Macbeth assume when she next begins to lay her plans with so much detail?

ACT II.

Scene I. — 1. Knowing what he knows, what would be the honorable course for Banquo to pursue with regard to Duncan?

2. Does he pursue it?

3. Why, then, is he unable to sleep?

4. Is Macbeth's answer to his challenge an answer proper in castles in times of peace, or in intrenched camps in times of war?

5. What must be Macbeth's attitude toward the rest of the world to prompt such an answer?

6. And what do you infer is Banquo's attitude from the 'effect' in lines 9 and 10?

7. If Banquo knows what is to happen, why does he throw out the feeler in lines 19 to 21?

8. Is Banquo's answer to Macbeth's bid sincere?

9. Does Macbeth in line 29 understand that it is not meant to be sincere?

10. Does Banquo in line 30 know that Macbeth thus understands it?

11. What does the past tense of the verbs in lines 42 and 43 indicate?

12. Has Macbeth ever been allowed to make up his own mind about this project, or has fate made it up for him? (See I., iii., 115; I., iv., 39, etc.)

13. How much has our sense of Macbeth's powerlessness against the witches had to do with keeping our sympathies with him?

14. Now, at the very moment of the murder, did Shakespeare think it necessary to deepen that sense of his helplessness?

15. Does this device of the air-drawn dagger do it?

Scene II. — 1. In line 16, Lady Macbeth asks, "Did not you speak?" Are her husband's inquiries as to the time at all minute?

2. Does she specify with like minuteness?

3. What condition of mind does the weariness in "Ay" indicate?

4. Does her answer in line 19 argue any change?

5. What suggests her remark in line 21?

6. What suggests her remark in line 25?

7. What suggests her remark in line 30?

8. Has she energy enough left to think independently, or can she only echo her husband's words?

9. How long does this condition last? Where does she begin to recover?

10. At what point has she recovered complete control over herself?

11. Why should she have felt under any obligation to come to the rescue at this point? Does she feel at all responsible for the situation?

Scenes III. and IV. — 1. Which is most difficult — to kill a king, or to play the innocent afterwards in the eyes of the world?

2. What task, then, confronts Macbeth and his wife now?

3. Does Macduff unconsciously seem to think Macbeth's entrance is at all sudden?

4. In lines 64 to 67, does Macduff say definitely, "The king is murdered"?

5. Is regicide a thing people are ready and willing to believe?

6. But what does Macbeth in line 67 assume Macduff meant?

7. Does Lennox make that assumption?

8. Why should the one make such an assumption and not the other?

9. How would a woman awakened out of a deep sleep while it is yet night, by the ringing of an alarm-bell and cries of 'murder,' be likely to act?
10. Does Lady Macbeth, then, assume the right manner?
11. Who has addressed Lady Macbeth, that she should speak in line 86?
12. Does Banquo have a point in "anywhere"?
13. How much more does she have to say after his innuendo?
14. Has Macduff observed anything strange about Macbeth's actions or words before line 105?
15. Why has he not turned on Macbeth before?
16. Does his sudden question strike home?
17. Who saves the day this time?
18. How would a nobleman on general principles treat a maudlin, porter who by his negligence had kept him out in the storm?
19. Does Macduff do so?
20. Is Macduff later equally cool, collected, and circumspect in his words and manner? Do you wish him to be?
21. How many of the noblemen are bold enough to "speak home" to Macbeth?
22. In scene iv. should Macduff's words in line 21 be pronounced with the ordinary intonation? How about line 23, also?
23. How many of the Scotch noblemen do you take it are going to be absent from the crowning?
24. Has Macduff a point in saying "things well done" instead of "good things done" in line 37 of scene iv.?
25. How do you like Macduff? Point out the 'effects' by which you are brought to your opinion of him.
26. Is Macduff later on to play a part of any special prominence?
27. Why, then, should Shakespeare have characterized him so fully here — why, indeed, at all?
28. Are there any indications in scene iii. that Banquo understands the situation?

ACT III.

- Scene I.** — 1. Has Macbeth met his nobles formally, as king, before?
2. In such a violent change of administration, can he be sure of the fidelity of his nobles? Why?
 3. Then what has this banquet been prepared for?

4. What does he expect to determine by this banquet, and on what principle?

5. Is there anything in Banquo's dress or equipment that prompts Macbeth's question in line 18?

Scene II. — 1. Is it probable that Lady Macbeth understands the object of the banquet as well as her husband?

2. Why should she then be so anxious concerning Banquo's whereabouts?

3. If the servant had replied, 'Nay, Madam, he remains here to-night,' would she probably have asked for the king?

4. Would she have made the lament following?

5. Would she have hinted, as here in line 38?

6. What, then, was her object in asking for the king?

7. Have Macbeth and his wife come to the same determination concerning Banquo independently?

8. Do you now see any reason for her silence in the first part of scene i.?

Scene III. — 1. At the very moment of the murder of Banquo is the scene illumined?

2. Do you, then, see Banquo's dead and bleeding body?

3. Do you, then, think this scene might have been made more effective? How?

4. What makes a situation intense either in life or in a play — the definitely known or the imaginative unknown?

5. Which generally gives your imagination most scope — definite particulars or hints only? Why?

6. Which, then, would have been most effective — to see Banquo's dead body with certain definite wounds, or to see splashes of his blood all over the murderers' face and clothes? Which would be by way of the 'effect'?

7. Which method does Shakespeare employ?

8. That this method may be successful, will it do to permit any doubt as to the identity of the blood we see? (Sc. iv.)

9. How is this contingency provided for?

10. Has the same art-expedient been used before in this play?

11. Scene iv., line 80. Would hired assassins be likely thus to mutilate their victim for spite?

12. Was it these blows that caused Banquo's death?
13. Which murderer do you think inflicted these unnecessary gashes?

Scene IV. — 1. At the opening of Act III., did you feel any degree of satisfaction that Macbeth had at last come into the estate marked out for him?

2. Did you anticipate for Macbeth any trouble beyond possibly some difficulty in getting himself established firmly as king?

3. Then how did Lady Macbeth's incidental revelation in scene ii., lines 8 and 9, affect you?

4. Is Lady Macbeth, according to lines 4 to 7 of scene ii., enjoying her queenship?

5. What in scene i. corresponds to this lament of scene ii.?

6. Do you know at once what it is that causes Macbeth thus to, "keep alone"?

7. How soon and from whose lips do you learn? Is this another surprise?

8. From line 18, scene ii., what prediction is being fulfilled?

9. Do you now see why Macbeth should be uncertain in scene i., line 73, when he last spoke with the murderers? Is this a cause of surprise?

10. What particular things (scene ii.) does Macbeth say he fears?

11. To what extent do you think his wholesale suspicions justified? Was Banquo, for instance, plotting at the opening of scene i.?

12. Which has changed — the attitude of the world toward Macbeth, or Macbeth's attitude toward the world?

13. What does Lady Macbeth know, that she should exhort her husband (ii. 28) to be bright and jovial *to-night*? Is this another revelation?

14. Would Macbeth's terror at the ghost's appearance be so intense if his mind had not been to a degree weakened by previous sleeplessness and suffering?

15. Point out the preliminaries to this scene.

16. Are these preliminaries direct representations or 'effects'?

17. What part of this ghost has Shakespeare intended we shall see — the uncovered breast, for instance?

18. And how is this to appear?

19. Why, then, should Shakespeare have made Macbeth inflict the twenty gashes *on the head*?

20. What does Ross expect to get as answer to his question in line 116?
21. Why then did Lady Macbeth hurry everybody out?
22. Does Macbeth show signs in lines 130 to 140 of retreat in his course of blood?
23. Banquo is gone; whom does Macbeth succeed in finding for his next victim?
24. What convenient excuse does he presently hit upon? Does he really in his heart believe that it is sufficient?
25. Are you pleased at the prospect that this man especially is to suffer next?
26. Were you decidedly opposed to the projected taking off of Banquo at the opening of this act?
27. If you have experienced any difference of feeling in these two cases, where and when was the change effected?

Scene VI. — 1. Are Lennox's remarks noteworthy for any quality?

2. At the end of Act II. was any one similarly bold?
3. Who has shown himself more bold, Lennox or Macduff?
4. Yet what did Macduff feel obliged to do on account of that boldness?
5. Does Lennox feel at all concerned about the consequences of his bold speech?
6. What does this indicate in regard to a change of public sentiment in Scotland?
7. Just what has caused that change?
8. Is there any similar change in your own feelings?
9. Does Shakespeare anywhere indicate like changes of sentiment before the audience has experienced the same change?
10. What effect, pleasing or other, is produced by seeing a representation of what we wish to see represented?

ACT IV.

Scene I. — 1. Do these apparitions deal with the present, the past, or the future?

2. Do, then, the apparitions themselves represent the present, the past, or the future?
3. Is the first apparition a *living* head? Is it attached to any body?

4. Is such an object in the nature of things ominous or auspicious?
5. What future event does this apparition represent?
6. Why, then, should the witch cut Macbeth's questions off so short?
7. What physiological marvel does the second apparition deal with in its words?
8. Why, then, should the apparition be a child, and why especially bloody?
9. Whom does this apparition represent?
10. Who is the only immature "issue of a king," destined to wear "the round and top of sovereignty," that we have seen in this play?
11. Is this individual really a child?
12. Is the representation of the future King of Scotland as a child with a crown on its head very complimentary?
13. Do you think Shakespeare intended satire here?
14. What is Macbeth's determination after the second apparition has spoken?
15. But what does Lennox soon after inform him?
16. If his purpose is anticipated, why does he not let it go, — why proceed against the wife and children?
17. Do you think his purpose was what he tries to make himself believe, — allowable protection against Macduff?
18. If he is actuated by something else, what is that something?

Scene II. — 1. What has Ross evidently just told Lady Macduff?

2. Is her husband's flight comprehensible to her?
3. What does Ross hint is her knowledge of the situation in Scotland?
4. How far is Macduff's castle from the court?
5. Does Lady Macduff think there is any danger? Does she understand how there could be any danger?
6. Does this indicate blindness to whatever causes of fear there may be, or absence of any real cause of fear?
7. Do you think Macbeth estimates the disposition among his nobles to rebellion at its true strength?
8. Do these considerations support any point raised in the last scene?
9. How does it come that this messenger should be acquainted with Lady Macduff's "state of honor," and be himself unknown to her?

10. Why should he not *know*, or at least say he knew, that danger approached? Is there anything peculiar about his use of the word *doubt*?

11. Why does he use first person in line 69 and not change to third person in line 70? What subject does he have in his mind for "to do"?

12. Why, finally, should he precede the murderers only by a few seconds?

13. Does this support the point above and in the preceding scene?

Scene III. — 1. In lines 11 to 17, what does Malcolm think may be Macduff's purpose?

2. What very good grounds does he give later on for his suspicions?

3. What reason does he give for having such suspicions?

4. Do you, then, take it Macduff is the first arrival from Scotland?

5. Then why in line 160 should Malcolm almost instinctively recognize that Ross is a Scotchman, while Macduff does not?

6. Do you think Malcolm honestly wishes to have only men of integrity and patriotism about him?

7. If Macduff should believe Malcolm's description of himself, and still wish him to be king, what sort of a mind would that indicate?

8. But if Macduff should refuse to have anything to do with him, what sort of mind would that indicate?

9. What, then, is Malcolm's object in libelling himself? Does he attain it?

10. Do you find in Malcolm any of the characteristics of his father?

11. In the doctor-episode how many references do you find to divine things?

12. What class of persons alone have 'divine rights' like these?

13. But what class of persons does Malcolm belong to?

14. To what historical personage does this episode refer?

15. Is Malcolm like him in disposition and character?

16. Yet what was he? Why cannot Malcolm be?

17. Can you tolerate Malcolm as prospective king?

18. Do you think that Shakespeare's sole purpose here was to compliment James?

19. In line 207, what causes Malcolm's exclamation?

ACT V.

Scene I. — 1. Which suffered most at the banquet in Act III Macbeth or his wife? (Compare scene iii.)

2. Which suffers most now?
3. How large an interval of time is to be supposed between that time and this?
4. What psychological change has taken place in each in this interval?
5. Has the murder, then, affected them in the same way?
6. Is this true pathologically, or is it merely a dramatic expedient?

Scene III. — 1. How long in stage time is it since you last saw Macbeth?

2. Are you struck with any change in him as shown by the language he uses?
3. Is this especially surprising to you?
4. Should you have been surprised if you had seen Macbeth at intervals, and watched the coming on of this change?
5. Then why has Shakespeare kept him away so long?
6. But is there any hint to our imagination in the preceding scene that keeps Macbeth alive in our minds?
7. Is there any hint in the first part of the first scene?
8. How many such hints do you find in the last scene of Act IV.?
9. How, then, has Shakespeare prevented our forgetting him entirely during this interval?
10. Does Macbeth's reception of the servant's message indicate belief in the witches?
11. If he believes in the witches, why should he need to "hang those that talk of fear"?
12. Do you think he believes the witches, after all?
13. Then why in his opening paragraph should he *express* such confidence in them? Why also at intervals throughout the scene?
14. Can you now explain why he should be so desperate and vacillating — in regard to his armor, for instance?

Scene IV. — 1. Whom do we recognize here that we have just had come before us in a preceding scene?

2. Where were they then going?

3. Where are they now?
4. What, then, is the purpose of this scene?

Scene V. — 1. Does any one tell Seyton to go and see what the cry means?

2. Does he come back excitedly? Why not?
3. Is any interval to be supposed between scenes iii. and v.?
4. How long, then, between his being summoned in scene iii. and his voluntary going out in scene v.?
5. Where do you suppose he was when (iii. 19) Macbeth called him?
6. Why should he not have come when first called? May he have been waiting for anything to happen?
7. If Macbeth in scene iii. had supposed he was at a distance, would he have been called three times?
8. In view of the points raised in the last questions under scene iii., can you explain why Macbeth should treat the messenger in this scene so roughly?

Scene VII. — 1. What has the audience just seen fulfilled?

2. What remains to be fulfilled?
3. Do we yet know who is to be the fated man not born of woman?
4. When young Siward comes in, do we wonder if he is the one?
5. What is the effect of finding he is not the one?
6. What was Shakespeare's purpose in introducing this episode?

Scene VIII. — 1. Who do we find is that mysterious man 'not born of woman'?

2. How has the author prepared us, on Macduff's side, for this combat?
3. Do we consent that Macduff win? For what reasons?
4. Would you have been pleased to see young Siward win? Why?
5. Could we have been made enthusiastic for Macbeth at the opening of the play if we had not supposed he would be a king of the valorous, romantic sort?
6. Has that expectation been fulfilled?
7. Are we now satisfied to see the throne occupied by a mere Duncan, or son of Duncan?
8. Why?

9. Should we have been content to witness Macbeth's death?
10. Did we consent to see Banquo and Siward slain?
11. Does the fact we were at one time enthusiastic over Macbeth have anything to do with our willingness or unwillingness to see him fall?

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